Russia’s efforts have never been honoured

Alexander Grushko, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Russia to NATO

Only Russia can change its behaviour

Kurt Volker, Ambassador (ret), Executive Director of The McCain Institute for Int’l Leadership, Washington, D.C.

www.magazine-the-european.com
A magazine of the Behörden Spiegel Group
Your protective shield against electronic eavesdropping

**Smartphone communications are intercepted.** Millions of times, day after day, around the world. BlackBerry and Secusmart have developed a way to counter this: an electronic shield which protects the communications of public authorities, ministries, defence establishments and numerous companies and governments worldwide and in Germany from electronic eavesdropping.

Follow the example set by governments around the globe by using the highly secure **SecuTABLET** and the tap-proof **SecuSUITE** for Government to safeguard your confidential communications. Control over your secrets is in your hands!

- Access highly secure data on the go with the SecuTABLET
- Benefit from extremely secure eavesdropping protection on your smartphone
- Communicate securely worldwide

www.secusmart.com
World Climate Summit 2015 – Paris gives the world hope

The result of the Paris World Climate Summit was a triumph for reason and an achievement for French diplomacy. This was the overwhelming view amongst the representatives of the 195 participating states as they listened to a moving speech by 69-year-old French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius announcing a successful conclusion to this diplomatic marathon. For more than two years French diplomats had travelled the world in an effort to convince the 195 governments to work from the very beginning of the conference towards a positive outcome. Paris was to be a counterpoint to the failed Copenhagen Summit.

France wanted this Agreement

When, on 13 November 2015, Paris was the victim of insane terrorist attacks that left it a grieving ghost city, all this appeared to be called into question. But the French President declared a state of emergency, and a few days later, France, refusing to yield to terror, gave a dignified welcome to the 195 delegations plus thousands of other participants.

This World Climate Agreement has its strengths and weaknesses. What is surely historic is the fact that the international community has agreed for the first time ever to take a common approach to combating global warming. It remains to be seen whether this Agreement will live up to its promises, because it leaves a number of essential questions unanswered. What it does do, however, is to give countries some room for manoeuvre in the definition of their climate objectives and make provision for financial aid to the tune of $100 billion each year for the period 2020 to 2025, as well for a compensation mechanism.

Perhaps the key to the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement will lie in the fact that, unlike the Copenhagen Agreement, it does not make its drastic reductions of greenhouse gases legally binding or propose to punish non-compliance with sanctions. What sets it apart from Copenhagen is that it leaves individual states free to decide whether to comply with the climate objectives or indeed to go even further.

Currently, however, there is still a gap between ambitions and reality. There can be no doubt that the Agreement will lead to a drastic reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases over a few decades. But whether this will be enough to keep global warming below the 2-degree limit remains to be seen.
Content

3 Editorial
6 NEWS
8 Documentation
UNHCR statement on the refugee crisis

The European Union
10 Jean-Dominique Giuliani
The European Union needs a change of software
How to prevent the EU from fraying

Main Topic
Re-stabilising the Euro-Atlantic Region: Should NATO and the EU reconcile with Russia?

12 Documentation
Applying reason in the crises of our time
Memorandum by the C. F. v. Weizsäcker Foundation

14 Ioan Mircea Paşcu MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels
Re-stabilising the Euro-Atlantic Region
Russia has decided to change course

15 Alexander Grushko, Brussels
Russia is the partner for the security of the Euro-Atlantic Region
Russia’s efforts have never been honoured

17 Karl-Heinz Kamp, Berlin
Reconciliation with Russia?
A future-oriented approach

18 Kurt Volker, Washington, D.C.
Only Russia is responsible for its bad behavior, and only Russia can change it
The West has sought to build a partnership

19 Harald Kujat, Berlin
NATO-Russia: Time to push the reset button
Building international stability through cooperation

20 Lubomír Zaorálek, Prague
The future of the Euro-Atlantic security framework
What role for the European Union?

21 Andy Francis Stirnal, Berlin
The 14th Berlin Security Conference 2015 – Review
Possibilities and impossibilities of a rapprochement with Russia

Special Dossier
Turkey’s role in the Middle East and its own security

24 Documentation
The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan

25 Elmar Brok MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels
The EU-Turkey understanding on refugees
This could be a significant step forward for both

26 Gerald Knaus and Katharina Knaus, Istanbul
Turkey’s role in the European refugee crisis
Restoring control without sacrificing compassion

Solving the refugee crisis: Turkey’s role

Photos (cover): Allan Grey, CC BY SA 2.0, flickr.com; private (left, right) Photos (page 4): Mariano Mantel, flickr.com, CC BY NC 2.0; EC.ECHO, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
Capabilities for Defence and Security

30 Marcin Styszynski, Poznań
The rise of global terror
ISIS’ domination and influence

34 Athanasios Manis, Erbil
Turkey and its Kurdish issue
The EU needs stable Turkish and Kurdish partners

35 Debalina Ghoshal, New Delhi
NATO and Turkey: the Missile Defence dilemma
NATO should stand strong with its ally

Security and Defence
Capabilities

38 Interview with Jorge Domecq, Brussels
The European Defence Agency
The EU needs strategic capabilities

41 Nico Segers, Brussels
NATO is sharpening its training capacities
Promising Trident exercises

44 Andreas Arnold, Erkrath
Personal protective clothing
Protection for law-enforcement & military operations

46 Brett Wahlin, Washington
From Here to cybersecurity
Four rules to be respected

47 Karim Michel Sabbagh, Luxembourg
Satellite – a critical infrastructure for Defence and Security
Connectivity is a key factor

49 Joel E. Villa, Washington
Tearing down political fortresses
Transatlantic industrial partnerships

50 Interview with James Monroe, Berlin
How to defend NATO and secure European societies?
A transatlantic and integrated missile defence

Smart Energy concepts and systems

54 Interview with Sorin Ducaru, Brussels
Secure energy supply for NATO armed forces
The use of alternative energies

56 Nannette Cazaubon, Paris
A German engineering system brings NATO closer to smart energy targets
Successful CrossPower technology

58 Uwe Tiegel, Radeberg
Heat management in camps
Smart energy success depends on end users

59 Gerhard Ebenhoch, Munich
Clean Sky engine demonstrator
Successful test marks a step forward

60 Jürgen Zitzmann, Nuremberg
Smart energy for settlements and refugee camps
Hybrid powerstation for Lebanon

61 List of authors 2015
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Back to Cold War?

This year’s Munich Security Conference was overshadowed by the failure of world powers to quell the five-year conflict in Syria, the Russian military intervention there, which earned harsh criticism, and the refugee crisis in Europe. Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry A. Medvedev even warned the conference about a looming slide into a new Cold War.

In these times of international crisis and confrontation, we decided to give the floor to European, Russian and American experts from the world of politics, NATO and academia to hear how they think Euro-Atlantic/Russia relations could or should look in the future.

→ See our Main Topic starting on page 13

MIGRATION AND REFUGEE CRISIS

Refugees continue to risk their lives to reach Europe

According to the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR, over 80,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe by boat during the first six weeks of 2016. Over 400 have died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Despite harsh winter weather with rougher seas over 2,000 people a day continue to risk their lives and the lives of their children attempting to reach Europe. UNHCR shows concern at the increasingly restrictive measures being taken by European countries with regard to the refugee crisis in Europe.

→ You will find a statement by UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming on page 10 of this magazine

TURKEY’S NEW ROLE

EU-Turkey Joint Action

During the last European Council held in Brussels on 18-19 February, European leaders emphasised the importance of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (activated in November 2015) as a key component of the response to the refugee and migrant crisis. European Council President Donald Tusk announced another summit to be held on 7 March with Turkey’s participation. In addition, European leaders consider it necessary to now put in place the capacity for the EU to provide humanitarian assistance within the EU, in cooperation with organisations such as UNHCR, to support countries faced with large numbers of refugees and migrants.

The refugee crisis was also on the agenda of the Brussels Justice and Home Affairs Council of 25 February. Klaas Dijkhoff, Dutch State Secretary for Security and Justice said: “We can solve this crisis if all member states are ready to work together, as well as work with the countries on the Western Balkan route and with Turkey. Today we confirmed again the importance of cooperating with each other through the exchange of information, by implementing what has already been agreed, and by assisting each other to do so.”

Source: Council of the European Union

→ See our Turkey special dossier, notably the article by Elmar Brok MEP addressing the role of Turkey in the refugee crisis (page 25), and by Gerald and Katharina Knaus from the European Stability Initiative who explain that a solution of the crisis is possible (page 26)
SECURITY AND DEFENCE

EU Military Staff and Eurocorps sign cooperation agreement

(ed/esdu, Paris) On 18 January 2016, a Letter of Intent was signed in Brussels by the Director General of the European Union Military Staff, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe, and the Commanding General of Eurocorps, Lieutenant General Alfredo Ramirez. The EU Military Staff, a body responsible for military expertise within the EU, and the Eurocorps, a multinational military Headquarters, express their common and mutual interest in closely linking and coordinating work with a common purpose and in establishing an agreed framework for bilateral cooperation. This framework includes, among other domains, the exchange of information, joint training and education and enhancing the efficiency of responses to crises. The agreement is a step towards at last making the highly operational Eurocorps Headquarters the EU’s preferred military asset for the whole spectrum of EU crisis-management operations.

EUROCORPS is a fully deployable and highly autonomous multinational Headquarters for its Framework Nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain), the EU, NATO and other International Organisations. It is to be prepared to plan and conduct the full spectrum of land and land-heavy operations by commanding allocated forces as decided by its Common Committee (CoCo) on behalf of the Framework Nations.

The European Union Military Staff is the source of the EU’s military expertise. It performs early warning, situation awareness and strategic planning for the missions and tasks referred to in Article 43 (1) of the Treaty on the European Union, including those identified by the European Security Strategy. This also encompasses the identification of European national and multinational forces and the implementation of policies and decisions as directed by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC).

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

New standards for RPAS

In Mid-December 2015, the European Defence Agency (EDA) signed a contract for the Enhanced RPAS Automation (ERA) project with a multinational industrial consortium. The objective of the project is to support the widespread use of both civil and military RPAS in non-segregated airspace in Europe, in general, and their integration in airport operations, in particular. It will address several capability gaps identified in the European RPAS Steering Group (ERSG) Roadmap for RPAS air traffic insertion. Technical and procedural solutions will be developed, and demonstrated by simulations and flight trials.

web: http://tinyurl.com/hk4gp8r

Editor-in-Chief Hartmut Bühl recently had a conversation with EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq. A report on this meeting can be found in the chapter entitled Security and Defence: Capabilities, starting on page 37.

SMART ENERGY

EDA Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy

On 14 January, the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector held its first plenary session. The consultation will take place through a series of meetings between more than 80 experts from the armed forces, industry and academia. The Forum will examine how energy efficiency measures and renewable energy sources could be better used and implemented within the European defence sector. Since defence is one of the largest energy consumers in Europe, the key challenges are to quantify the extent of this energy usage and to assess how projects stimulated through this Consultation Forum can impact overall EU energy usage.

web: http://tinyurl.com/qdg89lc

See also the Chapter Security and Defence: Smart Energy opening with an interview by our Journalist Nannette Cazaubon with Sorin Ducaru, Head of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division (pages 54–55)
UNHCR is concerned about increasingly restrictive measures in Europe

(ed/nc, Paris) At a press briefing on 12 February in Geneva, spokesperson Melissa Fleming expressed UNHCR’s concern at the increasingly restrictive measures being taken by European countries with regard to the refugee crisis in Europe (excerpts):

“Over 80,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe by boat during the first six weeks of 2016 and over 400 have died trying to cross. Despite rougher seas, harsh winter weather, and numerous hardships endured upon arrival, over 2,000 people a day continue to risk their lives and the lives of their children attempting to reach Europe.

More people arrived during the first six weeks of 2016 than during the first four months of 2015; comparably large numbers began arriving in Europe only by July 2015. The majority of those arriving in January 2016, nearly 58%, were women and children; one in three people arriving to Greece were children as compared to just 1 in 10 in September 2015. Over 91% of those arriving in Greece come from the world’s top ten refugee producing countries, including Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Winter weather and rough seas have not deterred those desperate enough to make the journey, however, have resulted in near daily shipwrecks and search and rescue operations with some 400 dead. When surveyed upon arrival, most cite they had to leave their homeland due to conflict. More than 56 per cent of January arrivals to Greece were from Syria.

Solutions to Europe’s situation are not only eminently possible, but have already been agreed by States and urgently need to be implemented. Stabilization is essential and something for which there is also strong public demand. Within the context of the necessary reduction of dangerous sea arrivals, safe access to seek asylum, including through resettlement and humanitarian admission, is a fundamental human right that must be protected and respected. (…)

Regrettably, the first six weeks of 2016 have also seen multiple developments in Europe suggesting that some countries are prioritizing keeping refugees and migrants out over finding realistic solutions. Since the start of 2016 border control measures have been tightened in many European States. Despite repeated calls by UNHCR to expand legal pathways to allow refugees and asylum seekers to access asylum, many European Member States are in fact reducing the legal avenues available.

On the legal front, restrictive measures on family reunification were imposed in January in Denmark, with refugees now only able to apply for their family to join them after three years, instead of one. Other countries are contemplating similar or even more restrictive legislation at a time where European countries need to improve the legal and secured ways to access family reunion and thus combat smuggling.

Recent successive announcements of national measures aiming at trying to appear more unattractive than the neighboring country only underlines the dire need for an effective comprehensive European response, the problems cannot simply be shifted from one country to another. A race to the bottom helps no-one.

UNHCR recognizes the challenges some European countries are facing due to significant arrivals of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. Clearly States have a sovereign right to manage their borders; however, this must be done in accordance with national, EU and international law. The possible damaging impact of individual measures and practices on the rights and lives of refugees has to be considered.

Increasing acts of violence and prejudice have jeopardized the safety and well-being of refugees and asylum seekers across Europe. Fueled by xenophobia and propaganda campaigns based on fear, refugee families, homes and places of worship are being targeted with hate crimes varying from physical attacks, vandalism, arson, and even more sinister incidents such as one where a mosque had blood thrown on its walls and a pig’s head left at its door. (…)

Quick and thorough support mechanisms will be crucial for integrating people in countries receiving the highest number of refugees, including Germany and Sweden, to help dispel the fear and xenophobia and reinstate the common European principles of dignity, solidarity and human rights that the European Union was founded upon.”

Source: UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/
The European Union

“These are testing times for the European Union. In our response to this unprecedented crisis lies the future of the Union itself: we are being tested and the world is watching to see if we practise what we preach in the area of human rights, security, freedom and human dignity. Will we sink or swim in this sea of despair?”

Ana Gomes MEP (in: ESDU 2/2015, Vol. 21)
One might well wonder whether the European edifice has not already begun to crack

The European Union needs a change of software

by Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Chairman Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris

Never has European integration faced as many serious challenges at any one time. The most evident of these is the migratory issue, the influx of refugees and economic migrants that is sweeping across the continent; but the imperative of security has also become a pressing demand, whilst the terrorist threat in Europe is particularly high.

Unprepared for the role of world player

It has been the West’s, and therefore Europe’s, incapacity to deal with instability in its neighbourhood and especially the Syrian crisis that is at the root of the exodus of millions of migrants and also of the terrorist attacks that are now striking our territories. In this regard the US withdrawal from the Middle East and from Europe has been costly to Europeans, who have been unprepared to take on a role of world player. Efforts to compensate for these weaknesses will be no match for a European political initiative of the highest level that will require strong commitment on the part of some Member States at least. Everyone is aware of the work undertaken by the European Commission to help the countries on the external borders to deal with the migratory wave. Thanks to the Commission and Frontex, thousands of lives have been spared from drowning and catastrophes prevented. No one can ignore the expression of solidarity towards France, which fell victim in 2015, in the wake of others, to the most horrible attacks. For the first time this even took the shape of the commitment of troops by France’s side, whilst previously it had fought alone in the field against terrorist movements of a new genre.

Nothing is able to replace far-reaching strategic action that simultaneously makes use of diplomacy, military commitment, humanitarian aid and the design of rules for the control of immigration.

The lesson of 2015 was a bitter pill to swallow

Today the European Union is governed by its rules rather than its leaders, although the latter have been democratically and legitimately elected. The Member States have abandoned Europe to the technicians, the legal experts and diplomats, who are not to blame, but who cannot replace elected leaders, who have previously put a true, subsequently ratified vision of the future to their people.

From this standpoint Jean-Claude Juncker emerges as the true political leader that he is and intends to remain. But his voice has not found much of a response in the capitals of Europe, which are more concerned about their electoral calendars than the continent’s future. Even within his own administration, the European Commission, we cannot say that a political vision holds sway over an administrative response – the so-called legal constraints – in short, over the cumbersome

Professor Jean-Dominique Giuliani

has been Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris, of which he was one of the founders, since 2000.

He was born in 1956. J-P. Giuliani has a degree in law from the Institute of Political Studies. From 1992 to 1998 he was Director of the Office of the President of the Senate, René Monory. He then became the Director for the General Management of TNS Sofres, Paris. In 2002 he founded JD-G.Com International Consultants and has been Special Adviser to the European Commission since 2006.
nature of an international organisation as feared by Robert Schuman himself.

Common sense and flexibility are lacking
The reform of the Commission, notably the introduction of powerful Vice-Presidents to coordinate the Commissioners’ activities, was a necessity. It finally enabled political debate within the European executive. But it also led to an increase in the rigidity of its positions: once a compromise has been found between the Commissioners, no-one want to challenge this during debate with Member States or Parliament. The administration of men involves authority as much as it does flexibility, imagination and common sense, a dose of reality as well as patience!

The Member States do not play their European role
European policy within the Member States has become an object of shame at best, and of opportunism at worst. Some pay Europe minimum lip service, others come to bargain. Given the rise of populism, most governments permanently recant what they have agreed in Brussels, split between their national election-prone personality and their more reasonable, collective European work. The result is colourless, ambitionless European policies, 10-page communiqués, but no real pro-action that is likely to spark interest amongst the citizens or provide for rapid answers to urgent issues.
In fact no European institution, neither the Commission nor the Parliament or the Council, nor even the Member States, is free from criticism in terms of their rising to the major challenges faced by the continent. There is a lack of strategic vision, a lack of flexibility and speed in implementation, and relative disinterest for everything European.

We need common sense within a strategic vision
If Europe wants to be effective again and to win back popular support, everyone, at their level, must work at it hard. The goals of unification must be recalled, starting with our leaders: the pooling of our strengths to guarantee the survival and promotion of our way of European life. This quite obviously demands a change of software, in other words, as in the world of IT, not just another institutional reform (the hardware) but a change in the way issues are addressed on a daily basis (the software).

Enough of legal quibbling, regulatory constraints, worn-out customs and practices! They worked well for too long for them now to be adapted to the modern world. Citizens want results. Europeans must practise politics in the noblest sense of the word, i.e., think on a par with the challenges at hand, be pro-active, implement rapidly and effectively in the field. Otherwise the entire European edifice will crack under the weight of events. We might well wonder whether this has not already begun...

---

NEWS

Keeping the UK in the Union
(ed/nc, Paris) The British EU membership referendum to be held on 23 June 2016 was one of the main topics of the 18-19 February European Council which reached a settlement for keeping the United Kingdom in the EU. At the close of the meeting, Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, made the following statement (excerpts): “Good evening, we have just achieved a deal which strengthens Britain’s special status in the European Union. It is a legally binding and irreversible decision by all 28 leaders. The settlement addresses all of Prime Minister Cameron’s concerns without compromising our fundamental values. (...) We have sent out a signal that we are all willing to sacrifice part of our interests for the common good, to show our unity. The times we live in are stormy and unpredictable, with all the crises raging around us. If you think I am over-dramatising, just look at what is happening at this very moment. The greatest migration crisis in the history of Europe. The imminent threat of borders closing on our continent. Terrorist attacks in Turkey, airstrikes in Libya, war flaring up in Syria. The growing conflict between Russia and Turkey. Unfortunately, I could go on.

Exceptional times need exceptional words. And nobody expressed himself better than Winston Churchill. Let me quote what he said in Zurich in 1946: (...) If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, as Churchill said, and indeed from final doom, there must be this act of faith in the European family. Can the peoples of Europe rise to the heights of the soul and of the instinct and spirit of man? What is sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom. Therefore I say to you, let Europe arise. (...) I deeply believe that the United Kingdom needs Europe, and Europe needs the United Kingdom. To break the link now would be totally against our mutual interests. We have done all we could not to let that happen. But the final decision is in the hands of the British people”.

Source: www.consilium.eu
Applying reason in the crises of our time

A memorandum by the Working Group Common European Home of the Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Foundation

(ed/ak, Berlin) In keeping with the aims and work of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, the Foundation strives to perform a scrupulous analysis of the present and to develop projects to address the current challenges facing society. The signatories – Frank Elbe, Harald Kujat, Dr Bruno Redeker and Prof. Dr Horst M. Teltschik – appeal to politicians, governments and heads of state to pave the way for and take active steps towards an “order of security and peace from Vancouver to Vladivostok” (excerpts):

“The problems of international terrorism and fundamentalism, the dramatic wave of refugees, the financial crisis of this century, the globally unequal distribution of wealth and the damage caused to our natural resources not only remain unsolved but they are intensifying on a local, regional and global level. The opportunity for an ‘order of peace and security from Vancouver to Vladivostok’ as set out in the ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’ seems largely to have been missed. Not only are wars being waged as ever before, but war has also returned to Europe, chiefly driven by the conflict between Russia and its neighbouring states and the tensions with the Western democracies. [...]”

War and the prevention of war

[...] The modern age is pursuing two goals: the humanisation of war and the prevention of wars. The humanisation of war includes, for example, banning certain weapons, the Red Cross and the development of international law. [...] However, the humanisation of war does not lead to the prevention of war [...]. Ultimately, the prevention of war can [only be secured] politically.

Since time immemorial, treaties have served to prevent war. The danger of the present situation consists above all in the fact that both major powers no longer perceive themselves as stabilizing leading powers of interlocking, though opposing systems or even ideologies but still mutually-respected strategic interests, but above all as representatives of national interests. [...] None of the structural reasons which led to the First World War appears to have been really overcome. [...]”

Renaissance

‘We are standing at a crossroads in the relationship between America and Russia,’ warns Gorbachev in a recent interview. He says that the ‘trust that we have built up so laboriously’ is at stake, as is the assurance that we do not really and earnestly need to reckon with an incalculable nuclear risk as a result of deterrence. [...] That forces us to tread new paths. But new paths mostly lie in a renaissance [...] of negotiations, treaties, [...] predictability and mutual trust. [...]”

The unconditional will on both sides to come to a ‘balance of differing interests’ (Clausewitz) seems to have almost expired on both sides, and probably cannot be readily revived. Yet it is possible to detect a trace of this will, for example in the New Start Treaty of 2010 between Russia and the United States which extends the 1991 Start I Treaty and at times introduces a new dynamic into the relations between the two states. Its trace can be recorded [...] also in the shared interests such as preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, weapons systems and technologies or containing trouble spots such as the Middle East and where possible jointly restoring peace there.

Europe

“No security without Russia” has now become a standard expression. Remembering the tension of the diversity and unity of European history, the aberrations, errors and mistakes, but also the glories of its civilisation, Europe, as an ad vocate of ‘commonly applied reason’ (C. F. v. Weizsäcker) faces the challenge and the struggle of achieving [...] a comprehensive order of peace and security [...]. On this path the signatories see two albeit insufficient, but also essential interlocking steps:

• Firstly, the insight that every major power has its Cuba. That means the defined and mutually respected recognition of strategic interests so that the war in Ukraine does not slip into a war around Ukraine.

• Secondly, the de-ideologicalisation of conflicts. That applies in regard to Syria as much as to Ukraine [...].

• Thirdly, negotiations that give priority to common rather than dividing interests and lead to as close as possible integration that, if broken, will entail consequences that none of those involved would wish. [...]”

Conclusion

No security without Russia, but equally ‘No security without America’. [...] As the advocate of jointly applied reason, Europe should bring the American and the Russian presidents to a table with the objective of finding a political solution to the conflict in Syria and in Ukraine through the balancing of differing interests. Yet Europe should not place its fate solely in the hands of the two great powers, but in its own best interests make every effort to contribute to overcoming the antagonism between east and west, the spiral of threat and counter-threat, and of misjudgment and overreaction. In this way [...], Europe could at the same time retain the opportunity of responding to the further challenges of our time [...].”

Source: Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Foundation
MAIN TOPIC
Re-stabilising the Euro-Atlantic Region: Should NATO and the EU reconcile with Russia?
Unfortunately, Russia has decided to change course

Re-stabilising the Euro-Atlantic Region

by Dr Ioan Mircea Pašcu MEP, Professor, Vice-President of the European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

I would start by noting that the Euro-Atlantic Region has evolved over time. While during the cold war it meant mostly the transatlantic area, after the end of it – following the admission of the former Warsaw Pact members and given the preponderantly cooperative relations between the West (and its institutions: NATO and the EU) and Russia – it grew to cover the entire continent. More recently, after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the military destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine by Russia, it again contracted, in an attempt to leave out the territory of the former Soviet Union claimed by Russia as its “natural” sphere of influence.

Russia and the West are in the same boat

However, in the face of the current challenges – both philosophically (our values are being contested) and physically (our territory is under assault by a refugee tsunami) – such distinctions as to what the Euro-Atlantic Region really is have in fact become almost irrelevant. The truth is that, irrespective of geography, Europe as a whole is under assault: therefore, for all practical purposes, both the West and Russia, even if some do not want to admit it, are in the same boat, navigating the same stormy sea.

Reconciliation with Russia is, naturally, preferable and desirable. But, that can hardly happen before Russia alters its current aggressive course.

Ioan Mircea Pašcu MEP

The recent terrorist attacks in Europe, especially those in Paris last November, have confronted the European citizens with a new reality, namely that Euro-Atlantic security is no longer a one-dimensional concept, i.e. external, but a multidimensional one, including internal. Those terrorist attacks have brought guerrilla warfare to the streets of Europe, directly confronting our citizens with a high degree of insecurity.

The EU needs concepts and practical measures

The consequences of this new situation are not only conceptual – in that the new European Global Strategy, under preparation in the office of the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, will have to reflect it accordingly – but also practical, unleashing the full potential of the legal instruments at our disposal (the Permanent Structured Cooperation foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty, for instance), making our relatively vast network of agencies and strategies dealing with the EU’s internal security work coherently and, finally, removing the obstacles that stand in the way of the necessary broad-based cooperation between the EU and NATO.

As indicated above, Russia is part of this same picture. As already proven, the terrorists make no distinction between the Russians and other European citizens, which logically should lead us to cooperate with each other. Unfortunately, Russia has decided to change course, no longer seeing the West as its partner, but rather as its adversary (see, for instance, the description of NATO). Presumably this is due to the West’s lack of sympathy for Russia’s recent assertiveness and bold revisionist actions in breach of international law and calling into question the territorial status quo in Europe and the value system on which it is based.

Reconciliation with Russia – on certain conditions

Reconciliation with Russia is, naturally, preferable and desirable. But, that can hardly happen before Russia alters its current aggressive course, which means abandoning confrontation and proving that it is again ready to cooperate (starting with the implementation of the Minsk 2 agreement, for instance). Any reversal of this sequence – namely reconciliation before a change of course – must be weighed against the West’s loss of credibility and the potential encouragement it would offer to further destabilisation in the East of the continent. To this must be added the fact that there is no apparent direct link between solving the refugee crisis and reconciliation with Russia, both issues needing to be addressed independently.
Russia’s efforts for building a common security area have never been honoured by the West

Russia is the partner for the security of the Euro-Atlantic Region

by Alexander Grushko, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Russia to NATO, Brussels

Many in the West tend to blame Russia for the current crisis, for its assertive behaviour and growing global ambitions. They claim that the West has done its utmost to promote genuine partnership, but that Moscow has been reluctant to cooperate and should be punished for its independent policy in international affairs. “Hybrid warfare” – to use the NATO terminology – has been waged against Russia with a combination of economic sanctions, military pressure through the NATO military build-up on the “eastern flank” and rigorous and demonising anti-Russian propaganda.

Russia’s efforts to build a common security

This simplistic, ideologically-driven approach – “anyone who is not with us is against us” – ignores the fact that the history of Russian foreign policy since the Cold War is the story of tremendous efforts to build a collective security system that would protect all members of the Euro-Atlantic region. Russia made a crucial contribution to the elimination of the legacy of the confrontation era by committing to withdrawing troops and armaments from Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries. After joining the Council of Europe in 1996 we invested a lot in that organisation with a view to creating a single legal space in Europe. We developed cooperation with NATO and the EU based on the principles of mutual respect and equality. In 1997, the signing of the Russia-NATO Founding Act laid the basis for partnership and a commitment to military restraint between former adversaries. Much was done to develop new instruments of arms control and confidence building, inter alia the CFE regime, the Vienna Document and the Open Sky Treaty, with a view to providing greater security with less means. In 2008, we proposed to jointly work on a European Security Treaty aimed at building a common security space in the Euro-Atlantic area for all states, regardless of their membership of military and political alliances.

The leading trend has always been to build partnerships, to capitalise on our relations with the West in such a way that would allow us to move forward on hard security, to build common security projects without dividing lines and to equate our political dialogue with the growing interdependence in the economic, humanitarian and cultural areas that we have accumulated over the years.

Russia became the EU’s third largest trade partner after the US and China.

International cooperation with Russia must continue. From left to right: EC President Jean-Claude Juncker, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, World Climate Summit, Paris, 30.11.2015

Photo: © European Union, 2015 / Source: EC - Audiovisual Service / Photo: Johanna Leguerre

Alexander Grushko

NATO’s geopolitical mistakes

However, the emerging security order was broken by the euphoria in the West, which claimed victory in the Cold War. NATO and the EU were identified as the only credible instruments for ensuring Euro-Atlantic security: their vision could not be questioned. The OSCE was downgraded. To guarantee its raison d’être NATO launched its open door policy, deemed by many prominent politicians to be one of the biggest geopolitical mistakes of the 20th century, because it creates further dividing lines on the continent and fosters a psychology of confrontation.

We offered to NATO to jointly develop a concept and architecture for European Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) that would be jointly controlled, adapted to the potential threats, and that would not undermine strategic stability. However, the US with its NATO partners did not agree to these proposals under the false pretext that Russia was not an ally, and continued to develop its missile defence, regardless even of the Iranian nuclear deal.

How can we act together?

If we are really interested in promoting a collective security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, we have to accomplish two major tasks.

• The first is to overcome the legacy of the Cold War. We thought that this task belonged to the past. But with the Ukraine crisis we saw those Cold War instincts fomented, with NATO making a sharp U-turn in its relations with Russia, opting for deterrence and reorienting its military planning to counter non-existent “threats” from the East. This is a dangerous tendency that has an overall negative impact on European security.

• Secondly, the quality of security directly depends on the ability of states to cooperate over and above institutional and political “dividing lines” in the areas of common interests. It is an illusion that one can create isolated “islands of security”, relying solely on the instruments of NATO, the EU or any other organisation. Global challenges have no borders, we are all equally exposed to them and the answer should be collective.

The Iranian nuclear deal and other examples of cooperation give hope

We saw good examples of a genuine international cooperation as we worked together on Iran’s nuclear deal or on the removal of chemical weapons from Syria. Russia continues to play an active role in the Normandy format, in the efforts to stabilise the situation in the Middle East, North Africa and Afghanistan. Russia is critical for issues related to strategic stability and non-proliferation. We are not interested in confrontation or in spiralling into a new Cold War. On the contrary, we are convinced that there is no real alternative to mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of equality, pragmatism and respect for each other’s interests.

They said at the Munich Security Conference 2016:

“There is a great deal at stake. The forces pulling us apart in Europe are so enormous that we should show our resolve [...]. We need to fight for Europe.”

Frank-Walter Steinmeier

“This moment is not as overwhelming as people think it is. We know what needs to be done and most importantly, we have the power to do it.”

John F. Kerry

“There can be no choice between defense and dialogue. To ensure long-term stability in Europe, we need both.”

Jens Stoltenberg

“One could go so far to say that we have slid back to a new cold war. [...] Sometimes I wonder whether it is 2016 we live in or 1962.”

Dmitry A. Medvedev

Source: http://bit.ly/1olZNrK

Documentation

Photo: Stephan Roehl, flickr.com, CC BY-SA 2.0

Photo: U.S. Government Work

Photo: MSC/Mueller, CC BY 3.0 DE

Photo: Downing Street, flickr.com, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
Reconciliation among conflicting states seems evident in a globalised world in which geographical distance and national borders no longer form a barrier to vital threats and challenges. Alas, reconciliation with Russia currently seems futile, as at the latest in 2014, Moscow fundamentally altered its position in and perception of the international order. Three elements of Russia’s new course are striking.

First, Russia defines itself as an anti-Western power, regarding Western values and concepts of democracy as degenerate. Instead, Moscow forms its policies on the basis of nationalism, orthodoxy and the notion of Slavic superiority. It therefore rejects a European security order based on institutions like NATO, the EU or the OSCE, which it perceives to have been corrupted by the United States.

Second, Russia’s strategic thinking has visibly reverted to the logic of the Yalta Conference of 1945, with major powers claiming spheres of interest that they mark by political and military signals such as force deployments or overflights by military aircraft or even nuclear bombers. Countries within these spheres have to accept limitations on their sovereignty, since they belong to the “Near Abroad” of the major power.

Thirdly, these two viewpoints have led Russia to breach international law, to violate agreements that it previously had negotiated and supported and to annex the territory of a neighbouring state.

The end of the European Peace Order
This open aggression against Crimea and the Eastern part of Ukraine in 2014 is key, as it ends a decades-long consensus that borders in Europe will never again be altered by military force. The “European Peace Order” established after the end of the Cold War has come to an end. The purpose of this fundamental shift is to re-establish Russia as a leading world power – a position President Putin believes that Russia lost during the humiliating years of the Yeltsin era. Means towards this end are a rapid military build-up, the creation and exploitation of rifts within the “West” and the de-legitimation of NATO and weakening of the European Union. The fact that this strategy has borne only limited fruit so far is not likely to lead Russia to change its course. NATO and the EU have maintained their cohesion, the aggression against Crimea was conducted at significant political and financial cost and Russia’s economic perspectives are disastrous.

Steps towards cooperation and more stability
Still, the Putin regime continues to cultivate at domestic level the illusion of a leading world power, investing in costly interna-
The West has consistently sought to reach out to Russia and to build a partnership

Only Russia is responsible for its bad behavior, and only Russia can change it

by Kurt Volker, Ambassador (ret), Executive Director of The McCain Institute for Intern. Leadership, Washington, D.C.

It is impossible to count the number of times western foreign policy leaders repeat the mantra, “We need to engage with Russia.” Sometimes, it comes out as, “We need to work with Russia,” and “We need Russia in order to solve... (pick your problem),” or “We must not provoke Russia.” While these sentiments seem laudable on the surface, the assumptions behind them are misguided. These assumptions seem to be: “Russia has a legitimate grievance;” “We cannot afford to be in a conflict with Russia;” and “If only we can engage with the Russians, we can moderate their behavior.”

Putin is not lashing out in irrational ways

In other words, many western leaders increasingly seem to believe that the Russians are legitimately angry over western encroachments on their interests; that the Russians are basically reasonable, but are confused and lashing out in irrational ways; and that merely by talking with them, we can bring them down from this ledge. Such is the success of Russian propaganda. These “assumptions” stated above are exactly what Russian President Putin wants the West to believe. The fact is that Putin is smart. He knows exactly what he is doing. He is deliberately engaging in aggressive, outrageous behavior, while spinning out propaganda to influence the West and to justify his actions. And he is deliberately exploiting the West’s penchant for reasonableness, dialogue and engagement in order to cement his gains and keep going. Let’s look at the “victimhood” narrative. Russia would have the rest of us believe that after 1991, NATO promised Russia never to enlarge or to have forces in what was then called Eastern Europe. But instead, NATO has relentlessly taken over countries, fomented revolutions, and encircled and threatened Russia. Russia, according to this line, has no choice but to respond. Nothing could be further from the truth. The cold war took place because the Soviet Union occupied Eastern Europe, imposed communist governments, and sought to do the same in Western Europe. NATO was formed as a defensive Alliance.

Russia was on the right track...

When the Cold War ended, people in newly free countries such as Poland and the Baltic States immediately put in place democratic governments, market economies, and sought to join NATO (and the EU) so that future generations would never have to suffer that kind of occupation again. And Russia recognized the right of people to make these choices – agreeing to document after document that reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all European states, and the commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force. It even pledged to build cooperation with NATO through the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council. What has changed since then is not western policy toward Russia. The West has consistently sought to reach out to Russia and to build a partnership. What has changed is Russia’s approach to Europe under Putin.

... but Putin is going in the wrong direction

Russia has invaded neighbors (Georgia, Ukraine); changed borders by force (Crimea, South Ossetia, Abkhazia); violated arms control treaties (CFE, INF); run roughshod over political agreements (Charter of Paris, Helsinki Accords, Budapest Memorandum); used energy as a political weapon (Ukraine, Bulgaria, Nordstream); threatened nuclear weapons use; and massively re-built its military while NATO has slashed its forces. Every time western leaders seek to accommodate these actions – by launching negotiations in Geneva or Normandy, tacitly accepting occupations, sticking to agreements while Russia violates them – Putin pockets these concessions and demands more.

The West must create the conditions for Russia to change

The West did not create these Russian actions, and no amount of western “engagement” with Russia will change them. Only Russia is responsible for its behavior, and only Russia can change it. Instead of seeking further engagement, the West should instead focus on creating the political, economic, and security conditions that will cause Russia to seek to engage with the West instead.
Building international stability through security and cooperation

NATO-Russia: Time to push the reset button
by Harald Kujat, General (ret), former Chairman Military Committee, NATO, Berlin

The fall of the Berlin wall and German reunification symbolise a return to the political, cultural and social unity of Europe. Those who stood on either side of the front, however, know that it was the strategic partnership between NATO and Russia that marked the final end of confrontation. Yet with the end of the Cold War began a tectonic shift that continues to this day: the Ukraine conflict is a striking example. Forces were unleashed that find their expression in the fight for freedom and for the preservation of natural resources, but also in the threats posed by terrorism and growing migratory flows.

Reviving the NATO-Russia Founding Act
It is necessary on geopolitical, military and strategic grounds as well as in its own security interests for NATO to return to the foundations of its relations with Russia. Both sides undertake in the Founding Act to work in a constructive and cooperative manner, whenever their security interests are at stake, in order to seek solutions to the crisis. The possibility that the NATO-Russia Council has of meeting at different levels makes it an effective and flexible crisis-management tool. Military confidence-building measures that would pave the way for a political solution to the Ukraine conflict could, for example, be agreed at the level of Chiefs of Staff.

Seeking a way out of the crisis
The world has fallen into a dangerous state of disorder. Just as the Harmel Report laid the foundations for security and détente in order to overcome the East-West conflict, it is necessary today, through security and cooperation, to seek a way out of the crisis and back to a stable international order. This cannot be done without Russia and certainly not against it. In the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear deal Russia proved to be a reliable partner. It was willing to risk military action in the Syrian civil war when the West was only willing to accept a limited engagement. Thus there is a chance of finding a successful approach against Islamic state in Syria and Iraq, putting an end to the civil war and finding a political settlement in Syria.

Coordination instead of confrontation
NATO is clearly increasingly under pressure to engage militarily in Syria. This makes close political coordination with Russia crucial. Further escalation between Russia and Turkey, which could have unforeseeable consequences for all NATO member states, must be avoided at all costs. NATO must contribute, together with Russia, to constructive crisis management, both in Syria and Ukraine. Both are primarily European conflicts, albeit with worldwide repercussions. Much is at stake, which is why it is not enough just to join forces against the common foe, IS.

Jointly assuming responsibility
Those who were present on the Cold War fronts know that acting responsibly means containing the current threats and preventing the tensions between NATO and Russia from spiralling out of control and exploding without either side having lifted a finger.

General (ret.) Harald Kujat
was born in 1942 in Mielke. He joined the German Armed Forces on 1 July, 1959 and completed the 20th General Staff Course (Air Force), at the Command and Staff College, Hamburg. 1992–1995 Chief of Staff and Deputy German MiliRep to the NATO Military Committee and Western European Union, Brussels. 1996–1998 Director, IFOR Coordination Centre (ICC), SHAPE, Belgium and later Assistant Director, International Military Staff (Plans & Policy) and Deputy Director, IMS, NATO Headquarters, Brussels. 1998–2000 Director of Policy and Advisory Staff to the German MOD, Berlin. 2000–2002, Chief of Defence (CHOD), Federal Armed Forces, Berlin. 2002–2005, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Brussels.
Possibilities and impossibilities of a rapprochement with Russia

The 14th Congress on European Security and Defence

by Andy Francis Stirnal, Berlin correspondent ESDU, Berlin

On 17–18 November, the 14th Berlin Security Conference (BSC) convened to discuss the central theme of “Euro-Atlantic Partnership – firm anchor in a turbulent world”. Never before has a BSC motto proven to be so apt: what seemed like only hours before, Paris had been struck by terrorist attacks, while throughout the year the world had been struggling with the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. Thus the focus of the 2015 BSC on its official partner country, the United States, was only nominal. In reality, every single topic had to be discussed in the context of forging alliances against global threats and hence through the prism of western relations with Russia and its role in handling the current crises. Although Russia and the West face the same security challenges – as demonstrated by the bringing down of a Russian plane in Sinai – this understanding appears on occasions to be lacking from the dialogue between them.

The need for multi-level approaches

“The forum is open – here is an opportunity for debate”: this, traditionally, is the guiding idea behind this broad-based conference bringing together members of Parliament, politicians and representatives of the armed forces, security organisations and industry from Europe and the United States, as well as Russia and other major states. If only in terms of its participation, this conference achieved the holistic approach that Ambassador Victoria Nuland from the US Department of State had called for. She stressed the need for a cooperative perspective, especially with regard to European energy issues and the TTIP, which have both an economic and a security dimension.

The unbearable simultaneousness of things

The consequences of one policy must be carefully weighed against its effects in another policy area. As pointed out by the former President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, “the European Neighbourhood Policy needs to be aligned in a more strategic manner”. He was expressing what
others were doubtless thinking with regard to the root causes and development of the crisis in Ukraine. Indeed, a key finding of international relations theory is that neither individual states nor the EU as a whole are a “black box”: the external dimension of the EU’s domestic policies is highly relevant for its role and influence within the international community. In view of the immense security threats confronting us in parallel – the crisis in Ukraine, but also Daesh and the Syrian conflict and the resulting refugee crisis – understanding this simultaneousness has become more important than ever.

**Are sanctions still appropriate?**

There was discussion of the sanctions against Russia: what have they achieved, what are the undesirable side effects and would lifting them provide leverage for negotiations in other areas? Jean Asselborn, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, for example, asked whether sanctions against Russia were still appropriate. Michèle Alliot-Marie, former Minister of Defence of France, stressed that the fight against Islamist terror was a common security priority for Europe and Russia. The “Ukraine issue”, she said, was no less important, but needed for the moment to take a backseat in the face of this clear and very present danger. These perspectives could provide the common ground for a dialogue.

**Multilateralism proved to be the best way**

Why shouldn’t the institutions designed for the 20th century catastrophes play a more important role in resolving today’s challenges? If it is so difficult to engage in dialogue, why not rely on institutions for which dialogue is an intrinsic and constitutive element? Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, OSCE Secretary General, issued a powerful and convincing message in favour of the institution he represents: he talked about the OSCE’s undisputed track record of providing a political space for dialogue even in recent crises. The OSCE’s inclusiveness might also help in future to bring together countries with heterogeneous interests and make them commit to a common international agenda. The 14th Congress on European Security and Defence with its forums for informal exchanges of views makes a contribution to achieving that aim.
What role must the European Union play?

The future of the Euro-Atlantic security framework

by Lubomír Zaorálek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prague

The fraying of Euro-Atlantic security poses an unprecedented set of challenges for the European Union. From the Ukraine conflict through spiralling bloodshed in the Middle East to lawlessness in parts of northern Africa, stability in our neighbourhood has succumbed to a toxic combination of power politics, social injustice and sectarian radicalism. The consequences for the EU extend far beyond security. Whether in the shape of heightened terrorist threats, hybrid warfare, or the challenges of migration, the effects of regional convulsions are now feeding into – and exacerbating – our internal crises of political trust and confidence in the European project.

Greater responsibility for security

The EU must respond by assuming greater responsibility for Euro-Atlantic security, without duplicating NATO’s role in collective and territorial defence. It will require closer cooperation in intelligence-sharing, coordinated investments in military capabilities and the consolidation of an integrated defence market. The operation and financing of CSDP should be upgraded to enable flexible and autonomous action, anchored in a productive division of labour and operational synergy with NATO. The Czech Republic plays an active part in these efforts, in the context of NATO’s Readiness Action Plan, the V4 Battlegroup and the protection of Schengen’s external borders. The EU needs to raise its game in security, but must not lose sight of its true strengths: these lie not in our military hardware, but in the openness of our societies, in the attractiveness of our single market and social model, in the stability of our rule-based integration and in the webs of partnerships and governance regimes that bind neighbours and their societies closer to us. Confronted with acute crises, the EU must sharpen – rather than dilute – its comprehensive and holistic approach to security, harnessing the full spectrum of our political, economic, humanitarian and military assets.

We must resist the temptation to turn inwards or to try to insulate ourselves from regional turmoil. Defending the Euro-Atlantic security framework calls for more – not less – engagement with neighbours. Ukraine is a case in point: despite an encouraging drop in hostilities, Ukraine’s sovereignty remains violated and its economy in dire straits, mainly as a result of its citizens’ democratic and European aspirations. We must support Kiev, as well as other partners in the East and South, in shoring up democratic institutions, the rule of law and security governance, and in promoting equitable and sustainable development that protects human dignity. In today’s interconnected world, our commitment to the indivisible security of the Euro-Atlantic area is both a moral duty and a strategic necessity.

The EU’s distinctive identity

The EU is too complex a structure to reinvent itself as a “normal” geopolitical power. Nor should it try to do so. We must preserve the EU’s distinctive identity as a normative actor – one that protects its security interests by upholding its founding values – but become smarter, credible and more strategic in going about it. We must acknowledge that context matters and that our interlocutors may not always share our goals. We must be comfortable in wielding power, including coercion, but recognise its limits in shaping outcomes. The new EGS will provide a revamped conceptual framework in this regard. The future of Euro-Atlantic security will largely depend on the EU’s political cohesion and strategic foresight, particularly in developing relations with two pivotal players: Russia and Turkey. As regards Russia, the EU needs a well-calibrated approach that enables a meaningful dialogue, made conditional upon and geared towards Moscow’s compliance with international law. As for Turkey, the EU must invest in deeper bilateral ties, aligning the conditionality of the accession process with Turkey’s role as a strategic ally in containing ISIS or managing migration flows. A constructive and responsible posture by Moscow and Ankara will be central to restoring an inclusive and rules-based security order in Europe. Some would argue that, with our neighbourhood in flames, the EU’s lofty pursuits of cooperative security and positive-sum relations are a luxury we can no longer afford. I disagree. These are indeed serious times, which is precisely why forgoing the EU’s unique vision of peace is a luxury we cannot afford.
SPECIAL DOSSIER:
Turkey’s role in the Middle East and its own security

Turkey is having to fight on many fronts while trying to live up to national objectives. Right at the top of the agenda is the refugee crisis. A Turkish and a European solution to this crisis are indissolubly linked and represent for both an opportunity to consolidate their relations and fruitfully develop them in the future.
The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan

(ed/ak, Berlin) At the EU-Turkey summit on 29 November 2015 a Joint Action Plan has been activated aimed at stepping up cooperation between the EU and Turkey for the support of Syrian refugees under temporary protection and their host communities in Turkey and to strengthen cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU. On 10 February 2016, the European Commission published a report on the implementation of the Joint Action Plan (excerpts):

Irregular arrivals to the EU

880,000 people arrived from Turkey to Greece since the beginning of 2015. The scale is immense and the Commission is working very closely with the Turkish authorities to reduce the scale of irregular crossings of the Aegean Sea. The EU and Turkey have agreed on a Joint Action Plan to tackle this challenge [...]

Commitments by Turkey

• Continue to ensure that migrants are registered and provided with appropriate documents on a compulsory basis;
• Continue efforts to facilitate access for Syrians under temporary protection to public services including education, health and employment;
• Ensure that vulnerable people continue to be identified and taken care of;
• Further strengthen the interception capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard;
• Step up cooperation with Bulgarian and Greek authorities to prevent irregular migration;
• Step up cooperation to smoothly readmit irregular migrants who are not in need of international protection and were intercepted coming from the Turkish territory;
• Pursue the progressive alignment of Turkish and EU visa policy, notably for countries representing an important source of illegal migration.

Turkey: What has been done

• Ongoing and accelerated work on the implementation of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap, including the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement (RA), expected to enter into force for third country nationals as of 1 June 2016;
• Introduction of visa obligation for Syrians travelling to Turkey by air and sea from a third country, with the aim to reduce onward transit towards the EU;
• Permission granted for Syrians under temporary protection to work in Turkey;
• Draft legislation on personal data protection in preparation, to facilitate cooperation with Frontex, Europol, Eurojust and Member States’ (MS) law enforcement agencies;
• Commitment to improve implementation of the Turkey-Greece RA;
• Efforts to prevent irregular departures, arrest smugglers and rescue migrants at sea.

Commitments by the EU

• Mobilise substantial and concrete new funds to support Turkey in coping with the challenge represented by the presence of Syrians under temporary protection;
• Continue to provide humanitarian assistance via relevant organisations in Turkey;
• Support existing MS and EU resettlement schemes and programmes;
• Further support Turkey to strengthen its capacity to combat migrant smuggling;
• Support cooperation between EU MS and Turkey in organising joint return operations towards countries of origin of irregular migrants;
• Enhance the EU capacity to exchange information with Turkey on combating smuggling networks;
• Increase the financial assistance offered to support Turkey in meeting the requirements of the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue.

EU: What has been done

• Provision of immediate assistance via humanitarian organisations in Turkey;
• Tabled and adopted the €3 billion Facility for Refugees in Turkey;
• First meeting of Facility for Refugees Steering Committee due on 17 February [...];
• Preparation of a needs assessment to identify projects for Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey – first analysis due by mid-February, with completion in early spring;
• Work has been undertaken towards activation of the EU-Turkey RA as regards third country nationals as of 1 June 2016;
• Adoption by the Commission of a Recommendation for a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme with Turkey for persons displaced by the conflict in Syria.

Next steps

• Rapidly deploy funding from the €3 billion Facility for Refugees in Turkey to provide assistance to Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey.
• As a matter of urgency, Turkey needs to make significant progress in preventing irregular departures of migrants and refugees from its territory.
• Strengthen efforts against migrant smuggling in coastal areas, including through land based operations; it is important that results are rapidly shown, in particular in stemming the influx of irregular migrants to the EU.
• Increase bilateral cooperation on Readmission between Turkey and Greece, and prepare to fully implement the EU-Turkey RA for third country nationals.”

Source: http://tinyurl.com/hqs9f7f
With the refugee crisis, the European Union (EU) is facing its biggest struggle ever. Millions of people fleeing from turmoil, war and terrorism are seeking shelter in European countries. Many of those countries see it as their duty to help and support those who are in dire need. But our capacities are being stretched to the full and we must therefore realise that this crisis will not be resolved without the help of the international community. One important partner is Turkey, a country that we share a long history with.

Many of those countries see it as their duty to help and support those who are in dire need. But our capacities are being stretched to the full and we must therefore realise that this crisis will not be resolved without the help of the international community. One important partner is Turkey, a country that we share a long history with.

It is urgent to implement the JAC

The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAC) was a major step forward in cooperation; its aim is to provide support for Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey and to manage migration in order to address the crisis created by the situation in Syria. It was put in place when it became more than clear that neither the European Union nor any country could deal with this massive influx of people on its own. “Challenges are common and responses need to be coordinated”, stated the European Commission. At this point it is absolutely crucial to work hand in hand with Turkey to maintain a minimum of control over the situation. It is enough to look at the map to understand why. This agreement has not been implemented very well so far. Three billion Euros have been promised to Turkey to help cover its costs – far less than what it would cost the EU otherwise – but that sum has not been forthcoming so far. In return, Turkey has promised to give shelter to Syrians, but also to prevent “irregular migration flows to the EU”. Right now we are observing around 80,000 refugees, mainly from Aleppo, who are waiting at the Syrian-Turkish border to enter safer ground but who are left out in the cold without proper supplies with no hope of crossing the border any time soon. It is uncertain what will happen to the people already there and to those arriving in the future, as this will not be the end of the story, with Russia bombing village after village to clear a path through to Aleppo for Assad’s troops. This will force many more people to flee their homes in order to get their families to safety. This means that the problem facing Turkey and the EU will only get worse.

The EU needs better control of its borders

The EU has to continue showing solidarity in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and with the humanitarian values that all EU Member States have signed up to.

One major improvement that must be made is to ensure better control of the EU’s external borders. Borders need to be well protected so that we can make a distinction between refugees who are really entitled to enter and those who are not; this goes not only for the border with Turkey but for all the EU’s external borders. Turkey, due to its location, plays a crucial role in this matter. It is absolutely essential to stop illegal crossings of the border into Turkey, and Germany has already shown its willingness to support Turkey to make this happen. Turkey needs to improve its screening process at its borders so that illegal refugees cannot enter the EU afterwards. But one big problem we face is that sea borders are not as easy to control as land borders are. In the month of October 2015 alone, over 200,000 refugees arrived on the shores of Greece, mainly via Turkey. The numbers fell during wintertime but still remained extremely high, with 60,000 refugees arriving in January 2016. This is why NATO is now stepping in, trying to support the EU in this major task. Efforts are also being directed against traffickers, making money from the plight of refugees.

We must master the challenge together

The EU and its member states will deepen their cooperation with Turkey as the various talks between Jean-Claude Juncker, Angela Merkel and Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu underline. Cooperation means that both sides must share responsibility for the new Facility for Refugees in Turkey set up by the Commission in November 2015, for which the EU Member States agreed on the funding in early February 2016. The basic idea is to coordinate a new assistance package to support 2 million Syrian refugees in Turkey and to improve border controls. This effort will cost a total of three billion Euros over the next two years.

The refugee crisis is an issue that challenges the EU and its Member States to a hitherto unprecedented degree. But if we look beyond our own noses we will see that we are not alone in this dilemma but are sharing it with a series of other countries that are equally eager to resolve it. We can only overcome this crisis by working together as an international community, by relying on each other. We must do this properly.
On 4 October 2015, in the early phase of the deepening political crisis resulting from the large number of asylum-seekers crossing into the EU, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) wrote “The Merkel Plan - A proposal for the Syrian refugee crisis.” We described the situation in the Aegean at the time as follows: “Currently, any migrant who gets into a boat off the coast of Lesbos and Kos has a near certainty of reaching Greece. The Greek government cannot sink ships or push them away from its shores. This would be both illegal and dangerous. Its choices are limited to waiting for them to land on Greek territory or intercepting them at sea and bringing them to Greece. Either way, they reach the EU. Smugglers know this, and as news travels fast, so does a rapidly growing number of potential migrants from countries as far away as Central Asia.”

We warned that in the face of escalating anti-migrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric from far right parties across Europe, a situation that suggested a total loss of control was deeply problematic.

**Resettle Syrian refugees directly from Turkey**

We also suggested how an agreement between Germany and Turkey might restore control over Europe’s external borders without sacrificing compassion for the refugees. The main points of such an agreement would be:

- **Resettlement**: Germany and a coalition of other willing EU states should agree to grant asylum to a few hundred thousand Syrian refugees registered in Turkey over the coming 12 months. The offer should be limited to Syrian refugees already registered with the Turkish authorities, to avoid cre-
ating incentives for new migration flows into Turkey. Other EU member states should join in.

- Readmission from Greece: in return, from a specified date, Turkey should agree to accept back all new migrants reaching Greece from its territory. This would quickly reduce the flood of boats crossing the Aegean to a trickle.
- Visa liberalisation: Germany should agree to help Turkey obtain visa-free travel in 2016, which is decided in the EU by qualified majority voting.

On 7 October 2015 Angela Merkel explained her plan for regaining control over the refugee crisis on German television: “We must better protect our external borders, but this is only possible if we reach agreements with our neighbours, for example Turkey, on how to better share the task of dealing with the refugees. And this will mean more money for Turkey, which has a lot of expenditure because of the refugees. This will mean that we will accept a set number of refugees, in such a way that the human traffickers and smugglers in the Aegean will not earn money, and in an orderly way; this will also mean fulfilling certain wishes of Turkey concerning the visa issue.” Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier also wrote in the weekly Der Spiegel on 20 November 2015: “If Turkey is ready to make a big contribution to securing the common border with the EU and, at the same time, will readmit refugees who try crossing that border, then the European Union has to actively support Turkey in return … then Germany should – in return – resettle contingents of Syrian refugees within the framework of a European effort as it already did in the case of other civil wars. The people in these contingents shall be safely brought to Europe and Germany. Instead of chaotic and uncontrolled immigration on dangerous routes as it is now … an orderly and safe resettlement of civil war refugees.”

And on 28 January 2016 support also came from the Netherlands, holding the rotating six-month EU Presidency. Social-Democrat leader Diederik Samsom said in an interview with the daily newspaper De Volkskrant: “I think there is a realistic chance that by this spring a leading group of EU countries will have an agreement with Turkey about a legal migration route for a couple of hundred thousand refugees per year, in exchange for [Turkey] accepting back everyone who enters [the EU] via Greece.”

**Europe has not yet come far enough**

In recent weeks Angela Merkel has been meeting regularly with Turkish Prime Minister Davutoğlu and has negotiated a more detailed agreement for a broader coalition of willing countries to resettle a large number of Syrian refugees directly from Turkey. The outlines of such an agreement are promising. The eligibility criteria are clear and precise: candidates must be Syrian nationals; displaced by the conflict in Syria; registered by the Turkish authorities prior to 29 November 2015; do not constitute a threat to public order or public security; and a substantial part of the scheme shall be used for families. Turkish authorities would recommend candidates fulfilling the criteria; participating states may demand that the candidates submitted have family ties in their country; identity and security checks will be carried out by the participating States.

So how far has the EU come, four months after Angela Merkel first accepted the outlines of such a solution? Unfortunately, not yet far enough. Europe’s leaders are right to feel pessimistic about their policy to relocate 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece/Italy to other states – it is a weekly humiliation, its failure painfully obvious every time the European Commission publishes new numbers, as relocation is failing everywhere: in Greece, in Italy, in receiving states. Relocation does not prevent people from drowning in the Aegean Sea; it does not disrupt the operations of people smugglers; it does not restore control over the EU and Schengen borders; and it does not help substantial numbers of recognised refugees find a safe way to the EU.

**A solution to the refugee crisis is possible**

The implementation of readmission in the Aegean would result in regaining control over EU external borders. The suspension of relocation would make it easier to call on EU member states to voluntarily take at least the number of people that they would have been required to take from Greece, but directly from Turkey. There would be no coercion. All member states could check the fingerprints of those they accept in order to identify possible security risks. They would be helping a NATO ally within a voluntary burden-sharing scheme. Under these conditions: would Poland, would the Czech Republic, still be
unwilling to accept a few thousand Syrian refugees – families, who have fled from war – directly?

At the same time the European Commission should present a legislative proposal to that effect as soon as possible. Since implementation of the EU-Turkey and Greece-Turkey readmission agreements and issues of asylum and migration are at the core of the visa liberalisation process, which was launched in December 2013, this would create a win-win situation.

ESI noted in September 2015 in “Why people don’t need to drown in the Aegean”, that building fences would not help in this context:

“It is not that fences never work ... But fences can’t be built on water. The suggestion that Greece could somehow stop migrants from reaching the EU if only it tried a bit harder is an empty one. Greece could not achieve this even if it allowed Finnish or Hungarian border guards to take over.”

However, a solution to the refugee crisis is possible. It remains to be seen whether the unlikely trio of Angela Merkel, Ahmet Davutoğlu and Alexis Tsipras will be able to seize it.

All ESI reports can be found at www.esiweb.org

Outcome of the 26th February Justice and Home Affairs Council

Schengen Border Code amendment: reinforcement of checks at external borders

The Council reached a general approach on the proposed regulation to reinforce checks against relevant databases at external borders. On the basis of this mandate, the Netherlands Presidency will start negotiations with the European Parliament as soon as the latter has adopted its position.

→ More information: http://tinyurl.com/guat156

European Border and Coast Guard

The Council was briefed by the Presidency on the state of play on the proposed regulation establishing a European Border and Coast Guard. The intention of the Presidency is to reach a political agreement before the end of its term, as requested by the last European Council. (…)The primary objective of the European Border and Coast Guard would be to ensure and implement, as a shared responsibility, the European integrated border management at the external borders with a view to managing migration effectively and ensuring a high level of security within the EU, while safeguarding EU-internal free movement. The proposal consists of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (which would replace Frontex) and national authorities responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks, with a shared responsibility for the security and protection of the EU’s external borders.

Migration

Particular attention was devoted to current developments on the Western Balkans route. A working breakfast took place in the margins of the Council with those member states most concerned and the ministers of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia. The Council examined measures to prepare for the possible humanitarian consequences of the unilateral adoption of border measures. The Commission, who is currently assessing the humanitarian needs, was invited to report on this issue and on the measures taken to the JHA Council at its next meeting on 10-11 March 2016.

Source: Council of the European Union

→ Web: www.consilium.eu
Berlin Security Conference 2016

Europe at risk – what are our answers to common threats?
29–30 November 2016, andel's Hotel & Convention Center Berlin

The Berlin Security Conference

- One of the largest events on European Security and Defence
- Meeting place for up to 1,000 participants from more than 50 countries
- International forum for members of parliament, politicians and representatives of the armed forces, security organisations and industry
- Partner this year: France
- Exhibitions with companies from Germany, Europe and the US
- Platform for exchanging ideas and networking

Further Information: www.euro-defence.eu

organised by Behörden Spiegel
Three reasons for the domination and influence of ISIS
The rise of global terror
by Marcin Styszynski, Associate Professor for Arabic and Islamic Studies at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań

The violent offensive of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is raising concern among authorities, the media and the public at large. Many analyses focus on the military, logistic and terror capabilities of Islamic State, when, in fact, the organisation relies for the success of its policy and activities on three main elements: ideological factors, financial aspects and a propaganda campaign.

The promise of a historic caliphate
The death of al-Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden, in 2011 and the decline of its logistic and operational capabilities affected jihadists worldwide, who had hopes of a different outcome: the implementation of their objectives. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi responded to insurgents' expectations by offering them the establishment of the historic caliphate, with the imposition of strict sharia laws. Moreover, the organisation's ideological position was reinforced by the support of Sunni communities marginalised by the Shia authorities in Baghdad and Damascus as well as by cooperation with members of Saddam Hussein's disbanded apparatus, who were trying to benefit from the political unrest in Iraq. New forms of jihad were also defined in the form of terror campaigns against ideological opponents and social or charity activities for ISIS followers in controlled regions.

Global allegiance
It should also be noted that ISIS is competing with al-Qaeda for a dominant position in the worldwide jihadist movement. So far, more than 30 different groups, including insurgents from Asia and Africa, have declared allegiance to al-Baghdadi. That competition was demonstrated during the terrorist attack against France's Charlie Hebdo magazine in January 2015, which was inspired by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), while the simultaneous assault on a kosher supermarket in Paris was carried out by ISIS. The latest terrorist attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso show similar tendencies.

So far, radical Islamist groups have relied on individual donations or financial intermediaries. ISIS by contrast has started to generate its own revenues. Al-Baghdadi's organisation has stolen $4.29 million from the Iraqi central bank and seized the Baiji oil refinery in the north of Baghdad as well as a strategic dam near Mosul. Insurgents have also taken control of the Shaar gas field near Palmyra, one of Syria's largest hydrocarbon reservoirs, and are occupying oil-rich reservoirs as well as active refineries in Iraq and Syria. In 2014, ISIS's oil production was estimated at 50,000 to 80,000 barrels a day. A further $3 million per day was earned from the smuggling of crude oil into neighbouring countries such as Turkey. Due to the latest air-strikes, ISIS's oil sector has radically declined. However, the organisation has diversified its revenues, which have relied more recently on the numerous taxes imposed on local communities and the charges for water, electricity and other services. The smuggling of migrants also plays an important role, with turnover estimated at $800 million. The organisation was involved, for example, in the smuggling of 170,000 migrants from Libya to Europe across the Mediterranean, which brought it $323 million last year. The sale of looted antiquities and valuables also makes an important contribution to the ISIS budget.

Successful propaganda campaign
Al-Baghdadi's strategy also comprises well-adapted communication and propaganda techniques that speak to the audience's emotions and inspire followers to join the caliphate. ISIS's communication strategy combines traditional discourse with the use of official Internet services or the social media. The traditional discourse, addressed to the local Arab populations, is based on the concept of the sermon, which is one of the oldest narrative and oratory forms in the Arab-Muslim world. Al-Baghdadi applied this form in his symbolic speech during Ramadan 2014, in which he declared the establishment of the historic caliphate.

Furthermore, ISIS's propaganda targets young people, who are indoctrinated by the official websites al-Hayat Media Center and A'maq Ikhbariya (Depth of Information). Propaganda materials are published in different languages, including English, French and German, and include short messages based on suggestive graphics and provocative pictures similar to the tabloid press or comics. ISIS also exploits the social media, especially Twitter, which facilitates fast communication among jihadists and enables them to express various opinions and emotions.
A comparison of the two organisations shows that IS has a much more effective and dangerous ideological and operational capacity than al-Qaeda. IS has learnt from al-Qaeda’s failures, such as a long-term strategy focused mainly on populist slogans, terrorist attacks requiring lengthy preparation and its reliance on donations. Al-Baghdadi’s organisation has put the ideas contained in the writings of Muslim Brotherhood ideologists into practice. It earns income from resources under its control and smuggling.

We asked Professor Marcin Styszynski to explain the differences between IS and al-Qaeda:

“To better understand the risks represented by IS, it is important to compare its military and operational capabilities with those of its rival, al-Qaeda, a key player in the global jihad before IS arrived on the scene. The differences are ideological, strategic and economic.

IDEOLOGY

Al-Qaeda tried many times to overthrow the governments of the Arab-Muslim world in order to impose sharia law, but never managed to establish itself. It committed terrorist acts all over the world in pursuit of the same theological ideal.

Islamic State: (IS) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s IS on the other hand, has achieved the aims pursued by previous jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda. In 2014 it founded the mythical caliphate and established institutional and logistic structures based on sharia law and on the ideas of ideologists like Sayyid Qutb and Abdallah Azzam. The establishment of the caliphate encouraged other jihadist groups to declare allegiance to al-Baghdadi and individual jihadists to join the war in the Middle East and commit terrorist acts in the West.

STRATEGY

Al-Qaeda’s main aim was to provoke a military offensive by the West in the Arab-Muslim world in order to spread instability and hasten the fall of the local governments which stood in the way of its objectives. It focused on spectacular terrorist attacks against symbolic targets the world over. The attacks of 11 September 2001 are the best example: they triggered the West’s military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. These attacks involving lengthy planning and a major logistics effort required the support of influential states or individuals.

Islamic State: Conversely, the aim of IS is no longer to provoke the West, because the caliphate has already been established. Its terrorist attacks are rather brutal acts of retaliation against the western military engagement in Syria and Iraq. They are also part of an IS defensive policy designed to weaken the West’s ability to combat its structures. At the same time IS is waging an assymmetrical war in different countries all over the world in order to attract attention away from Syria and Iraq, and to force the authorities to change their strategy and step up their efforts against IS. This is the case, for example, for its attacks in Europe, or in countries such as Libya and Egypt. The states concerned have no choice but to change their defence strategy and to step up or, on the contrary, curtail, their military operations. IS terrorist attacks are less spectacular and are aimed against less symbolic targets. They are deliberately unpredictable and target places with a lot of people. They require limited logistical and financial resources and preparation and are conducted by small groups of two or three individuals, sometimes by a single person, with no military training and using simple weapons such as assault rifles and guns available on the black market. They may also use knives or small improvised explosive devices. Despite their military and operational limitations these attacks against soft and crowded targets such as restaurants, cinemas, stadiums or concert halls spread a feeling of fear and insecurity.

IS no longer conducts terrorist attacks in the territories under its control in Syria or Iraq, relying instead on its security services and religious police to enforce compliance with its laws. Non-compliance is cruelly punished, sometimes by summary executions.

ECONOMY

Al-Qaeda’s funds came essentially from donations and money transfers from its sympathisers, but also from the profits generated by companies managed by members of the organisation, including its leader Osama bin Laden. The organisation’s financial and hence operational capabilities were weakened by the anti-terrorist campaign and tighter surveillance of bank transfers.

Islamic State: For IS on the other hand, donations account for only 5% of its revenues. It generates its own income from resources such as the oil fields and gas pipelines located in the areas under its control in Syria and Iraq. IS controls Iraq’s biggest refinery, for example, as well as dams on the Euphrates. It has taken control of local banks and commodities and also draws revenues from taxation and smuggling.”
Establishing vital communication links

SES connects, enables, enriches

Governments and public sector organisations around the globe use SES services to deliver a diverse range of solutions for their secure and reliable communication links.

SES’s global satellite fleet offers customized solutions to help your independent security defense, civil and industry projects achieve their goals.

The combination of SES’s geostationary and O3b medium earth orbit satellite networks provides reliable connectivity that allows governments to establish secure communication networks and enables organisations to quickly re-establish voice and data links when disaster strikes.

Find out more at www.ses.com/government
Turkey and its Kurdish issue
by Athanasios Manis, Senior Research Fellow, Middle East Research Institute, Erbil

On 29 November 2015, the leaders of the European Union and Turkey made a statement reflecting their collective determination to reinvigorate the accession process and cooperate on foreign policy and security, including counterterrorism, trade and energy, as well as the Syrian refugee crisis. This statement came after years of stalemate in Turkey’s EU accession process, confirming the growing appetite by both sides to give life to the faltering process of accession negotiations, while at the same time continuing to upgrade their collaboration in selected policy areas. Although the implementation of this statement can potentially serve short-term and long-term interests on both sides to a great extent, it neglects the growing instability in the Kurdish areas of Turkey, as it has been evolving in the aftermath of the 7th June 2015 Turkish elections. The EU member states should be concerned that the exacerbation of the Kurdish issue can potentially not only destabilise Turkey further, but also feed into other crises that have been taking place at the same time in Iraq and Syria, and have catastrophic effects on the refugee crisis – a major worry for EU decision-makers.

Past steps towards cultural and political pluralism
The main challenge for any Turkish government of the past was to depart effectively from the matrix of a unitary and monolithic Turkish national identity that has been denying the ethnic and cultural identity of the Kurdish community in Turkey. Turkey’s designation as an EU candidate country in 1999 opened a window of opportunity for democratic reforms that could potentially address the Kurdish issue through political dialogue and negotiations. As a result of this process, there have been some developments in terms of recognising cultural rights for the community, such as university programmes in Kurdish in four universities and the right to electoral campaigns in languages other than Turkish, for which implementation began in 2013. However, as the European Commission’s latest report on Turkey reveals, “Legal restrictions on possibilities for mother tongue education in primary and secondary schools remained in place. Education in mother tongues other than Turkish is not allowed apart from in minority schools”.

Breaking the vicious cycle of militarisation
In the meantime, the ceasefire that had been observed as of 2013 by the Turkish government and the PKK, and which subsequently was followed by a peace process, has collapsed. The Turkish State and the PKK have been engaging in military clashes in the Kurdish areas of Southeast Turkey, especially in urban areas where thousands of civilians reside. The militarisation of the Kurdish issue is gradually dragging Turkey back to the security instability of the 1990s. It is demonstrated by Amnesty International’s recent warning that “the Turkish government’s onslaught on Kurdish towns and neighbourhoods, which includes round-the-clock curfews and cuts to services, is putting the lives of up to 200,000 people at risk and amounts to collective punishment”. It is therefore of the utmost importance that a ceasefire be announced immediately so that gradually the two parties can return to the negotiating table. Obviously, there is lack of trust between the two, as well as growing pessimism among the AKP establishment, the public and the PKK about the likelihood of a political solution in the foreseeable future. If this pessimism becomes a conviction, it will be very difficult to break the vicious cycle of militarisation of the Kurdish issue.

The EU needs to engage – in its own interest
At this point, the EU needs to act swiftly with unity and determination in order to help reengage the two parties in a peace process that promotes democratisation, a decentralisation of power and a permanent end to acts of violence in Turkey. The EU strategies of influence, conditionality and socialisation must be employed effectively. In any other case, the EU will find itself in a much more precarious position: dealing with the ramifications of a war in the Kurdish areas of Turkey that is corroding any form of order in the area adjacent to Syria and Iraq. The overlap of areas that are suffering from conflicts and political fragmentation makes it even harder for the EU and the international community to deal with a continuous humanitarian catastrophe on the ground, resulting in more loss of life and displacement.

Athanasios Manis
is Senior Research Fellow for International Politics and National Security at the Middle East Research Institute (MERI). He obtained a Master’s degree in Turkish studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations and Organizations from the Aegean University, Greece. Mr Manis holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Prior to his current position, he worked as correspondent for Turkish Daily News.

In mid-August 2015, the German Defence Ministry announced its intention to withdraw its air defence system from Turkey. A few months earlier, the Netherlands had also withdrawn its Patriot missile batteries, due, it said, to the costs of maintaining its troops and batteries in Turkey. What are the reasons for the recent withdrawals and how are they affecting Turkey and its relations and role within NATO? At the end of 2012, Germany and other NATO countries such as the Netherlands and the United States stationed their Patriot missile batteries in Turkey under Operation Active Fence in order to counter threats from Syrian ballistic missiles. This followed the firing of a mortar bomb from Syria, which had killed five Turkish civilians in the border town of Akcakale, and the shooting down by the Syrian army of a Turkish warplane. In total, six Patriot batteries from Germany, the Netherlands and the US were stationed in Turkey in the provinces of Kahramanmaras, Adana and Gaziantep respectively.

Germany’s shift in engagement and priorities
The German Patriot systems had been deployed in Turkey in the face of domestic opposition within Germany. The German Government had continued to justify this deployment to its opposition parties and the public at large as a NATO obligation. Germany’s withdrawal of its defence system from Turkey therefore came as no big surprise to Turkey. German forces in Turkey comprised 250 soldiers with two Patriot missile defence systems. These forces included missile specialists, combat support personnel and a Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection unit. Germany stated as the reason for its withdraw-
al the fact that Turkey was now facing threats from ISIL and not from Syrian missiles, which increased the cost of maintaining its batteries and troops in the region.

Relevance of the Kurdish issue
Many Germans, like Florian Kahn, a military expert of the Christian Social Union party, consider that Turkey’s attacks against the Kurds in Northern Iraq – launched under the guise of an attack against ISIL in Syria – make it necessary for Germany to remove its defence system from Turkey. According to Kahn, with these attacks against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), President Tayyip Erdogan “once again demonstrated that Turkey and Germany are pursuing less and less common goals”. What makes him all the more critical is the fact that the YPG (Kurdish People’s Protection Units) plays a major role in the fight against Islamic State.

Turkey – on its own now?
In October 2015 there were reports confirming that not only Germany, but also the US had removed its Patriot batteries from Turkey and redeployed them in the US for critical modernisation upgrades. The US withdrawal of its Patriot batteries was probably astonishing news for Turkey, all the more so in view of the fact that Turkey had also opened its Incirlik Base to the United States in the fight against ISIL. Unlike in the case of the
Netherlands, when another NATO country (Spain) had stepped in to support Turkey with missile defence coverage, there has been no replacement for the German and US systems. Also, although the US assured Turkey that it would, should the need arise, "return the Patriot assets and personnel" to Turkey "within one week", there have been no such assurances from Germany. The US however affirms that the ships carrying the Aegis missile defence systems are deployed close to Turkey for its protection.

Can Turkey withstand the threats from Syria?
In December 2015, reports emerged of NATO plans to deploy aircraft and command ships in Turkey: NATO said it was making efforts to augment Turkey's air defence capabilities. These coincided with reports that the US had withdrawn its F-15s (air-to-air interceptors) and was planning to replace them with additional A-10 close air support aircraft. Turkish military officials are already apprehensive about the missile threat from Syria. They think that the Syrian 700 km Scud-category missile systems, although inaccurate, will cause casualties when weaponised with chemical and biological warheads. In the absence of the Patriot system, they are therefore concerned about the country's capacity to defend itself against missile attacks from Syria, given that Turkey currently lacks any sophisticated air or missile defence system of its own.

Looking for options outside NATO
In order to reduce this capability gap, Turkey has also turned to non-NATO partners for the acquisition of an air and missile defence capability. China is among the partners with whom Turkey considered striking a deal (for the FD-2000 defence system). In mid-2015 Turkey also took a keen interest in Russia’s S-300s, while simultaneously conducting talks with Ukraine on the development of defence systems. Its decision to give preference to the Chinese system over the US Patriot and French-Italian EUROSAM did not go down well with the NATO countries, including the United States. NATO was worried that such an acquisition might lead to the leaking to China of crucial information on NATO's missile defence capabilities.

NATO by Turkey’s side again?
However, in November 2015 it emerged that Turkey had cancelled the tender awarded to China owing to China's refusal to transfer technology to Turkey. Reports now suggest that Turkey is looking to develop an air and missile defence system indigenously. It is too early to predict whether the US and German withdrawal of Patriot batteries from Turkey will adversely affect NATO-Turkey relations. With NATO at least announcing that it will make every effort to protect its Turkish ally, Turkey can for the moment breathe a sigh of relief.
SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Serious challenges lie ahead for the European Defence Community. It is above all in the area of strategic aerospace capabilities – secure satellite communications, airborne ground surveillance in association with Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), strategic air transport and air-to-air refuelling – that the European Union faces the most critical deficits. Yet these are essential to its role of global security provider.

A further challenge facing forces is to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels, not just to increase their operational flexibility, but also to contribute to attaining the EU’s energy targets.
There are perspectives for developing appropriate European defence capabilities

The European Defence Agency

A conversation with Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive Officer, European Defence Agency, Brussels

by Editor-in-Chief Hartmut Bühl

“No, the Agency is doing well: we’re well organised, doing a good job and achieving visible results”.

This is Jorge Domecq’s reply when I ask him, on the way to have our photo taken, whether, 10 years after its creation, the European Defence Agency is in need of any in-depth reforms.

EDA Chief Executive Officer Jorge Domecq, a Spanish diplomat with wide-ranging international experience including at NATO, took up his post one year ago. He receives me for our talk in his airy office with its view over town houses and gardens, the EU flag displayed behind his desk. He is an imposing figure whose winning manner exudes confidence and energy.

A turbulent world around Europe

What has happened, he explains at the start of the conversation, is that the world of security and defence has changed. “The fact is that the civil aspect is becoming increasingly important, but we are mentally prepared for that; the EDA’s structure and organisation are well adapted and it shows: for some projects the work is already well under way”.

In Jorge Domecq’s view the Commission Communication of 24 July 2013 1 takes precisely the right approach. Particularly important for the development of capabilities, in his opinion, is not only to promote competitiveness but also to apply the EU’s energy policy measures and supporting instruments to the defence sector. “The world around us needs a Europe that is capable of helping to stabilise the situation in crisis areas, including by means of military missions”, he explains. “What is important is the cost-effective development of capabilities available to both civilian workers and military forces”.

At stake here are the dual-use capabilities underlying the Commission’s proposal for a ‘Preparatory action on CSDP-related research’ that are conducive to civil-military interoperability. I ask whether a list of such capabilities has finally been drawn up: after all, this is a necessary first step in order to tackle this complex issue. “Absolutely right: we are currently in the process of defining dual-use requirements in the CSDP framework, in order to prepare the ground for the launch of the Preparatory Action (PA)”, he answers.

I mention that this strikes me as being as a revolutionary development for the Commission, given its decades-long refusal to address military issues, even in the research area. “Revolutionary, certainly not”, he replies, “rather, it is an evolutionary and pragmatic adaptation to political and material requirements. The Preparatory Action will go beyond the existing possibilities of civil-military research in the new Horizon 2020 general research programme, thus opening EU funding to defence research”.

When I point out that all this is already covered by Article 185 of
When we spoke about capabilities I stated that Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) have been a capability of choice for some years now, but have become especially important for current operations. “You are striving to acquire this capability for European Forces, but unfortunately for the moment it remains scarce in their inventories”, I said. Jorge Domecq answered: “In order to meet operational requirements, some Member States have had to procure their MALE capability off the shelf on the international market, as France did in the US or Germany in Israel. In 2005, France, Germany and Italy took the lead for the establishment of a future MALE RPAS programme, open to other nations, which could become operational between 2020 and 2025.”

Security and Defence: Capabilities

I point out that this is a very ambitious objective that I would describe as having the capability for cooperability – being an equal partner from the political-strategic decision through to decision-making on the battlefield – which is currently far from being the case.

“An interesting way of putting it. What I am interested in is capability as such, call it what you like”, is his reply.

And what about the attitude of the US towards the EU’s efforts to create the basis for such capabilities by means of a European defence technological base? “The US sees this in a very positive light. It wants the EU to acquire capabilities. A militarily strong EU gives the US more leeway for its own geopolitical deployment decisions”.

EU energy policy and the armed forces

Turning to the Energy Consultation Forum which was held on 14 January in Brussels and brought together the Commission and the European Defence Agency under the lead of Jorge Domecq, I note that the energy issue is being taken very seriously and that the aim is now also to reduce the fossil fuel consumption of the military. He explains that “the venture between the Commission and EDA is the very first time that the Commission is financing a defence-specific issue. As I mentioned before, times have changed, and the EDA has been tasked by the Defence Ministers to pursue coherence with the other policies of the Union. And forces’ energy consumption is one of the issues that sprang to mind, especially as EDA has been working on this for years”.

When I object that the forces’ contribution to the emission of greenhouse gases can hardly be very significant, Jorge Domecq
immediately sets me right: “You’d be surprised. We are in the process of proving that military forces are one of the biggest fossil fuel users: we’re talking about billions of Euros here. Making a contribution to attaining the EU’s targets is one aspect, but for the forces there is a lot more at stake. To mention just three areas:
1. Managing energy saves lives, because the reduction in fuel logistics has a direct impact on soldiers’ security;
2. You can save on the costs of transport (reduced fleet and personnel) and fuel, with a positive impact on our budgets; and
3. Energy is a strategic subject for all sectors, but especially for the military during engagements”.

I note that achieving resilience and strategic autonomy takes time, but that efforts have already started in Mali using experimental smart energy assets. I wonder what the objective there is: “Indeed, we have different systems in use in Mali. Our main objective is to collect data in order to define the operational requirements in cooperation with the troops”.

Then I ask whether the same effort will be made for water treatment, which currently is extremely energy-intensive: “Certainly, we need mobile and scalable systems – i.e. ones that can be tailored to requirements – in all sectors. All these things go hand in hand”.

And the answer to my final question of where smart energy stands on the list of the EDA’s priorities is unhesitating: “this area belongs to operational capabilities, which have absolute priority”.

At the end of our discussion I tell Jorge Domecq how impressed I am by his clear vision of the future of his Agency as a driver for the development of European defence.

1 (Com (2013) 542 final)
Modern crisis-targeted training creates cohesive forces able to work smoothly in operations

NATO is sharpening its training capacities

(ed/ESDU) Trident Juncture – a two-pronged NATO exercise that took place from 3 to 16 October 2015 in southern Europe was a challenging exercise for the training audience. It marked a further step towards determining the best way of organising future exercises in order to enable NATO to achieve its operational objectives.

Nico Segers, this magazine’s correspondent to NATO, asked Brigadier General Indrek Sirel, Assistant Chief of Staff, J7 Division Joint Force Command (JFC) in Brunssum, Netherlands and Major General Reinhard Wolski, Commander Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway how JFC Brunssum and JWC Stavanger intend to use the lessons learned from these exercises.

The European: Generals, thank you for this opportunity of discussing the lessons learned by both the training audience and organisers from Trident Joint Exercise 15 (TRJE15). What is TRJE15 all about?

BG Sirel: There are two parts to the TRJE15 exercise:
1. The Command Post Exercise (CPX) as a certification exercise for the Joint Task Force HQ, Brunssum (JTF HQ) as the training audience (TA) on the operational level (JTFHQ TA). They submitted over 250 observations during the exercise; we now need to compile the observations arising from the analyses of the different NATO entities.
2. The LIVEX exercise with 35,000 soldiers as the training audience on the tactical level and with Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) in a directing and controlling role.

The European: Which aspects were covered by the observations made during the CPX?

BG Sirel: All aspects, from the decision-making process to the exercise design and real life-support issues. All the observations are being analysed in order to decide whether any kind of remedial action to resolve gaps or shortfalls is necessary, or whether they must simply be kept as reminders for future exercises or operations.

The European: For LIVEX the situation is somewhat different, isn’t it?

BG Sirel: Every command is responsible for its own lessons learned process. We from JFCBS are interested above all in observations or experiences from the TA that relate to the exercise design or structures and which need to be taken on board in the exercise planning directives for a future large-scale LIVEX exercise. So, to sum up, the observations are classified into two main blocks:
1. observations aimed at improving the JTFHQ performance, whereby we draw a distinction between the observations to be kept in mind for future deployments and those to become Lessons Learned; and
2. observations aimed at improving the exercise design and conduct.

Let me underline that almost all the observations made in TRJE15 are completely different from those submitted during former exercises. This shows that we are not repeating the same mistakes.

The European: General Wolski, which lessons has the JWC learned from this exercise?

MG Wolski: There are two main areas:
1. Lessons and observations aimed at our own internal improvement. These are analysed and then fed back into our exercise process so that upcoming exercises can benefit from them.
2. Lessons and observations which will contribute to improvements in the training audience and the broader NATO audience.

Our training teams play a vital role here, as they serve as a knowledge hub.

The European: And how is the knowledge used?

MG Wolski: We summarise a lot of this useful information in our First Impression Report (FIR), but we also focus on identifying any doctrinal gaps, which we forward to the Allied Joint Doctrine Working Group (AJOD WG) for the greater benefit of
Brigadier General Indrek Sirel
Assistant Chief of Staff, J7 Division Joint Force Command (JFC), Brunssum

Indrek Sirel was born in 1970 in Tallinn, After graduating from the Moscow Military Academy in June 1991 he joined the Estonian Defence Forces in January 1993. Following graduation from the US Army Command and General Staff college course (CGCS) in 2000, Sirel returned to the Estonian General Staff and was deployed to ISAF VI HQ as a Staff Officer. From 2005–2006 he was Commander of the Estonian Scouts Battalion. Post ISAF, he obtained a Master of Strategic Studies degree from the US Army War College in 2009. In August 2012, Indrek Sirel was appointed as the ACOS J7 (Exercises and Assessments) at the Joint Force Command Brunssum (Netherlands).

NATO. One challenge is to determine what lessons are specific to that particular exercise and training audience, and what can be successfully applied to other exercises or audiences.

The European: How do NATO exercises nowadays differ from those of the past?
MG Wolski: NATO is conducting exercises of greater complexity. We challenge our training audiences with this very demanding and realistic training that reflects the full spectrum of operations in which NATO is likely to be engaged.

The European: Hybrid warfare?
MG Wolski: The crises that we face are increasingly more complex, diverse and hybrid. Therefore, the biggest challenge is achieving operational readiness and adaptation to the realities of the new security environment.

The European: Any complementary thoughts from your perspective, BG Sirel?
BG Sirel: Regularly, but decreasingly from one exercise to the next, major challenges arise in the area of command and control (C2), such as the set-up for connecting HQ horizontally and vertically with other entities: in short, the information and coordination processes and responsibilities between different levels of command.
The European: Can you give an example of how lessons learned from past NATO operations have been incorporated into your operational exercises and in particular TRJE15?

BG Sirel: The most significant improvements in this regard have been made in the area of the Comprehensive Approach, namely the involvement of International Organisations (IO), Governmental Organisations (GO) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) in our exercises in civil-military interaction.

The European: And how did you organise that?

BG Sirel: The solution found, taking advantage of the experience of the German-Netherland Corps, was the creation of a so-called Inter-Agency Center (IAC) outside the HQ camp by the HQ Civil Military cooperation (CIMIC) Branch as a meeting and coordination point with non-NATO entities. It will be a model for the future.

The European: How have lessons learned from past NATO operations been incorporated into your operational exercises and in particular Trident Juncture?

MG Wolski: In the past with our ISAF Afghanistan exercises, we were fortunate to have a strong link with those in theatre at the time, enabling us to prepare the most realistic and up-to-date scenario for the next exercise. Nowadays:
1. We receive guidance for future exercise content from the SACEUR’s Annual Guidance for Exercises (SAGE). This sets out the topics and themes relating to current and future threats that SACEUR believes we should be focusing on.
2. Another major source of practical lessons is constituted by the Subject Matter Experts (SME), who are both internal and external to the JWC. They are involved in our exercise workshops, where they work alongside the training audience in order to provide training and coaching.

The European: How does the work of the JFC Brunssum and JWC teams differ? Complementarity, overlaps? Are you defining or negotiating criteria in terms of the Lessons Learned process?

BG Sirel: The JFCBS LL team was in an observer role in order to gain more in-depth knowledge on certain issues and to prevent a duplication of effort with the SHAPE Evaluation Team, which focused on the definition of evaluation criteria and certification. There were some inter-active discussions, including a comparison of findings and observations on some topics. So, in the end, not really complementary, but nevertheless engaging in fruitful cooperation.

MG Wolski: In essence we have the same aims, focusing on continual improvement. This is not to say that there is no overlap. Actually this overlap is healthy, as an observation seen from various perspectives brings a richer understanding of the issue in question.

The European: Your approaches are different.

MG Wolski: Lesson Learned (LL) teams at the JWC are involved from the very beginning of the exercise planning process, which can be up to 18 months before the actual execution phase, working both to collect and disseminate observations and lessons. The LL staff from the Training Audience is also involved from an early stage. There is definitely a linkage between them.

The European: Are there any efforts to establish links with other organisations?

MG Wolski: For sure we have links with the other organisations involved in the exercises, such as the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (SHAPE), Supreme Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT), and Centres of Excellence. The stronger this network, the better we can share lessons that are also relevant for other parties.

The European: Are there any efforts to establish links with other organisations?

MG Wolski: For sure we have links with the other organisations involved in the exercises, such as the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (SHAPE), Supreme Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT), and Centres of Excellence. The stronger this network, the better we can share lessons that are also relevant for other parties.

The European: NATO Extra portal offers a wide repository of relevant exercise-related information and possibilities for interaction between ‘LL Communities of interest’. Is this part of the overall LL discussions?

BG Sirel: For the COI’s it’s quite a new tool in the NATO Lessons Learned Portal. Not all areas of interest have as yet been established and those which have been are used more by the relevant specialists than by a widespread community geared to general issues. So at the moment it is not really a tool for cross-functional LL issues at HQ level.

MG Wolski: The NATO Extra portal is a useful archiving tool for gathering all the relevant lessons, reports and exercise outcomes. Within the portal we are able to share lessons, best practices and analytical reports, and also track lessons being learned across the Alliance, from the initial Observation stage through to the final Lessons Learned stage.
How to meet individual protection for security and law enforcement forces

Personal protective clothing

by Dr Andreas Arnold, Director Product Management & Business Development, Blücher GmbH, Erkrath

The changing and emerging threats that soldiers, first responders and other security forces are increasingly facing during their missions are leading to new, as yet unmet requirements for personal protective equipment (PPE) and keep challenging industry to develop new approaches and solutions. The increasing use of the acronym “CBRNe” instead of the classical “NBC” or the popular “CBRN” indicates the need for a broader range of protection.

New uncertainties

Although the likelihood of a major chemical attack has significantly decreased, there is greater uncertainty regarding whether, when and where such an attack could happen. There is therefore a need for protective solutions that can be worn over extended periods of time without an adverse impact on the users’ performance.

A significant increase in the number of attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against military personnel, civilian and government staff and police forces (e.g. during riot control activities) can be perceived worldwide, not only in regions of direct crisis but also in areas previously deemed safe.

Striving for PPE Innovation

When responding to such emerging threats with enhanced equipment, the immediate solution of simply adding protective components to the wearer’s equipment will foreseeably result in over-burdening the wearer, resulting in an inappropriate and dangerous sacrifice of operational capability for the sake of protection. The resulting lack of mobility and capability must be deemed unsafe and to be avoided. Users are therefore seeking PPE systems with enhanced properties offering a broad range of protection, and which are adapted or adaptable to their specific operational needs. Optimised wearing physiology and ergonomics, a longer wear-time and the integration of systems with maximum flexibility and modularity are the main priorities.

Parallel to hardware development, the research efforts of industry, institutes and academia must focus on describing these evolving features of personal protective equipment using quantitative and objective methods, which can then reliably predict and demonstrate its suitability for the user. When it comes to the implementation of new technologies in particular, new ways of quantifying their performance are required, as well as standards for the evaluation methodology and, equally important, performance criteria. The standardisation work in this area must consistently endeavour to strike the best possible balance between protection and capability.

CBRN protective PPE

Blücher GmbH is the world market leader in chemical and biological (CB) warfare agent protective materials and clothing. The strengths of the SARATOGA® technology include its unsurpassed combination of high protection and low heat stress, high durability, low life cycle costs, and operational capability as required by the most demanding armed forces, tactical operators and weapons inspectors.

Ongoing development work has led to CBRN protective suits like the Hot Climate Suit, fielded in the majority of the Gulf States with a significantly lower weight and physiological bur-
den than suits made from the clothing generations qualified in the 1990s.

Initiated by the German Bundeswehr, and in the meantime also fielded in large quantities by the Norwegian Armed forces, a suit with integrated protection against aerosolised chemical and biological contamination with close to no impact on weight or burden has been developed.

With its POLYPROTECT 12, Blücher provides the lightest product in the SARATOGA® CBRN family, performing well with many international disaster relief organisations as well as security services. Besides 12 hours of protection against threats from chemical warfare agents, the suit offers very high protection against contaminated particles, i.e. radioactive fall-out. The Special Forces Intervention (SFI) coverall, which was developed in close cooperation with GSG9, the German Federal Police’s anti-terror unit, incorporates an adapted choice of flame-retardant, high-strength textiles and a newly-developed lightweight SARATOGA® filter leading to a 25 % weight reduction.

A new generation of light, comfortable, stretchable and optionally inherently flame-retardant undergarments is currently in use by military forces, air crews, EOD teams, law enforcement agencies and OPCW inspectors, who all benefit from the combination of low profile, excellent wear physiology, durability and high levels of protection. Depending on the operational concepts, they are either worn in combination with dedicated garments on top, or they serve as an additional protective base layer underneath impermeable clothing, which never provides perfect gas tightness.

To combine ballistic and fragment protection

The main purpose of the ballistic protective equipment currently being fielded is to protect the vital organs against gunfire only, whereas the modular, ergonomic SARATOGA® Fragment Protective Clothing (FPC) has been especially developed to protect the entire body against primary and secondary fragments from IED explosions. This Fragment Protective Clothing (FPC) used in combination with personal protective equipment does not compromise any of the activities of the individuals concerned in terms of their range of action and operational duties at different locations and under various environmental conditions. The very soft, light and air-permeable garment ensemble is worn as a common undergarment and over-garment system providing state-of-the-art moisture and heat stress management. It adapts to all movements and postures without any mobility restrictions. The ballistic protection and FPC systems are mutually complementary, offering perfect synergy of protection against IED threats, thereby significantly reducing the threat of serious wounding and infections with their resulting long-term effects for the victim, while providing a high level of physiological comfort and mobility.

The first step in the development of these innovative PPE technologies is to perform a proper analysis at all system levels in order to gain a profound understanding of the threats, operating concept and operational requirements.

The way ahead

Development work is driven by emerging requirements for a broad range of protection and a low burden, resulting in products made of innovative materials incorporating low burden compounds, and novel tailor-made approaches to system integration. By providing protection against chemical and biological agents as well as explosives, SARATOGA® solutions are taking the CBRNe threats serious and literally.

Beyond existing and already fielded innovative solutions, a further implementation of novel technologies, or the integration of both chemical/biological and fragment protection within a single garment is foreseeable. The ground has been prepared for providing the user with PPE solutions that provide the highest degree of protection while maintaining an optimal operational capability. However, it is necessary to establish performance standards in order to facilitate future procurement.
Cyber attacks are a constant threat to all types of organizations. It’s not a matter if, but when and how often, attacks will occur. Don’t count a break in the battle – experts predict that cyber attacks will increase in frequency and sophistication in the future, as hacktivists, nation states, terrorists, and organized crime rings ramp up their hacking efforts. As cybersecurity evolves as a discipline distinct from its purely IT roots, capabilities and approaches have matured to defend against perpetually evolving threats. Through this transformation, four core cybersecurity disciplines have emerged: prepare, protect, prevent, and preempt. The proper resourcing, deployment, and execution of capabilities in these four areas can bolster an organization’s defenses to withstand and recover from attacks.

The evolution of cybersecurity
A fledgling cybersecurity program operates in support of IT and is primarily focused on basic protection, such as defending the perimeter and endpoints, and access management. The immature program lacks readiness insights for security incidents, and each incident triggers a mad scramble to defend against it. Events are viewed from the perspective of the impact on IT systems and infrastructure. As a cybersecurity program matures, teams gain visibility into the organization and expand their scope from purely protective to more preventative capabilities. Teams develop proactive detection and strive for speedy reaction to events, with an emphasis on prevention of outages and damage, containment, and remediation, rather than a purely IT-driven service restoration focus. Cybersecurity incidents also begin to be included in business continuity plans. An evolved cybersecurity program seeks to understand and engage the business or mission operations. Mature cybersecurity teams use a risk-based framework for prioritization and decision-making. With an improved understanding of both the organization’s and the attackers’ objectives, a team can move to disrupt attackers and build resiliency. The team also expands its focus to areas beyond IT, such as supply chain security, manufacturing operations, and third-party security controls validation or contractor personnel assurance. This may also result in stronger partnerships with physical security and other field operation teams.

Signs of maturity the four core disciplines
A truly mature cybersecurity program has mastered the disciplines of prepare, protect, prevent, and preempt, and has deployed effective capabilities in all four areas (see box). Any organization’s cybersecurity program must experience growing pains to become a mature and effective asset to the organization it serves. However, by heeding the four core disciplines – prepare, protect, prevent, and preempt – the march to maturity can prove faster and lighter, and result in a stronger cybersecurity program.

Disciplines to master

**Prepare:** Preparation requires an understanding of the business risks, the critical processes to reconstitute with urgency, and the deployment of playbooks, contingency plans, and incident response automation.

**Protect:** At its core, cybersecurity serves in a protective role. Much of this work is foundational capability consisting of well-known mechanisms and processes to protect assets, data, employees, and customers.

**Prevent:** Preventative capabilities are also foundational. They combat common security issues through action, such as vulnerability management, code reviews, firewall and advanced intrusion prevention systems, as well as common anti-malware tools.

**Preempt:** Preemptive operational security capabilities mark a mature program. They target the adversary’s tools and tactics. Preemptive tactics are aimed at early detection, withstanding the attacks, restoring key operational capabilities, and evolving defensive approaches to disrupt current and future attacks.
Connectivity is a key factor in preparing for social and defence challenges

Satellite – a critical infrastructure for Defence and Security

by Karim Michel Sabbagh, President and CEO, SES, Luxembourg

When we look at the number of geopolitical challenges we are facing, it is evident that connectivity is a key factor in preparing for social and defence challenges. Just look at two key indicators that illustrate this dynamic impressively:

The commercial bandwidth used by the US military has risen dramatically since the Desert Storm operation in 1990, from 100 Mbps used at the time by the military forces to 10-15 Gbps today. This represents an increase of up to 15,000%.

Secondly, the bandwidth consumption of UAV platforms is also increasing. The Predator consumes 3–5 Mbps, the consumption of the Reaper has risen to 5–10 Mbps, and that of Global Hawk has increased to an unprecedented level of 10-50 Mbps.

These developments demonstrate that we are looking at a significant increase in bandwidth-intensive government data applications. Based on these bold trends, how do we prepare to enter the next generation of defence & security connectivity? We see three key elements that are crucial for fulfilling our tasks: Assurance. Accessibility. Acceleration.

Assurance

This first element refers to the way we make sure communication networks are reliable and safe. Located 36,000 km above the Earth’s surface and powered by sunlight, geostationary satellites are shielded from terrestrial devastation such as hurricanes and earthquakes, power disruptions, cable damage, civil disturbance or terrorist attacks. An encrypted point-to-point satellite link is much easier to protect than terrestrial links that can be intercepted almost anywhere. Potential interferences can be detected instantaneously thanks to geostationary location capabilities, and anti-jamming measures can be put in place immediately. All these advantages are summarised in a figure that our engineers look at every week with pride.

The technical availability of our space segment reaches the record level of 99.999992%. This number is unrivalled and clearly illustrates the extremely high performance level of our satellite communication.

Accessibility

It is a fact today that a significant number of defence and security applications rely on satellite capacity. A large part of that capacity comes from commercial satellite operations. 60% of the defence and security satellite capacity comes from the military SATCOM sector (i.e. government-owned capacity) but the balance of 40% comes from the commercial satellite sector. The United States Department of Defense is the largest single customer of the commercial satellite sector worldwide, but other nations also make regular use of this capability. It is clear that...
easy access to commercial space capacity is imperative to government agencies and institutions, as they often require urgent and flexible bandwidth for their secure networks.

**Acceleration**

This element implies an increase in traffic demand that is managed faster. The amount of bandwidth we now see military satellite operations requiring leads us to constantly innovate, spurring the creation of new concepts and technologies. To respond to this demand for increased traffic we have created the concept of GOVSATCOM or Government Satellite Communications, building on the previous concept of Satellite Communications (SATCOM). GOVSATCOM is a new and innovative model that combines the strengths of government engagement with the assets and knowledge of commercial space. Our GOVSATCOM service has both an entrepreneurial logic and capital efficiency. In this new GOVSATCOM segment, we will deliver high throughput service that is assured and accessible, meeting the high bandwidth demand.

**The new model is LuxGovSat**

A first cornerstone is a new venture founded by SES and the Luxembourg Government. Jointly held by SES and the Luxembourg Government, the objectives of LuxGovSat are the acquisition, launch and operation of a satellite to provide government and military communication services from 2017 onwards. The second aspect of acceleration is innovation in order to change the technical and data speed and efficiency. SES regularly invests in new infrastructure that is able to handle even higher forms of data throughput. This significantly increases fleet performance and flexibility, and allows us to scale our customer solutions infinitely. The satellite fleet of O3b – which we have a significant investment in – orbits at 8,000 kilometres above the Earth, and is ideal for serving high-density and low-latency networks. The high-power beams of O3b satellites offer more than 1 Gigabit per second and therefore yield an unprecedented value proposition for clients in industries covering maritime, energy and telecommunications, but also to governments and their institutions. Demonstrations jointly conducted by SES and O3b have elicited positive feedback from clients, with more to come. What is important to note in this innovative model is the scalability of O3b as a future-proof system for next-generation networks.

With these important initiatives, we can show that SES has set the fundamentals of our future foundations. We are certain that it will also provide a strong basis for our government allies and institutional friends to build solutions upon.
Cuts in defence spending by EU Member States and the US and the need to counter security threats have highlighted an opportunity for transatlantic defence industries to collaborate more closely. Collaboration such as industrial teaming, long-term partnerships and even large-scale industrialisation can temper political protectionism, pool a greater diversity of skills and spread total life cycle costs. Collaboration’s greatest benefit is superior and innovative technological capability for the warfighter.

To get there, the Western Alliance’s armed forces must identify technological strengths and gaps in military capability, while governments must encourage greater organisational interoperability and cooperation across the transatlantic defence equipment market.

**We cannot afford national egotism**

Change necessitates breaking down the economic, political and regulatory fortresses that often upset collaboration. Walls usually stay ‘up’ to protect jobs, or to prevent the transfer of advanced technology perceived to be critical to national security. But fortresses do two things very well. They force sovereign nations or industry to duplicate the work of others, usually at great cost. And they restrict the flow of ideas, knowledge and trust that underpin the Transatlantic Bridge.

**Why such short-sightedness?**

Should Europe develop a new heavy-lift helicopter when the US Navy/Marine Corps have already spent $6 billion (including $3.7 billion with Sikorsky) to develop the new-generation CH-53K aircraft? If, for instance, Germany or another EU State should buy a derivative CH-53K platform, Sikorsky will seek European partners to build and then maintain the fleet at high operational readiness rates during its potential 40-year life cycle. With few large European next-generation military programmes in play, and defence industry eager to innovate, can the Alliance wait for today’s security crises to worsen before we see real change in interoperability and cooperation?

**Examples that it can work**

At our PZL Mielec factory in Poland, a skilled workforce of 1,500 builds the proven BLACK HAWK helicopter and M28 short take-off and landing aircraft. Through Mielec, Sikorsky is investing significantly in the Polish InnoLot R&D programme to develop an aerostructures centre of excellence with Poland’s National Centre for Research and Development.

In Turkey, Sikorsky has launched the most significant international industrialisation programme in the company’s 94-year history. TAI and other Turkish companies will acquire from Sikorsky the technological knowhow to manufacture a derivative BLACK HAWK helicopter, the T-70, for the country’s Armed Forces. Turkish industry will expand their scope as a source of production for the aircraft, including growth in dynamic components, aerostructures, electrical components and a digital cockpit.

Another strategic vision sees Sikorsky leading two next-generation helicopter development efforts based on our X2® co-axial design. Both efforts, including our partnership with Boeing, are largely self-funded. A flight speed of 230+ knots is only one attribute of an X2 aircraft. Superior manoeuvrability in the hover and low speed regimes, arguably more important than speed, will radically change the way that future aviators fly and fight.

We invite EU Member States to cooperate With X2, Sikorsky and our US teammates are shaping a future vision for rotorcraft. Will the EU Member States advance into the future with us?

Examples that it can work

At our PZL Mielec factory in Poland, a skilled workforce of 1,500 builds the proven BLACK HAWK helicopter and M28 short take-off and landing aircraft. Through Mielec, Sikorsky is investing significantly in the Polish InnoLot R&D programme to develop an aerostructures centre of excellence with Poland’s National Centre for Research and Development.

In Turkey, Sikorsky has launched the most significant international industrialisation programme in the company’s 94-year history. TAI and other Turkish companies will acquire from Sikorsky the technological knowhow to manufacture a derivative BLACK HAWK helicopter, the T-70, for the country’s Armed Forces. Turkish industry will expand their scope as a source of production for the aircraft, including growth in dynamic components, aerostructures, electrical components and a digital cockpit.
A cooperative transatlantic approach for an integrated missile defence

How to defend NATO and secure European societies?

Interview with James Monroe, Vice President, Raytheon Inc., Berlin

The European: Mr Monroe, Raytheon is a world leader in defence equipment. How does Raytheon see the situation and how you are currently positioned in Europe?

James Monroe: Europe faces a complex set of new security challenges, unlike anything seen for decades, as your readers are well aware. This requires more high-readiness forces with more ready-to-deploy capability than since the end of the Cold War. Some budgets are starting to increase again, and some efficient integration of forces is occurring, via NATO, the EU or trans-nationally, for example with Dutch and German land forces, among others.

The European: And what about industry?

James Monroe: Industry needs to harmonise requirements better, avoid duplication of effort and preserve and enhance existing capabilities while introducing new technologies quickly and efficiently.

The European: And customers?

James Monroe: Customers need real capability to defend themselves and their allies now or in the near term. Along with our European partners and suppliers, we have a proven record for enabling European forces to perform their critical missions, whether it be in air & missile defence, cyber defence, ISR, force projection or command & control.

The European: I imagine that the decision taken at NATO’s 2010 Lisbon summit to develop an integrated missile defence closely linked to the United States’ Ballistic Missile Defense was good news for your Patriot missile system?

James E. (Jim) Monroe,
Vice President of Raytheon International, Inc., since 2007, is responsible for Raytheon’s corporate business development in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Born in 1956 in Paris, he graduated from Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science. He served with the US Navy from 1978 to 1987 as a Naval Flight Officer. From 1987 to 1994 he held several positions with Fokker Aircraft Company of the Netherlands, and from 1994 to 1999 he was Manager Business Development for Missile Systems at Raytheon’s European regional office in Brussels. From 1999 to 2002 he served as a Senior Manager Business Development for Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson. Before taking up his current post he was Raytheon’s Director for BENELUX, NATO and EU affairs.

James Monroe: That NATO summit decision was really about defending all of NATO’s territory and population against Short, Medium, and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles and acceptance of the US offer of the “Phased Adaptive Approach” (EPAA), which was really the only way to implement an effective defence in time against that full threat spectrum. More than 30 proven Patriot lower-tier or endo-atmospheric intercept systems were already in place in Europe.

The European: The NATO decisions were taken on the basis of existing systems?

James Monroe: The decisions to deploy these systems were clearly made on the basis of proven capability. That is certainly a responsibility we take very seriously as we continue to invest and to cooperate with European and other partners to keep our systems well ahead of the threat.

The European: Patriot Configuration 3 corresponds to the requirements of NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NIAMD). What are its noteworthy features?

James Monroe: Patriot is the only combat-proven full-spectrum lower-tier air & missile defence system in the world today. It is critical for NATO’s air defence against multiple threats, and for protection of cities, airfields, brigade areas and other critical assets against time-sensitive Short and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. NATO’s earlier decision in 2004 to implement the

NATO integrated Air and Missile Defence (NIAMD)

NATO integrated Air and Missile Defence is an essential continuous mission that safeguards and protects Alliance territory in peacetime as well as in times of crisis and conflict.

It contributes to deterrence and to indivisible security and freedom of action of the Alliance, populations and forces against any air and missile threat and attack.

Source: NATO, July 2015
Recognized as the world’s premier medium range air defense system, the Patriot system is the standard for the protection of deployed forces due to its proven record of success in more than 70 combat engagements.

The European: What is unique about Patriot?
James Monroe: Patriot has a number of unique features and cooperative models that set it apart from other systems: the user community, with more than 220 fire units worldwide, over 200 combat engagements, more than 3,000 tests under real conditions and more than 1,400 flight tests – 700 by the US and 700 by Germany and other international Patriot customers. Test results are used to update the system to keep it well ahead of evolving threats. Each of the partner nations has introduced upgrades and no other air and missile defense system has seen this level of consistent investment.

The European: And the effect of digitization?
James Monroe: The digitization of Patriot has made it even more interoperable with lower and upper echelon systems, while maintaining its system integrity and its cyber security.

The European: In an article last year you mentioned the concept of a “built-in export market”. Can you tell our readers what this means, exactly?
James Monroe: Certainly. It means that Patriot is co-developed and co-produced by a network of more than 2,800 global partners and suppliers, using their latest innovations in technology and manufacturing. Many are based in the respective Patriot partner countries and already receive a high return on investment.

The European: Are you looking to expand this network as new countries join?
James Monroe: For sure. Poland selected Patriot for its medium range air defence solution, and industrial participation is important. We’re building new fire units right now using Polish TELDAT’s routers.

The European: What do you have to offer by way of new technologies to the nations that are currently fielding Patriot Configuration 3 Systems?
James Monroe: Two categories: the first is digitization of the systems – what we call Configuration 3+ – and the second is Next Generation Patriot, which builds upon digitization. It is all part of a continuous process of enhancing and refining the system. This proven upgrade includes Modern Man Station (MMS), with a redesigned Fire Solution Computer and an Enhanced Weapons Control Computer. The first enables Patriot to take advantage of the PAC-3 MSE missile capabilities, the latter provides up to 50 per cent more processing power. Configuration 3+ also includes a Radar Digital Processor (RDP), increasing reliability and significantly reducing life cycle costs.

The European: May I ask about your experience?
James Monroe: We’ve recently tested the system with a new software build known as Post-Deployment Build 8 (PDB-8) in Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System (ALTB-MD) for the protection of deployed forces was instrumental in linking the more than 30 operational Patriot systems in Europe.
cooperation with the US Army. During the flight test the operators successfully engaged two targets with two different kinds of missiles, a PAC-3 and a GEM-T.

The further evolution of the system is Next Generation Patriot. It includes a modular upgrade of the radar to full 360-degree capability with revolutionary Gallium Nitride-based Active Electronic Scanning Arrays (GaN AESA), as well as implementation of a role-based flexible Common Command and Control system in a netted and distributed architecture.

The European: You made an offer to Germany for the cost-effective modernisation of its existing Patriot Configuration 3 systems?

James Monroe: That’s right. We offered to seamlessly upgrade all of Germany’s Patriot fire units in cooperation with our German industrial partners. This included the 360-degree radar and the role-based Common Command and Control, which I’ve already mentioned. It also included retention and upgrade of Germany’s extensive inventory of Patriot missiles, and the additional ability to employ the PAC-3 MSE and IRIS-T SL missiles, for a robust effector mix. We also offered to integrate the MEADS NVLS launching system if desired. Retention of the existing missiles alone saves Germany at least a billion euros in inventory replacement costs.

The European: Are you confident?

James Monroe: We were also confident of the cooperative proposal because of our experience with a solid base of German partners and suppliers on Patriot and other programmes like RAM and ESSM.

The European: Yet the German Federal Government recently decided not to accept that offer, and to equip the Bundeswehr with the MEADS Missile Defence System.

James Monroe: We understand that the German Ministry of Defence has made a down-select for a MEADS-based TLVS system, but have clearly stated that they will only proceed with a development contract after careful review of the risks and milestones over the next year, and that a subsequent production phase will depend on a separate decision to be made some years in the future.

The European: And what action is your company planning as regards modernisation of the Patriot Configuration 3 systems of other European countries, such as the Netherlands?

James Monroe: The Netherlands just made a clear decision to modernise their Patriot batteries, extending operation to at least 2040. As such they are aligned with most global Patriot users. The Dutch Minister of Defence officially stated in answers to Parliament that the investment costs of replacing Patriot with MEADS would be much higher than for upgrading Patriot, even taking into account the life-cycle costs of both systems up to 2040.

The European: Could you tell us a bit more about Raytheon’s Standard Missile 3, which is capable of destroying approaching missiles in the upper layer, and about your business model for missiles in this field?

James Monroe: Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) is a defensive system with three propulsion stages plus a space intercept vehicle that actually pulverises ballistic missiles high in space with pure kinetic energy. It defends large areas with the ability to intercept across trajectories, taking out threats sooner than other options, with flexible land or sea-basing against MRBM and IRBM threats.

The European: How do you rate your experience?

James Monroe: On 9 December we had the first land-based intercept test of an SM-3 Block IB from an Aegis Ashore site in Hawaii and the day before, the new SM-3 Block IIA was successfully tested in California. Another great example is October’s At-Sea-Demonstration in the North Atlantic, where an eight-nation task group of sophisticated NATO air defence frigates and destroyers demonstrated combined operations against simultaneous anti-ship and ballistic missile attacks. It included the first exo-atmospheric intercept (with an SM-3) of a ballistic missile target in European waters.

The European: Do you see any possibilities for deeper cooperation in the future with the companies participating in the NIAMD?

James Monroe: Yes of course. And we already have very strong cooperation with companies across Europe on Patriot, on NATO BMD, and on many other air & missile defence systems in the land, sea and air domains. New opportunities for cooperation will be found in the expansion and further integration of lower and upper tier systems, also with inner layer self-protection systems, and integration across land and sea domains.

The European: Many thanks for this discussion!
IDE is the leading defense electronic and communication systems company in Greece, established through its participation in large-scale domestic as well as in international development and production programs.

Our expertise is founded on the utilization of high-end technologies in the design, development and manufacturing of advanced products in the areas of tactical military communications, encryption devices, C3I systems, surveillance, reconnaissance and security systems, hybrid electric power and electric energy storage systems, missile electronic components, software for military applications and test equipment. Utilizing our advanced production capabilities and large-scale project management know-how, IDE is a key player in the high technology sector of the Hellenic defense industry.
A behavioural change in the use of energy is indispensable

Secure energy supply for NATO armed forces

Interview with Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, ASG, Head Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO, Brussels

The European: Mr Ducaru, you have been Assistant Secretary General of the new Emerging Challenges Division since 2013. How, in a few words, would you describe your mission?

Sorin Ducaru: Today’s security environment offers a mix of emerging non-conventional challenges and some re-emerging conventional ones. They tend to merge into a hybrid blend. As an organisation that is responsible for the security of almost one billion people, NATO must have the tools to respond to both. My mission is to be an important part of this response.

The European: One of your sections deals with energy. You wish to see less wastage of fossil energy sources in NATO forces. What is your plan of action?

Sorin Ducaru: NATO is an organisation that brings together 28 member states and over 40 partner countries. Many of our partners are contributing to NATO-led missions. In some of these missions we face logistical challenges with resupply, of which energy and water are the most prominent. While NATO does not develop Smart Energy technologies, it can support cooperative research between national experts. One tool in this regard is NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme that is part of my division. The SPS Programme has already supported a number of workshops, training courses and projects on Smart Energy. Furthermore we are working with other NATO Divisions and bodies to encourage the development of policies and standards on energy efficiency. To bring home that these steps are indeed feasible, we demonstrate, for example, that diesel generators can reduce their consumption through energy management and additional renewable sources.

The European: This is something of a revolution. How do you think force commanders will react when you take away most of their beloved generators?

Sorin Ducaru: We will not take away their diesel generators. This is a common misperception. Instead we are showing that the old diesel generator can work more efficiently when it is connected to a micro grid with energy management. Last year, during the logistical exercise “Capable Logistician 2015” (CL15) in Hungary, we brought together private companies and armed forces to show that using less energy can actually result in having more power. In addition, the Science for Peace and Security Programme supported a group of public sector experts to evaluate the outcome.

The European: Your strategy is clear, but are there already plans for the functioning of such Smart Energy systems in practice?

Sorin Ducaru: The use of Smart Energy systems or micro grids is something that the nations will have to decide upon. NATO as an organisation should play the role of a mentor and mediator between policymakers, academia, the military and the private companies. The technologies are already on the
market. But for them to be useful for NATO’s forces, it is necessary to agree on standards. Our job is to convince nations to go down this path. Furthermore, we are designing a complete cooperative system in which Smart Energy support is closely linked with the users’ equipment and also, I would say, their “behaviour”: cooled tents, LED, systems which automatically switch off when there is no demand for electricity, etc.

The European: As I understand it, Smart Energy for you is about more than just reducing the consumption of fossil fuels. Is it also about changing people’s behaviour when using energy?
Sorin Ducaru: Yes, modern times call for modern approaches, and behavioural change is an indispensable part of the story. The Emerging Security Challenges Division initiated a concept on Smart Energy and brought together a large network of stakeholders from NATO bodies, agencies and nations. Experts inside and outside NATO have started to work on training courses, exercises, exhibitions and workshops dedicated to new technologies, but also on standardisation, training and behavioural change. And NATO is not working alone on this. The EU, for example, is implementing complementary Smart Energy projects.

The European: You have mentioned industry several times in connection with the famous CL15 exercise. How was it possible to get industry directly involved in a NATO exercise?
Sorin Ducaru: One of my staff members, Dr Susanne Michaelis, had been building ties with industry for quite some time. When we felt that the time had come to take this cooperation to a new level, I supported her in bringing together interested companies and negotiating with CL15 Host Nation Hungary to permit their involvement as fully integrated participants in the exercise. Special agreements were signed and 14 companies brought over 50 pieces of equipment, interacting with other logistical units such as FUEL and MILITARY POLICE. None of these steps had ever been taken before, but we felt that the importance of the issue made it worth taking risks. Fortunately, we were proven right.

The European: This means that NATO created expectations and that industry spent a lot of money on building prototypes to participate in CL15. Who will be the customer: NATO or member states?
Sorin Ducaru: Member states. It is always the member states who decide. And this is something we want to address at the Post Exercise Workshop that will take place at NATO Headquarters on 3 March. Together with NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and other divisions we want to further raise awareness with the nations. We will provide experts from the public and private sectors with an opportunity to demonstrate the value of Smart Energy. Basically, the message I would like to convey is simple: invest a little more when you buy new technologies, then save in the long run. Journals, such as “The European”, can be of great help in getting this message to the potential customers.

The European: Is there any follow-up for industry in the pipeline?
Sorin Ducaru: Yes. Besides the workshop on 3 March, we hope that the nations will agree on a conference and exhibition in November with the title “Innovative Energy Solutions for Military Applications” (IESMA 2016) in Lithuania. This will be the third event of its kind, and it has already become a trademark for NATO’s Smart Energy initiative. We also will follow up on the Capable Logistician evaluation report that will soon be presented to the nations, recommending, inter alia, the establishment of standards for micro grids.

The European: I’m sure industry will appreciate that. I have the feeling from my discussions with industry representatives that they think NATO should now make an effort to involve them in the Trident exercises as part of the logistic chain. Wouldn’t this be fair?
Sorin Ducaru: Exercises such as Capable Logistician 2018 and Trident Juncture 2018 are being discussed as possible opportunities to include Smart Energy equipment, including those contributed by both Armed Forces and companies. This is one point that we will raise during the workshop on 3 March. But as I said, the Emerging Security Challenges Division is not alone. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations, as well as Committees, such as the Military Committee and the Logistics Committee, are also very keen to continue their good cooperation with industry.

The European: Thank you for this exchange of views, Ambassador.

Interview conducted by Nannette Cazaubon, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of this magazine

Sorin Ducaru

has been Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges since 2013. He studied at the Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest and the Romanian National School of Political Studies and Public Administration. Mr Ducaru holds a MPhil Degree in International Relations and a PhD degree in International Economics. He joined the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, assuming various posts. In 2000-2001 he was the Permanent Representative of Romania to the UN and from 2001 to 2006 the Romanian Ambassador to the US. Prior to his appointment as NATO ASG, Ambassador Ducaru served as Romania’s Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council.
Lithuania receives innovative hybrid power generating and management system

A German engineering system brings NATO closer to smart energy targets

A report by Nannette Cazaubon, Journalist, Paris

PFISTERER’s new CrossPower energy management system, which is designed to foster energy efficiency by reducing dependence on diesel generators in civil and military camps, was handed over to the Lithuanian Armed forces on 4th February, making Lithuania the first NATO member to benefit from this mobile “smart energy” system.

Having followed its development since 2014, when the system was only at the stage of an idea within the German-Swiss company Pfisterer Holding AG, and reported on it twice since then in this magazine, I was eager to see the product in operation. So I took the plane to Lithuania, where an official handover ceremony had been organised in Marijampolė by the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence.

(Lithuania, 4th February) It is cold this morning in Marijampolė, at the Grand Duke Vytenis Main Support Logistics Battalion of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. Accompanied by Col Gintaras Bagdonas, Director of the Vilnius-based NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO ENSEC COE) and LtCol Luca Dottarelli, Head of the Doctrine and Concept Development Division, I cross the frozen training ground to inspect the CrossPower system installed in recent weeks by a Pfisterer team. The system will be run here under the name of HPGS (deployable modular Hybrid Power Generation and management System), I am told by the Colonels during a private tour ahead of the arrival of the official invitees to the ceremony during which the energy management system is to be formally transferred from NATO ENSEC COE to the Lithuanian Armed Forces.

The system at work

It is quite impressive for me to see with my own eyes this brand new mobile power generating system that uses both alternative energy sources (solar/wind) and conventional diesel generators, and is equipped with an intelligent control system that strikes an optimum balance between power generation and consumption. The whole system – capable of supplying energy to a battalion-sized unit (2500 KWh/day) – fits into two olive green military standard containers which do not strike me as being that big: one of them, with a wind turbine attached, hosts the management system as well as powerful batteries.
During the handover ceremony, Col Sigitas Mundris Commander of Logistics Command of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, paid tribute to Pfisterer’s exceptional performance in meeting an extremely short deadline, and Col Bagdonas thanked Canada for its financial support, observing that: “This System is very modern equipment that will allow us to gather all the research data and improve energy efficiency in all allied countries.”

Then it is time to go back out into the cold for the official tour of the system which will serve as a “smart energy” test ground for NATO and its nations by providing them, through NATO ENSEC COE, with valuable data from military installations as well as from the upcoming NATO/multi-nation exercises in which the system is to be utilised. A first report on the HPGS in use is awaited for the end of the year, LtCol Nicolas Henry, Deputy Director of the NATO ENSEC COE, tells me at the close of the event. The system seems to me, at any rate, to be well on track, which is confirmed by Mr Schuster, who joins us for a warming cup of coffee. He explains that the CrossPower product is already much in demand in the civilian sector where several projects are under way, including, for example, the energy supply to a refugee camp in Lebanon. “This event here in Marijampolė is a starting point for us”, he says.

Both a culmination and a starting point

This ceremony is the culmination of 14 months of intensive work that had begun following the announcement in November 2014 by NATO ENSEC COE of a call for tenders for a mobile hybrid power generation system, which was won by Pfisterer. The development of the system was funded by Canada, which made a voluntary national contribution of CAD 1 million to the Centre of Excellence for a project designed to improve the energy efficiency of the NATO military forces.

During the handover ceremony, Col Sigitas Mundris Commander of Logistics Command of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, paid tribute to Pfisterer’s exceptional performance in meeting an extremely short deadline, and Col Bagdonas thanked Canada for its financial support, observing that: “This System is very modern equipment that will allow us to gather all the research data and improve energy efficiency in all allied countries.”

Then it is time to go back out into the cold for the official tour of the system which will serve as a “smart energy” test ground for NATO and its nations by providing them, through NATO ENSEC COE, with valuable data from military installations as well as from the upcoming NATO/multi-nation exercises in which the system is to be utilised. A first report on the HPGS in use is awaited for the end of the year, LtCol Nicolas Henry, Deputy Director of the NATO ENSEC COE, tells me at the close of the event. The system seems to me, at any rate, to be well on track, which is confirmed by Mr Schuster, who joins us for a warming cup of coffee. He explains that the CrossPower product is already much in demand in the civilian sector where several projects are under way, including, for example, the energy supply to a refugee camp in Lebanon. “This event here in Marijampolė is a starting point for us”, he says.

Both a culmination and a starting point

This ceremony is the culmination of 14 months of intensive work that had begun following the announcement in November 2014 by NATO ENSEC COE of a call for tenders for a mobile hybrid power generation system, which was won by Pfisterer. The development of the system was funded by Canada, which made a voluntary national contribution of CAD 1 million to the Centre of Excellence for a project designed to improve the energy efficiency of the NATO military forces.

Both a culmination and a starting point

This ceremony is the culmination of 14 months of intensive work that had begun following the announcement in November 2014 by NATO ENSEC COE of a call for tenders for a mobile hybrid power generation system, which was won by Pfisterer. The development of the system was funded by Canada, which made a voluntary national contribution of CAD 1 million to the Centre of Excellence for a project designed to improve the energy efficiency of the NATO military forces.

Both a culmination and a starting point

This ceremony is the culmination of 14 months of intensive work that had begun following the announcement in November 2014 by NATO ENSEC COE of a call for tenders for a mobile hybrid power generation system, which was won by Pfisterer. The development of the system was funded by Canada, which made a voluntary national contribution of CAD 1 million to the Centre of Excellence for a project designed to improve the energy efficiency of the NATO military forces.
Gaining strategic advantages with smart HVAC systems

Heat management in Camps

by Uwe Tiegel, General Manager, Tiegel GmbH, Radeberg

Events in recent months have confirmed the trend: the situation in refugee camps is becoming increasingly difficult, to a point where often even the most basic humanitarian needs are not being met. The cost of covering basic heating, ventilation and cooling requirements in camps and settlements using fossil fuels remains very high. Investments in alternative energy sources or energy recycling remain few and far between.

“Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come” — Victor Hugo

The main objective of Tiegel, located just outside Dresden, is to put to good use energy that has already been produced while adapting the systems ever more closely to the users’ requirements. The company, which was founded in 1914, has been active in the area of mobile heating, ventilation and cooling systems since 1970.

Tiegel’s approach to energy recycling

When considering the replacement of the generator technology, various points must be borne in mind. What is most important from the military standpoint is to guarantee security of supply and sustainability in the field of operations. This is where Tiegel’s heat management systems have a role to play.

1. The power generator is a very old, widely available, tried and tested technology, which, albeit reliable, is not only inefficient but also environmentally unfriendly.
2. The power generator produces about 1/3 electrical energy from the fuel. But what happens to the rest? This is where Tiegel comes in.
3. The rest is transformed into waste heat, which the Tiegel heat management system puts to good use.

A forward-looking concept

The Tiegel heat management system is a mobile system that can be tailored to the heating, ventilation and cooling requirements of any of the living and storage areas of a settlement or camp with thermal requirements, while also supplying hot or cold water.

1. Various modules are assembled in accordance with the camp’s requirements.
2. A heat recovery module collects the waste heat from the generator and conveys it to a storage module. The purpose of this component is to preserve the energy for later delivery to the system’s user elements.
3. Various supply modules ensure that the areas with thermal requirements receive the appropriate heating, ventilation or cooling. The medium that is used is air or warm water.
4. Redundancy in the security of supply: if insufficient waste heat is available, the end units can provide heating or cooling by conventional means.

Modular design tested during CL15

The modular system design, based on the plug & play approach, is open on all sides. Even in an installation that is up and running, the user can modify the modular structure or add further modules. This means that the system can develop and grow together with the camp. It was successfully demonstrated during the June 2015 NATO CL15 exercise in Hungary in various scenarios that renewable energies in combination with energy-efficient technologies have a major role to play in increasing a camp’s self-sufficiency and independence. Involved in this fielding of energy-efficient equipment technology and technical expertise were, among others, TIEGEL GmbH, the Bundeswehr and the US Department of Defense, who thus demonstrated their interoperability.

Conclusions

Tiegel’s heat management system can make an essential contribution to reducing a camp’s fuel consumption. Since the system builds on available technologies, it is simple to install in existing camps, or to gradually incorporate individual modules into them. Thus the company with its forward-looking approach contributes to reducing logistics costs.
Clean Sky is the most ambitious EU-funded aeronautical research programme ever launched in Europe, with more than 600 partners working to develop new, greener technologies for tomorrow’s aviation. One such partner is MTU Aero Engines, Germany’s leading engine manufacturer, responsible for an engine demonstrator that was run in MTU’s test cell in Munich. The test campaign marks the culmination of MTU’s Clean Sky 1 research activities, and the milestone was celebrated jointly with distinguished representatives from government, business, the Clean Sky Joint Undertaking, and research institutes.

New technologies for geared turbofan engines
Around 100 guests gathered in the pre-rigging room of test cell 3 last November to take a closer look at the demonstrator engine. The demonstrator, dubbed SAGE 4 (Sustainable And Green Engines), is one of five Clean Sky 1 engine demonstrators. It is based on advanced geared turbofan technology and it is used to show the maturity of the newly developed technologies for low-weight constructions, designs and materials which will help increase the efficiency of future geared turbofan (GTF) engines and at the same time reduce emissions and noise. MTU is concentrating its efforts on the low-pressure turbine and high-pressure compressor, two technology areas in which the company excels. All new technologies were integrated into a PurePower® PW1500G geared turbofan engine made available by MTU’s partner in the U.S., Pratt & Whitney. When Clean Sky 1 ends late this year, the new technologies will be available to support the next step in the evolution of the current geared turbofan shortly afterwards.

The propulsion system of the future …
The objective was to validate improved geared turbofan technology, especially for the low-pressure turbine section, in a joint effort with other European partners. Above and beyond the development of breakthrough technological solutions, Clean Sky pursues yet another major objective: to create a network of core partners, small and medium-sized enterprises, academia and research establishments in Europe. On this count, too, MTU has scored a success: more than 20 European partners – companies, universities and research institutes – have contributed to SAGE 4. For example: GKN Aerospace Engine Systems from Sweden provided a new, advanced, light-weight turbine exit case.

With the geared turbofan engine, Pratt & Whitney and MTU Aero Engines are building the propulsion system of the future. The GTF represents a huge leap forward in engine technology, for its new architecture reduces fuel consumption by 15 per cent, cuts CO2 emissions by the same amount, and almost halves the perceived noise level. MTU contributes the high-speed low-pressure turbine, a key component that is absolutely essential for the GTF, and the forward four stages of the high-pressure compressor.

... and beyond
Alongside its SAGE 4 activities, MTU as is one of 16 lead partners industry in Europe has already started the successor programme, Clean Sky 2, which will be tested between 2017 and 2020 to prove their capabilities.
The current refugee crisis requires us to act; this includes taking action wherever possible to encourage people to stay in their homes and to enable refugees from neighbouring countries to live decent lives within their “own” region in order to save them from an uncertain onward journey and to nurture their hope of returning home.

This is why, after lengthy and intensive preparations, the company S & Z Energiesysteme GmbH has decided to launch a project to tackle the problem of energy supplies in Middle Eastern Arab countries. The first concrete action will be to supply a town in Lebanon (12,500 inhabitants plus 2,500 refugees) with a 4-megawatt electricity supply from renewable sources, as well as water. The current sporadic power supply has negative consequences for the quality of life, education and economic development.

Photovoltaic and wind

In order to provide a continuous supply of electricity we intend to create a new grid incorporating the current emergency network based on diesel generators, to the extent that these are still usable. The aim is to cover 80% of the town’s energy requirements from renewable sources. Located close to a windy coast and with 320 days of sun each year, the town offers optimum conditions for a renewables-based power supply. With the aid of a smart energy management system that includes battery storage, 2000 households can be provided with an uninterrupted power supply at constant and affordable prices. This will strengthen infrastructure, enable schools to be built and create jobs. In addition, a reliable farmland irrigation system will make for better planning and harvests.

S & Z Energiesysteme GmbH wishes to implement its project in cooperation with competent and well-known partners. It is counting on state-of-the-art technologies from Germany, such as the CrossPower system produced by the Winterbach-based company Pfisterer Holding AG, which has agreed to participate in the technical and technological implementation. Thanks to its good contacts with partners in Lebanon the company can also rely on the intensive involvement in this project of Lebanese engineers, who are already contributing to the planning process.

Prospects

In the Arab world too, renewable energies are the key to the future. We will demonstrate that a renewables-based power supply is possible, even in places where the people themselves are not yet convinced because they are not familiar with this technology.

Having convinced the people in Lebanon, we intend to propose and implement similar projects on a comparable scale elsewhere in the Arab world.

by Jürgen Zitzmann, General Manager S & Z ENERGIESYSTEME, GmbH, Nuremberg

Jürgen Zitzmann, currently the Manager of S & Z Energiesysteme GmbH in Nuremberg, has been involved in the renewable energy sector since 2004. As head of sales he has been responsible for the installation of a total of 100-megawatt photovoltaic power stations. He specialises in conversion areas.
## List of authors and articles in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/Title</th>
<th>ESDU N° Page</th>
<th>Author/Title</th>
<th>ESDU N° Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ansgorge, Samuel and Martin Schuster Mobile Power Supply Management Systems for permanent and temporary use</td>
<td>20 41</td>
<td>Gomes MEP, Ana A sea of despair: where is the EU?</td>
<td>21 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold, Andreas Mobile and energy-efficient water purification</td>
<td>21 46</td>
<td>Güldogan, Sedat Turkey’s Defence Industry – a reliable partner for cooperation</td>
<td>20 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asselborn, Jean Migration: drawing up robust solutions</td>
<td>21 8</td>
<td>Hävre, André Smart energy for secure communications</td>
<td>20 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atalay, Ahmet Hamid A broad spectrum of capabilities is opened up to global cooperation</td>
<td>20 28</td>
<td>van Hazebrrouch, Richard and Albrecht Broemme, Christina Brüns THW’s support for disaster management and humanitarian aid</td>
<td>21 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balis, Christina and Lars Miethke German defence deserves a 21st century industrial strategy</td>
<td>20 18</td>
<td>Heinrich, Markus N. Together is better: overcoming resistance to European defence integration</td>
<td>20 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbatelli, Paolo Smart energy for multiple fields of application – Interview</td>
<td>21 52</td>
<td>Hende, Csaba Smart energy for crisis-management forces has become a reality – Interview</td>
<td>21 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond, David and Martin Jung Maritime interdependence: is China a troublemaker for the EU?</td>
<td>21 20</td>
<td>Homberg, Thomas MEADS – a unique opportunity for Germany, the EU and NATO</td>
<td>20 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broemme, Albrecht and Richard van Hazebrrouch, Christina Büns THW’s support for disaster management and humanitarian aid</td>
<td>21 28</td>
<td>Juncker, Jean-Claude My vision of Europe</td>
<td>20 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Büns, Christina and Albrecht Broemme, Richard van Hazebrrouch THW’s support for disaster management and humanitarian aid</td>
<td>21 28</td>
<td>Jung, Martin and David Bond Maritime interdependence: is China a troublemaker for the EU?</td>
<td>20 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cazaubon, Nannette Photovoltaic power available in a flash IESMA 2014 Vilnius – Conference Report</td>
<td>20 46</td>
<td>Kaptan, Eyüp and Selçuk Yaşar ROKETSAN – a global defence industry player for indigenous missile systems</td>
<td>20 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Das, Hans EU civil protection legislation – towards the two-year milestone</td>
<td>21 27</td>
<td>Klostermann, Karl Peter Alternative methods for the production of energy using mobile systems</td>
<td>20 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dördkaşlı, Muharrem There is room for expanding cooperation between the EU and Turkey</td>
<td>20 24</td>
<td>Kretschmann, Winfried Europe is being put to the test</td>
<td>21 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ducaru, Sorin Smart Energy for military forces is becoming a reality</td>
<td>20 39</td>
<td>Kujat, Harald The end of the ISAF mission and Afghanistan’s future</td>
<td>20 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gahler MEP, Michael European Defence – what is it all about?</td>
<td>21 8</td>
<td>Leinardi, Sven New impetus for mobile solar plants</td>
<td>21 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuliani, Jean-Dominique The horizon for the European Union</td>
<td>20 10</td>
<td>Lochbihler MEP, Barbara Armed drones – high time for an ethical and legal discussion</td>
<td>20 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perruche, Jean Paul An appeal for a European White paper</td>
<td>21 18</td>
<td>Michaels, Susanne NATO continues making Smart Energy smarter</td>
<td>20 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miethke, Lars and Dr. Christina Balis German defence deserves a 21st century industrial strategy</td>
<td>20 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author/Titel</td>
<td>ESDU N°</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaden, Andrea</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical experience of the Syrian Refugee Response in southeast Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizzo, Mandy</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TechNet Europe Paris 2014 – Conference Report</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling C4ISR – Conference Report</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowley, Swen-Colin</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The future of military command and control centres</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabbagh, Karim Michel</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide secure governmental communications – a step towards global security</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schuster, Martin and Samuel Ansorge</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Power Supply Management Systems for permanent and temporary use</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šedivý, Jiří</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New unrest and instability on Europe’s periphery</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stirnal, Andy Francis</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Berlin Security Conference – Conference report</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European financial instruments to promote solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stylianides, Christos</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaping the EU’s coordination and intervention capabilities – Interview</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suiissa, Rachel</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Euro-Atlantic relationship after the Iran agreement and the implications for Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>da Sylva, Emmanuella</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATO Final Conference Brussels – Conference report</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, Melanie</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bionic capillary System in operation</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thränert, Oliver</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Defence – a valuable tool to defend against current threats</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Vries, Tjeerd</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy storage – be smart: use battery management systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahnbaeck, Till</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs in emergency response mode amid global conflicts</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weber, Simone</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Solar Energy Systems presented at the NSPA Green Day 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wittmann, Klaus</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO – new look, original tasks, and reflections about the future</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wosolsobe, Wolfgang</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-civil synergies in CSDP – examples and opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaşar, Selçuk and Eyüp Kaptan</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKETSAN – a global defence industry player for indigenous missile systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zannier, Lamberto</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian monitors in a conflict zone: the OSCE’s Special monitoring mission to Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoller, Markus A.</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatible systems for cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zotos, Alexander</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid Smart Energy Systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUBSCRIPTION ORDER:**
by Fax to +49(0)228 9709775 or by E-Mail: subscription@euro-defence.eu

Karin Dornbusch · Advertising Manager · Phone: +49(0)228 9709740

3 issues for one year, including postage and delivery:

- [ ] International subscription: 66,- euros  
- [ ] Subscription EU: 42,- euros

Company: ___________________________________________ VAT no.: ____________________________

Address (Street, Zip Code, Town, Country): _________________________________

Phone: ___________________________ Fax: ___________________________

E-Mail: ___________________________ Date, Signature: ___________________________

Under the Patronage of the Ministry of Defence, Estonia
CrossPower: Smart Energy wherever you need it

CrossPower provides a stable, reliable power supply for civil or military camps, supply centers and field hospitals – anywhere it is needed. The scalable hybrid power generation system combines an energy management system and a mobile solar and wind farm with conventional diesel generators and battery storage. The system offers up to 50% fossil fuel savings and ensures 100% availability of supply day and night.

www.pfisterer.com