Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century
Thematic Bibliography no. 2/16

La dissuasion nucléaire au 21ème siècle
Bibliographie thématique no. 2/16
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2016

Title: The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century
Author: Roberts, Brad
Physical Description: x, 340 pages ; 23 cm.
Notes: Includes index.
Notes: This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds: historical, political, and moral. But, the author argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author’s experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
ISBN: 9780804797139
Call Number: 623 /01248
Item ID: 80026078
Media: Book
Collection Type: General Collection

* This list contains material received as of March 31st, 2016.—Cette liste est arrêtée au 31 mars 2016.
Notes: South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region's nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analyzing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia's nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia's nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasize the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.

Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--SOUTH ASIA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--SOUTH ASIA
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--SAFETY MEASURES--SOUTH ASIA
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--SECURITY MEASURES--SOUTH ASIA
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--SOUTH ASIA
ISBN: 9780415494496
Call Number: 623 /01225
Item ID: 80025658
Media: Book
Collection Type: General Collection
The War that Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence

**Notes:** The authors make the case for governments to take urgent steps toward abolishing nuclear weapons. The well-informed contributors to this volume consider the relative costs and benefits of nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament, examining the particular challenges that a shift from deterrence to disarmament would pose in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. All conclude that the path of disarmament is the only safe choice.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

**ISBN:** 9780817918453

**Call Number:** 327.3 /00723

**Item ID:** 80025901

**Media:** Book

**Collection Type:** General Collection

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Vers une erosion du soutien à la dissuasion nucléaire française?

**Author:** Dumoulin, Andre

**Institution:** Institut Royal Superieur de Defense. Centre d'Etudes de Securite et de Defense (BE)

**Published:** Bruxelles : Institut Royal Superieur de Defense, 2015

**Physical Description:** ix, 52 pages ; 29 cm.

**Notes:** Bibliography: p. 49-52.

**Notes:** When highlighting the evolution of French doctrinal questions and the arguments in favour or against France pursuing its nuclear policy, ultimately the question is to determine what swings the balance in the recent legitimization/delegitimation game, given the past doctrinal debates which feature some grey areas regarding small nuclear charges.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

**Call Number:** 623 /01239

**Item ID:** 80025962

**Media:** Book

**Collection Type:** General Collection

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The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond

**Additional Author:** Von Hlatky, Stefanie, 1982- , ed.

**Additional Author:** Wenger, Andreas, ed.

**Published:** Washington : Georgetown University Press, 2015

**Physical Description:** xv, 259 pages ; 23 cm.

**Notes:** Bibliography: p. 225-249. Includes index.

**Notes:** This book is about the present and future of US extended deterrence commitments in the NATO alliance. NATO is a mutual security treaty backed by the full range of US and allied military capabilities, and the hope has always been that by extending this military umbrella, especially nuclear weapons, adversaries would be deterred from attacking allied countries. Extended deterrence in NATO has been enormously successful, but today its commitments are strained by military budget cuts, anti-nuclear sentiment, and the US shift away from European security during the 2000s and more recently with the Asia pivot. The resurgence of Russia, however, has at least temporarily reinvigorated NATO and made extended deterrence commitments seem more important but also more risky. This book engages in a cross-sector intellectual exercise, bringing together experts from academia, think tanks and the policy world from the United States, Canada, and Europe to assess the future of US-NATO extended deterrence for regional and international security. The volume also tackles important and controversial debates about the role of nuclear weapons and missile defense, as backbone capabilities in support of extended deterrence.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO

**Subject:** NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA

**Subject:** NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--NATO

**ISBN:** 9781626162655

**Call Number:** 623 /01245
Title: Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the 21st Century
Author: O'Neil, Andrew
Published: Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013
Physical Description: xii, 176 pages; 24 cm.
Notes: Bibliography: p. 153-170. Includes index. 'Since the end of the Cold War, significant attention has focused on the issue of nuclear deterrence and in particular whether formal nuclear security guarantees from nuclear weapons states to non-nuclear weapons states involving the possible use of nuclear weapons have a place in the twenty-first century global strategic landscape. Growing support for nuclear disarmament in the US and elsewhere has seen serious doubts being raised about the ongoing utility of extended nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first detailed analysis of the way in which extended nuclear deterrence operates in contemporary Asia. It addresses the following key questions: What does the role of extended nuclear deterrence in Asia tell us about the broader role of extended nuclear deterrence in the contemporary international system? Is this role likely to change significantly in the years ahead? The author uses a theoretical and historical framework to analyse the contemporary and future dynamics of extended nuclear deterrence in Asia and challenges many of the existing orthodox perspectives on the topic.'
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--ASIA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: ASIA--MILITARY RELATIONS--USA
Subject: USA--MILITARY RELATIONS--ASIA
ISBN: 9780415644938
Call Number: 623 /01173
Item ID: 80024846
Media: Book
Collection Type: General Collection

Title: Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations
Additional Author: Colby, Elbridge A., ed.
Additional Author: Gerson, Michael S., ed.
Institution: US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Published: Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2013
Physical Description: viii, 440 p.; 23 cm.
Subject: BALANCE OF POWER
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Subject: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Subject: ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
ISBN: 1584875623
Call Number: 623 /01171
Item ID: 80024807
Media: Book
Collection Type: General Collection
Notes: 'There is a broad sense in both Russia and the United States that deep nuclear reductions - a goal endorsed by both governments - would constitute a risky step into the unknown and could undermine international security. However, until now, the reasons behind these concerns - and whether they are justified - have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in both Russia and the United States, this paper maps out these concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence), the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and nuclear multipolarity. Contrary to popular belief, there is evidence against which these fears can be assessed. The practical experience of deterrence at low numbers that was acquired by the Soviet Union and the United States early in the Cold War, as well as by other nuclear-armed states, is highly relevant. Based on this experience and insights from deterrence theory, the paper concludes that most of the challenges associated with low numbers are not really a consequence of arsenal size and, accordingly, that there are good reasons to believe that deep reductions would not undermine international security.'

Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Subject: SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL

ISBN: 9780415681827

Call Number: 327.3 /00688

Item ID: 80023832

Media: Book

Collection Type: General Collection
Notes: 'Michael Quinlan’s grasp of defence policy - particularly that relating to Britain’s deterrence posture - was second to none. His career in the British civil service spanned three decades, during which time he advised various governments, including those of James Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher. He was closely involved in the decision to procure Trident from the United States and, within NATO, in shaping the policies that led to the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles. The letters gathered in this book reveal the industry and thorough consideration that Quinlan gave to his role in government. They also shed light upon complex matters of ethics and morality, which Quinlan took pains to reconcile with his work in Whitehall. What emerges is a portrait of a dedicated and gifted civil servant, who, partly due to his deep Catholic faith and horror of what he referred to as ‘atheistic totalitarianism’, regarded nuclear deterrence as a strategic necessity. But the correspondence also shows how, in his later years, Quinlan began to reassess the costs and benefits of nuclear weapons. Shifting power dynamics and uncertainties over the nuclear future mean that the insights of Michael Quinlan’s career continue to be relevant today.'
2010

Title: Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development, and Implications for South Asian Security
Author: Cheema, Zafar Iqbal
Published: Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010
Physical Description: xxiv, 609 p.; 25 cm.
Notes: Bibliography: p. 569-587. Includes index. 'The significance of this study is that it establishes the fallacy of conventional perspectives on Indian nuclear deterrence - that the Indian nuclear program entailed 'exclusively peaceful uses' during the Nehru era and the development of weapons capability was initiated by the government of Lal Bahadur Shastri after the first Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964. On the contrary, the book provides incontrovertible documentary evidence that Dr. Homi J. Bhabha formulated with Nehru's approval a nuclear weapons development strategy within the structural framework of the Indian civilian nuclear program. Nehru was interested in a nuclear weapons capability for a 'deterrent in extremis'. The central premise of the book is that the BJP government's decision to carry out the May 1998 nuclear tests was not an original one, but a step prefigured in a strategic continuum whose genesis dates back to the late 1950s. It suggests that the declaration of Indian nuclear deterrence after the May 1998 nuclear tests, the weaponization of Indian nuclear capability and the pronouncement of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) were not separate from earlier policies, but instead were part of that strategic continuum. The study analyzes the dynamics of Indian nuclear deterrence, Indian nuclear doctrine, and their implications for South Asian security.'
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--INDIA--HISTORY
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--SOUTH ASIA
ISBN: 9780195979039
Call Number: 623 /01124
Item ID: 80023670
Media: Book
Collection Type: General Collection

2009

Title: The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons
Author: Paul, T. V.
Published: Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009
Physical Description: viii, 319 p.; 24 cm.
Notes: Bibliography: p. 277-304. Includes index. 'This book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the US, Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behaviour of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.'
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY
Subject: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--GOVERNMENT POLICY
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
Subject: NUCLEAR WARFARE--PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
ISBN: 9780804761314
Call Number: 623 /01086
Item ID: 80022641
Media: Book
Collection Type: General Collection
**2008**

**Title:** Thinking Beyond the Unthinkable : Harnessing Doom from the Cold War to the Age of Terror  
**Author:** Stevenson, Jonathan, 1956-  
**Published:** New York : Viking, 2008  
**Physical Description:** 302 p.; 24 cm.  
**Notes:** Includes index. 'September 11 was a product of bad intelligence and wrongheaded expectations about al-Qaeda's motivations, intentions, resourcefulness, and capabilities. But it also sprang from a failure of the kind of predictive strategic deliberation that had kept the world from becoming atomic rubble in the fifties and sixties. What was it about the strategic thinking of the Cold War era that we got right? The short answer is that deterrence had worked: the prospect of nuclear devastation made its avoidance the undisputed top priority for both Washington and Moscow. At the same time, the rank unacceptability of Soviet communism to Americans and American democratic capitalism to Soviets made each side view the other as the consuming foe that dwarfed all others. The author illuminates the genius of nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD), as well as the blind spots that limited the great Cold War civilian strategists' intellectual fertility and flexibility.'  
**Subject:** STRATEGY  
**Subject:** NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA  
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA  
**Subject:** COLD WAR  
**Subject:** WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009  
**ISBN:** 9780670019014  
**Call Number:** 355.4 /01597  
**Item ID:** 80022546  
**Media:** Book  
**Collection Type:** General Collection

**2007**

**Title:** The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship : Theories of Deterrence and International Relations  
**Additional Author:** Sridharan, Eswaran, ed.  
**Published:** Abingdon, UK : Routledge, 2007  
**Physical Description:** 326 p.; 23 cm.  
**Notes:** Includes index. 'In the aftermath of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, followed by the outbreak of fighting in Kargil in 1999, full mobilization on the border in 2001-02, and a continuing separatist insurgency and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, conflict resolution and promotion of regional cooperation in South Asia has assumed a new urgency. This book argues that while short-term solutions and military and non-military confidence building measures are necessary to prevent the outbreak of war by accident or miscalculation, there is a need to go far beyond this. In this way, the book is a departure from most other works which are essentially analytical histories. It is not about the motivations and driving forces of the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. Rather, it is about the explanatory power of the theories of nuclear deterrence and international relations in explaining India's and Pakistan's nuclear behaviour. As the contributors demonstrate, we must begin to conceptually think through the longer-term difficulties in stabilizing the deterrence relationship between the two countries as a first step towards comprehensive conflict resolution and lasting peace.'  
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA  
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN  
**Subject:** INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--PAKISTAN  
**Subject:** PAKISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA  
**ISBN:** 0415424089  
**Call Number:** 623 /01046  
**Item ID:** 80021321  
**Media:** Book  
**Collection Type:** General Collection
Title: The United Kingdom's Independent Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Observations on the 2006 White Paper and Issues for the Parliamentary Debate

Author: Codner, Michael

Additional Author: Ireland, Gavin

Additional Author: Willett, Lee

Institution: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (GB)

Published: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2007

Physical Description: vii, 17 p.; 30 cm.

In: Whitehall Report: 1-07

Notes: 'This report has been produced in response to the United Kingdom Government’s White Paper on the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent, published in December 2006. The authors explore here what they consider to be the principal issues that should form the basis for discussion during the consultation period and the Parliamentary debate. In focusing on what they consider to be the substance of an appropriate debate, the authors’ aim is not one of advocacy either for or against retention of Britain’s nuclear deterrent, but of informing the Parliamentary debate in a way that is accessible to the British electorate, whose views should be represented on the floors of the Houses of Parliament. In this way, a well-informed nation should directly influence development and implementation of Government policy in this hugely important matter over the next decade. During this period, further decisions will be required before the bulk of procurement money is actually committed, at which stage, the decision will be binding.'

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN

Call Number: 623 /01040

Item ID: 80021282

Media: Book

Collection Type: General Collection

Title: The United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence

Author: Stocker, Jeremy

Institution: International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)

Published: Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007

Physical Description: 99 p.; 24 cm.

In: Adelphi Paper; 386

Notes: 'In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing GBP 15-20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with nonproliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government’s decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.'

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN

Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GREAT BRITAIN

Subject: TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)

ISBN: 9780415438346

Call Number: 623 /01038

Item ID: 80021226

Media: Book

Collection Type: General Collection
2006

Title: Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation
Author: Arbatov, Aleksei Georgievich
Additional Author: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (US)
Additional Author: Dvorkin, Vladimir
Physical Description: xi, 188 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
Notes: Includes index. 'This book argues for more extensive security accommodation between Russia and the United States, beginning with a transformation of the legacy deterrent relationship. The authors suggest that the predominant common interest in the new political situation is to establish more robust protection against the potential diversion or misuse of nuclear weapons - an interest that is seriously undermined by current operational practices and could only be achieved through direct collaboration. To establish the foundation for mutually beneficial collaboration, they argue for explicit termination of the deterrent policy, and they advance a series of specific recommendations as to how that could be accomplished. Those recommendations feature extensive reduction and deactivation of Russian and US offensive forces, integration of the early warning systems, and joint efforts to establish global stabilization measures.'
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USSR
ISBN: 0870032275
Call Number: 623 /01029
Item ID: 80021060
Media: Book
Collection Type: General Collection

2004

Title: Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice
Additional Author: Sokolski, Henry D., ed.
Institution: US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Published: Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2004
Physical Description: vii, 361 p.; 23 cm.
Notes: 'This is the first critical history of the intellectual roots and actual application of the strategic doctrine of nuclear mutual assured destruction or MAD. Written by the world’s leading French, British, and American military policy planners and analysts, this volume examines how MAD and its emphasis on the military targeting of population centers influenced the operational plans of the major nuclear powers and states, such as Pakistan, India, and Israel. Given America’s efforts to move away from MAD and the continued reliance on MAD thinking by smaller nations to help justify further nuclear proliferation, this book is a timely must read for anyone eager to understand our nuclear past and future.'
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Subject: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
ISBN: 1584871725
Call Number: 623 /00990
Item ID: 80019895
Link: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=585
Media: Book
Collection Type: General Collection
During the Cold War deterrence and treaties based on nuclear overkill coupled with national vulnerability proved to be a winning strategy. However, with growing threats posed by terrorism, proliferation, and asymmetric warfare and with bad actors seeking weapons of mass destruction, it is time for a new strategy. The Bush administration has rightly rejected the Cold War strategic concept of Mutual Assured Destruction or MAD, but what will replace it? Some seek to strengthen national security by significantly boosting defense spending, deploying missile defenses, withdrawing from treaties and, when necessary, carrying out preemptive strikes against those seeking mass casualty weapons. In this book the author argues that this unbalanced approach will not make the United States safer. Success in countering proliferation and asymmetric threats requires strong nonproliferation and disarmament treaty regimes as well as superior US firepower. Success also requires closer cooperation with Russia and China, which will not be possible if the United States seeks to weaponize space or to negate their nuclear deterrents. America now needs missile defenses keyed to proliferation threats, and more far-reaching, collaborative programs to prevent dangerous weapons and materials from falling into the wrong hands. These cooperative threat reductions programs have become central to securing future military, diplomatic, and arms control triumphs. The way to a safer future lies in replacing MAD with cooperative threat reduction.

Subject: COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
Subject: ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION
Subject: USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
ISBN: 0312295561
Call Number: 327.3 /00630
Item ID: 80019066
Media: Book
Collection Type: General Collection

At the end of the Cold War, the nuclear arms had seen its role and its existence even profoundly questioned. The massive reductions of arsenals and the undeniable successes of the counter-proliferation campaign during the first years of the 1990s have even made the hypothesis of a world less and less nuclear, even, in the long term, nuclear-free. Today, the strategic realities present a much darker picture: the risks of the use of mass destruction weapons in regional crises have increased, the disarmament process and the non-proliferation regime are in crisis, and the projects of antiballistic defense risk revolutionizing the strategic equation. If one adds to this the uncertainties surrounding Russian nuclear policy as well as the precariousness of the situation in Asia, it is clear that the nuclear landscape is currently not only more complex, but also, in many respects, more unstable and therefore more dangerous than during the Cold War. In Europe, where the marginalization of nuclear weapons was particularly strong in the last ten years, this reality was long underestimated, if not ignored. It is above all American ambitions in the field of antiballistic defense that return today to the Europeans that nuclear issues remain relevant. Given the potential consequences on international relations and strategic issues, the project of the (National) Missile Defence raises a debate of nuclear magnitude that Europe cannot afford to abstain from. In order to make their voices heard in this debate, the members of the Union must think and act together. This requires intense consultation on all nuclear issues, from disarmament to deterrence, passing through non-proliferation and antiballistic defense. Proposing a common approach in these domains could seem unrealistic given the nuclear factor that has traditionally divided the Europeans. Nevertheless, upon closer inspection, there is a degree of convergence among the Fifteen that would allow cooperation even on sensitive issues. Without going to the extreme of 'concerted deterrence', a line that has been limited and provocative, the Europeans should treat nuclear issues in the PESC/PESD. It is only by using the European Union as a forum for consultation and action that they can assume their responsibilities in this key area of international security.
The Price of Dominance: The New Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership

Lodal, Jan, 1943-


xviii, 145 p.; 23 cm.

According to this book, the emergence of new nuclear, biological, and chemical threats is a price America pays for its growing military, economic, and cultural dominance. U.S. preeminence motivates states to oppose American power through whatever means possible, and the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has become more acute as globalization makes it easier for rogue states and terrorists to obtain the necessary technology. This book argues that the WMD threat can be stopped only with the active cooperation of other states - especially U.N. Security Council members Russia, China, and France - but U.S. policies are actually undermining international support. To gain their cooperation, the United States will have to change its approach to arms control negotiations, antiballistic missile defenses, intelligence, law enforcement, military strategies, and nuclear force deployments. The first step should be to abandon 'prompt retaliatory' nuclear war plans left over from the Cold War that no longer serve any strategic purpose. If these plans are maintained while limited antiballistic missile defenses are deployed, they will give the United States a de facto nuclear first-strike capability and absolute military dominance. Retaining such a capability would make it possible to obtain the intelligence and law enforcement cooperation necessary to stop WMD proliferation. This book recommends an integrated program to foster international cooperation to stop WMD proliferation while retaining strong nuclear deterrence as the foundation of American security strategy.

The central organizing principle of strategic arms control during the Cold War was to prevent a nuclear exchange by being vulnerable to its consequences. The core principle of assured destruction (Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD) was more than a fact of Cold War life; it was codified by treaties permitting huge offensive nuclear arsenals while expressly prohibiting national missile defenses. President Bush now seeks to set Cold War thinking aside and to replace MAD with a more affirmative construct. Unlike MAD, the strategic concept of cooperative threat reduction is affirmative. It strengthens both strategic arms reduction and non-proliferation accords. It is sufficiently adaptive to deal with the wide range of threats facing America, and it has enjoyed broad, bipartisan support. It is now incumbent on the Bush administration to put forward a positive strategic concept alongside deterrence, one that will reduce the severe threats posed by terrorism and asymmetric warfare that the country now faces. It is also incumbent on the Bush administration to fully fund and expand cooperative threat-reduction programs.
Massive reductions in nuclear arsenals and the undeniable success of the fight against proliferation during the early 1990s opened up the prospect of a world with increasingly fewer nuclear weapons, or even, in time, none at all. Today's strategic realities appear much more sombre: the risks of use of weapons of mass destruction in regional crises are increasing, the disarmament process and the non-proliferation regime are in a serious state and anti-missile defences could revolutionise the strategic equation. If to that one adds uncertainties over Russian nuclear policy and the precarious situation in Asia, one is bound to conclude that the nuclear landscape is more complex, more unstable and therefore more dangerous now than during the Cold War. In Europe, where the marginalisation of nuclear weapons has been particularly pronounced during the last then years, this reality was for long underestimated or even ignored. It is above all American ambitions in the field on anti-missile defence that today remind Europeans that nuclear issues are still relevant. Because of its potential consequences for international and strategic relations, US plans for a (National) Missile Defence (NMD) have sparked off a new nuclear debate that is much too important for Europe not to participate in it. If they are to make their voices heard in this debate, the members of the Union will have to act jointly. That presupposes intense reflection on all nuclear issues, from disarmament to deterrence and including non-proliferation and anti-missile defence. Proposing a joint approach in these areas may seem unrealistic, given that nuclear issues have traditionally been something that has divided the Europeans. None the less, on close examination one sees a degree of convergence among the Fifteen that should allow them to cooperate even on questions as sensitive as these. Without going back to the idea of 'concerted deterrence', which is both too limited and provocative, the Europeans should tackle nuclear questions within the CFSP/ESDP. It is only by using the European Union as a framework for concerted action that they will be able to assume fully their responsibilities in this key sector of international security.
Title: Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age
Author: Ayson, Robert
Additional Author: Leah, Christine M.
Notes: While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.
Subject: GUIDED MISSILES
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Item ID: JA030940
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.895329
Media: Article

Title: Winter-Safe Deterrence : The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence
Author: Baum, Seth D.
Notes: A new line of nuclear winter research shows that even small, regional nuclear wars could have catastrophic global consequences. However, major disarmament to avoid nuclear winter goes against the reasons nuclear weapon states have for keeping their weapons in the first place, in particular deterrence. To reconcile these conflicting aims, this paper develops the concept of winter-safe deterrence, defined as military force capable of meeting the deterrence goals of today's nuclear weapon states without risking catastrophic nuclear winter. This paper analyses nuclear winter risk, finding a winter-safe limit of about 50 nuclear weapons total worldwide. This paper then evaluates a variety of candidate weapons for winter-safe deterrence. Non-contagious biological weapons (such as anthrax or ricin), neutron bombs detonated at altitude, and nuclear electromagnetic weapons show the most promise. Each weapon has downsides, and the paper's analysis is only tentative, but winter-safe deterrence does appear both feasible and desirable given the urgency of nuclear winter risk.
Subject: NUCLEAR WINTER
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA030959
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2015.1012346
Media: Article

* This list contains material received as of March 31st, 2016.— Cette liste est arrêtée au 31 mars 2016.
Anticipatory attacks come in two forms. Preemptive attacks are first strikes based on the assumption that the opponent has already set an attack in motion or is about to, and the purpose of the preemption is to mitigate or neutralize the effect of the enemy’s move. Preventive wars, on the other hand, are undertaken to preclude a threatening power from increasing its capabilities relative to ours, assuming that smaller differences in power will lead the challenger to become more risk acceptant. With respect to nuclear weapons, deterrence is intended to preclude both preemptive and preventive attacks, although the former is judged to be more likely than the latter. Leaders authorizing a nuclear preemption would need to have high confidence about the intentions as well as the capabilities of the other state, and the requirements for fine-grained intelligence would be considerable, prior to any actual launch of delivery systems. Seeing into the other side’s world view, regardless of its apparent rationality or lack thereof, would also be prudent before undertaking a decision of such magnitude.

Stability has been the holy grail of deterrence strategists since the outset of the US–Soviet nuclear-arms competition. This prize has been elusive because nuclear weapons are not stabilising. The U.S. nuclear umbrella is predominantly designed to deter attacks against treaty allies, but may not be finely tuned enough to engage either potential conflicts around island disputes or a potential challenger who is not a full-blown adversary. Here’s why and what can be done about it.

The contemporary multipolar nuclear order is more complex and unnerving to many US allies. To fully assure its two Northeast Asia treaty allies, the United States must convince Japan and South Korea that extended deterrence works simultaneously for multiple nuclear-armed adversaries through a handful of key challenges and opportunities.
Title: Deterrence with Dominance: Discouraging Chinese Adventurism under Austerity
Author: Heginbotham, Eric
Additional Author: Heim, Jacob L.
Notes: U.S. force posture in Asia does not address the primary challenges we face today. Neither would offshore balancing nor dominance, but a new strategy - active denial - would do more to assure U.S. partners with a more resilient, cost-effective forward presence while reducing crisis pre-emption incentives.
Subject: USA--MILITARY RELATIONS--CHINA
Subject: CHINA--MILITARY RELATIONS--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--EAST ASIA
Item ID: JA031185
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1038189
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence at Three: US, UK and French Nuclear Cooperation
Author: Lewis, Jeffrey
Additional Author: Tertrais, Bruno
In: SURVIVAL, vol. 57, no. 4, August - September 2015, p. 29-52.
Notes: Western nuclear deterrence could benefit from closer cooperation ‘at three’. The US, UK and France should take care, however, to do no harm to their existing bilateral relationships.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Item ID: JA031232
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1068554
Media: Article

Title: Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance: A Prudent Alternative to Minimum Deterrence
In: COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 34, no. 3, July - August 2015, Special Issue.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA031277
Link: http://atoz.ebsco.com/Titles/SearchResults/7806?SearchType=1&Find=comparative+strategy&GetResourcesBy=QuickSearch&resourceTypeName=allTitles&resourceType=&RadioButtonChanged=
Media: Article

Title: Trident Replacement and UK Nuclear-Deterrence Requirements in an Uncertain Future
Author: Futter, Andrew
Notes: A decision to replace Trident with a like-for-like system will see the UK remain in the nuclear-weapons business well into the second half of this century, but it is far from clear that reliance on a small, retaliatory nuclear capability for deterrence would be the best approach to an increasingly complex future nuclear-threat landscape. The author argues that the requirements of deterrence are perhaps more blurred today than at any point in the nuclear age – a situation only likely to get worse. A more holistic and long-term view of UK nuclear policy is needed, with greater consideration given to how techno-military, strategic and, to a lesser extent, political-normative developments are likely to alter, if not transform, the nature of the future deterrence environment.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Item ID: JA031441
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1102548
Media: Article
Title: Time to Come in from the Cold (War) : Nuclear Force Structure for an Uncertain World
Author: Turnbull, Wallace R.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA031429
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence and Arms Control in a Second Conventional Age
Author: Leah, Christine M.
In: COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 34, no. 5, November - December 2015, p. 401-421.
Notes: Neither further nuclear reductions nor total nuclear disarmament are necessarily smart ideas, but proponents of these goals insist that we should move toward a second conventional age, in which nuclear weapons are either marginalized or completely removed from international politics. But in this world, deterrence and extended deterrence might not endure without boosting aspects of conventional arsenals. How might the U.S. deter adversaries and assure allies? The answer ultimately rests on conventional forces, especially long-range ballistic and cruise missiles. But these would have to be deployed in greater numbers to compensate for a 'nuclear gap'. This might lead to a destabilizing arms race.
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Subject: CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA031538
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2015.1089122
Media: Article

Title: Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age
Author: Ayson, Robert
Additional Author: Leah, Christine M.
Notes: While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Subject: GUIDED MISSILES
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Item ID: JA030795
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.895329
Media: Article
Pakistan’s Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution to an Exaggerated Threat

Author: Sankaran, Jaganath


Notes: Pakistan has introduced a new battlefield nuclear weapon, Nasr, into its arsenal. Nasr, a short-range ballistic missile, was first flight-tested in 2011. Pakistani leaders have declared that the weapon is meant to deter India from executing its Cold Start war doctrine. The doctrine was conceived by members of India’s army and its strategic community in 2004 as a solution to perceived operational shortcomings of the army in responding to major terrorist incidents involving Pakistanis. It recommends the positioning of smaller army units at the international border with the capability to rapidly invade Pakistan and occupy narrow slices of territory, while denying Pakistan the ability to anticipate the attack and to immediately assemble a counterattack force. The Cold Start war doctrine, however, has since been publicly disavowed by the Indian government, and the Indian army has not reorganized or equipped its troops in a manner consistent with the doctrine. Further, the use of battlefield nuclear weapons inside Pakistan or near the densely populated border regions could potentially cause civilian casualties in the tens of thousands. These factors should dissuade Pakistan from deploying the Nasr missile.

Subject: GUIDED MISSILES--PAKISTAN

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA

Item ID: JA030916

Link: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00191

Media: Article

Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia

Author: Adamsky, Dima


Notes: Russian reliance on its non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been an ongoing concern for security experts. What is the Russian de facto employment doctrine for this arsenal? This article argues that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) have no defined mission and no deterrence framework has been elaborated for them. This study disentangles Russian thoughts and deeds about regional nuclear deterrence and the role of NSNW in it. Situating the Russian case in the comparative context, the article argues that establishing a coherent theater nuclear posture and streamlining it with the national level deterrence strategy is a demanding and frequently unfulfilled task. It is likely to remain as such for both current and prospective nuclear states that consider an asymmetrical deterrence posture.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

Item ID: JA030087

Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.798583

Media: Article

Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence


Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

Item ID: JA030128

Link: http://atoz.ebsco.com/Titles/SearchResults/7806?SearchType=2&Find=comparative+strategy&GetResourcesBy=QuickSearch&resourceTypeName=journalsOnly&resourceType=1&radioButtonChanged=

Media: Article
Le retour de la bataille ?

**Title:** Le retour de la bataille ?

**Author:** Paris, Henri

**In:** REVUE DEFENSE NATIONALE, no. 770, mai 2014, p. 75-80.

**Notes:** L'auteur voit dans la defense antimissile balistique, devenue assez efficace pour neutraliser partiellement la frappe nucléaire stratégique, un pendant nécessaire de la dissuasion. Il imagine que le couple ainsi forme va progressivement libérer de l'espace militaire pour la bataille conventionnelle entre forces organisées, annonçant ainsi le retour aux fondamentaux de la guerre de toujours.

**Subject:** BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

**Item ID:** JA030261

**Media:** Article

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The Least Bad Option ? Extending the Nuclear Umbrella to the Middle East

**Title:** The Least Bad Option ? Extending the Nuclear Umbrella to the Middle East

**Author:** Saunders, Emily Cura

**Additional Author:** Fearey, Bryan L.

**In:** COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 33, no. 2, April - June 2014, p. 177-188.

**Notes:** This article examines the merits of extending the U.S. nuclear deterrent to the Middle East. It begins by looking at past practices of such an extension before delving into the overall issues presented by providing such a security guarantee. This article then looks at a brief survey of some of the regional issues facing a nuclear extension before considering the P-5 states and their concerns.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--MIDDLE EAST

**Subject:** USA--MILITARY RELATIONS--MIDDLE EAST

**Subject:** MIDDLE EAST--MILITARY RELATIONS--USA

**Item ID:** JA030323

**Link:** [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2014.897117](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2014.897117)

**Media:** Article

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India's Submarine Deterrent and Asian Nuclear Proliferation

**Title:** India's Submarine Deterrent and Asian Nuclear Proliferation

**Author:** Joshi, Yogesh

**Additional Author:** O'Donnell, Frank

**In:** SURVIVAL, vol. 56, no. 4, August - September 2014, p. 157-174.

**Notes:** New Delhi's plans for nuclear-armed submarines could undermine efforts to restrict fissile materials, and set off a naval arms race.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA

**Subject:** NUCLEAR SUBMARINES--INDIA

**Subject:** NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA

**Item ID:** JA030409

**Link:** [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.941574](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.941574)

**Media:** Article

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Pakistan's Nasr/Hatf-IX Missile : Challenges for Indo-Pak Deterrence

**Title:** Pakistan's Nasr/Hatf-IX Missile : Challenges for Indo-Pak Deterrence

**Author:** Vishwanathan, Arun

**In:** STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, vol. 38, no. 4, July - August 2014, p. 444-448.

**Subject:** GUIDED MISSILES--PAKISTAN

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA

**Item ID:** JA030486

**Link:** [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.918420](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.918420)

**Media:** Article
Notes: The 100th anniversary of World War I is a reminder of the risks of great power politics. The current dynamics of world politics rest on the relations among the US, China, Russia and India, and their interlocking relations with friends and enemies in a region that extends from the Gulf to the Japanese archipelago. A naval and nuclear arms race is underway that reflects these complex relationships. One of the numerous disputes could spread conflict across the whole region. This risk includes the nuclear factor. A three-pronged effort including political détente, arms control and nuclear disarmament is needed to defuse these dangers, which will otherwise continue to grow.

Title: La dissuasion : un heritage pour l'avenir
Author: Esper, Philippe
Notes: Après la présentation confidentielle des enjeux du nucléaire qui fut faite au général de Gaulle, il y a soixante-dix ans, le bilan de la IVe et de la Ve Républiques fait apparaître l'efficacité du nucléaire français tant pour l'énergie que pour la force de dissuasion. La gestion conduite par les dirigeants de notre defense conduit aujourd'hui à leur accorder confiance quant à leur capacité de développer une dissuasion crédible au-dessus du seuil 'de stricte suffisance', s'ils parviennent à enrayer la dérive progressive des budgets. Une telle politique n'est pas contraire à la recherche de solidarités européennes, techniques et operationnelles. Comme ses prédécesseurs, l'actuel président de la République a montré son attachement à notre outil de dissuasion. Il est souhaitable qu'il s'exprime publiquement à son sujet.

Title: Minimum Deterrence and Russian and Chinese Threat Developments
Author: Schneider, Mark
Notes: Minimum Deterrence advocates, such as the Global ZERO report chaired by retired General James Cartwright, often urge the elimination of the U.S. triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers and minimum modernization of U.S. nuclear forces. These recommendations ignore fundamental realities. Both Russia and China have announced that they intend to increase their nuclear forces and both are modernizing their forces. Russia and China regard the U.S. as their main enemy and are arming against us. The Minimum Deterrence assumption that there is no risk of a conflict between the U.S. and Russia or China is a dangerous one. Both Russia and China have significant territorial claims against their neighbors. Russian claims to the Arctic Ocean and Chinese claims over the South China Sea are particularly troubling. China continues to threaten war over Taiwan. China has increasingly used military might to support its territorial claims in the South China Sea, creating incidents that have the potential to escalate into war. The most fundamental problem with Minimum Deterrence is that it intentionally degrades our deterrence of nuclear or other WMD attack, as well as our ability to deter nuclear escalation in a situation where the U.S. provides allies a credible nuclear umbrella. U.S. failure to provide a credible nuclear umbrella could result in Japan and, possibly other nations, deciding to go nuclear in order to protect themselves.
Title: Cyber War and Deterrence Stability: Post-START Nuclear Arms Control  
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.  
Notes: Nuclear deterrence and cyber war are often discussed as separate worlds of research and military-strategic practice. To the contrary, a certain degree of overlap between nuclear deterrence and cyber conflicts is a plausible expectation for several reasons. First, future deterrent challenges will include regional nuclear arms races accompanied by competition in information technology and other aspects of advanced conventional command-control and precision strike systems. Second, cyber-attacks may be used against opposed nuclear command-control systems and weapons platforms as well as against infrastructure for the purpose of mass disruption during a crisis or war. Third, cyber capabilities support escalation dominance or escalation control, depending on the objectives of states and on the transparency of identification for cyber friends and foes.  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE  
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
Subject: INFORMATION WARFARE  
Item ID: JA030516  
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2014.926727  
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence with China: Avoiding Nuclear Miscalculation  
Author: Forman, David S.  
In: JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 75, 2014, p. 34-42.  
Notes: This article analyzes nuclear deterrence principles with China across the spectrum of peacetime, conventional crisis or conflict, and nuclear war. If the United States finds itself in a crisis or conflict with China, it would be important to know how the United States achieved deterrence in peacetime as well as how deterrence might be regained if a crisis deteriorates to the point of involving nuclear weapons. The article then makes recommendations on how to enhance nuclear deterrence. By assessing the full spectrum of potential conflict in this manner, the United States can lower the risk of miscalculation.  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA  
Subject: USA--MILITARY RELATIONS--CHINA  
Subject: CHINA--MILITARY RELATIONS--USA  
Item ID: JA030547  
Media: Article

Title: North Korea, Deterrence, and Engagement  
Author: Gaertner, Heinz  
Notes: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) justifies its nuclear weapon arsenal with the concept of deterrence. It means that it will try to miniaturize and modernize its warheads and missiles. This leads to a first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons. Obama's policy of engagement does not offer a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as yet. In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the European Union has three key interests: regional peace and stability, denuclearization, and human rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) could be a precedent. The CSCE process was based on three 'baskets' : security, economics, and humanitarian. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step in this regard. This article looks at three theoretical approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internationalism. It concludes that a political strategy to create a stable North Korean peninsula has to go beyond nuclear deterrence that is based on the realist notion of balance of power.  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--KOREA (NORTH)  
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--KOREA (NORTH)  
Item ID: JA030688  
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2014.950464  
Media: Article
Notes: The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is a worldwide system for detecting illicit radiological or nuclear (R/N) material and R/N weapons. The technical and nontechnical detection capabilities of the architecture can contribute to the deterrence of nuclear terrorism by increasing the risks and costs of mounting an R/N attack. Risks include the danger of one or more encounters with elements of the architecture, uncertainties about the locations and other characteristics of detection capabilities, discovery upon encounter with detection capabilities, and attack failure upon discovery. Among the costs are the added manpower, money, materiel, time, and operational difficulties entailed by attempts to evade or defeat detection capabilities. The deterrent effect of the detection architecture - part of a broader effort to counter nuclear terrorism - warrants greater attention and emphasis.

Subject: NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA030756
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2014.962961
Media: Article

Title: Considering Alternative Nuclear Targeting Strategies
Author: Gallagher, Mark A.
Additional Author: Sorice, Justin E.
Notes: The authors construct an analysis framework for nuclear force structure where the ends are deterrence objectives, the ways are viable targeting strategies, and the means are nuclear forces. Deterring adversaries requires both capability and will that convinces them not to act. A country's will is perceived as credible only if the war plans and targeting strategies are consistent with a nuclear power's principles, such as the Just War Doctrine. The United States currently applies a counter-force targeting strategy; however, hardening, mobility, deceptions, and defensive systems continue to challenge the ability to target another's nuclear weapons. Alternative strategies, such as counter-economic (energy, transportation, financial center, or communications) and counter-leadership may be feasible. However, with fewer nuclear weapons, fewer targeting strategies are viable.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA030757
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2014.962964
Media: Article

2013

Title: Certainty of Uncertainty : Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics
Author: Riqiang, Wu
Notes: China's nuclear deterrent relies on so-called 'first strike uncertainty', which means not letting the other side be confident of a completely successful disarming strike. But in order to deter, the uncertainty must be high enough. After reviewing the developmental history of China's nuclear capability and the evolution of Chinese and foreign leaders' perceptions of China's nuclear retaliatory capability, this article identifies the criteria of nuclear deterrence for China and other countries. This research can contribute to Sino-US strategic dialogue and deepening understanding of the security consequences of nuclear proliferation.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--CHINA
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--CHINA
Item ID: JA029589
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.772510
Media: Article
Title: Peut-on se passer du nucléaire ?
Author: Cothier, Philippe
In: REVUE DEFENSE NATIONALE, no. 764, novembre 2013, p. 113-118.
Notes: L'arme nucléaire fait depuis le début partie intégrante de la posture militaire de la France. Soubassement de sa défense, sa détention n'est pas invalidee par les changements stratégiques du monde même si la doctrine qui la sous-tend a vieilli. Critiquer la doctrine de la dissuasion, se dispenser d'en reformuler une, mais conserver l'arme nucléaire contre les incertitudes, telle est la conclusion faite ici par un expert.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--FRANCE
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Item ID: JA029826
Media: Article

Title: Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons ?
Author: Doyle, James E.
Notes: The world must reject the myths and expose the risks of the ideology of nuclear deterrence if it is to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Item ID: JA029160
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence in an Increasingly Nuclear World
Author: Ruhle, Hans
Notes: This article argues that government leaders need to bid farewell to the assumption that the rationality of all nuclear states can be assured for all times, that nuclear deterrence can never fail, and that we are somehow 'nuclear immortal'. It is a fundamental fact of the multinuclear world of the twenty-first century that deterrence built on the threat of a nuclear second strike will not work against 'irrational' aggressors.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA029413
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2013.773697
Media: Article

Title: Rethinking the Utility of Nuclear Weapons
Author: Wilson, Ward
Notes: Is over thinking about nuclear deterrence on solid ground ?
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA029388
Media: Article
Trident Tribulations: Understanding the UK's Trident Alternatives Review

Title: Trident Tribulations: Understanding the UK’s Trident Alternatives Review
Author: Ritchie, Nick
Notes: The United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons policy is in flux. A UK decision to end continuous at-sea deterrence would be in keeping with the country’s self-identification as the most forward leaning of the nuclear-weapon states on nuclear disarmament and would have implications beyond the UK’s borders.
Subject: TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Item ID: JA029832
Link: http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2013_10/Trident-Tribulations-Understanding-the-UKs-Trident-Alternatives-Review
Media: Article

Written by Nick Ritchie.

Imaginary Nuclear Conflicts: Explaining Deterrence Policy Preferences Formation

Title: Imaginary Nuclear Conflicts: Explaining Deterrence Policy Preferences Formation
Author: Zwald, Zachary
Notes: Although the question of how policymakers arrive at their nuclear doctrine and force structure preferences is one of unparalleled importance, it has not received systematic attention in international relations. This article, therefore, develops and illustrates a behavioral model of nuclear deterrence preference formation wherein variation in such preferences is a function of the content and flexibility of one’s theory-driven thinking. A policymaker determines the value of potential doctrine and force structure positions in the context of his or her beliefs about the nature of how nuclear conflict will likely begin and proceed - i.e., whether more as a result of rational and deliberate action or due to fear, misperception, and accident. This analysis challenges the dominant explanations of doctrine and force structure preference formation that are implicit in IR. It suggests how the dialogue of the deaf in domestic debates over nuclear weapons policy can be reduced in the future and provides new criteria by which to recast the proliferation optimist-pessimist debate.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Subject: NUCLEAR WARFARE
Item ID: JA029960
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.844519
Media: Article

Pakistan's Policy on Minimum Deterrence: Why Minimum Is Not the Minimum?

Title: Pakistan's Policy on Minimum Deterrence: Why Minimum Is Not the Minimum?
Author: Khan, Zafar
Notes: This article focuses on Pakistan’s policy option of ‘minimum deterrence’ (MD) post-1998 nuclearization of South Asia and explores why ‘minimum’ in reality is not the minimum. It states that the term ‘minimum’ has not been fully defined yet due to which MD stays ambiguous. In addition, it endeavors to elaborate the rudimentary factors responsible for the non-existence of an MD, which, in turn, keeps the Pakistani stance on MD dynamic and evolving.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN
Item ID: JA029283
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2013.760247
Media: Article

What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict

Title: What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict
Author: Narang, Vipin
Notes: Existing nuclear deterrence scholarship evinces a pervasive ‘existential bias’, assuming that once a state merely possesses nuclear weapons, it should be able to deter armed conflict. The empirical literature expresses this bias by simply dichotomously coding a state based on whether it has nuclear weapons, thereby treating all nuclear states as equivalent. Thus, whether nuclear weapons deter conflict, and how much is required to do so, is unclear. This article shifts the unit of analysis away from nuclear weapons to postures, hypothesizing that different nuclear postures are distinct and generate differential deterrent power, particularly amongst the non-superpower states which comprise the lion’s share of nuclear powers. The author finds that an asymmetric escalation nuclear posture uniquely deters conflict initiation and escalation. Not only do small arsenals have little deterrence success, but he finds that even assured retaliation postures fail to deter intense conventional conflict. This suggests that the
deterrence dividend is distributed unequally across nuclear powers, and that states may need to do more than simply acquire nuclear weapons to successfully deter conventional attacks.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA029441
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002712448909
Media: Article

2012

Title: Turkish Nuclear Security after Iranian Nuclearization
Author: Guney, Nursin Atesoglu
Notes: If the international community cannot dissuade Iran from becoming either a nuclear threshold country or an explicit nuclear power, then the manner in which deterrence is extended is of utmost importance to Turkish security. Turkish security will ultimately be damaged by Iranian attempts to acquire a nuclear bomb. The credibility of extended deterrence will surely be the key factor in averting regional decisions to opt for nuclear status in the face of a likely threshold nuclear Tehran. Current proposals regarding missile defence and precision guided weapons as optimum tools of deterrence fall short as alternatives compared with a credible reliable nuclear deterrence. So as long as NATO maintains a credible mix of nuclear and conventional means of deterrence, and guarantees allied security via strengthened extended assurance, Turkey will be comfortable when confronted with new nuclear states in its region. Ankara’s likely response is expected to favour strengthening security relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and seeking to bolster the American/NATO security guarantee, rather than decoupling from the alliance. As long as American/NATO extended deterrence is adapted to the new conditions and continuity is assured, a Turkish decision to decouple from the Western alliance or opt for its own individual nuclear capability remains only a distant possibility.

Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--IRAN
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--TURKEY
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO
Subject: NATO--TURKEY
Item ID: JA029105
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2012.727682
Media: Article

Title: Minimum Deterrence and Missile Defenses: What’s New, What’s True, What’s Arguable
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.
Notes: Minimum deterrence is a compromise, or halfway house, between nuclear abolition or nearly zero and assured destruction, the dominant paradigm for strategic nuclear arms control during and after the cold war. Minimum deterrence as applied to the current relationship between the United States and Russia would require downsizing the numbers of operationally deployed long-range nuclear weapons to 1000, or fewer, on each side. More drastic bilateral Russian-American reductions would require the cooperation of other nuclear weapons states in making proportional reductions in their own arsenals. In addition, US plans for European-based and global missile defenses cause considerable angst in Russia and threaten to derail the Obama ‘reset’ in Russian-American relations, despite the uncertainties about current and plausible future performances of missile defense technologies.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Item ID: JA028566
Media: Article
Dissuasion du fort au faible

L'expression dissuasion du fort au faible a fait flores. Chacun y voit le pendant de la dissuasion du faible au fort qui constitue la base de la doctrine française de dissuasion. Or, l'inversion des mots entraîne un profond changement de logique qu'aucun des auteurs classiques de la dissuasion n'a vraiment décortiqué. A l'heure de la prolifération nucléaire, ne convient-il pas de conceptualiser cette nouvelle configuration stratégique ? L'auteur amorce un débat sur cette question.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE


Nuclear Deterrence in a Changed World

Drell, Sidney D.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

Nuclear weapons cannot be justified simply by invoking 'deterrence'. The range of actions that nuclear weapons might deter never was very large, and it is even smaller today. Russia and the United States can adjust to 21st-century realities by reducing their stockpiles well below the ceilings set in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2012_06/Nuclear_Deterrence_in_a_Changed_World

How Much Is Enough ? A Goal-Driven Approach to Defining Key Principles for Measuring the Adequacy of U.S. Strategic Forces

Payne, Keith B.

DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2012.647528

Analyses of US strategic force requirements frequently are based on assertions about the requirements for deterrence. A politically attractive position is that a relatively small number of nuclear weapons reliably meets US strategic nuclear requirements. This position, however, is flawed for two reasons : first, the number/types of nuclear weapons required for deterrence cannot be identified with precision because requirements shift dramatically across time and circumstances. Second, strategic forces also are intended to assure allies and limit damage, and these goals entail separate requirements that must be included in any serious calculation of US strategic force requirements.
Title: NATO's Incredible Nuclear Strategy: Why U.S. Weapons in Europe Deter No One
Author: Seay, Edmond
In: ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 41, no. 9, November 2011, p. 8-11.
Notes: NATO's nuclear strategy is 'incredible' in the strictest sense: it does not have the credibility necessary to deter potential aggressors. This shortcoming raises fundamental questions about the value of the US B61 bombs deployed in Europe.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--NATO
Subject: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
Item ID: JA028295
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence and a Nuclear-Armed Iran
Author: Duus, Henning P.
Notes: A nuclear deterrence policy will probably not be effective vis-a-vis a nuclear-armed Iran the way it was effective vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and China because of the present Iranian leadership. The West faces an unprecedented asymmetrical threat. While the West will be deterred by a nuclear-armed Iran, Iran may perceive its own nuclear weapons not as a deterrent but as the facilitator of a unique eschatological opportunity towards the God-promised worldwide rule of Imamite Shi'a Islam.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Subject: SHIITES--IRAN
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--IRAN
Item ID: JA027745
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2011.561731
Media: Article

Title: Matrix of Nonlinearity: Minimum Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Nuclear Arms Reductions
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.
Notes: This article considers some of the political and military backdrop for any transition to a post-New START regime of minimum deterrence by the United States and Russia compared to the currently shrink-wrapped version of assured destruction or assured retaliation. Second, it analyzes whether a minimum deterrence regime at either of two levels could provide for US and Russian nuclear security and deterrence stability. Third, it discusses how defenses might complicate the picture of offensive force reductions as described.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Item ID: JA027905
Media: Article
US Missile Defence and China’s Nuclear Posture: Changing Dynamics of an Offence-Defence Arms Race

Author: Zhang, Baohui


Notes: This article examines the rising prominence of strategic nuclear deterrence in Sino-US relations. China is the only major nuclear power that has been actively expanding its offensive capabilities. Its nuclear modernization has inevitably caused concerns in the United States. The article suggests that China’s nuclear programme is driven significantly by US missile defence, which has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for Chinese nuclear deterrence. The article also assesses the latest Chinese perception of US strategic adjustment under the Obama administration and its potential impact on arms control. It reveals that recent measures by the United States to restrain its missile defense could be conducive for achieving a strategic nuclear understanding between the two countries. The article then suggests a number of concrete actions for China and the United States to realize such an understanding.

Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS—GOVERNMENT POLICY—CHINA
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES—USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—CHINA

Notes: This article examines the rising prominence of strategic nuclear deterrence in Sino-US relations. China is the only major nuclear power that has been actively expanding its offensive capabilities. Its nuclear modernization has inevitably caused concerns in the United States. The article suggests that China’s nuclear programme is driven significantly by US missile defence, which has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for Chinese nuclear deterrence. The article also assesses the latest Chinese perception of US strategic adjustment under the Obama administration and its potential impact on arms control. It reveals that recent measures by the United States to restrain its missile defense could be conducive for achieving a strategic nuclear understanding between the two countries. The article then suggests a number of concrete actions for China and the United States to realize such an understanding.

Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS—GOVERNMENT POLICY—CHINA
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES—USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—CHINA

Low-Profile Deterrence: Lessons from the Indian Experience

Author: Basrur, Rajesh


Notes: India’s disarmament policy has often been regarded as long on rhetoric and short on delivery. But, argues the author, its approach to arms stability and reduction has been consistent, maintaining that non-proliferation and universal disarmament are mutually dependent. India has developed a minimalist nuclear posture that offers deterrence stability at low numbers, and could be a model for other nuclear powers seeking to reduce their arsenal.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—INDIA
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS—GOVERNMENT POLICY—INDIA
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT—INDIA

Criteria for Deterrence

Author: Lever, Paul


Notes: The postponement until 2016 of the Trident procurement decision gives the next government an opportunity to review the options properly. This means abandoning Cold War planning assumptions and establishing new criteria for credibility with regard to specific scenarios and targets. Britain needs a deterrent which is fit for purpose and ‘good enough’. But a permanently deployed, dedicated platform may not be necessary.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS—GOVERNMENT POLICY—GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)

Notes: The postponement until 2016 of the Trident procurement decision gives the next government an opportunity to review the options properly. This means abandoning Cold War planning assumptions and establishing new criteria for credibility with regard to specific scenarios and targets. Britain needs a deterrent which is fit for purpose and ‘good enough’. But a permanently deployed, dedicated platform may not be necessary.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS—GOVERNMENT POLICY—GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
Title: Minimum Deterrence and Missile Defenses: U.S. and Russia Going Forward  
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.  
Notes: Ratification and entry into force of the New START agreement open the door for possible additional reductions in both states' numbers of deployed long-range nuclear weapons and launchers, but the matrix of post-New START agreement involves nonlinearities with respect to the relationship between minimum deterrence and missile defenses. NATO's Lisbon summit in 2010 invited Russia to participate in a European missile defense system, but Russia is wary of any theaterwide antimissile system that could grow into a more ambitious deterrent-denial force pointed at Russia. Minimum deterrence would drop the numbers of US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons to 1,000 or fewer, but getting Moscow and Washington to move well below 1,000 would require parallel reductions and/or restraints on the part of other nuclear weapons states and a missile defense regime of 'cooperative security' rather than mutual suspicion.  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE  
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA  
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)  
Subject: NEW START  
Item ID: JA028075  
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2011.605024  
Media: Article

Title: Nuclear Weapons Acquisition and Deterrence  
Author: Guthe, Kurt  
Notes: The effects of nuclear weapons acquisition on deterrence will depend on the nature of the state, leadership, or even organization that obtains the weapons; the types of actions to be deterred; the purpose and strategy the weapons serve; the consequences for the military situation between the acquiring state and its adversaries; and the ways in which those adversaries respond to the opposing nuclear threat. The implications of nuclear acquisition for deterrence are likely to change over time as nuclear capabilities move from a nascent state and gain, among other qualities, increased size, longer range, more diversity, better survivability, and greater destructive power. Deterrence is only a matter of who is being deterred, from what action, by whom, for what reason, by what threats, and in what circumstances, but also when in the extended process of acquiring nuclear weapons, capabilities a deterrence challenge occurs.  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE  
Item ID: JA028236  
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2011.622192  
Media: Article

Title: Right-Sizing Russia's Nuclear Deterrent: Offensive Reductions and Defense Uncertainties  
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.  
Notes: Russia and the United States face conflicting pressures with respect to broadening and deepening the regime of strategic nuclear arms reductions agreed to in New START. The Obama administration favors additional reductions in long-range nuclear weapons as well as talks on the status of NATO and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons located in Europe. At the 2010 Lisbon summit NATO and Russia agreed to prompt discussions on the possibility of creating a European missile defense system with shared responsibility. Against these positives, Russia remains wary of US intent with respect to missile defenses, both states face near term presidential elections that distract from prior commitments, and neither the Obama administration nor the US congressional leadership is ready for a bruising post-new START debate.  
Subject: NEW START  
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA  
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)  
Item ID: JA028167  
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2011.598743  
Media: Article
Title: The US Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence  
Author: Yost, David S.  
In: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 87, no. 6, November 2011, p. 1401-1438.  
Notes: NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk- and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual-capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence - including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non-nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy - recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long-standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk-and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US-Russian numerical disparity in non-strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangement unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO  
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA  
**Item ID:** JA028221  
**Link:** http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01043.x  
**Media:** Article

### 2010

**Title:** Reassessing the Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey  
**Author:** Kibaroglu, Mustafa  
**In:** ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 40, no. 5, June 2010, p. 8-13.  
**Notes:** NATO is revising its Strategic Concept; the alliance is due to complete work on the document in November. A key issue in the revision is the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as part of the alliance's policy of extended nuclear deterrence. Although Turkey has long been in agreement with its allies on the value of these forward deployments, it may soon find itself in a delicate position on the question of how to continue the policy effectively.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO  
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA  
**Subject:** TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--TURKEY  
**Subject:** NATO--STRATEGIC ASPECTS--NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, 2010  
**Subject:** TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA  
**Item ID:** JA026941  
**Link:** http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=51697231&site=ehost-live&scope=site  
**Media:** Article

**Title:** Nuclear Testing : Deterrence, Stewardship, and Arms Reduction  
**Author:** Sharp, David H.  
**In:** COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 29, no. 4, September - October 2010, p. 295-307.  
**Notes:** A limited resumption of nuclear testing is needed for effective nuclear deterrence. Nuclear testing is necessary to maintain an acceptable level of confidence in the current US stockpile, enable modifications of legacy nuclear weapons that may be required to meet emerging stockpile requirements, support a prudent nuclear arms reduction program, and confirm by actual demonstration that we have the nuclear weapons design and manufacturing skills we think we have.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR WEAPONS--TESTING  
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA  
**Item ID:** JA027228  
**Link:** http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2010.509633
EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons: A Common Deterrent for Europe?

Author: Jasper, Ursula

Additional Author: Portela, Clara


Notes: Nuclear weapons remain the unquestioned core of the defence postures of both France and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the European Union is progressively enhancing its Common Foreign and Security Policy, notably through the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy. Yet, despite evident progress in the CFSP, whose ultimate purpose is to lead to a 'common defence policy', EU member-states still deal with nuclear issues on a predominantly national basis. What is the alleged purpose of European nuclear forces? How is the raison d'etre of the French and British nuclear deterrents conceptualized against the background of progressing European (defence) integration? This article examines the construction of the rationale of the French and British nuclear forces and their compatibility with the emerging European defence policy, particularly with regard to a hypothetical integration of both arsenals into a common deterrent. Could and should a 'European nuclear deterrent' be envisaged as the final stage in the framing of a European defence?

Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--FRANCE
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--EUROPE

Title: Getting to Zero

Author: Keller, Patrick

Additional Author: Scheer, Benjamin


Notes: The new German government has pledged to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. Although this is in keeping with President Obama's aim of achieving 'global zero', a world free of nuclear weapons, it cannot impede a debate in Germany on Europe's deterrence strategy.

Subject: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GERMANY
Subject: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--EUROPE
Subject: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO

Title: Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Under the Umbrella

Author: Ruhle, Michael


Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA

Media: Article
**Title:** The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent
**Author:** Miller, Franklin C.
**In:** RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 155, no. 2, April - May 2010, p. 34-39.
**Notes:** Britain's nuclear deterrent remains under keen examination as both the general election and defence review loom. In an American perspective on the issue, the author argues that not only is a deterrent capability necessary, but also that the UK's defence will only be assured by continuous submarine-based capability: the alternatives do not stand up to scrutiny.
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
**Subject:** NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--GREAT BRITAIN
**Item ID:** JA026808
**Link:** [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2010.486549](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2010.486549)
**Media:** Article

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**Title:** La dissuasion et le second age nucleaire
**Author:** Miraillet, Michel
**Notes:** Dans un environnement incertain, et dans l'avenir previsible, les armes nucleaires continueront de jouer un role majeur au sein des politiques de defense dont l'objectif, qui ne peut etre le desarmement en soi, est une securite accrue. Dans ce contexte, l''abolitionnisme' est d'abord affaire de rhetorique, et l'on peut douter du lien suppose entre desarmement et lutte contre la proliferation. Le desarmement, comme la dissuasion nucleaire, dot d'abord produire de la securite.
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
**Subject:** NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--FRANCE
**Item ID:** JA026901
**Media:** Article

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**Title:** Pertinence et permanence de la dissuasion
**Author:** Georgelin, Jean-Louis
**In:** REVUE INTERNATIONALE ET STRATEGIQUE, no. 79, automne 2010, p. 113-118.
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
**Item ID:** JA027099
**Media:** Article

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**Title:** The Impossible Challenge of Deterring 'Nuclear Terrorism' by Al Qaeda
**Author:** Velde, James R. Van De
**In:** STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 33, no. 8, August 2010, p. 682-699.
**Notes:** Deterring Al Qaeda from using a nuclear weapon, should it acquire one, is a harder challenge than analysts have argued. Suggestions for 'deterrence based on punishment' have severe limitations. Al Qaeda is not a state, has no clear command authority, and has no clear nuclear weapons-employment doctrine. Most analysts also ignore the dynamic of 'crisis instability' ('use it or lose it') : should the West believe Al Qaeda has an improvised nuclear devise, it is unlikely (regardless of whether Al Qaeda leadership claimed the weapon would be held as a deterrent only) that the West would accept a mutually-assured-destruction relationship with the group. The West would hunt the weapon down, forcing Al Qaeda's hand. The best counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction-Nuclear Terrorism defense, therefore, is good counterinsurgency policy to starve it of recruits until the group dies.
**Subject:** NUCLEAR TERRORISM
**Subject:** QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
**Item ID:** JA027020
**Link:** [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.494155](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.494155)
**Media:** Article
2009

Title: The End of Nuclear at Sea: A Part-Time Deterrent Will Not Do!
Author: Hare, Tim
Notes: Britain's nuclear capability is once again a subject of intense debate. Some suggest that, in order to save money and make a political statement on global disarmament, Britain should reduce its deterrent capability. But as the author argues, these arguments are misleading. The fundamental driver of British nuclear forces must be credible deterrence. While politically appealing, the alternatives to Britain's current nuclear capability carry serious deficiencies, which undermine their very purpose.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Item ID: JA026425
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840903532924
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence Dogma? Challenging the Relevance of British Nuclear Weapons
Author: Ritchie, Nick
Notes: In December 2006 the British government released a White Paper announcing its intention to begin the process of replacing its current Trident nuclear weapons system, thereby allowing it to retain nuclear weapons well into the 2050s. In March 2008 the government released its National Security Strategy that stressed the long-term complexity, diversity and interdependence of threats to British security with a clear focus on human rights, justice and freedom. This article asks how the threat to kill tens if not hundreds of thousands of people with British nuclear weapons fits into the National Security Strategy's world view and questions the relevance of an instrument of such devastating bluntness to threats defined by complexity and interdependence. It argues that the government's case for replacing the current Trident system based on the logic of nuclear deterrence is flawed. First, Britain faces no strategic nuclear threats and the long-term post-Cold War trend in relations with Russia and China - the two nuclear-armed major powers that could conceivably threaten the UK with nuclear attack - is positive, despite current tensions with Moscow over Georgia. Second, the credibility and legitimacy of threatening nuclear destruction in response to the use of WMD by 'rogue' states is highly questionable and British nuclear threats offer no 'insurance' or guarantee of protection against future 'rogue' nuclear threats. Third, nuclear weapons have no role to play in deterring acts of nuclear terrorism whether state-sponsored or not. Fourth, British nuclear threats will be useless in dealing with complex future conflicts characterized by 'hybrid' wars and diverse and interdependent sources of insecurity. The article concludes by arguing that the government's fall-back position that it must keep nuclear weapons 'just in case' because the future security environment appears so uncertain, makes no sense if British nuclear threats offer no solution to the causes and symptoms of that uncertainty.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Item ID: JA025598
Link: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=36077974&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Media: Article

Title: NATO and Extended Deterrence in a Multinuclear World
Author: Ruhle, Michael
Notes: Concerns about nuclear proliferation have led to a new wave of enthusiasm for far-reaching nuclear disarmament schemes. According to their proponents, the United States must take the lead in generating a new global disarmament dynamic, including withdrawing the remaining US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Such a step will not spell the end of extended deterrence, yet its drawbacks would far outweigh its gains. While achieving little in terms of relaunching disarmament, it would weaken nuclear sharing as an important achievement of managing alliance security. In an emerging multinuclear strategic environment, maintaining a visible nuclear bond between the United States and its NATO allies is not a Cold War relic, but a sensible and nonprovocative means of both deterrence and nonproliferation.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO
Subject: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
Subject: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--EUROPE
Subject: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--NATO
Item ID: JA025697
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495930802679686
Title: Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO
Author: Yost, David S.
Notes: Historically the NATO allies have focused considerable attention on US 'extended deterrence' - that is, the extension by Washington of an umbrella of protection, sometimes called a 'nuclear guarantee'. A persisting requirement has been to provide the allies with assurance about the reliability and credibility of this protection. This article examines the definition of 'assurance' used by the US Department of Defense for most of the past decade and argues that it has drawn attention to long-standing policy challenges associated with US extended deterrence in NATO. The article considers the assurance roles of US nuclear forces in Europe, as well as elements of assurance in Washington's relations with its allies regarding extended nuclear deterrence. Whether the allies will retain the current requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in their new Strategic Concept or devise a new approach will be an issue of capital importance in the policy review launched at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. Contrasting approaches to these questions are visible in the United States and Germany, among other allies. The main issues to be resolved include reconciling extended deterrence with arms control priorities; managing the divisions in public and expert opinion; and avoiding certain potential consequences of a rupture with established arrangements.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO
Subject: NATO--USA
Item ID: JA025994
Link: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=42959798&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Media: Article

Title: A Second Nuclear Revolution : From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence
Author: Sauer, Tom
Notes: This article predicts that the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected. This delegitimation of nuclear weapons is due to five factors whose importance has grown since the mid-1990s: nuclear proliferation, the risk of nuclear terrorism, the nuclear taboo, missile defence, and the increased importance of international law. The article starts with categorizing nuclear weapons policies: nuclear primacy, maximum deterrence, minimum deterrence, existential deterrence, and post-existential deterrence. The nuclear weapon states will probably shift their policies from nuclear primacy (US), maximum deterrence (Russia), minimum or existential deterrence (UK, France, Israel, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea) to post-existence deterrence (or elimination), taking one step at a time.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA026305
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390903189402
Media: Article

Title: Renoncer a la dissuasion nucleaire ?
Author: Ranquet, Robert
Notes: La question de la dissuasion nucleaire francaise fait encore aujourd'hui l'objet d'un large consensus alors meme que les conditions qui ont preside a sa creation ont profondement evolue. Prenant en compte le risque majeur de la proliferation, la France pourrait avoir une carte a jouer en proposant un processus de desarmement incluant le renoncement complet a la dissuasion nucleaire.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Item ID: JA026030
Media: Article
Morale et efficacité dans le débat nucléaire
Title: Morale et efficacité dans le débat nucléaire
Author: Lambert, Denis
In: DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 65e année, no. 4, avril 2009, p. 150-158.
Notes: Un nouveau débat sur l'avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire s'annonce, préempté par quelques manœuvres politiques. La nécessité de rebâtir l'équilibre stratégique entre les Etats-Unis et la Russie, avant l'échéance du 5 décembre 2009 pour le Traité Start, fixe même une première limite au calendrier, sans compter la préparation de la prochaine conférence d'examen du TNP. La perception de la menace principale a change, mais aussi le cadre et certaines modalités de la dissuasion. Loin d'être devenue desuète, elle s'intègre dans une vision plus globale. Le réalisme l'emporte sur l'idéalisme.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA025888
Media: Article

Soldiers Against the Bomb?
Title: Soldiers Against the Bomb?
Author: Lewis, Julian
Notes: The current economic crisis and two costly wars have put much strain on British defence planners. Government expenditure is being placed under increasing scrutiny. There have been voices claiming that Trident is an unnecessary expense. This article counters this argument and advocates the necessity of maintaining and renewing Britain’s nuclear deterrent.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Item ID: JA025650
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840902818621
Media: Article

Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia
Title: Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia
Author: Mistry, Dinshaw
Notes: This article tempers the argument of deterrence optimists, who make the case that nuclear deterrence has maintained the peace between regional nuclear rivals. In particular, it challenges the assertion by Kenneth Waltz that 'nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced' among regional rivals in South Asia. Examining two major regional military crises, this article notes that, first, nuclear deterrence was not the key factor ending these crises. Instead, non-nuclear factors involving American diplomacy, which provided the participants with timely exit strategies, ended the crises. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, there was a strong possibility of significant military escalation, and nuclear deterrence would not have averted such an escalation. The article concludes by noting that, in regions where deterrence optimism is not well supported, Washington may continue intervening in crises between nuclear rivals, and, anticipating such a US approach, regional rivals could become involved in repeated military crises over the long term.'
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--SOUTH ASIA
Subject: INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--PAKISTAN
Subject: PAKISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
Item ID: JA025688
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410802678072
Media: Article

Trident: White Elephant or Black Hole?
Title: Trident: White Elephant or Black Hole?
Author: Beach, Hugh
Notes: Britain has possessed its own nuclear weapons for just over fifty years and is laying plans to keep them going for the next half-century. The author argues that there are better things to spend government money on and the Trident replacement programme should be cancelled.
Subject: TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Item ID: JA025651
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840902818613
Media: Article
Les nouvelles formes de terrorisme, par leurs modes d'action et leurs effets destructeurs comparables à ceux d'action de guerre, sont souvent qualifiées de menaces asymétriques car susceptibles de prendre en défaut les systèmes de sécurité de temps de paix, généralement non dimensionnés contre des actions de telle ampleur, comme les systèmes de défense militaire dont l'emploi est contraint par le cadre légal du temps de paix. Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale prend en compte ces nouvelles formes de menaces et formule des recommandations pour limiter les effets de telles actions à défaut de pouvoir les prévenir en totalité. Parmi les cibles potentielles que l'on pourrait qualifier de cibles 'à très haut rendement' figurent les installations présentant des risques majeurs pour l'environnement en cas d'agression dite 'hors dimensionnement' dont les systèmes militaires nucléaires de dissuasion. Les nouvelles menaces asymétriques pourraient, si l'on n'y prenait garde, contourner de tels systèmes, la plupart du temps concus pour contrer des menaces de nature militaire.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

**Subject:** ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

**Link:** http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662830903432680

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This paper emphasizes the pertinence of the British government's claim that nuclear deterrent threats are still relevant in the four broad areas to which it addresses: deterrence against aggression towards British/NATO vital interests or nuclear coercion/blackmail with other WMD by regional 'rogue' states; deterrence against state-sponsored acts of nuclear terrorism; and as a general residual deterrent function to preserve peace and stability in an uncertain world. British nuclear weapons are still important and very much relevant in all the four areas discussed.

First of all, they play a role of a significant tool of political leverage as they still function much the same way way they did during the Cold War. WMDs were, after all, a guarantee of their non-use, which does not mean that they were not useful. Secondly, it also authenticates the UK among its allies. Even though generally democracies do not wage wars with each other, they still have to face the challenges posed by non-democracies. In doing so, they need to support each other with the use of 'ultima ratio' arguments in order to safeguard international peace and stability. The British nuclear deterrent should, therefore, be perceived as a general deterrent with a positive influence on international community and international security, overall.

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN

**Link:** http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330903011545

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A US nuclear no-first-use doctrine would have fewer costs and bring greater benefits than commonly recognised.

**Subject:** NO FIRST USE (NUCLEAR STRATEGY)

**Subject:** NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Title: La dissuasion nucléaire : permanence et changements
Author: Debouzy, Olivier
Notes: L'auteur risque dans cette réflexion l'opinion que la dissuasion nucléaire, pour avoir profondément changé, est aujourd'hui tout aussi pertinente qu'hier; que, si ses points d'application et donc ses modalités changent, son utilité demeure; qu'elle est, en un mot, aussi - et peut-être plus - nécessaire aujourd'hui et pour le futur prévisible qu'hier, mais que la question de l'utilisation des armes nucléaires doit se renouveler en profondeur, notamment par une réflexion sur les caractéristiques futures des armes nucléaires et leur doctrine d'emploi; sur l'articulation entre l'exercice de la dissuasion nucléaire et la mise en œuvre des forces conventionnelles d'une part, et la défense antimissiles d'autre part; sur la question de la dissuasion élargie, enfin, du fait des circonstances a la fois plus variées dans lesquelles elle s'exerce et de l'absence de structures comparables a celles qui existaient du temps de la guerre froide pour en formaliser les conditions.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA026221
Media: Article

Title: Framing Strategic Deterrence : Old Certainties, New Ambiguities
Author: Freedman, Lawrence
Notes: During the Cold War deterrence worked better in practice than in theory. It became an article of faith that great power war was virtually unthinkable because of the consequences, yet this conclusion was reached without ever working through the scenarios. Today, in a world of shrinking great power arsenals and proliferating small arsenals, we may now be moving away from the models which served us well during the Cold War. The author interrogates the assumptions which underpinned strategic deterrence and casts an eye on a more ambiguous nuclear future.
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA026155
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840903216452
Media: Article

2008

Title: Belgique, armes nucléaires et opinion publique
Author: Dumoulin, Andre
In: DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 64e année, no. 5, mai 2008, p. 155-163.
Notes: Le lancement d'une démarche prudente d'extension des intérêts vitaux de la France a ses proches voisins renvoie à la question des armes nucléaires. Dans le royaume de Belgique la question de la perception de la dissuasion est plurielle, ambiguë et attentiste, entre les 'assurances otaniennes', 'les ballons d'essai hexagonaux', les audaces 'contenues' des résolutions parlementaires et les incertitudes américaines à l'approche du 60e anniversaire de l'Alliance atlantique.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--BELGIUM
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--BELGIUM
Item ID: JA024885
Media: Article

Title: The Future of the US Nuclear Deterrent
Author: Schneider, Mark
Notes: The United States must maintain an effective nuclear deterrent because, without it, the US could be destroyed as an industrial civilization, and our conventional forces could be defeated by a state with grossly inferior conventional capability but powerful weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Both Russia and China have the nuclear potential to destroy the US (and our allies) and are modernizing their forces with the objective of targeting the US missile defenses and conventional strike capabilities, while critically important elements of deterrence and national power simply cannot substitute for nuclear deterrence. In light of the emerging 'strategic partnership' between Russia and China and their emphasis on nuclear weapons, it would be foolish indeed to size US strategic nuclear forces as if the only threat we face is that of rogue states and discard the requirement that the US nuclear deterrent be 'second to none'.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA025185
Media: Article

Title: Nuclear Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion
Author: Colby, Elbridge
Notes: A rising and influential tide of opinion is pressing for the United States to take major steps towards actually realizing 'a world without nuclear weapons', including by taking steps towards dismantling its nuclear arsenal. This article argues that a world without nuclear weapons, and particularly American nuclear weapons, is not desirable nor is real and effective nuclear disarmament possible. Therefore, while non-proliferation is an important objective, the United States should not abandon or move substantially towards the abandonment of its arsenal in pursuit of nuclear abolition. Instead, the United States should seek the worthy goal of preventing and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons while maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, a policy that can be followed by de-linking non-proliferation from disarmament.

Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA025012
Media: Article

Title: DoD and the Nuclear Mission
Author: Murdock, Clark A.
Notes: This article presents an advocacy narrative for the still important contributions that nuclear weapons make to US security and outlines a set of recommendations for how the Department of Defense should organize for the nuclear mission. After first addressing the role of nuclear weapons in 21st century international affairs and national security, this article reviews how the nuclear mission has been neglected in the post-Cold War era and suggests what actions are needed to resuscitate the nuclear deterrent.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA025159
Media: Article

Title: Biological Weapons, Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence: The Biotechnology Revolution
Author: Galamas, Francisco
Notes: The strategic use of biological weapons has presented some difficulties. Biological weapons use has been always uncertain, invisible, and delayed due to factors such as the incubation period. With the intervention of biotechnology techniques, the possible applications of biological weapons may increase and gain new strategic value. That may enhance the deterrence capability of these weapons against countries with nuclear weapons. To better understand these changes, we must look first at how biotechnology can eliminate some of the disadvantages of the strategic biological weapons use and therefore may enhance the use of biological weapons for deterrence.

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Item ID: JA025184
Media: Article
Title: Russia's Evolving Strategic Nuclear Deterrent  
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.  
Notes: Within the complex and fast-moving context for Russian nuclear force modernization, how deterrence-stable will future Russian forces be? This study provides a partial answer to that question in three steps. First, the author compares the performances of Russian and American Moscow Treaty-compliant forces with an alternative, smaller 'minimum deterrent' force for each state. Second, he tests the sensitivity of these forces to requirements for early generation on alerting of forces, and for prompt launch of retaliatory forces. Third, the author considers whether the introduction of missile defenses of notional effectiveness affects the balance of deterrence credibility as between the two states.  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA  
Subject: STRATEGIC FORCES--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)  
Subject: STRATEGIC FORCES--USA  
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)  
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA  
Item ID: JA024114  
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence, Blackmail, Friendly Persuasion  
Author: Ifft, Edward  
Notes: The author thoroughly discusses the concept of deterrence. He goes to the root Latin verb deterrere, to frighten, to begin his discussion of deterrence. He uses the shorthand term 'blackmail', as in 'nuclear blackmail', as little more than 'nuclear deterrence in the wrong hands'.  
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE  
Item ID: JA024113  
Media: Article

Title: Russia's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Realistic or Uncertain?  
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.  
Notes: The US-Russian nuclear relationship is not a Cold War anachronism, as many assume, but a vital constituent of a robust international body politic. War between Russia and America is unlikely, but misunderstanding and misperception with respect to their military ends and means are not. US nuclear modernization plans impact on Russian perceptions of their great-power status and vice versa. The US and Russia are downsizing their numbers of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to meet the Moscow Treaty (SORT) requirements. Even Moscow Treaty-compliant forces will be well in excess of what some experts regard as necessary for deterrence.  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)  
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA  
Subject: STRATEGIC FORCES--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)  
Subject: STRATEGIC FORCES--USA  
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)  
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA  
Item ID: JA024124  
Media: Article
Title: El arsenal nuclear británico y el régimen de no proliferación
Author: Lara, Belen
Notes: Con el apoyo conservador y la oposición laborista, Tony Blair ha conseguido la renovación del sistema británico de disuasión nuclear. La decisión no solo debilita el TNP, sino que impulsará las políticas nucleares de países como Irán, que se sienten cada vez más amenazados.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Subject: TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GREAT BRITAIN
Item ID: JA023734
Media: Article

Title: The Iranian Nuclear Threat and the Israeli Options
Author: Pedatzur, Reuven
Notes: As a result of developments including the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Muammar Al-Qaddfi’s decision to cease WMD programs, and the weakening of the Syrian military, only one potential strategic threat against Israel remains: the Iranian nuclear program. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is likely to transform the Middle East’s strategic balance, force changes in Israel’s national security planning in general and its nuclear policy in particular. This article analyses the options open to Israel in response to a nuclear Iran, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. Evaluation of the options available to Israel reveals seven alternatives. In the near future, Israeli decision makers will have to decide whether to adopt one or a mix of options ranging from preemptive attack to unconcealed nuclear deterrence. After analysing each of these options, the conclusion is that Israel probably will move to unconcealed nuclear deterrence in the event of Iran completing the development and the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--IRAN
Subject: ISRAEL--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAN
Subject: IRAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--ISRAEL
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--ISRAEL
Item ID: JA024433
Media: Article

Title: Deterring a Nuclear 9/11
Author: Talmadge, Caitlin
Notes: Can a nuclear terrorist attack be deterred? Nuclear forensic techniques to identify the origins of nuclear material are improving, but significant associated strategic, political, diplomatic, and organizational challenges have yet to be sufficiently addressed.
Subject: NUCLEAR TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA023579
Media: Article

Title: Doctrine nucleaire francaise : questions en suspens
Author: Courmont, Barthélemy
In: REVUE INTERNATIONALE ET STRATEGIQUE, no. 65, printemps 2007, p. 81-90.
Notes: La doctrine de dissuasion nucleaire francaise repose sur le concept de seuil de suffisance: le volume de l’arsenal nucleaire doit correspondre a ce seuil, a partir duquel il est suffisamment dissuasif pour eviter une attaque. Or des questions se posent autour de cette doctrine de dissuasion. Comment renouveler l’arsenal tout en respectant les traites, qui visent a reduire le nombre d’armes et a interdire les essais nucleaires? Comment identifier les menaces dans un environnement changeant, et par consequent ou situer le seuil de suffisance? Comment l’opinion publique percoit-elle le nucleaire? La proliferation nucleaire et l’évolution des doctrines des autres puissances nucleaires pourraient inciter la France a privilegier une doctrine, non plus de dissuasion, mais d’emploi du nucleaire.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Item ID: JA023559
Media: Article
Title: Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation
Author: Rendall, Matthew
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA024418
Media: Article

Title: Uncertain Justice for Nuclear Terror: Deterrence of Anonymous Attacks Through Attribution
Author: Phillips, Matthew
Notes: In light of ongoing work to improve nuclear attribution capabilities, policymakers could be tempted to consider a nuclear terrorism deterrence doctrine relying strongly on the ability of those capabilities to support retaliation against states that supply materials used anonymously in an attack. Although the United States must develop the best possible nuclear attribution capabilities, at the very least to support response actions after an attack, prospects for deterrence are uncertain. To accommodate these uncertainties, as well as the wide range of possible nuclear terrorism scenarios, the United States should adopt a broadly scoped operationally ambiguous declaratory policy in the context of a comprehensive strategic doctrine to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Subject: NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA023817
Media: Article

2006

Title: Inde-Pakistan: les vertus de la dissuasion nucléaire
Author: Drouhaud, Pascal
Notes: Des lors qu'un Etat, poussé par le sentiment national, ou par la volonté de s'affirmer comme une puissance régionale, développe un arsenal nucléaire, une réaction en chaine est à craindre. Les États voisins se sentent menacés, soit, tout simplement, par l'éventualité d'un conflit militaire, soit par une perte de vitesse sur l'échiquier régional. L'Inde et le Pakistan, qui sont deux 'nouvelles' puissances nucléaires, en quête de reconnaissance sur la scène internationale, ne sont pas signataires du Traité de non-proliferation de l'armement nucléaire. S'il est évidemment dans l'intérêt de la communauté internationale de limiter la prolifération, les partisans de la 'dissuasion' considèrent que l'arme nucléaire permet de stabiliser les relations entre ces deux États, qui se tiennent ainsi mutuellement en respect.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN
Item ID: JA022956
Media: Article

Title: Prestige Purchase
Author: Dorman, Andrew
Notes: Britain seems likely to buy its most expensive weapons system ever without much debate or a vote in parliament. Is the replacement of the Trident nuclear submarine just an issue of national pride and international rivalry? Or could there be a cheaper alternative that might also allow more money for conventional forces?
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
Item ID: JA022487
Media: Article
L'avenir de la force de dissuasion britannique

Parmi les membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, le Royaume-Uni est l'État qui dispose de la plus petite force de dissuasion, avec moins de 200 têtes et un seul type d'arme pour sa mise en œuvre eventuelle. L'interdependance dans le domaine nucléaire avec les États-Unis voulue par les gouvernements britanniques depuis une cinquantaine d'années a conduit Londres à se trouver dans une position de dissymétrie technologique croissante à l'égard des Américains. Ce choix politico-stratégique a fini par restreindre considérablement les options qui restent encore ouvertes au Royaume-Uni pour rester à l'avenir un joueur dans le club des puissances nucléaires militaires.

Chiracs nukleares Vermächtnis

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Nuclear Disarmament versus Peace in the Twenty-first Century

The purpose of the British nuclear deterrent remains what it has always been: to minimize the prospect of the United Kingdom being attacked by mass-destruction weapons. It is not a panacea and it is not designed to forestall every type of threat. Nevertheless, the threat which it is designed to counter is so overwhelming that no other form of military capability could manage to avert it. The possession of the deterrent may be unpleasant, but it is an unpleasant necessity, the purpose of which lies not in its actual use but in its nature as the ultimate 'stalemate weapon' and, in the nuclear age, stalemate is the most reliable source of security available to us all.

Nuclear Disarmament versus Peace in the Twenty-first Century

In his analysis of the continuing necessity for Britain to retain its nuclear capability, the author argues that the purpose of the British nuclear deterrent is what it has always been: 'to minimize the prospect of the United Kingdom being attacked by mass destruction weapons'. His discussion ranges from the ethical paradox surrounding the possession of nuclear weapons, the central problem of their predictability, the problem of new threat and, in his view, the Utopian non-proliferation obligations. The possession of the deterrent may be unpleasant, he concludes, but it is necessary, its purpose lying 'not in its actual use but in its nature as the ultimate 'stalemate weapon'.'
Discours de l'Ile Longue : tournant pour la doctrine de dissuasion nucléaire de la France ?

Author: Favin-Leveque, Jacques

Notes: La doctrine française de dissuasion nucléaire n’avait guère évolué depuis son élaboration dans les années 60. Destinée à dissuader toute agression contre les intérêts vitaux du pays, elle ne pouvait jusqu’à présent s’adresser qu’à des pays eux-mêmes dotés d’un armement nucléaire. Ainsi définie, elle jouit depuis plusieurs décennies d’un consensus tacite au plan politique. Le discours que le chef de l’État a prononcé à l’Ile Longue le 19 janvier 2006 modifie sensiblement cette théorie de la dissuasion en étendant la possibilité de la menace d’emploi à certains États non nucléaires et en donnant des intérêts vitaux une définition plus large de leur positionnement géographique et de leur nature même. L’article se propose d’analyser cette importante évolution de la doctrine française. Il en souligne la pertinence, mais il met également en garde contre sa relative fragilité dans l’environnement géopolitique de la France en 2006.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

Parity in Peril ? The Continuing Vitality of Russian-US Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.

Notes: The stability of nuclear deterrence between the United States and Russia no longer can be regarded as a relic of the Cold War. The topic is rapidly re-emerging as one of ever-greater relevance and policy-strategic urgency. A more fluid international order, the complexity of post-Cold War security issues, and the pressure of incipient nuclear proliferation in Asia, make clarity in American-Russian nuclear arms control of first importance. Through the revival of proven analytical techniques, however, this article self-consciously reintroduces concepts long at the heart of strategic nuclear debates. These show that although there is no imminent risk to first strike stability, arms control stability is more nuanced and cannot be assumed without deliberate effort. Missile defences, already deployed by the US and possibly appealing to others, may further complicate the stabilisation of Russian-American nuclear security relations and the containment of nuclear arms races in Asia. Strategic stability is not as important as before for immediate human survival, nor does it raise a significant danger of Russian-American confrontation, and certainly not a risk of pre-emptive attack. The strategic balance, rather, remains a precondition to cooperation on other issues, above all nuclear proliferation.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States

Author: Yost, David S.

Notes: The three Western nuclear powers have in recent years been more preoccupied with threats from regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction than with potential major power threats. London, Paris, and Washington have each substantially reduced their deployed nuclear forces and sharply cut back their range of delivery systems since the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991. While each has manifested greater interest in non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence, each has attempted, with varying degrees of clarity, to define options for limited nuclear use. All three have articulated their nuclear employment threats within a conceptual framework intended to promote deterrence. Despite the differences in their approaches and circumstances, the three western nuclear powers are grappling with tough and, to some extent, unanswered questions: what threat will deter? To what extent have the grounds for confidence in deterrence been diminished? To what extent has it been prudent to scale back deployed nuclear capabilities and redefine threats of nuclear retaliation? To what extent would limited nuclear options enhance deterrence and simplify nuclear employment decisions? What level of confidence should be placed in the full array of deterrence and containment measures? To what extent is deterrence national policy, and to what extent is it Alliance policy?

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Title: Dissuading Nuclear Adversaries: The Strategic Concept of Dissuasion and the US Nuclear Arsenal
Author: Hagood, Jonathan
Notes: This essay contributes to an understanding of the strategic concept of dissuasion by defining it as the active constraint of rationally beneficial options available to a current or potential geopolitical rival in order to preserve that national interests or goals of the US or its allies. The key military component of dissuasion lies in its link to deterrence, wherein the promise of credible deterrence raises the costs of alternatives to a rival. Dissuasion is further refined through analyses of historical case studies, the current security environment, and future scenarios and by identifying three operational types: global, regional, and tactical.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
Item ID: JA021662
Media: Article

Title: Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East
Author: MacInnis, Kathleen J.
Notes: Iranian nuclear proliferation could prove uniquely dangerous because of the potential to ignite regional proliferation in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others. Unlike in Asia, the US has few good options for reassuring allies in the Middle East.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--IRAN
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--MIDDLE EAST
Item ID: JA021673
Media: Article

Title: La dissuasion nucleaire au XXIe siecle
Author: Rose, Francois de
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA021449
Media: Article

Title: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century: From Simplicity to Complexity
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.
Notes: The present study considers whether the US and Russia could, at reduced levels of offensive nuclear weapons, deploy defenses sufficient to change the character of the mutual hostage suicide pact that the two states have inherited from the Cold War. The Moscow Treaty of 2002 is used as an analytical benchmark for this purpose. The author considers alternative force postures for the two states under a variety of total force constraints in order to evaluate whether defenses can drive retaliation based on offenses into the margins of deterrence and, if so, what other implications exist for deterrence broadly defined.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Item ID: JA021809
Media: Article
France’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy

Notes: France’s revised nuclear strategy, announced by President Jacques Chirac in June 2001, represents a move away from the Cold War ‘anti-cities’ strategy to one based on a more extensive range of options, including more precise and discriminate capabilities, intended to reinforce deterrence with choices beyond ‘all or nothing’. Neither of the main rationales for the nuclear posture - the long-standing hedge against potential major power threats and the current emphasis on being able to deter regional powers armed with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons - has provoked much open debate or critical analysis in France. To proponents of reduced nuclear spending, both contingencies seem improbable and not worth the current and projected costs. The thesis that France’s nuclear forces constitute an indispensable contribution to the European Union’s future deterrent posture appears an even less plausible justification to sceptics, who maintain that France could retain options for the EU and obtain approximately the same amount of security insurance with redefined nuclear posture requirements.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

2004

Title: Actualite et avenir de la dissuasion nucleaire.

Notes: Identifiee a l’exces a l’affrontement de la guerre froide qui en masquait bien des atouts, l’arme nucleaire a peine a conserver sa legitimite apres la chute de l’URSS. Pourtant, dans un paysage strategique mouvant, non stabilise et incertain, elle donne a l’Etat qui la possede une dimension quotidienennement mise en valeur par l’actualite internationale si tourmentee, sujette a bien des tensions et demandant force et credibilite pour se faire entendre. Deployee avec determination et perseverance aujourd’hui, elle garantira pour cela notre securite demain si le besoin s’en faisait sentir. L’Europe en sera un jour la beneficiaire.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

Dissuasion.

Notes: Contrat d’assurance contre des menaces extremes qui pourraient un jour se concretiser a nouveau, la dissuasion est des aujourd’hui garante de notre autonomie strategique, dans un monde marque par la proliferation des armes de destruction massive. Sa credibilite repose sur la modernisation et l’adaptation des moyens, non seulement pour continuer a garantir la capacite de frappe en second, mais aussi pour diversifier les modes d’action susceptibles d’etre mis en oeuvre. La credibilite est egalement conditionnee par l’adhesion des Francais : sans debat, celle-ci risquerait de s’affaiblir.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Title: The Nuclear Posture Review and Deterrence for a New Age
Author: Payne, Keith B.
Notes: The NPR heralded a needed paradigm shift away from the Cold War concept of deterrence stability, and toward a much more adaptive approach. Much work remains to be done to develop tailored approaches to deterrence and new threat options that are more adaptable to the contemporary security environment than those we inherited from the Cold War. We are still in the early stages of shaking off the detritus of Cold War thought and identifying the outlines of the new deterrence paradigm. We may not have decades of relative stability to get it right this time around and so need to move forward as fast, and as thoughtfully as we are able. The NPR and recent policy directions are a good start.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
Item ID: JA021230
Media: Article

Title: La dissuasion nucleaire contre les menaces multiformes.
In: DEFENSE NATIONALE, 60e annee, no. 8 - 9, aout - septembre 2004, p. 49-58.
Notes: Il ne fait doute dans aucun esprit que la periode de paix cinquantenaire vecue en Europe depuis la fin du second conflit mondial est tres largement imputable au jeu subtil de la dissuasion nucleaire. Pour autant les elements constitutifs de cette categorie d'affrontement de volontes n'ont pas cesse de se modifier et continuent de le faire. Sans omettre les evolutions observees ailleurs dans le monde, l'adaptation en France et en Europe de cette matrice protectrice aux risques actuels et futurs est l'objet de cette reflexion.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--EUROPE
Item ID: JA020752
Media: Article

Title: De la dissuasion nationale, a la persuasion europeenne.
In: DEFENSE NATIONALE, 60e annee, no. 8 - 9, aout - septembre 2004, p. 59-71.
Notes: L'examen de l'environnement strategique conduit la Societe francaise d'etudes militaires (SFEM) a suggerer que la France revise sa doctrine de dissuasion. Malgre des critiques plus ou moins fondees, celle-ci garde des vertus qui font que l'arme nucleaire contribue a la stabilisation du monde. Des lors qu'une revision est necessaire, il apparaît opportun de proposer un concept apte a emporter l'adhesion de l'Europe. La SFEM propose le concept de persuasion.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--EUROPE
Item ID: JA020753
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence and the New Global Security Environment
In: CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 25, no. 1, April 2004, Special Issue.
Notes: The authors have tried to provide a systematic coverage of the many issues that are emerging over the future of deterrence. This coverage starts by asking what does the concept of deterrence imply both theoretically and in practice. It then moves on to examine how deterrence, and the ideas of the stability it could generate through concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), evolved during the Cold War period. There then follow three analyses of specific problems arising in the post-Cold War international strategic environment. An attempt is then made to assess the problems facing the governments of the established nuclear weapon states and their allies in the new century and how they are facing up to them. There are contributions on how deterrence can be viewed in different regions - from Western Europe on the new problems faced by Germany, with US nuclear weapons still based on its territory, politically uncertain of their future military role in its security. And, finally, from two areas that are at the heart of regional concerns over nuclear war: South Asia and the Middle East.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Item ID: JA021162
Media: Article
Title: Uncertain Future : NPT and the Global Nuclear Order.
Author: Zuberi, Matin
Notes: The global nuclear order has rested on two mutually supportive arrangements: the elaborate structure of nuclear deterrence and the nonproliferation regime. These two arrangements that sustained the nuclear order are no longer exclusive in their operation. The United States, as the chief architect of this nuclear order, has succeeded in making substantial changes in the nonproliferation regime. Arms control that provided a link between nuclear deterrence and the nonproliferation regime is now viewed as a relic of the Cold War. With possibilities of a nuclear response to chemical or biological attack from countries that were previously part of the nonproliferation regime, there is a danger of 'nuclear disorder' in the not too distant future. An international consensus exists on the campaign against terrorism. There is, however, considerable unease about combining it with preventive or preemptive counterproliferation. The nuclear order has survived so far because of the strengthening of the taboo against the military use of nuclear weapons during each successive decade of the nuclear era. Any such use, accidental or deliberate, would destroy whatever remains of that order.
Subject: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA020064
Media: Article

Title: The Nuclear Peace Fallacy : How Deterrence Can Fail.
Author: Russell, Richard L.
Notes: Some scholars counter-intuitively argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases international security by substantially reducing the chances for inter-state armed conflict. This school of thought draws heavily on the history of the American-Soviet Cold War rivalry to inform its analysis. The security dilemma in the contemporary Middle East and South Asia where numerous states have or want nuclear weapons, however, are profoundly different than the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. States in the Middle East and South Asia today may see nuclear weapons as usable instruments of warfare in contrast to conventional wisdom in the West that views them as weapons of deterrence and last resort. As common sense would have it, American and Allied policy designed to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons is prudent. American diplomatic intervention, moreover, in regional crises as a third party may be needed in the future in the Middle East and South Asia to lessen the risks of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, American policy-makers are likely in the future to find themselves facing a nuclear-armed nation-state - or soon to be nuclear weapons-capable state - in a crisis and will have to grapple with the risks of preemptive or preventive military action.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Subject: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Item ID: JA019394
Media: Article

Title: Nuclear Terrorism : Why Deterrence Still Matters.
Author: Castillo, Jasen J.
Notes: Under most circumstances, rogue states can be deterred from transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. The most dangerous exception: when regime change is threatened.
Subject: NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA019893
Media: Article
The United States decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and to accelerate the testing and deployment of a limited, layered ballistic missile defense system by 2004 obviously raises important questions about the future of strategic stability and the evolution of nuclear deterrence. How significant are these decisions? Do they indicate fundamental shifts in US-Russian nuclear doctrine? Is the shift permanent, especially in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001? What are the implications for the future of strategic stability? Are the concepts (mutual assured destruction or MAD), theories (deterrence), policies and treaties (ABM) that were the cornerstones of strategic stability still valid and/or relevant? Do we need a more complex approach to strategic stability and arms control that acknowledges emerging threats of terrorism and proliferation to new and aspiring nuclear powers? If so, what would a future oriented approach to deterrence and arms control encompass? Finally, what are the implications for Canada and Canadian policies and preferences for multilateral approaches to security?

Title: Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense.
Author: Powell, Robert
In: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 27, no. 4, Spring 2003, p. 86-118.
Notes: The author uses nuclear deterrence theory to address three major concerns involving nuclear proliferation and national missile defense (NMD): how might the spread of nuclear weapons affect the ability of the United States to achieve its foreign policy objectives? Can a national missile defense protect against nuclear blackmail by a rogue state? What are the likely political and economic costs to the United States of pursuing NMD? The author warns that although 'NMD would give the United States somewhat more freedom of action and make a rogue state more likely to back down in a crisis', it could also increase the risk of a nuclear attack on the United States. This heightened risk, says the author, would be 'a direct consequence of a greater US willingness to press its interests harder in a crisis' once it has missile defenses.

Subject: NMD--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Item ID: JA020094
Media: Article

Title: Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Theory and Practice.
Author: Lo, James
Notes: This paper questions the basic soundness of the nuclear deterrence regime between India and Pakistan, and argues that the possibility of deterrence failure in this context is significant. Given the historical, geographic and psychological context of these rival states, nuclear weapons are more likely to create greater insecurity (than security) for the states involved. The central argument is that new nuclear states such as India and Pakistan are, inevitably, drawn towards nuclear war by their need to undertake low-level aggressive actions to maintain the credibility of their nuclear forces. Such actions, however, are in sharp contrast to the distant battles that were fought between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and these actions have a significantly higher probability of triggering a catastrophic deterrence failure. Beginning with an examination of the evolution of nuclear deterrence theory, this paper pays special attention to developments particularly important to India and Pakistan. It then proceeds with a case study of the nuclear weapons issue in India and Pakistan, up to the present day. Drawing on theoretical insights provided in the first section, it then critically analyzes the stability of the current deterrence regime. Finally, it examines some of the implications that these findings have for security studies, setting the agenda for future research.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN
Item ID: JA020013
Media: Article
Entre dissuasion et conventionnel : la perssuasion.

Notes: A la question 'nos concepts et nos moyens de dissuasion doivent-ils etre revises ?', un comite d'auditeurs de la 38e session du CHEAr repond par l'affirmative en introduisant une notion a mi-chemin de la prevention et de la dissuasion, celle de 'pressuasion'. La dissuasion nucleaire actuelle repond toujours aux menaces militaires traditionnelles, mais ne repond que partiellement aux menaces emergentes de type asymetrique. Il a donc semble necessaire de proposer une evolution du concept de dissuasion et de ses moyens, conforme aux orientations donnees par le president de la Republique, lors de son discours de juin 2001 a l'IHEDN, et qui permette d'adapter la menace de l'emploi de l'arme nucleaire pour la rendre credible a des puissances mineures, recourant a des moyens asymetriques ou a des armes de destruction massive. Cette proposition consiste a etablir un continuum dissusasif allant d'une dissuasion 'conventionnelle' a une dissuasion nucleaire revisee et s'inscrivant dans le prolongement d'une prevention renforcee. De la prevention a la dissuasion, la 'pre-ssusasion'.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Subject: DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--FRANCE
Item ID: JA018754
Media: Article

2002

Title: The Law of Small Numbers : Deterrence and National Missile Defense.
Author: Lebovic, James H.

Notes: Armed with a new threat and promising technology, advocates of national missile defense (NMD) have framed the debate by presenting NMD as a break from traditional deterrence principles. The assumption that the United States faces new adversaries that cannot be deterred by US offensive options and whether adversaries can and will use nuclear weapons to coerce the United States, given its inclination and ability to retaliate, are assessed. The effectiveness of NMD against various offensive threats is simulated. Conclusions indicate that NMD advocates have not made their case that cold war-era deterrence principles are ill suited to US relations with fledgling nuclear states and that the expected value of a missile defense of any type and scale is low because it is unlikely to enhance global security above levels offered by retaliatory deterrence.

Subject: NMD--USA
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA018139
Media: Article

Title: Russia's Vanishing Deterrent.
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.

Notes: Even in the post-Cold War world, the stability of nuclear deterrence as between not-unfriendly US and Russian governments remains significant. Nuclear stability implies mutual confidence that the minimum conditions of rational deterrence models are fulfilled with high confidence. As US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals are gradually reduced in conformity with the Moscow Treaty to levels far below current deployments, the qualities of forces and the performances of their command and control systems matter as much as do the exact quantities of weapons held by the two sides. Data analysis shows that both the US and Russia can expect to maintain a minimum counter-city deterrent even at levels below the once proposed START III or agreed Moscow treaty limits, but defense deployments add uncertainty to projections and might compromise second strike retaliation under some conditions of launch readiness or warning.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA018602
Media: Article
Title: The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India.
Author: Tellis, Ashley J.
Notes: This article seeks to examine the broader strategic implications of the Indian decision to develop a nuclear deterrent. It focuses on three distinct but related sets of issues. First, how does the formal Indian decision to develop a nuclear deterrent change the strategic environment in Southern Asia? Second, how does it affect the prospects of war and peace in the greater South Asian region? And, third, how will it affect American regional nonproliferation objectives and, in particular, India's relationship with the United States? This article will argue that India's prospective nuclearization is unlikely to dramatically alter the prevailing patterns of security competition in the region; that its prospective consequences for deterrence and crisis stability are more or less positive, though tinged with some uncertainty when subjective factors and third-party actions are taken into account; and that so long as it maintains a certain modicum of restraint India's relationship with the United States is unlikely to be undermined. The article concludes with a brief comment on the role nuclear issues ought to play in the evolving U.S. relations with India.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
Item ID: JA017459
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence and Friction: Implications for Missile Defense.
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.
Notes: Renewed interest in missile defense on the part of the US government has raised the visibility of controversies related to nuclear deterrence and arms control in the new world order. A nuclear arms control and deterrent regime that comingle offenses and defenses increases the possibility, compared to the simpler offense-only model, of Clausewitzian 'friction' in deterrence, in crisis management, and in war. Friction is both a theoretical and a practical, realistic concern for military planners and for policy-makers: simply put, it is the difference between expected, versus actual, behavior or outcomes. To discuss how friction might result from mixing offenses and defenses, the author proceeds in two steps. First, he reviews concepts of deterrence and coercive diplomacy, especially as they pertain to the problem of nuclear crisis management. Second, he provides pertinent examples of friction as it might affect nuclear offenses and anti-missile defenses.
Subject: NMD--USA
Subject: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA018152
Media: Article

Title: Nuclear Proliferation and 'Realistic Deterrence' in a New Century.
Author: Cimbala, Stephen J.
Notes: Deterrence became an all-purpose theory and policy solution during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has caused theorists and policy-makers to ask whether deterrence is still either practicable or theoretically compelling. The prospect of additional and angry state and non-state actors armed with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), together with long-range delivery systems, threatens to shake the foundations of deterrence stability. In this article, the author considers whether this is so. First, he examines some of the theoretical arguments for a benign world with nuclear proliferation and some reasons to be skeptical about those arguments. Second, he considers the current status of nuclear weapons spread and some of the particular challenges presented to deterrence and arms race stability by nuclear proliferation.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Subject: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Item ID: JA018495
Media: Article
Title: Moving Away From MAD.
Author: Krepon, Michael
Notes: Treaties, governing nuclear-arms reduction and missile defences are languishing for political and more fundamental strategic reasons. START and the ABM Treaty reflect the logic of Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, the central organising principle of strategic-arms control during the Cold War. MAD's two basic tenets, as practised by the US and the Soviet Union, were nuclear overkill and vulnerability to missile attack. Now that the Cold War is over, these tenets no longer command widespread public or congressional support in the US. A sustainable and bipartisan basis for future US policies geared toward the reduction of nuclear dangers must be built on different ground. While nuclear deterrence will remain important in the twenty-first century, Cold War conceptions of MAD can no longer guide future US decisions regarding nuclear weapons and missile defences. The time has come to replace MAD with a new principle, one that embodies a cooperative approach to reducing nuclear threats.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
Subject: USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
Subject: COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION
Item ID: JA016553
Media: Article

Title: Deterrence, Defenses, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control.
Author: Sloss, Leon
Notes: This paper suggests a framework for thinking about the subjects of deterrence, nuclear weapons, defenses and arms control and outlines the major issues and how they interrelate. In the post-Cold War environment, new connections among them and vastly different circumstances around them will change how the United States formulates its security.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Item ID: JA017609
Media: Article

Title: The Need for a Japanese Nuclear Deterrent.
Author: Sherrill, Clifton W.
Notes: Japanese, American, and East Asian security interests each would be better served by a Japanese state that publicly admits to possession and accepts the responsibility of nuclear weapons. Japan can no longer rely on the U.S. security guarantee and, in particular, on the American nuclear deterrent, and for internal political and security reasons Japan should not be dependent on others to provide Japanese security in this era of proliferation.
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS--JAPAN
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--JAPAN
Item ID: JA017136
Media: Article
Notes: The debate over missile and nuclear proliferation has been clouded by some misplaced liberal assumptions. To focus on 'rogue' states with malignant designs is to misdiagnose nuclear proliferation as a 'disease'. Nuclear proliferation is much more a 'symptom' of the struggle for power that characterises international relations, with or without superpower conflict. One such area of proliferation may be right under our noses, not in a so-called rogue state, but in a key American ally in the Persian Gulf - Saudi Arabia. There is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia has already chosen a nuclear option. However, the Saudis already have in place a foundation for building a nuclear deterrent. They could work clandestinely to develop a nuclear capability, much as they did to procure ballistic missiles. Washington should not assume that a close regional ally such as Saudi Arabia would be loath to jeopardise that relationship by working at cross-purposes with declared American policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Such an assumption would profoundly overestimate the Saudi confidence in US protection, and would fail to recognise that security interests - not in any sense an innate friendship - are the driving forces behind policy in international politics.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—SAUDI ARABIA

2000

Author: Barnett, Roger W.
Notes: The risks of sharp reductions are of the greatest magnitude, and so are the possible consequences. 'Existential deterrence', the pivotal concept in Admiral Turner's scheme, is a very risky and dangerous approach to nuclear deterrence - for if it fails, it fails catastrophically.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—USA

Title: L'Identite europeenne de securite et de defense et la dissuasion nucleaire.
Author: Dumoulin, Andre
In: DEFENSE NATIONALE, 56eme annee, no. 8-9, aout - septembre 2000, p. 20-37.
Subject: ESDI
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—EUROPE

Title: Facing Nuclear and Conventional Reality.
Author: Gormley, Dennis M.
Additional Author: Mahnken, Thomas G.
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—USA
Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS—USA

Title: Droit international et dissuasion nucleaire.
Author: Zbienen, Randal
Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Subject: INTERNATIONAL LAW
Subject: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Media: Article
Title: The Assured Vulnerability Paradigm: Can It Provide a Useful Basis for Deterrence in a World of Strategic Multi-Polarity?

Author: Curtis, Willie


Notes: This article examines a number of assumptions regarding the viability of the Assured Vulnerability Paradigm for providing a useful basis for deterrence and strategic force structuring in a world of strategic multi-polarity. The study uses a retrospective historical approach to examine the basic assumptions of the Assured Vulnerability Paradigm in a world of strategic bi-polarity; outlines a set of questions regarding the assumptions; and provides a critique of the paradigm's ability to cope with the new challenges to strategic deterrence in a world of strategic multi-polarity.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Item ID: JA016701

Media: Article

Title: How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence?

Author: Quinlan, Michael


Notes: The risk that hostility between India and Pakistan may generate nuclear war depends upon factors too diverse and shifting for a simple prediction or assessment. Overall, the underpinnings of deterrence seem less solid than they had become in at least the later years of the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union. Stability in that setting became, however, very robust, and to say that risk is higher in South Asia is not to say that it is in absolute terms at all high. Nevertheless, the magnitude and repercussions of the catastrophe, should it happen, require that everything practicable be done to reduce the risk. By far the biggest contribution would be a settlement of the Kashmir conflict.

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN

Item ID: JA015913

Media: Article

Title: Nuclear Order and Disorder.

Author: Walker, William


Notes: After a decade of great progress in diminishing the risks posed by nuclear weapons, international nuclear relations came unstuck in the late 1990s. Why did this happen? This question is best answered through an understanding of how a 'nuclear order' was constructed during the Cold War, how it developed in the early post-Cold War period, and how confidence in it dissipated as the 1990s wore on. After considering how the nuclear order was founded upon linked systems of deterrence and abstinence, the article explains how both were destabilized in the mid- to late 1990s - cause and effects of the US shifting its ordering strategy towards protection (through missile defences) and enforcement. Can confidence in nuclear order be restored? How should we regard the recent agreement among States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement to press for complete nuclear disarmament?

Subject: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Subject: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Subject: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Item ID: JA015818

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