Deterrence Strategy
Thematic Bibliography no. 5/12

La stratégie de dissuasion
Bibliographie thématique no. 5/12
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Toutes les publications de la Bibliothèque sont disponibles sur les sites Intranet et Internet de l'OTAN.
ISBN: 9780833059307

Author(s):
1. Delpech, Therese

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)

Notes:
'Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. In this book, the author calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of the traditional concepts of first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers (e.g., China), smaller nuclear powers (e.g., Pakistan and North Korea), and nonstate actors (e.g., terrorists), as well as the extension of defense and security analysis to new domains, such as outer space and cyberspace. The author draws upon the lessons of the bipolar Cold War era to illustrate new concepts of deterrence that properly account for the variety of nuclear actors, the proliferation of missiles and thermonuclear weapons, and the radical ideologies that all are part of the nuclear scene today.'

ID number: 80024421
Year: 2012
Type: M
2011

Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Russian Approaches to a New Environment and Implications for the United States - Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
xviii, 91 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
(Project Air Force)
ISBN: 9780833052148
Author(s):
1. Quinlivan, James T.
2. Oliker, Olga
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
2. RUSSIA (FEDERATION)--MILITARY POLICY
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
'Bibliography: p. 81-91.
The United States and Russia no longer face each other as perpetual adversaries in a conflict of political ideology. However, as in the Cold War, Europe continues to be a key focus of possible contention between these powers, and, as in the Cold War, nuclear weapons have a role in how claimed interests might be defended within an overall deterrent framework. Through a variety of policies and actions - and most recently in a new military doctrine adopted in February 2010 - Russia has indicated the types of situations that might cause it to resort to using nuclear weapons. This monograph examines the elements of Russia's emerging deterrent framework: Russia's statements of claimed interests, its force development and posture, its military doctrine and practice, major military exercises it has conducted, and, importantly, whether Russia's highest political authorities have endorsed these military doctrines and exercises. The authors discuss the implications of Russia's evolving deterrence doctrine for US military operations in Europe, particularly for the US Air Force.'

128 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(Adelphi; 417)
ISBN: 9780415681827
Author(s):
1. Acton, James M.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
3. SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
Added entry(s):
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
Notes:
'There is a broad sense in both Russia and the United States that deep nuclear reductions - a goal endorsed by both governments - would constitute a risky step into the unknown and could undermine international security. However, until now, the reasons behind these concerns - and whether they are justified - have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in both Russia and the United States, the authors discuss the implications of deep nuclear reductions for international security.'
States, this paper maps out these concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence), the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and nuclear multipolarity. Contrary to popular belief, there is evidence against which these fears can be assessed. The practical experience of deterrence at low numbers that was acquired by the Soviet Union and the United States early in the Cold War, as well as by other nuclear-armed states, is highly relevant. Based on this experience and insights from deterrence theory, the paper concludes that most of the challenges associated with low numbers are not really a consequence of arsenal size and, accordingly, that there are good reasons to believe that deep reductions would not undermine international security.'

ID number: 80023832
Year: 2011
Type: M

190 p.; 22 cm.
ISBN: 9782738126290
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
2. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Added entry(s):
Notes:
'Les armes nucleaires occupent dans l'imaginaire collectif comme dans la realite historique une place paradoxale : d'un cote, on redoute l'horreur de l'apocalypse; de l'autre, la dissuasion apparait comme une donnee immuable et somme toute assez confortable. Seulement voila : dans ce domaine aussi, le monde est devenu multipolaire. La carte geopolitique se recompose. Revisions doctrinales, initiatives contre la proliferation des armes atomiques, mesures de desarmement nucleaire sont désormais a l'ordre du jour. Les meilleurs experts etrangers et francais examinent pour la premiere fois les consequences de ces evolutions. Ils analysent en particulier les risques d'eclatement et les consequences potentielles d'un conflit nucleaire dans les regions ou les armes atomiques sont devenus des composantes cle du paysage strategique : Moyen-Orient, Extreme-Orient, Asie du Sud. Ils examinent egalement les choix auxquels la France, avec ses allies, sera confrontee.'

ID number: 80024036
Year: 2011
Type: M
407 p.; 24 cm.
(Adelphi: 421-23)
ISBN: 9780415521659
Author(s): 1. Ogilvie-White, Tanya
Subject(s): 1. QUINLAN, MICHAEL, 1930-2009
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Added entry(s): 1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)
Notes: 'Michael Quinlan's grasp of defence policy - particularly that relating to Britain's deterrent posture - was second to none. His career in the British civil service spanned three decades, during which time he advised various governments, including those of James Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher. He was closely involved in the decision to procure Trident from the United States and, within NATO, in shaping the policies that led to the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles. The letters gathered in this book reveal the industry and thorough consideration that Quinlan gave to his role in government. They also shed light upon complex matters of ethics and morality, which Quinlan took pains to reconcile with his work in Whitehall. What emerges is a portrait of a dedicated and gifted civil servant, who, partly due to his deep Catholic faith and horror of what he referred to as 'atheistic totalitarianism', regarded nuclear deterrence as a strategic necessity. But the correspondence also shows how, in his later years, Quinlan began to reassess the costs and benefits of nuclear weapons. Shifting power dynamics and uncertainties over the nuclear future mean that the insights of Michael Quinlan's career continue to be relevant today.'
ID number: 80024124
Year: 2011
Type: M

xxvii, 197 p.; ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780160897603
Author(s): 1. Gompert, David C.
2. Saunders, Phillip C.
Subject(s): 1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA
2. CHINA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Added entry(s): 1. Institute for National Strategic Studies. Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (US)
Notes: 'The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to US-Chinese competition and cooperation in three
domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clear understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about.'

2010

623 /01124
ISBN: 9780195979039
Author(s):
1. Cheema, Zafar Iqbal
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNEMNT POLICY--INDIA--HISTORY
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--SOUTH ASIA
Notes:
'The significance of this study is that it establishes the fallacy of conventional perspectives on Indian nuclear deterrence - that the Indian nuclear program entailed 'exclusively peaceful uses' during the Nehru era and the development of weapons capability was initiated by the government of Lal Bahadur Shastri after the first Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964. On the contrary, the book provides incontrovertible documentary evidence that Dr. Homi J. Bhabha formulated with Nehru's approval a nuclear weapons development strategy within the structural framework of the Indian civilian nuclear program. Nehru was interested in a nuclear weapons capability for a 'deterrent in extremis'. The central premise of the book is that the BJP government's decision to carry out the May 1998 nuclear tests was not an original one, but a step prefigured in a strategic continuum whose genesis dates back to the late 1950s. It suggests that the declaration of Indian nuclear deterrence after the May 1998 nuclear tests, the weaponization of Indian nuclear capability and the pronouncement of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) were not separate from earlier policies, but instead were part of that strategic continuum. The study analyzes the dynamics of Indian nuclear deterrence, Indian nuclear doctrine, and their implications for South Asian security.'

ID number: 80023670
Year: 2010
Type: M
2009

496.3 /00383
213 p.; 21 cm.
(NDC Forum Paper ; 8)
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--NATO
Added entry(s):
2. Yost, David Scott, 1948- , ed.
3. NATO Defence College (IT)
Notes:
'The mismatch between the increasing relevance of nuclear or 
non-nuclear deterrence requirements and the reluctance of 
decision makers to take note of these developments is striking. 
What is missing is an extended debate, at least on the level of 
experts.'
ID number: 80022582
Year: 2009
Type: M

623 /01086
The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons - Stanford, CA : Stanford 
University Press.
viii, 319 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9780804761314
Author(s):
1. Paul, T. V.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY 
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--GOVERNMENT POLICY 
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS 
4. NUCLEAR WARFARE--PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
5. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
'This book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of 
the US, Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and 
Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the 
rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It 
examines the influence of the tradition on the behaviour of 
nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores 
the tradition’s implications for nuclear non-proliferation 
regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by 
discussing the future of the tradition in the current global 
security environment.'
ID number: 80022641
Year: 2009
Type: M
Escalation and Intrawar Deterrence during Limited Wars in the Middle East
xiii, 112 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584874066
Author(s):
  1. Terrill, W. Andrew
Subject(s):
  1. ESCALATION (MILITARY SCIENCE)
  2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
  3. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--1967-1973
  4. PERSIAN GULF WAR, 1991
Added entry(s):
  1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'This monograph analyzes military escalation and intrawar
deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts
became especially relevant: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the
1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this
monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile
concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in
both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that
may not be repeated in future conflicts.'
ID number: 80022897
Year: 2009
Type: M

The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold
War to the Twenty-First Century - Fairfax, VA : National Institute
Press.
xiii, 471 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9780977622160
Author(s):
  1. Payne, Keith B.
Subject(s):
  1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
Notes:
Includes index.
'This book examines the past, present and prospective future of US
deterrence theory, strategic forces, nuclear weapons and
policy. It provides a detailed explanation of the competing
schools of deterrence theory that emerged during the late 1950s
and early 1960s. Based on an extensive review of previously
classified documents, it demonstrates how and why US government
policies came to adhere to the guidelines established by the
theory of deterrence popularity called the 'balance of terror'.
The author presents the assumptions, judgments and hopes that
led US policy makers in consecutive Republican and Democratic
administrations to that choice. Acceptance of a balance of
terror as official policy was challenged on occasion during the
Cold War, but it persisted as the lodestar for US strategic
policies. Looking forward, the key concern is to what extent
the basic tenets of Cold War academic deterrence theory provide
useful guidance to contemporary strategic policy given
contemporary threats and conditions. The conclusion offered
herein is that familiar Cold War guidelines are a manifestly
imprudent basis for US policy. Much of what we believed we knew
about deterrence during the Cold War now appears to have been
more fleeting hope than wisdom.'
ID number: 80022548
Year: 2008
Type: M
Thinking Beyond the Unthinkable: Harnessing Doom from the Cold War to the Age of Terror — New York: Viking.

302 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 978-0670-01901-4

Author(s):
1. Stevenson, Jonathan, 1956-

Subject(s):
1. STRATEGY
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS—GOVERNMENT POLICY—USA
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—USA
4. COLD WAR
5. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009

Notes:
Includes index.

'September 11 was a product of bad intelligence and wrongheaded expectations about al-Qaeda's motivations, intentions, resourcefulness, and capabilities. But it also sprang from a failure of the kind of predictive strategic deliberation that had kept the world from becoming atomic rubble in the fifties and sixties. What was it about the strategic thinking of the Cold War era that we got right? The short answer is that deterrence had worked: the prospect of nuclear devastation made its avoidance the undisputed top priority for both Washington and Moscow. At the same time, the rank unacceptability of Soviet communism to Americans and American democratic capitalism to Soviets made each side view the other as the consuming foe that dwarfed all others. The author illuminates the genius of nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD), as well as the blind spots that limited the great Cold War civilian strategists' intellectual fertility and flexibility.'

ID number: 80022546
Year: 2008
Type: M

v, 25 p.; 23 cm.
(Advancing Strategic Thought Series)
ISBN: 1584873256

Author(s):
1. Myerson, Roger B.

Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
2. GAME THEORY
3. GAMES OF STRATEGY (MATHEMATICS)
4. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
5. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)—MATHEMATICAL MODELS

Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes:
'In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: what determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the
risk of such adverse reactions?'}
ID number: 80021671
Year: 2007
Type: M

623  /01046
The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
326 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0415424089
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN
3. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--PAKISTAN
4. PAKISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
Added entry(s):
1. Sridharan, Eswaran, ed.
Notes:
Includes index.

"In the aftermath of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, followed by the outbreak of fighting in Kargil in 1999, full mobilization on the border in 2001-02, and a continuing separatist insurgency and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, conflict resolution and promotion of regional cooperation in South Asia has assumed a new urgency. This book argues that while short-term solutions and military and non-military confidence building measures are necessary to prevent the outbreak of war by accident or miscalculation, there is a need to go far beyond this. In this way, the book is a departure from most other works which are essentially analytical histories. It is not about the motivations and driving forces of the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. Rather, it is about the explanatory power of the theories of nuclear deterrence and international relations in explaining India's and Pakistan's nuclear behaviour. As the contributors demonstrate, we must begin to conceptually think through the longer-term difficulties in stabilizing the deterrence relationship between the two countries as a first step towards comprehensive conflict resolution and lasting peace.'
ID number: 80021321
Year: 2007
Type: M

623  /01040
vii, 17 p.; 30 cm.
(Whitehall Report: 1-07)
Author(s):
1. Codner, Michael
2. Ireland, Gavin
3. Willett, Lee
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
Added entry(s):
1. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (GB)
Notes:
'This report has been produced in response to the United Kingdom Government's White Paper on the future of Britain's nuclear deterrent, published in December 2006. The authors explore here
what they consider to be the principal issues that should form the basis for discussion during the consultation period and the Parliamentary debate. In focusing on what they consider to be the substance of an appropriate debate, the authors' aim is not one of advocacy either for or against retention of Britain's nuclear deterrent, but of informing the Parliamentary debate in a way that is accessible to the British electorate, whose views should be represented on the floors of the Houses of Parliament. In this way, a well-informed nation should directly influence development and implementation of Government policy in this hugely important matter over the next decade. During this period, further decisions will be required before the bulk of procurement money is actually committed, at which stage, the decision will be binding.'

Author(s): 1. Arbatov, Alexei Georgievich 2. Dvorkin, Vladimir

Subject(s): 1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION) 2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA 3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USSR

Added entry(s): 1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (US)

Notes: Includes index.

'This book argues for more extensive security accommodation between Russia and the United States, beginning with a transformation of the legacy deterrent relationship. The authors suggest that the predominant common interest in the new political situation is to establish more robust protection against the potential diversion or misuse of nuclear weapons - an interest that is seriously undermined by current operational practices and could only be achieved through direct collaboration. To establish the foundation for mutually beneficial collaboration, they argue for explicit termination of the deterrent policy, and they advance a series of specific recommendations as to how that could be accomplished. Those recommendations feature extensive reduction and deactivation of Russian and US offensive forces, integration of the early warning systems, and joint efforts to establish global stabilization measures.'

ID number: 80021060
Year: 2006
Type: M


Subject(s): 1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION 2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Added entry(s): 1. Sokolski, Henry D., ed. 2. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes: 'This is the first critical history of the intellectual roots and actual application of the strategic doctrine of nuclear mutual assured destruction or MAD. Written by the world's leading French, British, and American military policy planners and analysts, this volume examines how MAD and its emphasis on the military targeting of population centers influenced the operational plans of the major nuclear powers and states, such as Pakistan, India, and Israel. Given America's efforts to move away from MAD and the continued reliance on MAD thinking by smaller nations to help justify further nuclear proliferation, this book is a timely must read for anyone eager to understand our nuclear past and future.'
As a concept, deterrence has launched a thousand books and articles. It has dominated Western strategic thinking for more than four decades. The author develops here a distinctive approach to the evaluation of deterrence as both a state of mind and a strategic option. This approach is applied to post-cold war crisis management, and the utility and relevance of the concept is addressed in relation to US strategic practice post-9/11, particularly in the light of the apparent preference of the Bush Administration for the alternative concept of pre-emption. The study of deterrence has been hampered by the weight of the intellectual baggage accumulated since the end of the Second World War. Exaggerated notions of what deterrence might achieve were developed, only to be knocked down by academic critique. The author charts the evolution of the contemporary concept of deterrence, and discusses whether - and how - it still has relevance in today's world. He considers constructivist as well as realist approaches and draws on criminological as well as strategic studies literature to develop a concept of a norms-based, as distinct from an interest-based, deterrence.'
deploying missile defenses, withdrawing from treaties and, when necessary, carrying out preemptive strikes against those seeking mass casualty weapons. In this book the author argues that this unbalanced approach will not make the United States safer. Success in countering proliferation and asymmetric threats requires strong nonproliferation and disarmament treaty regimes as well as superior US firepower. Success also requires closer cooperation with Russia and China, which will not be possible if the United States seeks to weaponize space or to negate their nuclear deterrents. America now needs missile defenses keyed to proliferation threats, and more far-reaching, collaborative programs to prevent dangerous weapons and materials from falling into the wrong hands. These cooperative threat reductions programs have become central to securing future military, diplomatic, and arms control triumphs. The way to a safer future lies in replacing MAD with cooperative threat reduction.'

ID number: 80019066
Year: 2003
Type: M

355.4 /01378
xii, 55 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584871350
Author(s):
  1. Gray, Colin S.
Subject(s):
  1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
  2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
Added entry(s):
  1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'While deterrence is as old as human conflict itself, it became particularly important with the advent of nuclear weapons when armed conflict between the superpowers had the potential to end civilization. Today there is a sense that terrorism has rendered deterrence obsolete and forced the United States to substitute preemption for it. The author illustrates that strategic reality is not simple. He provides both a conceptual framework for understanding deterrence or, more accurately, the psychology of deterrence and policy guidance on how the United States can most effectively use it. The author concludes that an adaptable and flexible military with robust landpower is the only tool that can maintain deterrence.'

ID number: 80018806
Year: 2003
Type: M
Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace
x, 275 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
ISBN: 0801440971
Author(s):
1. Crawford, Timothy W.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
2. THIRD PARTIES (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
3. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS
Notes:
Includes index.
'As the preponderant world power, the United States is a potential arbiter of war and peace between such feuding rivals as India and Pakistan, Turkey and Greece, China and Taiwan. How can it deter them from going to war and impel them to accept compromise without firmly choosing sides? This age-old strategic dilemma, which the author calls 'pivotal deterrence', has become a central challenge of international security in today's unipolar world. The author explains the political dynamics of pivotal deterrence and the conditions under which it is likely to succeed, while examining some of its most impressive feats and failures. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's agile approach to the 1870s Eastern Crisis, which prevented war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, is contrasted with Britain's ambiguous and ill-fated maneuvers to deter Germany and France in July 1914. Shifting to the 1960s Cold War, the author explores the successes and setbacks in US efforts to prevent NATO allies Greece and Turkey from fighting over Cyprus and to defuse the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. Capping the analysis is a rich look at similar US efforts in the 1990s in South Asia, the Aegean, the Balkans, and East Asia. The author concludes with an assessment of the prospects for American pivotal deterrence in the years ahead and its implications for international relations theory.'
ID number: 80019705
Year: 2003
Type: M

Deterrence Now
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
xx, 331 p.; 23 cm.
(Cambridge Studies in International Relations ; 89)
ISBN: 0521529697
Author(s):
1. Morgan, Patrick M., 1940-
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
'This authoritative study revisits the place of deterrence after the Cold War. By assessing and questioning the state of modern deterrence theory, particularly under conditions of nuclear proliferation, the author argues that there are basic flaws in the design of the theory that ultimately limits its utility. Given the probable patterns of future international politics, he suggests that greater attention be paid to 'general' deterrence as opposed to 'immediate' deterrence and to examining the deterrent capabilities of collective actors such as NATO and the UN Security Council. Finally he contends that the revolution in military affairs can promote less reliance on deterrence by retaliatory threats, support better collective
management of peace and security, and permit us to outgrow nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.'

ID number: 80019345
Year: 2003
Type: M

2001

327.3 /00616
iv, 11 p.; 30 cm.
(Report ; 41)
Author(s):
1. Krepon, Michael, 1946-
Subject(s):
1. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION
3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
4. USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
Added entry(s):
1. Henry L. Stimson Center (US)
Notes:
'The central organizing principle of strategic arms control during the Cold War was to prevent a nuclear exchange by being vulnerable to its consequences. The core principle of assured destruction (Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD) was more than a fact of Cold War life; it was codified by treaties permitting huge offensive nuclear arsenals while expressly prohibiting national missile defenses. President Bush now seeks to set Cold War thinking aside and to replace MAD with a more affirmative construct. Unlike MAD, the strategic concept of cooperative threat reduction is affirmative. It strengthens both strategic arms reduction and non-proliferation accords. It is sufficiently adaptive to deal with the wide range of threats facing America, and it has enjoyed broad, bipartisan support. It is now incumbent on the Bush administration to put forward a positive strategic concept alongside deterrence, one that will reduce the severe threats posed by terrorism and asymmetric warfare that the country now faces. It is also incumbent on the Bush administration to fully fund and expand cooperative threat-reduction programs.'

ID number: 80017863
Year: 2001
Type: M

623 /00909
xviii, 145 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0876092741
Author(s):
1. Lodal, Jan, 1943-
Subject(s):
1. WMD NONPROLIFERATION--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
3. USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
4. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
5. NMD--USA
6. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
Notes:
Includes index.
'According to this book, the emergence of new nuclear, biological, and chemical threats is a price America pays for its growing military, economic, and cultural dominance. U.S. preeminence motivates states to oppose American power through whatever means possible, and the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has become more acute as globalization makes it easier for rogue states and terrorists to obtain the necessary technology. This book argues that the WMD threat can be stopped only with the active cooperation of other states – especially U.N. Security Council members Russia, China, and France – but U.S. policies are actually undermining international support. To gain their cooperation, the United States will have to change its approach to arms control negotiations, antiballistic missile defenses, intelligence, law enforcement, military strategies, and nuclear force deployments. The first step should be to abandon 'prompt retaliatory' nuclear war plans left over from the Cold War that no longer serve any strategic purpose. If these plans are maintained while limited antiballistic missile defenses are deployed, they will give the United States a de facto nuclear first-strike capability and absolute military dominance. Retaining such a capability would make it possible to obtain the intelligence and law enforcement cooperation necessary to stop WMD proliferation. This book recommends an integrated program to foster international cooperation to stop WMD proliferation while retaining strong nuclear deterrence as the foundation of American security strategy.'

ID number: 80017561
Year: 2001
Type: M

623 /00890
vii, 176 p.; 24 cm.
(Chaillot Papers ; 48)
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
3. NMD--USA
4. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
5. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Added entry(s):
1. Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (FR)
Notes:
'At the end of the Cold War, the role, even the raison d'etre of nuclear weapons, was seriously questioned. Massive reductions in nuclear arsenals and the undeniable success of the fight against proliferation during the early 1990s opened up the prospect of a world with increasingly fewer nuclear weapons, or even, in time, none at all. Today's strategic realities appear much more sombre: the risks of use of weapons of mass destruction in regional crises are increasing, the disarmament process and the non-proliferation regime are in a serious state and anti-missile defences could revolutionise the strategic equation. If to that one adds uncertainties over Russian nuclear policy and the precarious situation in Asia, one is bound to conclude that the nuclear landscape is more complex, more unstable and therefore more dangerous now than during the Cold War. In Europe, where the marginalisation of nuclear weapons has been particularly pronounced during the last few years, this reality was for long underestimated or even ignored. It is above all American ambitions in the field on anti-missile defence that today remind Europeans that nuclear
issues are still relevant. Because of its potential consequences for international and strategic relations, US plans for a (National) Missile Defence (NMD) have sparked off a new nuclear debate that is much too important for Europe not to participate in it. If they are to make their voices heard in this debate, the members of the Union will have to act jointly. That presupposes intense reflection on all nuclear issues, from disarmament to deterrence and including non-proliferation and anti-missile defence. Proposing a joint approach in these areas may seem unrealistic, given that nuclear issues have traditionally been something that has divided the Europeans. None the less, on close examination one sees a degree of convergence among the Fifteen that should allow them to cooperate even on questions as sensitive as these. Without going back to the idea of 'concerted deterrence', which is both too limited and provocative, the Europeans should tackle nuclear questions within the CFSP/ESDP. It is only by using the European Union as a framework for concerted action that they will be able to assume fully their responsibilities in this key sector of international security.'
nouveau débat nucléaire beaucoup trop important pour que l'Europe puisse se permettre de s'abstenir. Pour faire entendre leurs voix dans ce débat, les membres de l'Union doivent réfléchir et agir en commun. Cela suppose une concertation intense sur l'ensemble des questions nucléaires, du désarmement à la dissuasion, en passant par la non-proliferation et la défense antimissile. Proposer une approche commune dans ces domaines pourrait apparaître irréaliste dans la mesure où le nucléaire fut traditionnellement un facteur de division entre les Européens. Néanmoins, en y regardant de plus près, on constate un degré de convergence parmi les Quinze qui leur permettrait de coopérer même sur des questions aussi sensibles. Sans aller jusqu'à reprendre l'idée d'une 'dissuasion concertée', à la fois trop limitée et provocatrice, les Européens devraient traiter les questions nucléaires dans la PESC/PESD. C'est seulement en utilisant l'Union européenne comme cadre de concertation et d'action commune qu'ils peuvent assumer pleinement leurs responsabilités dans ce domaine cle de la sécurité internationale.'
Deterrence beyond the State: The Israeli Experience.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 33, no. 1, April 2012, p. 124-147.)

Author(s):
1. Rid, Thomas

Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--ISRAEL

Notes:
Israel's experience with deterrence is unique: it is older, more diverse, and more experimental than that of any other state. How did Israel's strategy of deterrence evolve? How was it adapted to fit the non-state threat? And what is its utility? This article argues that Israel's experience with deterrence beyond the state can best be understood through the conceptual lenses provided by the other grand deterrence debate, that in the philosophy of law, not international relations. Israel's use of military force against non-state enemies does not fit the classic concepts of strategy. It is not just one act of force to compel one actor to fulfil one specific political goal at one given time; deterrence consists of a series of acts of force to create— and maintain— general norms of behaviour for many political actors over an extended period of time. Using force, consequently, does not represent a principal failure of deterrence but its maintenance through swift, certain, but measured responses. The inquiry concludes by identifying the method's limitations.

ID Number: JA028585
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

* This list contains material received as of June 1st, 2012. – Cette liste est arrêtée au 1er juin 2012.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 28, no. 1, March 2012, p. 65-80.)
Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
4. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
Minimum deterrence is a compromise, or halfway house, between nuclear abolition or nearly zero and assured destruction, the dominant paradigm for strategic nuclear arms control during and after the cold war. Minimum deterrence as applied to the current relationship between the United States and Russia would require downsizing the numbers of operationally deployed long-range nuclear weapons to 1000, or fewer, on each side. More drastic bilateral Russian-American reductions would require the cooperation of other nuclear weapons states in making proportional reductions in their own arsenals. In addition, US plans for European-based and global missile defenses cause considerable angst in Russia and threaten to derail the Obama 'reset' in Russian-American relations, despite the uncertainties about current and plausible future performances of missile defense technologies.
ID Number: JA028566
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 31, no. 1, January - March 2012, p. 3-17.)
Author(s):
1. Payne, Keith B.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
Analyses of US strategic force requirements frequently are based on assertions about the requirements for deterrence. A politically attractive position is that a relatively small number of nuclear weapons reliably meets US strategic nuclear requirements. This position, however, is flawed for two reasons: first, the number/types of nuclear weapons required for deterrence cannot be identified with precision because requirements shift dramatically across time and circumstances. Second, strategic forces also are intended to assure allies and limit damage, and these goals entail separate requirements that must be included in any serious calculation of US strategic force requirements.
ID Number: JA028457
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART
A Cyberwar of Ideas? Deterrence and Norms in Cyberspace.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 33, no. 1, April 2012, p. 148-170.)
Author(s):
1. Stevens, Tim
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
2. INFORMATION WARFARE--USA
Notes:
This article relates American efforts to develop strategic 'cyber deterrence' as a means to deter adversarial actions in and through global cyberspace. Thus far, interests-based cyber deterrence theory has failed to translate into effective American policy and strategy, due to a divergence between the operational idiosyncrasies of cyberspace and an over-reliance on Cold War models of deterrence. Even while explicit cyber deterrence strategy falters, the United States is pursuing a norms-based approach to cyber strategy generally, and hopes to derive deterrent effects from its attempts to broker international agreements pertaining to the 'rules of the road' for the proper and productive use of cyberspace. The United States is not the only norm entrepreneur in this policy space, however, and this article examines how a range of other state and non-state actors are complicating efforts to develop normative regimes that might reduce risks to and from cyberspace. The article concludes that a norms-based approach to cyber deterrence might engender deterrent effects at the state level but is unlikely to do so in the case of 'rogue' states and many non-state actors. States will continue, therefore, to develop punitive deterrence capabilities to respond to these actors.
ID Number: JA028586
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

Dissuasion du fort au faible.
(REVUE DEFENSE NATIONALE, no. 747, fevrier 2012, p. 21-28.)
Author(s):
1. Kempf, Olivier
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Notes:
L'expression dissuasion du fort au faible a fait flores. Chacun y voit le pendant de la dissuasion du faible au fort qui constitue la base de la doctrine francaise de dissuasion. Or, l'inversion des mots entraine un profond changement de logique qu'aucun des auteurs classiques de la dissuasion n'a vraiment decortique. A l'heure de la proliferation nucleaire, ne convient-il pas de conceptualiser cette nouvelle configuration strategique ? L'auteur amorce un debat sur cette question.
ID Number: JA028376
Year: 2012
Language: French
Type: ART
Deterring Conventional Terrorism: From Punishment to Denial and Resilience.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 33, no. 1, April 2012, p. 171-198.)
Author(s):
1. Gearson, John
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--PREVENTION
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
This article considers the developing role of deterrence in countering conventional terrorist threats, tracing the post-9/11 rejection and later rediscovery of deterrence as a tool of counter-terrorism. Why do so many policymakers assume that the 'new' terrorism represented such a break with the past? Why was deterrence neglected as a consequence, under the belief that few terrorists do not aspire to be strategic in their campaigns? To the contrary, this analysis shows that most terrorists are open to attempts at coercion and in particular can be influenced by denial-based strategies. In the case of the United Kingdom, denial-based strategies successfully diverted a potentially crippling campaign of economic dislocation in the 1990s, with lessons for today's challenges. A reinvigorated focus on resilience - physical and societal - as part of a denial-based approach to deterring terrorist attacks, particularly those involving home-grown activists, is recommended. This offers the prospect of time and space for broader counter-terrorism programmes of counter-radicalization and de-legitimization to run their course and should be part of future counter-terrorism strategies.
ID Number: JA028587
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

How to Deter Terrorism.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 35, no. 2, Spring 2012, p. 21-36.)
Author(s):
1. Kroenig, Matthew
2. Pavel, Barry
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--USA--PREVENTION
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
The coauthors of the first US government-wide strategy for deterring terrorist networks present the first publicly available articulation of that strategy, arguing that deterrence remains a poorly understood and underutilized element of US counterterrorism strategy.
ID Number: JA028536
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART
In comparison with the Cold War era, deterrence in international politics has changed significantly, even though many of the basic components of that deterrence still exist and continue to have an impact. Deterrence is now less salient in national security policies and international security management, more recessed, particularly nuclear deterrence. This is primarily due to the huge changes in international politics ushered in by the end of the Cold War, particularly in great-power political relationships, and which are continuing to unfold. Important developments are underway with respect to nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, collective actor deterrence, and other aspects of international system security. While many old topics pertaining to deterrence continue to be studied and generate continuing controversies, often along the same lines as in the past, some important investigations and theoretical analyses have also emerged on pivotal deterrence, the deterrence of cyberattacks, terrorism, and international crime. What is needed most is analysis on how to develop and apply deterrence strategy and practice in new ways as a central contribution to global and regional system security maintenance and management, a function deterrence performed during the Cold War but in ways now largely out of date. Also needed is careful attention to the possibility of the return of more traditional international politics, particularly if this were to occur in relations among the major states, and careful consideration of how best to use deterrence to hedge against such a development.

Conventional Deterrence and the Challenge of Credibility.

The concept of 'credibility' is a central component of deterrence theory. In this article, credibility is used as a lens through which to examine the effectiveness of conventional force as a deterrent. An advantage that conventional force enjoys over its nuclear counterpart is that it can be used with much greater discrimination. Conventional threats can, therefore, be considered more politically credible than nuclear threats under all but the most extreme circumstances. Conversely, the relatively modest power of conventional weapons renders their effects 'interpretable' to a problematic degree by potential aggressors. Thus, such threats are less likely to be as technically credible as their nuclear equivalents. A range of communicative efforts may serve to reduce the scope for interpreting the effects possible to conventional weapons, although efforts of this kind risk being hampered by cultural obstacles. In consequence, success with conventional deterrence will turn on the ability to identify the specific technical and cultural conditions under which credible threats can readily be
2011

Extended Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia: Redundant or Resurgent?.
(International Affairs, vol. 87, no. 6, November 2011, p. 1439-1457.)
Author(s):
1. O'Neil, Andrew
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Deterrence--East Asia
Notes:
A number of commentators have claimed that the strategic relevance of extended nuclear deterrence is declining in the twenty-first century. This claim is based on three key arguments. First, that the positive effects of extended nuclear deterrence have been exaggerated by its proponents; second, that the rational actor logic underpinning extended nuclear deterrence is increasingly redundant; and third, that extended deterrence using conventional weapons is equally, if not more, effective as extended nuclear deterrence. This article applies these arguments to East Asia, a region where nuclear weapons continue to loom large in states' security equations. In applying each of the above arguments to the East Asian context, the analysis finds that not only is extended nuclear deterrence alive and kicking in the region, but also that in the coming decades it is likely to become more central to the strategic policies of the United States and its key allies, Japan and South Korea. Despite predictions of its demise, US extended nuclear deterrence remains a critical element in East Asia's security order and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

(Arms Control Today, vol. 41, no. 9, November 2011, p. 8-11.)
Author(s):
1. Seay, Edmond
Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Deterrence--NATO
2. Nuclear Weapons--Government Policy--NATO
3. Tactical Nuclear Weapons--USA
Notes:
NATO's nuclear strategy is 'incredible' in the strictest sense: it does not have the credibility necessary to deter potential aggressors. This shortcoming raises fundamental questions about the value of the US B61 bombs deployed in Europe.
The US Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence.

(AINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 87, no. 6, November 2011, p. 1401-1438.)

Author(s):
1. Yost, David S.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

Notes:
NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk- and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual-capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence - including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non-nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy - recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long-standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk - and responsibility-sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US-Russian numerical disparity in non-strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangement unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.

ID Number: JA028221
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART


(AINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 87, no. 3, May 2011, p. 555-569.)

Author(s):
1. Zhang, Baohui

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--CHINA
2. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--CHINA

Notes:
This article examines the rising prominence of strategic nuclear deterrence in Sino-US relations. China is the only major nuclear power that has been actively expanding its offensive capabilities. Its nuclear modernization has inevitably caused concerns in the United States. The article suggests that China's nuclear programme is driven significantly by US missile

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defence, which has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for Chinese nuclear deterrence. The article also assesses the latest Chinese perception of US strategic adjustment under the Obama administration and its potential impact on arms control. It reveals that recent measures by the United States to restrain its missile defense could be conducive for achieving a strategic nuclear understanding between the two countries. The article then suggests a number of concrete actions for China and the United States to realize such an understanding.

Matrix of Nonlinearity: Minimum Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Nuclear Arms Reductions.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 62, 2011, p. 110-116.)
Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
4. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
This article considers some of the political and military backdrop for any transition to a post-New START regime of minimum deterrence by the United States and Russia compared to the currently shrink-wrapped version of assured destruction or assured retaliation. Second, it analyzes whether a minimum deterrence regime at either of two levels could provide for US and Russian nuclear security and deterrence stability. Third, it discusses how defenses might complicate the picture of offensive force reductions as described.

Right-Sizing Russia's Nuclear Deterrent: Offensive Reductions and Defense Uncertainties.
(JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES, vol. 24, no. 3, July - September 2011, p. 428-438.)
Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NEW START
2. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
4. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
5. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
Russia and the United States face conflicting pressures with respect to broadening and deepening the regime of strategic nuclear arms reductions agreed to in New START. The Obama administration favors additional reductions in long-range nuclear weapons as well as talks on the status of NATO and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons located in Europe. At the 2010 Lisbon summit NATO and Russia agreed to prompt discussions on the possibility of creating a European missile defense system with shared responsibility. Against these positives, Russia remains wary of US intent with respect to missile
defenses, both states face near term presidential elections that distract from prior commitments, and neither the Obama administration nor the US congressional leadership is ready for a bruising post-new START debate.

ID Number: JA028167
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Criteria for Deterrence.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 156, no. 1, February - March 2011, p. 12-18.)
Author(s):
1. Lever, Paul
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--GREAT BRITAIN
3. TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
Notes:
The postponement until 2016 of the Trident procurement decision gives the next government an opportunity to review the options properly. This means abandoning Cold War planning assumptions and establishing new criteria for credibility with regard to specific scenarios and targets. Britain needs a deterrent which is fit for purpose and 'good enough'. But a permanently deployed, dedicated platform may not be necessary.

ID Number: JA027544
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Low-Profile Deterrence: Lessons from the Indian Experience.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 156, no. 5, October - November 2011, p. 38-43.)
Author(s):
1. Basrur, Rajesh
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--INDIA
3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--INDIA
Notes:
India's disarmament policy has often been regarded as long on rhetoric and short on delivery. But, argues the author, its approach to arms stability and reduction has been consistent, maintaining that non-proliferation and universal disarmament are mutually dependent. India has developed a minimalist nuclear posture that offers deterrence stability at low numbers, and could be a model for other nuclear powers seeking to reduce their arsenal.

ID Number: JA028138
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART
The Limits of Tailored Deterrence.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 63, 2011, p. 47-57.)
Author(s):
1. Larkin, Sean P.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
Notes:
Deterrence is back. Although the Cold War concept lost its centrality in security policy for many years, the United States embraced a modified version of it in its 2006 and 2010 National Security Strategies. The original concept of deterrence - preventing an attack by credibly threatening unacceptable retaliation - has been reborn as tailored deterrence. Tailored deterrence seeks to customize whole-of-government deterrence strategies to specific actors and scenarios. Ideally, this approach would address the flaws in rational deterrence theory, which assumes that adversaries will make decisions exclusively on the basis of the expected costs and benefits of a contemplated course of action.

God, Nations, and Deterrence: The Impact of Religion on Deterrence.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 30, no. 5, November - December 2011, p. 428-452.)
Author(s):
1. Bar, Shmuel
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
2. RELIGION
Notes:
This article discusses the influence of religion on deterrence. Faith may increase risk propensity and lower the legitimacy of being deterred. Anticipation of divine intervention, reward or punishment, adherence to an apocalyptic ideology, or (in the Shiite world) to believe in the imminent advent of the Hidden Imam reduces susceptibility to deterrent threats. Religious motivation can, however, be potentially exploited to enhance deterrence. Superstitions can induce courage and self sacrifice but may also induce fear and mass hysteria. Prophecies too are a two-edged sword; believers, who receive divine guarantees that a certain event will not happen, may loose faith in the face of the occurrence of that event.
Understanding Deterrence.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 30, no. 5, November - December 2011, p. 393-427.)
Author(s):
1. Payne, Keith B.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
During the Cold War, academic theorists and senior US policy makers planned strategies of nuclear deterrence according to a particularly narrow application of the rational actor model. Their assumptions were that the Soviet leadership would make decisions pertinent to deterrence per an instrumental rationality, and that the parameters of that rational decision making would be bounded by a familiar and largely Western world-view with regard to perceptions, values, goals, and behavioral norms. The fundamental problem with this narrow application of the rational actor model is that it typically does not take into account a wide range of factors that can shape decision making decisively and vary widely across time, place, and opponent.
ID Number: JA028233
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Evolutionary Psychology, Cognitive Function, and Deterrence.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 30, no. 5, November - December 2011, p. 453-480.)
Author(s):
1. Scheber, Thomas
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
For decades deterrence has been understood to depend largely on psychology - convincing an adversary that certain actions are not in the adversary's best interests. However, beyond a token mention, contemporary discussions of deterrence seldom examine further the role of psychology and brain function in human decision making in matters of war and violence. Instead, deterrence planners typically rely on the rational actor model as a convenient simplifying assumption. The rational actor model itself is comprised of corollary assumptions that do not comport with scientific findings or empirical evidence from historical studies. This article examines the development of the human brain, human cognition (the process of knowing), and relevant findings from the field of evolutionary psychology, as well as various factors that affect brain function and decision making. The discussion herein of psychology, human cognition, and deterrence suggests the inadequacy of the rational actor model for deterrence planning and offers a few useful guidelines as an alternative.
ID Number: JA028235
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART
Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism.

(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 34, no. 1, February 2011, p. 3-37.)

Author(s):
1. Wilner, Alex S.

Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--PREVENTION
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
This article argues that deterrence theory can be applied to counterterrorism. Doing so requires broadening the traditional concept of deterrence by punishment, expanding deterrence by denial to include defense, mitigation, and strategic hindrance, and developing deterrence by delegitimization to influence the political, ideological and religious rationales informing terrorist behavior. In practice, deterring terrorism requires tailoring threats against state and individual facilitators, diffusing the intended consequences of terrorism, and manipulating terrorist self-restraints. When these and other deterrent leverages are applied simultaneously against various actors and processes involved in terrorism, coercion can be achieved.

ID Number: JA027586
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Minimum Deterrence and Missile Defenses: U.S. and Russia Going Forward.

(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 30, no. 4, September - October 2011, p. 347-362.)

Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
2. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
3. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
4. NEW START

Notes:
Ratification and entry into force of the New START agreement open the door for possible additional reductions in both states' numbers of deployed long-range nuclear weapons and launchers, but the matrix of post-New START agreement involves nonlinearities with respect to the relationship between minimum deterrence and missile defenses. NATO's Lisbon summit in 2010 invited Russia to participate in a European missile defense system, but Russia is wary of any theaterwide antimissile system that could grow into a more ambitious deterrent-denial force pointed at Russia. Minimum deterrence would drop the numbers of US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons to 1,000 or fewer, but getting Moscow and Washington to move well below 1,000 would require parallel reductions and/or restraints on the part of other nuclear weapons states and a missile defense regime of 'cooperative security' rather than mutual suspicion.

ID Number: JA028075
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART
Deterrence and a Nuclear-Armed Iran.
Author(s):
1. Duus, Henning P.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
2. SHIITES--IRAN
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--IRAN
Notes:
A nuclear deterrence policy will probably not be effective vis-a-vis a nuclear-armed Iran the way it was effective vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and China because of the present Iranian leadership. The West faces an unprecedented asymmetrical threat. While the West will be deterred by a nuclear-armed Iran, Iran may perceive its own nuclear weapons not as a deterrent but as the facilitator of a unique eschatological opportunity towards the God-promised worldwide rule of Imamite Shi'a Islam.
ID Number: JA027745
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Nuclear Weapons Acquisition and Deterrence.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 30, no. 5, November – December 2011, p. 481-507.)
Author(s):
1. Guthe, Kurt
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Notes:
The effects of nuclear weapons acquisition on deterrence will depend on the nature of the state, leadership, or even organization that obtains the weapons; the types of actions to be deterred; the purpose and strategy the weapons serve; the consequences for the military situation between the acquiring state and its adversaries; and the ways in which those adversaries respond to the opposing nuclear threat. The implications of nuclear acquisition for deterrence are likely to change over time as nuclear capabilities move from a nascent state and gain, among other qualities, increased size, longer range, more diversity, better survivability, and greater destructive power. Deterrence is only a matter of who is being deterred, from what action, by whom, for what reason, by what threats, and in what circumstances, but also when in the extended process of acquiring nuclear weapons, capabilities a deterrence challenge occurs.
ID Number: JA028236
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART
Getting to Zero.

(PrintATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 11, no. 1, January - February 2010, p. 50-54.)

Author(s):
1. Keller, Patrick
2. Scheer, Benjamin

Subject(s):
1. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GERMANY
2. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--EUROPE
3. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
4. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO

Notes:
The new German government has pledged to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. Although this is in keeping with President Obama's aim of achieving 'global zero', a world free of nuclear weapons, it cannot impede a debate in Germany on Europe's deterrence strategy.

Reassessing the Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey.

(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 40, no. 5, June 2010, p. 8-13.)

Author(s):
1. Kibaroglu, Mustafa

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
3. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--TURKEY
4. NATO--STRATEGIC ASPECTS--NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT, 2010
5. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA

Notes:
NATO is revising its Strategic Concept; the alliance is due to complete work on the document in November. A key issue in the revision is the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as part of the alliance's policy of extended nuclear deterrence. Although Turkey has long been in agreement with its allies on the value of these forward deployments, it may soon find itself in a delicate position on the question of how to continue the policy effectively.
Britain's nuclear deterrent remains under keen examination as both the general election and defence review loom. In an American perspective on the issue, the author argues that not only is a deterrent capability necessary, but also that the UK's defence will only be assured by continuous submarine-based capability: the alternatives do not stand up to scrutiny.

ID Number: JA026808
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART

A limited resumption of nuclear testing is needed for effective nuclear deterrence. Nuclear testing is necessary to maintain an acceptable level of confidence in the current US stockpile, enable modifications of legacy nuclear weapons that may be required to meet emerging stockpile requirements, support a prudent nuclear arms reduction program, and confirm by actual demonstration that we have the nuclear weapons design and manufacturing skills we think we have.

ID Number: JA027228
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART
EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons: A Common Deterrent for Europe?


Author(s):
1. Jasper, Ursula
2. Portela, Clara

Subject(s):
1. Nuclear Weapons--Government Policy--France
2. Nuclear Weapons--Government Policy--Great Britain
3. Nuclear Deterrence--Europe

Notes:
Nuclear weapons remain the unquestioned core of the defence postures of both France and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the European Union is progressively enhancing its Common Foreign and Security Policy, notably through the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy. Yet, despite evident progress in the CFSP, whose ultimate purpose is to lead to a 'common defence policy', EU member-states still deal with nuclear issues on a predominantly national basis. What is the alleged purpose of European nuclear forces? How is the raison d'être of the French and British nuclear deterrents conceptualized against the background of progressing European (defence) integration? This article examines the construction of the rationale of the French and British nuclear forces and their compatibility with the emerging European defence policy, particularly with regard to a hypothetical integration of both arsenals into a common deterrent. Could and should a 'European nuclear deterrent' be envisaged as the final stage in the framing of a European defence?

ID Number: JA026806
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART


Author(s):
1. Payne, Keith B.

Subject(s):
1. Deterrence (Strategy)--USA

Notes:
Many commentators who publicly calculate 'how much is enough' in terms of the US strategic capabilities necessary to support national goals continue to adhere to the Cold War formula that was known as 'assured destruction'. That formula, however, is inadequate at best and likely misleading in the post-Cold War era. It bases such calculations on a simplistic numbers game based on weapons and targets and generally is unrelated to the goals that US strategic forces are expected to support. A goal-driven approach to calculating how much is enough offers the opportunity to have such calculations driven by the needs of strategy as opposed to having strategy driven by numbers.

ID Number: JA027032
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART
Pertinence et permanence de la dissuasion.
(REVUE INTERNATIONALE ET STRATEGIQUE, no. 79, automne 2010, p. 113-118.)
Author(s):
1. Georgelin, Jean-Louis
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
ID Number: JA027099
Year: 2010
Language: French
Type: ART

La défense antimissile, renforcement ou fragilisation de la dissuasion ?.
(REVUE INTERNATIONALE ET STRATEGIQUE, no. 79, automne 2010, p. 119-124.)
Author(s):
1. Guilloteau, Christophe
Subject(s):
1. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--FRANCE
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
ID Number: JA027100
Year: 2010
Language: French
Type: ART

La dissuasion et le second âge nucléaire.
Author(s):
1. Miraillet, Michel
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
2. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--FRANCE
Notes:
Dans un environnement incertain, et dans l'avenir prévisible, les armes nucléaires continueront de jouer un rôle majeur au sein des politiques de défense dont l'objectif, qui ne peut être le désarmement en soi, est une sécurité accrue. Dans ce contexte, l'abolitionnisme est d'abord affaire de rhétorique, et l'on peut douter du lien supposé entre désarmement et lutte contre la prolifération. Le désarmement, comme la dissuasion nucléaire, doit d'abord produire de la sécurité.
ID Number: JA026901
Year: 2010
Language: French
Type: ART

(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 29, no. 3, July - August 2010, p. 278-283.)
Author(s):
1. Gray, Colin S.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
This article explains the core logic of the theory of deterrence. It defines the three key terms, deterrence, coercion, and brute force, and relates each to the others. Common reasons for deterrence failure are cited, while conditions most permissive of success also are noted. Above all else, the essay insists that a successful strategy of deterrence requires the enemy to cooperate - he must choose to be deterred. It is probably far more difficult to succeed with a strategy of deterrence today
than it was in the Cold War. For this reason it is necessary to marry the theory and attempted practice of deterrence to an understanding of the roles of coercion and, if need be, brute force.


(SECURITY DIALOGUE, vol. 41, no. 4, August 2010, p. 435-459.)

Author(s):

1. Hynek, Nik

Subject(s):

1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
2. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

Notes:

In recent considerations of deterrence in strategic studies, there are almost no works that would systematically link deterrence to one of the most important current issue areas of contemporary strategic studies: ballistic missile defence (BMD). In an attempt to address this lacuna, this article considers ways in which missile defence has been—and can be—intertwined with deterrence of the 21st century. The article begins with a historical outline of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and BMD, and continues by comparing and contrasting US political and strategic-planning discourses in how they have addressed the examined relationship. What follows is the recasting of traditional understanding of deterrence as a set of disparate modalities underpinned by different principles and organizing logics. The article shows the role and function of BMD in three relevant modalities of deterrence in the 21st century: first, in a renewed strategic deterrence between the USA and Russia based on an axiomatic logic of MAD; second, in the deterrence of rogue states in reaction to their asymmetric nuclear threats; and, finally, in a reverse deterrence from intervention in regional conflicts. Consequently, the presented outline of the three modalities are theoretically furthered to allow for conceptualization of possible links to BMD in ways in which practical implications for future research, strategic planning and political action can be seen.

The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research.

(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 31, no. 1, April 2010, p. 1-33.)

Author(s):

1. Knopf, Jeffrey W.

Subject(s):

1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:

Following the end of the Cold War and accelerating after 9/11, a new wave of research on deterrence has emerged. Building on an earlier characterization by Robert Jervis, this work is here designated the fourth wave. The fourth wave reflects efforts to grapple with the change from a relatively symmetrical situation of mutual deterrence that characterized the Cold War to the asymmetric threats that dominate the current security environment for the United States and many other states.
Despite widespread doubts that have been expressed in public about whether the most threatening actors today are deterrable, the fourth wave is nearly unanimous in finding that deterrence remains relevant, even with respect to terrorism. Beyond this basis consensus, the fourth wave also includes vigorous debates, particularly regarding alternative strategies for dealing with WMD-seeking rogue states. Because few analysts expect deterrence to be foolproof, especially in dealing with non-state actors, much of the work has focused on finding ways to improve the prospects for deterrence at the margins. Overall, the most important result of the fourth wave has been to reveal the value of moving toward a broader concept of deterrence that incorporates non-nuclear and even non-military sources of leverage. Proposals to use this information and discourse as bases for deterrence are especially innovative and worthy of further research.

The Impossible Challenge of Deterring 'Nuclear Terrorism' by Al Qaeda. (STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 33, no. 8, August 2010, p. 682-699.)

Author(s):
1. Velde, James R. Van De

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR TERRORISM
2. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Notes:
Deterring Al Qaeda from using a nuclear weapon, should it acquire one, is a harder challenge than analysts have argued. Suggestions for 'deterrence based on punishment' have severe limitations. Al Qaeda is not a state, has no clear command authority, and has no clear nuclear weapons-employment doctrine. Most analysts also ignore the dynamic of 'crisis instability' ('use it or lose it') : should the West believe Al Qaeda has an improvised nuclear devise, it is unlikely (regardless of whether Al Qaeda leadership claimed the weapon would be held as a deterrent only) that the West would accept a mutually-assured-destruction relationship with the group. The West would hunt the weapon down, forcing Al Qaeda's hand. The best counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction-Nuclear Terrorism defense, therefore, is good counterinsurgency policy to starve it of recruits until the group dies.
Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia.  
Author(s):  
  1. Mistry, Dinshaw
Subject(s):  
  1. Nuclear Deterrence--South Asia  
  2. India--Foreign Relations--Pakistan  
  3. Pakistan--Foreign Relations--India
Notes:  
This article tempers the argument of deterrence optimists, who make the case that nuclear deterrence has maintained the peace between regional nuclear rivals. In particular, it challenges the assertion by Kenneth Waltz that 'nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced' among regional rivals in South Asia. Examining two major regional military crises, this article notes that, first, nuclear deterrence was not the key factor ending these crises. Instead, non-nuclear factors involving American diplomacy, which provided the participants with timely exit strategies, ended the crises. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, there was a strong possibility of significant military escalation, and nuclear deterrence would not have averted such an escalation. The article concludes by noting that, in regions where deterrence optimism is not well supported, Washington may continue intervening in crises between nuclear rivals, and, anticipating such a US approach, regional rivals could become involved in repeated military crises over the long term.'

NATO and Extended Deterrence in a Multinuclear World.  
Author(s):  
  1. Ruhle, Michael
Subject(s):  
  1. Nuclear Deterrence--Nato  
  2. Tactical Nuclear Weapons--USA  
  3. Tactical Nuclear Weapons--Europe  
  4. Tactical Nuclear Weapons--Nato
Notes:  
Concerns about nuclear proliferation have led to a new wave of enthusiasm for far-reaching nuclear disarmament schemes. According to their proponents, the United States must take the lead in generating a new global disarmament dynamic, including withdrawing the remaining US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Such a step will not spell the end of extended deterrence, yet its drawbacks would far outweigh its gains. While achieving little in terms of relaunching disarmament, it would weaken nuclear sharing as an important achievement of managing alliance security. In an emerging multinuclear strategic environment, maintaining a visible nuclear bond between the United States and its NATO allies is not a Cold War relic, but a sensible and nonprovocative means of both deterrence and nonproliferation.
Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO.

(INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 85, no. 4, July 2009, p. 755-780.)

Author(s):
1. Yost, David S.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--NATO
3. NATO--USA

Notes:
Historically the NATO allies have focused considerable attention on US 'extended deterrence' - that is, the extension by Washington of an umbrella of protection, sometimes called a 'nuclear guarantee'. A persisting requirement has been to provide the allies with assurance about the reliability and credibility of this protection. This article examines the definition of 'assurance' used by the US Department of Defense for most of the past decade and argues that it has drawn attention to long-standing policy challenges associated with US extended deterrence in NATO. The article considers the assurance roles of US nuclear forces in Europe, as well as elements of assurance in Washington's relations with its allies regarding extended nuclear deterrence. Whether the allies will retain the current requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in their new Strategic Concept or devise a new approach will be an issue of capital importance in the policy review launched at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. Contrasting approaches to these questions are visible in the United States and Germany, among other allies. The main issues to be resolved include reconciling extended deterrence with arms control priorities; managing the divisions in public and expert opinion; and avoiding certain potential consequences of a rupture with established arrangements.

ID Number: JA025994
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Trident : White Elephant or Black Hole ?.

(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 154, no. 1, February 2009, p. 36-43.)

Author(s):
1. Beach, Hugh

Subject(s):
1. TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GREAT BRITAIN
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN

Notes:
Britain has possessed its own nuclear weapons for just over fifty years and is laying plans to keep them going for the next half-century. The author argues that there are better things to spend government money on and the Trident replacement programme should be cancelled.

ID Number: JA025651
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
Britain's nuclear capability is once again a subject of intense debate. Some suggest that, in order to save money and make a political statement on global disarmament, Britain should reduce its deterrent capability. But as the author argues, these arguments are misleading. The fundamental driver of British nuclear forces must be credible deterrence. While politically appealing, the alternatives to Britain's current nuclear capability carry serious deficiencies, which undermine their very purpose.

ID Number: JA026425
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

The current economic crisis and two costly wars have put much strain on British defence planners. Government expenditure is being placed under increasing scrutiny. There have been voices claiming that Trident is an unnecessary expense. This article counters this argument and advocates the necessity of maintaining and renewing Britain's nuclear deterrent.

ID Number: JA025650
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

In December 2006 the British government released a White Paper announcing its intention to begin the process of replacing its current Trident nuclear weapons system, thereby allowing it to retain nuclear weapons well into the 2050s. In March 2008 the government released its National Security Strategy that stressed the long-term complexity, diversity and interdependence of threats to British security with a clear focus on human rights, justice and freedom. This article asks how the threat to kill tens if not hundreds of thousands of people with British nuclear weapons fits into the National Security Strategy's world view and questions the relevance of an instrument of such devastating bluntness to threats defined by complexity and interdependence. It argues that the government's case for replacing the current Trident system based on the logic of nuclear deterrence is flawed. First, Britain faces no strategic nuclear threats and the long-term post-Cold War trend in relations with Russia and China - the
two nuclear-armed major powers that could conceivably threaten the UK with nuclear attack - is positive, despite current tensions with Moscow over Georgia. Second, the credibility and legitimacy of threatening nuclear destruction in response to the use of WMD by 'rogue' states is highly questionable and British nuclear threats offer no 'insurance' or guarantee of protection against future 'rogue' nuclear threats. Third, nuclear weapons have no role to play in deterring acts of nuclear terrorism whether state-sponsored or not. Fourth, British nuclear threats will be useless in dealing with complex future conflicts characterized by 'hybrid' wars and diverse and interdependent sources of insecurity. The article concludes by arguing that the government's fall-back position that it must keep nuclear weapons 'just in case' because the future security environment appears so uncertain, makes no sense if British nuclear threats offer no solution to the causes and symptoms of that uncertainty.

ID Number: JA025598
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

(EUROPEAN SECURITY, vol. 18, no. 1, March 2009, p. 81-97.)

Author(s):
1. Sliwinski, Krzysztof

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN

Notes:
This paper emphasizes the pertinence of the British government's claim that nuclear deterrent threats are still relevant in the four broad areas to which it addresses: deterrence against aggression towards British/NATO vital interests or nuclear coercion/blackmail with other WMD by regional 'rogue' states; deterrence against state-sponsored acts of nuclear terrorism; and as a general residual deterrent function to preserve peace and stability in an uncertain world. British nuclear weapons are still important and very much relevant in all the four areas discussed. First of all, they play a role of a significant tool of political leverage as they still function much the same way they did during the Cold War. WMDs were, after all, a guarantee of their non-use, which does not mean that they were not useful. Secondly, it also authenticates the UK among its allies. Even though generally democracies do not wage wars with each other, they still have to face the challenges posed by non-democracies. In doing so, they need to support each other with the use of 'ultima ratio' arguments in order to safeguard international peace and stability. The British nuclear deterrent should, therefore, be perceived as a general deterrent with a positive influence on international community and international security, overall.

ID Number: JA026533
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
The Case for No First Use.
Author(s):
  1. Sagan, Scott D.
Subject(s):
  1. NO FIRST USE (NUCLEAR STRATEGY)
  2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
  A US nuclear no-first-use doctrine would have fewer costs and bring greater benefits than commonly recognised.
ID Number: JA025913
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Renoncer a la dissuasion nucleaire ?.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 65e annee, no. 721, juillet 2009, p. 132-138.)
Author(s):
  1. Ranquet, Robert
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Notes:
  La question de la dissuasion nucleaire francaise fait encore aujourd'hui l'objet d'un large consensus alors meme que les conditions qui ont preside a sa creation ont profondement evolue. Prenant en compte le risque majeur de la proliferation, la France pourrait avoir une carte a jouer en proposant un processus de desarmement incluant le renoncement complet a la dissuasion nucleaire.
ID Number: JA026030
Year: 2009
Language: French
Type: ART

Framing Strategic Deterrence : Old Certainties, New Ambiguities.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 154, no. 4, August 2009, p. 46-50.)
Author(s):
  1. Freedman, Lawrence
Subject(s):
  1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
  2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Notes:
  During the Cold War deterrence worked better in practice than in theory. It became an article of faith that great power war was virtually unthinkable because of the consequences, yet this conclusion was reached without ever working through the scenarios. Today, in a world of shrinking great power arsenals and proliferating small arsenals, we may now be moving away from the models which served us well during the Cold War. The author interrogates the assumptions which underpinned strategic deterrence and casts an eye on a more ambiguous nuclear future.
ID Number: JA026155
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age.

Author(s):
1. Gerson, Michael S.

Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
The author highlights the fact that deterrence is once again a popular topic of discussion within the US defense and policy communities. As part of these adversary-specific deterrence strategies, there is renewed interest in the role conventional weapons might play in national and international security decisions. The author establishes a context for his argument by means of a detailed analysis of the factors influencing the military's expansion of 'strategic deterrence' to incorporate nuclear and conventional forces, as well as a nation's diplomatic, economic, and information tools. The author closes with a warning that this increased role for conventional forces requires new thinking regarding conventional capabilities, targeting doctrine, warfighting strategies, force deployment, and strategic communication necessary to deter both conventional and weapons of mass destruction-armed adversaries.

ID Number: JA026363
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 32, no. 9, September 2009, p. 776-801.)

Author(s):
1. Helfstein, Scott
2. Meese, Michael J.
3. Rassler, Don

Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--PREVENTION
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
This article was written at the request of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management. While this analysis suggests that certain types of terrorists can be deterred from certain types of attacks, it is less optimistic about the use of nuclear weapons in a terrorist deterrent strategy. A broad approach to deterrence may be effective against certain types of terrorist groups and attacks, making it crucially important to disaggregate the terrorist threat when setting policy. The article goes on to address two types of terrorist groups with a 'global reach' that pose a serious threat to the United States: non-state actors driven by doctrines permitting catastrophic attacks and state-sponsored groups capable of carrying out catastrophic attacks. The analysis reveals a number of previously unappreciated tradeoffs and paradoxes associated with the deterrence of terrorists.

ID Number: JA026202
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice.
Author(s):
1. Lantis, Jeffrey S.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
This article describes the emergence of a new generation of strategic cultural studies that informs models of deterrence and weapons of mass destruction policy, especially the role of culture shaping expectations and the possibilities for deterrent strategies. After several decades of research, the role of culture as an influence on strategy is widely acknowledged. Contemporary academic research on strategic culture, moreover, has not been integrated into current nuclear policy, including official doctrinal statements on tailored deterrence, itself one of the most important innovations in nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War. The result is a gap between theory and practical policy applications. This article seeks to bridge this gap by identifying conditions in which strategic cultural understanding offer added value for tailoring deterrence policies toward potential adversaries. Drawing from reviews of the academic research, the article details scope conditions of the relationship between strategic culture and deterrence that may provide a policy means for discerning trends relevant to the future security environment. Strong national cultural identities, dominant leaders, and powerful military organizations are important players in strategic development as well as important receptors for strategic targeting. And while some doctrinal statements on tailored deterrence were formulated during the Bush administration, cultural dimensions continue to be relevant for progressive models of deterrence in the Obama administration and beyond.
ID Number: JA026477
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

La dissuasion nucleaire : permanence et changements.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 65eme annee, no. 10, octobre 2009, p. 119-131.)
Author(s):
1. Debouzy, Olivier
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Notes:
L'auteur risque dans cette reflexion l'opinion que la dissuasion nucleaire, pour avoir profondement change, est aujourd'hui tout aussi pertinente qu'hier; que, si ses points d'application et donc ses modalites changent, son utilite demeure; qu'elle est, en un mot, aussi - et peut-être plus - necessaire aujourd'hui et pour le futur previsible qu'hier, mais que la question de l'utilisation des armes nucleaires doit se renouveler en profondeur, notamment par une reflexion sur les caracteristiques futures des armes nucleaires et leur doctrine d'emploi; sur l'articulation entre l'exercice de la dissuasion nucleaire et la mise en oeuvre des forces conventionnelles d'une part, et la defense antimissiles d'autre part; sur la question de la dissuasion elargie, enfin, du fait des circonstances a la fois plus variees dans lesquelles elle s'exerce et de l'absence de structures comparables a celles qui
existaient du temps de la guerre froide pour en formaliser les conditions.

ID Number: JA026221
Year: 2009
Language: French
Type: ART

Morale et efficacité dans le débat nucléaire.

(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 65e année, no. 4, avril 2009, p. 150-158.)

Author(s):
1. Lambert, Denis

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Notes:
Un nouveau débat sur l'avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire s'annonce, preempté par quelques manoeuvres politiques. La nécessite de rebatir l'équilibre stratégique entre les Etats-Unis et la Russie, avant l'échéance du 5 décembre 2009 pour le Traite START, fixe même une première limite au calendrier, sans compter la préparation de la prochaine conférence d'examen du TNF. La perception de la menace principale a change, mais aussi le cadre et certaines modalités de la dissuasion. Loin d'être devenu desuete, elle s'intègre dans une vision plus! globale. Le réalisme l'emporte sur l'idéalisme.

ID Number: JA025888
Year: 2009
Language: French
Type: ART

A Second Nuclear Revolution : From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence.

(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 32, no. 5, October 2009, p. 745-767.)

Author(s):
1. Sauer, Tom

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Notes:
This article predicts that the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected. This delegitimation of nuclear weapons is due to five factors whose importance has grown since the mid-1990s : nuclear proliferation, the risk of nuclear terrorism, the nuclear taboo, missile defence, and the increased importance of international law. The article starts with categorizing nuclear weapons policies: nuclear primacy, maximum deterrence, minimum deterrence, existential deterrence, and post-existential deterrence. The nuclear weapon states will probably shift their policies from nuclear primary (US), maximum deterrence (Russia), minimum or existential deterrence (UK, France, Israel, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea) to post-existential deterrence (or elimination), taking one step at a time.

ID Number: JA026305
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
Dissuasion, asymétrie et contournement.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 65e année, no. 721, juillet 2009, p. 139-148.)

Author(s):
1. Savoyant, Luc

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
2. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Notes:
Les nouvelles formes de terrorisme, par leurs modes d'action et leurs effets destructeurs comparables à ceux d'action de guerre, sont souvent qualifiées de menaces asymétriques car susceptibles de prendre en défaut les systèmes de sécurité de temps de paix, généralement non dimensionnés contre des actions de telle ampleur, comme les systèmes de défense militaire dont l'emploi est contraint par le cadre légal du temps de paix. Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale prend en compte ces nouvelles formes de menaces et formule des recommandations pour limiter les effets de telles actions à défaut de pouvoir les prévenir en totalité. Parmi les cibles potentielles que l'on pourrait qualifier de cibles 'à très haut rendement' figurent les installations présentant des risques majeurs pour l'environnement en cas d'agression dite 'hors dimensionnement' dont les systèmes militaires nucléaires de dissuasion. Les nouvelles menaces asymétriques pourraient, si l'on n'y prenait garde, contourner de tels systèmes, la plupart du temps concus pour contrer des menaces de nature militaire.

ID Number: JA026031
Year: 2009
Language: French
Type: ART

2008

Belgique, armes nucléaires et opinion publique.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 64e année, no. 5, mai 2008, p. 155-163.)

Author(s):
1. Dumoulin, Andre

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--BELGIUM
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--BELGIUM

Notes:
Le lancement d'une démarche prudente d'extension des intérêts vitaux de la France à ses proches voisins renvoie à la question des armes nucléaires. Dans le royaume de Belgique la question de la perception de la dissuasion est plurielle, ambigue et attentiste, entre les 'assurances otaniennes', 'les ballons d'essai hexagonaux', les audaces 'contenues' des résolutions parlementaires et les incertitudes américaines à l'approche du 60e anniversaire de l'Alliance atlantique.

ID Number: JA024885
Year: 2008
Language: French
Type: ART
Israel and Asymmetrical Deterrence.
Author(s):
1. Malka, Amos
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--ISRAEL
2. TERRORISM--ISRAEL--PREVENTION
Notes:
This article analyzes the elements of the asymmetry of deterrence in the Israeli context. It contains the personal insights of someone who had the opportunity to be involved in both formulating deterrent positions and observing their effect on 'the other side of the hill'. Even taking into account the differences between the Israeli case and others, the Israeli case study may shed some light for other Western parties facing terrorist threats.
ID Number: JA024636
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Nuclear Abolition : A Dangerous Illusion.
(ORBIS, vol. 52, no. 3, Summer 2008, p. 424-433.)
Author(s):
1. Colby, Elbridge
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
A rising and influential tide of opinion is pressing for the United States to take major steps towards actually realizing 'a world without nuclear weapons', including by taking steps towards dismantling its nuclear arsenal. This article argues that a world without nuclear weapons, and particularly American nuclear weapons, is not desirable nor is real and effective nuclear disarmament possible. Therefore, while non-proliferation is an important objective, the United States should not abandon or move substantially towards the abandonment of its arsenal in pursuit of nuclear abolition. Instead, the United States should seek the worthy goal of preventing and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons while maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, a policy that can be followed by de-linking non-proliferation from disarmament.
ID Number: JA025012
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART
DoD and the Nuclear Mission.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 51, 2008, p. 13-20.)
Author(s):
1. Murdock, Clark A.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
This article presents an advocacy narrative for the still important contributions that nuclear weapons make to US security and outlines a set of recommendations for how the Department of Defense should organize for the nuclear mission. After first addressing the role of nuclear weapons in 21st century international affairs and national security, this article reviews how the nuclear mission has been neglected in the post-Cold War era and suggests what actions are needed to resuscitate the nuclear deterrent.

The Future of the US Nuclear Deterrent.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 27, no. 4, July - September 2008, p. 345-360.)
Author(s):
1. Schneider, Mark
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
The United States must maintain an effective nuclear deterrent because, without it, the US could be destroyed as an industrial civilization, and our conventional forces could be defeated by a state with grossly inferior conventional capability but powerful weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Both Russia and China have the nuclear potential to destroy the US (and our allies) and are modernizing their forces with the objective of targeting the US missile defenses and conventional strike capabilities, while critically important elements of deterrence and national power simply cannot substitute for nuclear deterrence. In light of the emerging 'strategic partnership' between Russia and China and their emphasis on nuclear weapons, it would be foolish indeed to size US strategic nuclear forces as if the only threat we face is that of rogue states and discard the requirement that the US nuclear deterrent be 'second to none'.

ID Number: JA025159
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

ID Number: JA025185
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART
Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy after 9/11.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 29, no. 2, August 2008, p. 229-265.)

Author(s):
1. Knopf, Jeffrey W.

Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA

Notes:
After the announcement of the doctrine of preemption in 2002, many observers concluded the George W. Bush administration had abandoned the strategy of deterrence. This is a misconception. This article aims both to clarify the status of deterrence in American strategy since 9/11 and to assess that strategy.

ID Number: JA025177
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Biological Weapons, Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence: The Biotechnology Revolution.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 27, no. 4, July - September 2008, p. 315-323.)

Author(s):
1. Galamas, Francisco

Subject(s):
1. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
3. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
The strategic use of biological weapons has presented some difficulties. Biological weapons use has been always uncertain, invisible, and delayed due to factors such as the incubation period. With the intervention of biotechnology techniques, the possible applications of biological weapons may increase and gain new strategic value. That may enhance the deterrence capability of these weapons against countries with nuclear weapons. To better understand these changes, we must look first at how biotechnology can eliminate some of the disadvantages of the strategic biological weapons use and therefore may enhance the use of biological weapons for deterrence.

ID Number: JA025184
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Dissuader la menace d'armes de destruction massive.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 64e annee, no. 11, novembre 2008, p. 91-99.)

Author(s):
1. Jenner, Nicolas

Subject(s):
1. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
La proliferation des armes de destruction massive se poursuit. Cependant, la defense contre ces nouvelles puissances ne peut etre la meme que la dissuasion de represailles du temps de la guerre froide. Il faudra mettre en oeuvre une strategie indirecte : la dissuasion de deni, et adapter nos forces et notre posture de defense en consequence.

ID Number: JA025322
Year: 2008
Language: French


Author(s):
1. Geipel, Gary L.

Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--EUROPE--PREVENTION
2. TERRORISM--EUROPE
3. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--EUROPE

Notes:
This article considers the experience of continental European governments after 1970 in dealing with indigenous groups that sought the violent overthrow of parliamentary democracy and market economics. Drawing on detailed case histories of the so-called 'urban terrorists' in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain - along with lessons form Greece and the Netherlands - the article examines efforts to achieve deterrence by denial of nonstate actors. Even under the constraints of law in highly evolved criminal-justice systems, the affected governments often were successful in employing both conciliatory and coercive measures to deny the urban terrorists popular sympathy, ability to remain at large, communications while in custody, financial resources, crossborder support and recruitment of new members. These measures, along with changes in the political and social environment, combined to neutralize the threat from urban terrorism in most of the countries studied.

ID Number: JA024457
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

The Iranian Nuclear Threat and the Israeli Options.

(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 28, no. 3, December 2007, p. 513-541.)

Author(s):
1. Pedatzur, Reuven

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--IRAN
2. ISRAEL--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAN
3. IRAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS--ISRAEL
4. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--ISRAEL

Notes:
As a result of developments including the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Muammar Al-Qaddfi's decision to cease WMD programs, and the weakening of the Syrian military, only one potential strategic threat against Israel remains: the Iranian nuclear program. Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is likely to transform the Middle East's strategic balance, force changes in Israel's national security planning in general and its nuclear policy in particular. This article analyses the options open to Israel in response to a nuclear Iran, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. Evaluation of the options available to Israel reveals seven alternatives. In the near future, Israeli decision makers will have to decide whether to adopt one or a mix of options ranging from preemptive attack to unconcealed nuclear deterrence. After analysing each of these options, the conclusion is that Israel probably will move to unconcealed nuclear deterrence in the event of Iran completing the
Within the complex and fast-moving context for Russian nuclear force modernization, how deterrence-stable will future Russian forces be? This study provides a partial answer to that question in three steps. First, the author compares the performances of Russian and American Moscow Treaty-compliant forces with an alternative, smaller 'minimum deterrent' force for each state. Second, he tests the sensitivity of these forces to requirements for early generation on alerting of forces, and for prompt launch of retaliatory forces. Third, the author considers whether the introduction of missile defenses of notional effectiveness affects the balance of deterrence credibility as between the two states.

The US-Russian nuclear relationship is not a Cold War anachronism, as many assume, but a vital constituent of a robust international body politic. War between Russia and America is unlikely, but misunderstanding and misperception with respect to their military ends and means are not. US nuclear modernization plans impact on Russian perceptions of their great-power status and vice versa. The US and Russia are downsizing their numbers of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to meet the Moscow Treaty (SORT) requirements. Even Moscow Treaty-compliant forces will be well in excess of what some experts regard as necessary for deterrence.
El arsenal nuclear británico y el régimen de no proliferación.
(POLÍTICA EXTERIOR, vol. 21, no. 117, mayo - junio 2007, p. 87-97.)
Author(s):
1. Lara, Belen
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
3. TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GREAT BRITAIN
Notes:
Con el apoyo conservador y la oposición laborista, Tony Blair ha conseguido la renovación del sistema británico de disuasión nuclear. La decisión no solo debilita el TNP, sino que impulsará las políticas nucleares de países como Irán, que se sienten cada vez más amenazados.
ID Number: JA023734
Year: 2007
Language: Spanish
Type: ART

Deterring a Nuclear 9/11.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 30, no. 2, Spring 2007, p. 21-34.)
Author(s):
1. Talmadge, Caitlin
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
Can a nuclear terrorist attack be deterred? Nuclear forensic techniques to identify the origins of nuclear material are improving, but significant associated strategic, political, diplomatic, and organizational challenges have yet to be sufficiently addressed.
ID Number: JA023579
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Restoring Deterrence.
(ORBIS, vol. 51, no. 3, Summer 2007, p. 413-428.)
Author(s):
1. Colby, Elbridge
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
Notes:
While the strategy of deterrence has faced considerable criticism since September 11, it needs to be reexamined. This article addresses serious challenges to the deterrence strategy. It also considers the deterrence strategy as it relates to states such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran and others. Ultimately, it argues that deterrence is a security policy offering a way forward for the United States that is not only more effective because more tailored, but is also more moral than its alternatives.
ID Number: JA023940
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
The Continuing Roles for US Strategic Forces.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 26, no. 4, July - September 2007, p. 269-274.)

Author(s):
1. Payne, Keith B.

Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA

Notes:
The rise of hostile rogue states, new terrorist threats, and the proliferation of WMD and missile technology have all highlighted our need for an effective deterrence strategy in this post-Cold War environment. The fundamental questions of strategy we now face are to understand what and how we may be able to deter in a new strategic environment. Unfortunately, most of what we believed was true about deterrence during the Cold War is now misleading because international conditions have changed so dramatically. This conclusion does not suggest that we discard deterrence. It does, however, explain why our Cold War strategy of deterrence based on offensive nuclear forces and a mutual balance of terror must be reconsidered in toto.

ID Number: JA024265
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Doctrine nucleaire francaise : questions en suspens.
(REVUE INTERNATIONALE ET STRATEGIQUE, no. 65, printemps 2007, p. 81-90.)

Author(s):
1. Courmont, Barthelemy

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

Notes:
La doctrine de dissuasion nucleaire francaise repose sur le concept de seuil de suffisance : le volume de l'arsenal nucleaire doit correspondre a ce seuil, a partir duquel il est suffisamment dissuasif pour eviter une attaque. Or des questions se posent autour de cette doctrine de dissuasion. Comment renouveler l'arsenal tout en respectant les traites, qui visent a reduire le nombre d'armes et a interdire les essais nucleaires ? Comment identifier les menaces dans un environnement changeant, et par consequent ou situer le seuil de suffisance ? Comment l'opinion publique perçoit-elle le nucléaire ? La proliferation nucléaire et l'évolution des doctrines des autres puissances nucléaires pourraient inciter la France a privilegier une doctrine, non plus de dissuasion, mais d'emploi du nucléaire.

ID Number: JA023559
Year: 2007
Language: French
Type: ART

L'avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire française.

Author(s):
1. Debouzy, Olivier

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

ID Number: JA024034
Year: 2007
Language: French
Type: ART
Deterrence, Blackmail, Friendly Persuasion.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 23, no. 3, September 2007, p. 237-256.)
Author(s):
1. Ifft, Edward
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Notes:
The author thoroughly discusses the concept of deterrence. He goes to the root Latin verb deterre, to frighten, to begin his discussion of deterrence. He uses the shorthand term 'blackmail', as in 'nuclear blackmail', as little more than 'nuclear deterrence in the wrong hands'.
ID Number: JA024113
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Author(s):
1. Szabo, David
Subject(s):
1. PREEMPTIVE ATTACK (MILITARY SCIENCE)
2. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
3. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
This article examines the potential for intra-conflict deterrence when a state confronts an enemy that possesses WMD—most likely chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW). It contends that, despite creating an increased risk of a WMD attack, the invading state can take steps to reduce the likelihood of being met by a WMD response. It begins by exploring the relevant literature on deterrence and intra-war negotiation in an effort to develop a framework for deterrence while at the same time restraining conflict below a desired threshold. The case study of the 1991 Persian Gulf War is then analyzed in an attempt to draw lessons on whether, and if possible how, intra-conflict deterrence might work and implications for developing a theoretical understanding of likely deterrence scenarios. Finally, the article considers lessons applicable to future conflict capable of lowering the likelihood of the use of such weapons.
ID Number: JA024501
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
Uncertain Justice for Nuclear Terror: Deterrence of Anonymous Attacks Through Attribution.
(ORBIS, vol. 51, no. 3, Summer 2007, p. 429-446.)

Author(s):
1. Phillips, Matthew

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR TERRORISM
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Notes:
In light of ongoing work to improve nuclear attribution capabilities, policymakers could be tempted to consider a nuclear terrorism deterrence doctrine relying strongly on the ability of those capabilities to support retaliation against states that supply materials used anonymously in an attack. Although the United States must develop the best possible nuclear attribution capabilities, at least to support response actions after an attack, prospects for deterrence are uncertain. To accommodate these uncertainties, as well as the wide range of possible nuclear terrorism scenarios, the United States should adopt a broadly scoped operationally ambiguous declaratory policy in the context of a comprehensive strategic doctrine to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation.
(SEcurity Studies, vol. 16, no. 7, October - December 2007, p. 525-554.)

Author(s):
1. Rendall, Matthew

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

2006

(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 27, no. 3, December 2006, p. 417-434.)

Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

Notes:
The stability of nuclear deterrence between the United States and Russia no longer can be regarded as a relic of the Cold War. The topic is rapidly re-emerging as one of ever-greater relevance and policy-strategic urgency. A more fluid international order, the complexity of post-Cold War security issues, and the pressure of incipient nuclear proliferation in Asia, make clarity in American-Russian nuclear arms control of first importance. Through the revival of proven analytical techniques, however, this article self-consciously reintroduces concepts long at the heart of strategic nuclear debates. These show that although there is no imminent risk to first strike stability, arms control stability is more nuanced and cannot be
assumed without deliberate effort. Missile defences, already deployed by the US and possibly appealing to others, may further complicate the stabilisation of Russian-American nuclear security relations and the containment of nuclear arms races in Asia. Strategic stability is not as important as before for immediate human survival, nor does it raise a significant danger of Russian-American confrontation, and certainly not a risk of pre-emptive attack. The strategic balance, rather, remains a precondition to cooperation on other issues, above all nuclear proliferation.

L'avenir de la force de dissuasion britannique.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 62e année, no. 7, juillet 2006, p. 35-45.)
Author(s):
  1. Boyer, Yves
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
  2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GREAT BRITAIN
Notes:
Parmi les membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, le Royaume-Uni est l'État qui dispose de la plus petite force de dissuasion, avec moins de 200 têtes et un seul type d'arme pour sa mise en œuvre eventuelle. L'"interdépendance" dans le domaine nucléaire avec les États-Unis voulue par les gouvernements britanniques depuis une cinquantaine d'années a conduit Londres à se trouver dans une position de dissymétrie technologique croissante à l'égard des Américains. Ce choix politico-stratégique a fini par restreindre considérablement les options qui restent encore ouvertes au Royaume-Uni pour rester à l'avenir un joueur dans le club des puissances nucléaires militaires.

Prestige Purchase.
Author(s):
  1. Dorman, Andrew
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
  2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GREAT BRITAIN
  3. TRIDENT (WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
Notes:
Britain seems likely to buy its most expensive weapons system ever without much debate or a vote in parliament. Is the replacement of the Trident nuclear submarine just an issue of national pride and international rivalry? Or could there be a cheaper alternative that might also allow more money for conventional forces?
The purpose of the British nuclear deterrent remains what it has always been: to minimize the prospect of the United Kingdom being attacked by mass-destruction weapons. It is not a panacea and it is not designed to forestall every type of threat. Nevertheless, the threat which it is designed to counter is so overwhelming that no other form of military capability could manage to avert it. The possession of the deterrent may be unpleasant, but it is an unpleasant necessity, the purpose of which lies not in its actual use but in its nature as the ultimate 'stalemate weapon' - and, in the nuclear age, stalemate is the most reliable source of security available to us all.
reconnaissance sur la scène internationale, ne sont pas signataires du Traité de non-prolifération de l'armement nucléaire. S'il est évidemment dans l'intérêt de la communauté internationale de limiter la prolifération, les partisans de la 'dissuasion' considèrent que l'arme nucléaire permet de stabiliser les relations entre ces deux États, qui se tiennent ainsi mutuellement en respect.

Chirac's nuclear Vermächtnis.
(EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 55. Jg., Nr. 4, April 2006, S. 20-22.)
Author(s):
1. Ehrhart, Hans-Georg
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

Discours de l'Ile Longue : tournant pour la doctrine de dissuasion nucléaire de la France ?.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 62e année, no. 5, mai 2006, p. 5-12.)
Author(s):
1. Favin-Leveque, Jacques
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
Notes:
La doctrine française de dissuasion nucléaire n'avait guère évolué depuis son élaboration dans les années 60. Destinée à dissuader toute agression contre les intérêts vitaux du pays, elle ne pouvait jusqu'à présent s'adresser qu'à des pays eux-mêmes dotés d'un armement nucléaire. Ainsi définie, elle jouit depuis plusieurs décennies d'un consensus tacite au plan politique. Le discours que le chef de l'Etat a prononcé à l'Ile Longue le 19 janvier 2006 modifie sensiblement cette théorie de la dissuasion en étendant la possibilité de la menace d'emploi à certains États non nucléaires et en donnant des intérêts vitaux une définition plus large de leur positionnement géographique et de leur nature même. L'article se propose d'analyser cette importante évolution de la doctrine française. Il en souligne la pertinence, mais il met également en garde contre sa relative fragilité dans l'environnement géopolitique de la France en 2006.
France's New Nuclear Doctrine.
(INternational Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4, July 2006, p. 701-721.)
Author(s):
  1. Yost, David S.
Subject(s):
  1. Nuclear Deterrence--France
Notes:
The new nuclear deterrence doctrine announced by President Jacques Chirac in January 2006 has rightly been recognized as a milestone, although in fact several of the key changes in policy were set forth in June 2001. While France remains determined to deter major power threats, its main new preoccupation is deterring regional powers by making clear that it has developed more employable nuclear options. The innovations announced in January 2006 include the focus on deterring state sponsors of terrorism, the threat to attack an enemy's 'capacity to act', the more discriminate and controllable employment options, the willingness to launch 'final warning' strikes, the description of 'strategic supplies' as a potential vital interest, and the presentation of nuclear deterrence as the foundation of a strategy of prevention and, when necessary, conventional military intervention. Several factors may have led Chirac to make the speech at this juncture. These include maintaining the credibility of deterrence and presidential power, sustaining the budgetary effort required for the nuclear posture, clarifying French deterrence doctrine for external and internal audiences, and sending a message of autonomy to Iran's and France's key European partners. The new doctrine's implications include its significance for deterrence and non-proliferation and for France's relations with its partners in NATO and the European Union.
ID Number: JA022687
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

El concepto de disuasion en el siglo XXI.
Author(s):
  1. Isidoro, Ricardo Martinez
Subject(s):
  1. Deterrence (Strategy)
  2. Terrorism
Notes:
'Si quieres la paz, prepara la guerra' es el mensaje de la política de disuasión. Valida durante la guerra fría, la disuasión necesita readaptarse a las nuevas amenazas del terrorismo internacional.
ID Number: JA022296
Year: 2006
Language: Spanish
Type: ART
Deterrence or Preemption?.
(CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 105, no. 694, November 2006, p. 395-399.)
Author(s):
1. Knopf, Jeffrey W.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
2. PREEMPTIVE ATTACK (MILITARY SCIENCE)
Notes:
Are deterrence and preemption mutually exclusive, or can they work together? The Bush administration and its supporters believe the preemption doctrine can strengthen deterrence: the threat to hit other states preemptively will convince some states not to seek WMD or give support to terrorists. In this view, even a decision to exercise the preemption option can contribute to deterrence.
ID Number: JA023046
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Deterrence in the Cold War and the 'War on Terror'.
(DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS, vol. 17, no. 6, December 2006, p. 605-617.)
Author(s):
1. Levine, David K.
2. Levine, Robert A.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
2. COLD WAR
3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009
Notes:
The authors examine how the theory of deterrence differs from a Cold-War type of setting to a War-on-Terror type of setting. Their central conclusion is that deterrence of terrorist states should resemble Cold War deterrence. Deterring terrorist groups is more difficult. In either case, failure of deterrence will have far less traumatic consequences than during the Cold War, unless we ourselves are overcome by fear.
ID Number: JA023161
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

2005

Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East.
Author(s):
1. MacInnis, Kathleen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--IRAN
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--MIDDLE EAST
Notes:
Iranian nuclear proliferation could prove uniquely dangerous because of the potential to ignite regional proliferation in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others. Unlike in Asia, the US has few good options for reassuring allies in the Middle East.
ID Number: JA021673
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART
Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century: From Simplicity to Complexity.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 21, no. 3, September 2005, p. 267-281.)
Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
3. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
4. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
Notes:
The present study considers whether the US and Russia could, at reduced levels of offensive nuclear weapons, deploy defenses sufficient to change the character of the mutual hostage suicide pact that the two states have inherited from the Cold War. The Moscow Treaty of 2002 is used as an analytical benchmark for this purpose. The author considers alternative force postures for the two states under a variety of total force constraints in order to evaluate whether defenses can drive retaliation based on offenses into the margins of deterrence and, if so, what other implications exist for deterrence broadly defined.
ID Number: JA021809
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States.
(International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 1, January 2005, p. 83-114.)
Author(s):
1. Yost, David S.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--GREAT BRITAIN
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
The three Western nuclear powers have in recent years been more preoccupied with threats from regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction than with potential major power threats. London, Paris, and Washington have each substantially reduced their deployed nuclear forces and sharply cut back their range of delivery systems since the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991. While each has manifested greater interest in non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence, each has attempted, with varying degrees of clarity, to define options for limited nuclear use. All three have articulated their nuclear employment threats within a conceptual framework intended to promote deterrence. Despite the differences in their approaches and circumstances, the three Western nuclear powers are grappling with tough and, to some extent, unanswered questions: what threat will deter? To what extent have the grounds for confidence in deterrence been diminished? To what extent has it been prudent to scale back deployed nuclear capabilities and redefine threats of nuclear retaliation? To what extent would limited nuclear options enhance deterrence and simplify nuclear employment decisions? What level of confidence should be placed in the full array of deterrence and containment measures? To what extent is deterrence national policy, and to what extent is it Alliance policy?
ID Number: JA021302
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART
Dissuading Nuclear Adversaries: The Strategic Concept of Dissuasion and the US Nuclear Arsenal.


Author(s):
1. Hagood, Jonathan

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA

Notes:
This essay contributes to an understanding of the strategic concept of dissuasion by defining it as the active constraint of rationally beneficial options available to a current or potential geopolitical rival in order to preserve that national interests or goals of the US or its allies. The key military component of dissuasion lies in its link to deterrence, wherein the promise of credible deterrence raises the costs of alternatives to a rival. Dissuasion is further refined through analyses of historical case studies, the current security environment, and future scenarios and by identifying three operational types: global, regional, and tactical.

Deterring a Nuclear Iran.


Author(s):
1. Zaborski, Jason

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

Notes:
What if Iraq had nuclear weapons when if invaded Kuwait and dared the world to respond? The US needs to consider sharing missile defenses and, regrettably, developing new capabilities to enhance deterrence against future potential adversaries who possess nuclear weapons.

France's Evolving Nuclear Strategy.

(SURVIVAL, vol. 47, no. 3, Autumn 2005, p. 117-146.)

Author(s):
1. Yost, David S.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--FRANCE

Notes:
France's revised nuclear strategy, announced by President Jacques Chirac in June 2001, represents a move away from the Cold War 'anti-cities' strategy to one based on a more extensive range of options, including more precise and discriminate capabilities, intended to reinforce deterrence with choices beyond 'all or nothing'. Neither of the main rationales for the nuclear posture - the long-standing hedge against potential major power threats and the current emphasis on being able to deter regional powers armed with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons - has provoked much open debate or critical analysis in France. To proponents of reduced nuclear spending, both contingencies seem improbable and not worth the current and projected costs. The thesis that France's nuclear forces
constitute an indispensable contribution to the European Union's future deterrent posture appears an even less plausible justification to sceptics, who maintain that France could retain options for the EU and obtain approximately the same amount of security insurance with redefined nuclear posture requirements.

Deterrence : A Roundtable Review.
(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 28, no. 5, October 2005, p. 751-801.)
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
During the Cold War, deterrence was one of the central topics of discussion in the field of strategic studies. The end of the Cold War, the rise of international terrorism and the potential for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have led some to question the relevance of deterrence theory as well as deterrence as a strategic option.

Face au terrorisme, la dissuasion en style indirect.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 61e annee, no. 12, decembre 2005, p. 104-112.)
Author(s):
1. Lambert, Denis
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
3. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY
Notes:
Nul ne peut dissuader, en le menacant de mort, un terroriste qui recherche cette mort. Il reste cependant possible d'agir sur les Etats qui le soutiennent. Dans le climat confus d'apres guerre froide, la dissuasion trouve donc, au moins contre les formes d'hyperterrorisme qui necessitent l'assistance d'un Etat, un sens et un role nouveaux.

La dissuasion nucleaire au XXIe siecle.
Author(s):
1. Rose, Francois de
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The Nuclear Posture Review and Deterrence for a New Age.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 23, nos. 4 - 5, 2004, p. 411-419.)
Author(s):
1. Payne, Keith B.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
3. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
Notes:
The NPR heralded a needed paradigm shift away from the Cold War concept of deterrence stability, and toward a much more adaptive approach. Much work remains to be done to develop tailored approaches to deterrence and new threat options that are more adaptable to the contemporary security environment than those we inherited from the Cold War. We are still in the early stages of shaking off the detritus of Cold War thought and identifying the outlines of the new deterrence paradigm. We may not have decades of relative stability to get it right this time around and so need to move forward as fast, and as thoughtfully as we are able. The NPR and recent policy directions are a good start.

Notre ami americain et la dissuasion francaise.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 60e annee, no. 4, avril 2004, p. 104-119.)
Author(s):
1. Lambert, Denis
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--FRANCE
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
Notes:
La conception strategique de la France et celle de la seule hyperpuissance, si assuree d'elle-meme, ne peuvent pas coincider, ni donc leurs conceptions de la dissuasion. Pourtant la difference, bien que reelle, ne signifie pas forcement opposition, mais elle doit etre expliquee par l'historique des evolutions respectives.

Actualite et avenir de la dissuasion nucleaire.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 60e annee, no. 8 - 9, aout - septembre 2004, p. 18-22.)
Author(s):
1. Arbonneau, Thierry d'
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--EUROPE
Notes:
Identifiee a l'exces a l'affrontement de la guerre froide qui en masquait bien des atouts, l'arme nucleaire a peine a conserver sa legitime apres la chute de l'URSS. Pourtant, dans un paysage strategique mouvant, non stabilise et incertain, elle donne a l'Etat qui la possede une dimension quotidiennement mise en valeur par l'actualite internationale si tourmentee, sujette a bien des tensions et demandant force et credibilite
pour se faire entendre. Déployée avec détermination et persévérance aujourd'hui, elle garantira pour cela notre sécurité demain si le besoin s'en faisait sentir. L'Europe en sera un jour la bénéficiaire.

ID Number: JA020751
Year: 2004
Language: French
Type: ART

La dissuasion nucléaire contre les menaces multiformes.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 60e année, no. 8 - 9, aout - septembre 2004, p. 49-58.)
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--EUROPE
Notes:
Il ne fait doute dans aucun esprit que la période de paix cinquantenaire vécue en Europe depuis la fin du second conflit mondial est très largement imputable au jeu subtil de la dissuasion nucléaire. Pour autant les éléments constitutifs de cette catégorie d'affrontement de volontés n'ont pas cesse de se modifier et continuent de le faire. Sans oublier les évolutions observées ailleurs dans le monde, l'adaptation en France et en Europe de cette matrice protectrice aux risques actuels et futurs est l'objet de cette réflexion.

ID Number: JA020752
Year: 2004
Language: French
Type: ART

De la dissuasion nationale, à la persuasion européenne.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 60e année, no. 8 - 9, aout - septembre 2004, p. 59-71.)
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--EUROPE
Notes:
L'examen de l'environnement stratégique conduit la Société française d'études militaires (SFEM) à suggérer que la France revise sa doctrine de dissuasion. Malgré des critiques plus ou moins fondées, celle-ci garde des vertus qui font que l'arme nucléaire contribue à la stabilisation du monde. Des lors qu'une revision est nécessaire, il apparaît opportun de proposer un concept apte à emporter l'adhésion de l'Europe. La SFEM propose le concept de persuasion.

ID Number: JA020753
Year: 2004
Language: French
Type: ART
Dissuasion.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 60e annee, no. 8 - 9, aout - septembre 2004, p. 11-17.)

Author(s):
1. Bentegeat, Henri

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

Notes:
Contrat d'assurance contre des menaces extremes qui pourraient un jour se concretiser a nouveau, la dissuasion est des aujourd'hui garante de notre autonomie strategique, dans un monde marque par la proliferation des armes de destruction massive. Sa credibilite repose sur la modernisation et l'adaptation des moyens, non seulement pour continuer a garantir la capacite de frappe en second, mais aussi pour diversifier les modes d'action susceptibles d'etre mis en oeuvre. La credibilite est egalement conditionnee par l'adhesion des Francais : sans debat, celle-ci risquerait de s'affaiblir.

ID Number: JA020750
Year: 2004
Language: French
Type: ART

Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 34, no. 4, Winter 2004 - 2005, p. 4-19.)

Author(s):
1. Almog, Doron

Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
The author explores the strategy of cumulative deterrence as exercised by Israel in its war against the Palestinian intifadas and suggests that, perhaps, this is the strategy the United States should be using in the current war on terror. He argues that the classical deterrence theory that emerged following the Second World War and was practiced during the Cold War is no longer relevant in the war against terror. The author cautions that although the military superiority of the United States may never be in doubt, it is the war of ideas that will determine the final victor in the global war on terror. Only through the implementation of a strategy based on cumulative deterrence will America and its allies hope to win the hearts and minds of those supporting Islamic terrorists.

ID Number: JA021078
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 25, no. 1, April 2004, Special Issue.)
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
The authors have tried to provide a systematic coverage of the many issues that are emerging over the future of deterrence. This coverage starts by asking what does the concept of deterrence imply both theoretically and in practice. It then moves on to examine how deterrence, and the ideas of the stability it could generate through concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), evolved during the Cold War period. There then follow three analyses of specific problems arising in the post-Cold War international strategic environment. An attempt is then made to assess the problems facing the governments of the established nuclear weapon states and their allies in the new century and how they are facing up to them. There are contributions on how deterrence can be viewed in different regions - from Western Europe on the new problems faced by Germany, with US nuclear weapons still based on its territory, politically uncertain of their future military role in its security. And, finally, from two areas that are at the heart of regional concerns over nuclear war: South Asia and the Middle East.

ID Number: JA021162
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

2003

Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia : Theory and Practice.
Author(s):
1. Lo, James
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN
Notes:
This paper questions the basic soundness of the nuclear deterrence regime between India and Pakistan, and argues that the possibility of deterrence failure in this context is significant. Given the historical, geographic and psychological context of these rival states, nuclear weapons are more likely to create greater insecurity (than security) for the states involved. The central argument is that new nuclear states such as India and Pakistan are, inevitably, drawn towards nuclear war by their need to undertake low-level aggressive actions to maintain the credibility of their nuclear forces. Such actions, however, are in sharp contrast to the distant battles that were fought between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and these actions have a significantly higher probability of triggering a catastrophic deterrence failure. Beginning with an examination of the evolution of nuclear deterrence theory, this paper pays special attention to developments particularly important to India and Pakistan. It then proceeds with a case study of the nuclear weapons issue in India and Pakistan, up to the present day. Drawing on theoretical insights provided in the first section, it then critically analyzes the stability of the current deterrence regime. Finally, it examines some of the implications that these findings have for security studies, setting the agenda for future research.

ID Number: JA020013
Entre dissuasion et conventionnel : la persuasion.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e année, no. 1, janvier 2003, p. 43-54.)
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--FRANCE
Notes:
À la question 'nos concepts et nos moyens de dissuasion doivent-ils être revisés ?', un comité d'auditeurs de la 38e session du CHEAr répond par l'affirmative en introduisant une notion à mi-chemin de la prevention et de la dissuasion, celle de 'persuasion'. La dissuasion nucléaire actuelle répond toujours aux menaces militaires traditionnelles, mais ne répond que partiellement aux menaces emergentes de type asymétrique. Il a donc semblé nécessaire de proposer une évolution du concept de dissuasion et de ses moyens, conforme aux orientations données par le président de la République, lors de son discours de juin 2001 à l'IHEDN, et qui permette d'adapter la menace de l'emploi de l'arme nucléaire pour la rendre crédible à des puissances mineures, recourant à des moyens asymétriques ou à des armes de destruction massive. Cette proposition consiste à établir un continuum dissuasif allant d'une dissuasion 'conventionnelle' à une dissuasion nucléaire revisée et s'inscrivant dans le prolongement d'une prevention renforcée. De la prevention a la dissuasion, la 'presuasion'.

Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
(SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 12, no. 4, Summer 2003, p. 152-197.)
Author(s):
1. Smith, Derek D.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA
2. COUNTERPROLIFERATION--USA
Notes:
The emergence of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have pushed the Bush administration to declare that it was adopting a doctrine of preemption (what the doctrine calls for would be more accurately described as 'prevention') to augment, and even supplant, the decades-old US reliance on deterrence. The author considers US action in regional crises and conflicts involving important interests, ranging from the reversal of local aggression, the destruction of terrorist camps and WMD facilities, or even the removal of an adversary's regime. He argues that deterrence is of decreasing reliability against rogue states, but of increasing potency against the United States. To forestall this development, the United States should invest in counterproliferation programs and articulate a preventive war doctrine against threatening regimes, aiming to eliminate potential security threats before they fully materialize. These efforts, however, will only be beneficial if tempered by a strategy that capitalizes on US power and influence, but also recognizes its shortcomings and limitations. Otherwise, heavy-handed US military action will dramatically exacerbate the threats arrayed against it, quite possibly to the point...
that even the most ambitious counterproliferation efforts will fail.

Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 22, no. 5, December 2003, Special Issue.)
Subject(s):
  1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
ID Number: JA020098
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence.
(DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS, vol. 14, no. 4, August 2003, p. 237-249.)
Author(s):
  1. Frey, Bruno S.
  2. Luechinger, Simon
Subject(s):
  1. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY
  2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism, both in actual politics and rational choice analyses of terrorism. But there are superior strategies to deterrence. One is to make terrorist attacks less attractive. Another to raise the opportunity cost—rather than the material cost—to terrorists. These alternative strategies effectively dissuade potential terrorists. The strategies suggested here build on the 'benevolence' system and tend to produce a positive sum game among the interacting parties. In contrast, the deterrence system is based on 'threats' and tends to produce a negative sum game interaction.
ID Number: JA019436
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters.
(CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 102, no. 668, December 2003, p. 426-431.)
Author(s):
  1. Castillo, Jasen J.
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR TERRORISM
  2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Notes:
Under most circumstances, rogue states can be deterred from transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. The most dangerous exception: when regime change is threatened.
ID Number: JA019893
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART
The Future of Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence.

Author(s):
1. Harvey, Frank P.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Notes:
The United States decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and to accelerate the testing and deployment of a limited, layered ballistic missile defense system by 2004 obviously raises important questions about the future of strategic stability and the evolution of nuclear deterrence. How significant are these decisions? Do they indicate fundamental shifts in US-Russian nuclear doctrine? Is the shift permanent, especially in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001? What are the implications for the future of strategic stability? Are the concepts (mutual assured destruction or MAD), theories (deterrence), policies and treaties (ABM) that were the cornerstones of strategic stability still valid and/or relevant? Do we need a more complex approach to strategic stability and arms control that acknowledges emerging threats of terrorism and proliferation to new and aspiring nuclear powers? If so, what would a future oriented approach to deterrence and arms control encompass? Finally, what are the implications for Canada and Canadian policies and preferences for multilateral approaches to security?

Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense.

Author(s):
1. Powell, Robert

Subject(s):
1. NMD--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Notes:
The author uses nuclear deterrence theory to address three major concerns involving nuclear proliferation and national missile defense (NMD): how might the spread of nuclear weapons affect the ability of the United States to achieve its foreign policy objectives? Can a national missile defense protect against nuclear blackmail by a rogue state? What are the likely political and economic costs to the United States of pursuing NMD? The author warns that although 'NMD would give the United States somewhat more freedom of action and make a rogue state more likely to back down in a crisis', it could also increase the risk of a nuclear attack on the United States. This heightened risk, says the author, would be 'a direct consequence of a greater US willingness to press its interests harder in a crisis' once it has missile defenses.
The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail.
Author(s):
1. Russell, Richard L.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Notes:
Some scholars counter-intuitively argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases international security by substantially reducing the chances for inter-state armed conflict. This school of thought draws heavily on the history of the American-Soviet Cold War rivalry to inform its analysis. The security dilemma in the contemporary Middle East and South Asia where numerous states have or want nuclear weapons, however, are profoundly different than the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. States in the Middle East and South Asia today may see nuclear weapons as usable instruments of warfare in contrast to conventional wisdom in the West that views them as weapons of deterrence and last resort. As common sense would have it, American and Allied policy designed to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons is prudent. American diplomatic intervention, moreover, in regional crises as a third party may be needed in the future in the Middle East and South Asia to lessen the risks of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, American policy-makers are likely in the future to find themselves facing a nuclear-armed nation-state - or soon to be nuclear weapons-capable state - in a crisis and will have to grapple with the risks of pre-emptive or preventive military action.

Uncertain Future: NPT and the Global Nuclear Order.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 6, December 2003, p. 42-45.)
Author(s):
1. Zuberi, Matin
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Notes:
The global nuclear order has rested on two mutually supportive arrangements: the elaborate structure of nuclear deterrence and the nonproliferation regime. These two arrangements that sustained the nuclear order are no longer exclusive in their operation. The United States, as the chief architect of this nuclear order, has succeeded in making substantial changes in the nonproliferation regime. Arms control that provided a link between nuclear deterrence and the nonproliferation regime is now viewed as a relic of the Cold War. With possibilities of a nuclear response to chemical or biological attack from countries that were previously part of the nonproliferation regime, there is a danger of 'nuclear disorder' in the not too distant future. An international consensus exists on the campaign against terrorism. There is, however, considerable unease about combining it with preventive or preemptive counterproliferation. The nuclear order has survived so far because of the strengthening of the taboo against the military use of nuclear weapons during each successive decade of the nuclear era. Any such use, accidental or deliberate, would
destroy whatever remains of that order.

ID Number: JA020064
Year: 2003
Language: English
Type: ART

2002

Russia's Vanishing Deterrent.
Author(s):
  1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
  2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
Even in the post-Cold War world, the stability of nuclear
deterrence as between not-unfriendly US and Russian governments
remains significant. Nuclear stability implies mutual
confidence that the minimum conditions of rational deterrence
models are fulfilled with high confidence. As US and Russian
strategic nuclear arsenals are gradually reduced in conformity
with the Moscow Treaty to levels far below current deployments,
the qualities of forces and the performances of their command
and control systems matter as much as do the exact quantities
of weapons held by the two sides. Data analysis shows that both
the US and Russia can expect to maintain a minimum counter-city
deterrent even at levels below the once proposed START III or
agreed Moscow treaty limits, but defense deployments add
uncertainty to projections and might compromise second strike
retaliation under some conditions of launch readiness or
warning.

ID Number: JA018602
Year: 2002
Language: English
Type: ART

Deterrence and Friction : Implications for Missile Defense.
201-220.)
Author(s):
  1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
  1. NMD--USA
  2. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
  3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
Renewed interest in missile defense on the part of the US
government has raised the visibility of controversies related
to nuclear deterrence and arms control in the new world order.
A nuclear arms control and deterrence regime that comingles
offenses and defenses increases the possibility, compared to
the simpler offense-only model, of Clausewitzian 'friction' in
deterrence, in crisis management, and in war. Friction is both
a theoretical and a practical, realistic concern for military
planners and for policy-makers : simply put, it is the
difference between expected, versus actual, behavior or
outcomes. To discuss how friction might result from mixing
offenses and defenses, the author proceeds in two steps. First,
he reviews concepts of deterrence and coercive diplomacy,
especially as they pertain to the problem of nuclear crisis
management. Second, he provides pertinent examples of friction
as it might affect nuclear offenses and anti-missile defenses.
(JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, vol. 46, no. 4, August 2002, p. 455-483.)

Author(s):
1. Lebovic, James H.

Subject(s):
1. NMD--USA
2. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
3. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

Notes:
Armed with a new threat and promising technology, advocates of national missile defense (NMD) have framed the debate by presenting NMD as a break from traditional deterrence principles. The assumption that the United States faces new adversaries that cannot be deterred by US offensive options and whether adversaries can and will use nuclear weapons to coerce the United States, given its inclination and ability to retaliate, are assessed. The effectiveness of NMD against various offensive threats is simulated. Conclusions indicate that NMD advocates have not made their case that cold war-era deterrence principles are ill suited to US relations with fledgling nuclear states and that the expected value of a missile defense of any type and scale is low because it is unlikely to enhance global security above levels offered by retaliatory deterrence.

The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India.

Author(s):
1. Tellis, Ashley J.

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA

Notes:
This article seeks to examine the broader strategic implications of the Indian decision to develop a nuclear deterrent. It focuses on three distinct but related sets of issues. First, how does the formal Indian decision to develop a nuclear deterrent change the strategic environment in Southern Asia? Second, how does it affect the prospects of war and peace in the greater South Asian region? And, third, how will it affect American regional nonproliferation objectives and, in particular, India's relationship with the United States? This article will argue that India's prospective nuclearization is unlikely to dramatically alter the prevailing patterns of security competition in the region; that its prospective consequences for deterrence and crisis stability are more or less positive, though tinged with some uncertainty when subjective factors and third-party actions are taken into account; and that so long as it maintains a certain modicum of restraint India's relationship with the United States is unlikely to be undermined. The article concludes with a brief comment on the role nuclear issues ought to play in the evolving U.S. relations with India.
La dissuasion nucléaire aujourd'hui.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e année, no. 5, mai 2002, p. 34-39.)

Author(s):
1. Colatrella, Marcel

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

Notes:
Les attentats du 11 septembre conduisent à repenser les systèmes de sécurité. L'auteur confirme le besoin d'une dissuasion nucléaire accompagnée du dispositif spatial d'observation et de communication qui la valorise. La France a fait ce choix qui devrait être à terme celui de l'Europe si elle veut être une puissance politique : cela passe par le développement de Galileo.

ID Number: JA017870

La dissuasion nucléaire française après le 11 septembre.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e année, no. 5, mai 2002, p. 19-27.)

Author(s):
1. Tandonnet, Jean

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--FRANCE

Notes:
À la suite du 11 septembre, on a vu s'exprimer différentes positions qui entrent bien vite la dissuasion. Celle-ci n'a pas été faite pour répondre au terrorisme et l'arme nucléaire n'a jamais été l'arme absolue. Elle reste cependant l'arme ultime dans les situations extrêmes et on ne peut malheureusement pas prédire que ces situations ne se produiront jamais. Les armements nucléaires ont mis des décennies à être élaborés, une très grande prudence s'impose avant de les abandonner. Enfin, la publication récente aux États-Unis de la Nuclear Posture Review incite également à un débat sur ce sujet.

ID Number: JA017869

A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence.

Author(s):
1. Berejikian, Jeffrey D.

Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
Prospect theory is an empirical model of choice that stands as the leading alternative to rationality for explaining decisions under conditions of risk. While many still defend the assumption of rationality as an appropriate starting point for the construction of international relations theory - deterrence theory especially - there is growing support for models of international politics grounded in the actual capacities of real-world decisionmakers. This article accepts that standard depictions of deterrence incentives capture much of the
essential character of deterrent relationships. However, it substitutes cognitive assumptions in place of traditional rational choice. Using prospect theory, the article reconsiders three typical deterrence games. The new model of military deterrence put forth unearths a set of conditions that are required for successful deterrence and uncovers a set of causes for deterrence failures that run counter to conventional understanding.

ID Number: JA017741
Year: 2002
Language: English
Type: ART

Apres le 11 septembre : dissuasion, defense active et defense passive.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 58e annee, no. 5, mai 2002, p. 40-54.)
Author(s):
1. Lambert, Denis
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
2. TERRORISM
Notes:
Le terrorisme n'est pas soudain devenu, le 11 septembre 2001, la seule menace contre l'Occident. Les acteurs se multiplient, etatiques ou non, les risques se diversifient, balistiques autant que terroristes, la reponse doit integrer des composantes multiples. La dissuasion nucleaire, toujours d'actualite, peut viser des cibles plus precis, durcies, tout en minimisant les retombees. La defense active doit inclure l'interception antimissiles. La prevention doit exploiter le renseignement le plus precis. Le monde bouge, les Etats-Unis repondent, nous ne pouvons rester inertes.

ID Number: JA017871
Year: 2002
Language: French
Type: ART

Nuclear Proliferation and 'Realistic Deterrence' in a New Century.
(EUROPEAN SECURITY, vol. 11, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 33-47.)
Author(s):
1. Cimbala, Stephen J.
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Notes:
Deterrence became an all-purpose theory and policy solution during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has caused theorists and policy-makers to ask whether deterrence is still either practicable or theoretically compelling. The prospect of additional and angry state and non-state actors armed with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), together with long-range delivery systems, threatens to shake the foundations of deterrence stability. In this article, the author considers whether this is so. First, he examines some of the theoretical arguments for a benign world with nuclear proliferation and some reasons to be skeptical about those arguments. Second, he considers the current status of nuclear weapons spread and some of the particular challenges presented to deterrence and arms race stability by nuclear proliferation.

ID Number: JA018495
Year: 2002
Language: English
Type: ART
Moving Away From MAD.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 2, Summer 2001, p. 81-95.)
Author(s):
  1. Krepon, Michael
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
  2. USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
  3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--USA
  4. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
  5. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION
Notes:
Treaties, governing nuclear-arms reduction and missile defences are languishing for political and more fundamental strategic reasons. START and the ABM Treaty reflect the logic of Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, the central organizing principle of strategic-arms control during the Cold War. MAD's two basic tenets, as practised by the US and the Soviet Union, were nuclear overkill and vulnerability to missile attack. Now that the Cold War is over, these tenets no longer command widespread public or congressional support in the US. A sustainable and bipartisan basis for future US policies geared toward the reduction of nuclear dangers must be built on different ground. While nuclear deterrence will remain important in the twenty-first century, Cold War conceptions of MAD can no longer guide future US decisions regarding nuclear weapons and missile defences. The time has come to replace MAD with a new principle, one that embodies a cooperative approach to reducing nuclear threats.

The Need for a Japanese Nuclear Deterrent.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 20, no. 3, July - September 2001, p. 259-270.)
Author(s):
  1. Sherrill, Clifton W.
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--JAPAN
  2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--JAPAN
Notes:
Japanese, American, and East Asian security interests each would be better served by a Japanese state that publicly admits to possession and accepts the responsibility of nuclear weapons. Japan can no longer rely on the U.S. security guarantee and, in particular, on the American nuclear deterrent, and for internal political and security reasons Japan should not be dependent on others to provide Japanese security in this era of proliferation.
A Saudi Nuclear Option?.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 43, no. 2, Summer 2001, p. 69-79.)
Author(s):
  1. Russell, Richard L.
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--SAUDI ARABIA
Notes:
The debate over missile and nuclear proliferation has been clouded by some misplaced liberal assumptions. To focus on 'rogue' states with malignant designs is to misdiagnose nuclear proliferation as a 'disease'. Nuclear proliferation is much more a 'symptom' of the struggle for power that characterises international relations, with or without superpower conflict. One such area of proliferation may be right under our noses, not in a so-called rogue state, but in a key American ally in the Persian Gulf - Saudi Arabia. There is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia has already chosen a nuclear option. However, the Saudis already have in place a foundation for building a nuclear deterrent. They could work clandestinely to develop a nuclear capability, much as they did to procure ballistic missiles. Washington should not assume that a close regional ally such as Saudi Arabia would be loath to jeopardise that relationship by working at cross-purposes with declared American policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Such an assumption would profoundly overestimate the Saudi confidence in US protection, and would fail to recognise that security interests - not in any sense an innate friendship - are the driving forces behind policy in international politics.
ID Number: JA016552
Year: 2001
Language: English
Type: ART

(NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, vol. 54, no. 2, Spring 2001, p. 24-35.)
Author(s):
  1. Barnett, Roger W.
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
Notes:
The risks of sharp reductions are of the greatest magnitude, and so are the possible consequences. 'Existential deterrence', the pivotal concept in Admiral Turner's scheme, is a very risky and dangerous approach to nuclear deterrence - for if it fails, it fails catastrophically.
ID Number: JA016716
Year: 2001
Language: English
Type: ART

Deterrence and the ABM : Retreating the Old Calculus.
(WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, vol. 18, no. 3, Fall 2001, p. 23-31.)
Author(s):
  1. Levine, Robert A.
Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
  2. NMD--USA
  3. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--USA
ID Number: JA017159
Year: 2001
Language: English
Type: ART
Deterrence, Defenses, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 20, no. 5, October - December 2001, p. 435-443.)

Author(s):
1. Sloss, Leon

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA

Notes:
This paper suggests a framework for thinking about the subjects of deterrence, nuclear weapons, defenses and arms control and outlines the major issues and how they interrelate. In the post-Cold War environment, new connections among them and vastly different circumstances around them will change how the United States formulates its security.

ID Number: JA017609
Year: 2001
Language: English
Type: ART

Towards an Evolving Deterrence Strategy: Space and Information Dominance.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 20, no. 5, October - December 2001, p. 453-466.)

Author(s):
1. Worden, Simon P.
2. France, Martin E. B.

Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)--USA

Notes:
Faced today with a broader spectrum of challenges than the bipolar world of the Cold War, the importance of providing national leaders with non-nuclear strike options that would have a broader applicability and deterrent effect on potential adversaries is increasing. A new strategy that employs space- and cyberspace-based systems to provide continuous surveillance, space situational awareness and superiority, and information and 'global utilities' blockade, followed by precision strike from space, if warranted, is presented. This paper advocates the development and demonstration of key enabling systems that would lead to a flexible, CONUS-based, force structure capable of effectively deterring regional aggression without reliance on nuclear weapons.

ID Number: JA017611
Year: 2001
Language: English
Type: ART

Can Information Warfare Be Deterred?.
(DEFENSE ANALYSIS, vol. 17, no. 2, August 2001, p. 121-138.)

Author(s):
1. Blank, Stephen

Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION WARFARE
2. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
This article presents a very topical and highly relevant discussion on information warfare (IW) in which the author poses the challenging question, 'Can it be deterred?'. The corollary is how, if it can be deterred, could it be achieved, acknowledging in the process the assumption might prove to be unwarranted if IW can indeed be deterred at all. It is also open to debate whether or not past theories of deterrence or,
indeed, US approaches to the concept are either relevant or applicable to IW in today's world. This article picks up on the earlier work of Richard Harknett and examines in detail conventional and nuclear theories of deterrence. He then systematically applies them to the world of information technology ('cyberspace'), and the complex world of national security - that world in which information technology (the revolution in military affairs) is now seen as the core enabling capability that not only enhances one's own defense and security but also offers the ability to disrupt and frustrate the military capabilities of others. He concludes, however, on a more sobering note. IT, and US superiority in the field, rather than making war more humane and conflict shorter, could well have the opposite effect: namely, reliance on IW may well have the effect of widening wars and also persuading adversaries to rely even more on weapons of mass destruction. The debate on IW and its impact on future war still has far to run, and this article makes a significant contribution.

The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence.


Author(s):
1. Danilovic, Vesna

Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
For deterrence to work, a potential attacker needs to perceive the deterrent's threats capable and credible for retaliation. The issue of relative capabilities has been extensively analyzed, yet the core problem concerns credible intentions. The strategic literature is largely influenced by commitment theory prescribing various "manipulation of risk" strategies intended to enhance that credibility. A few analysts, however, challenge this view and recognize the importance of "intrinsic interests" in the issues at stake (i.e., inherent credibility), which can limit the effectiveness of costly signals. These two alternative views are quantitatively tested in the cases of major-powers deterrence from 1895 to 1985. A new measure of the observable category of inherent credibility is also introduced, consisting of the regional interests of major powers in the area of dispute. The results indicate strong and sufficient effects of regional interests on both the onset and outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence, thus suggesting relevant theoretical and policy implications.
Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence.
(JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, vol. 45, no. 1, February 2001, p. 97-125.)

Author(s):
  1. Danilovic, Vesna

Subject(s):
  1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)

Notes:
Three critical issues involved in quantitative analysis of deterrence are addressed: the criteria for identifying deterrence cases, the problem of selection bias, and understanding the nature of deterrence outcomes. The criteria for establishing the presence of immediate deterrent threats are refined to allow for a more robust selection of cases, and deterrence outcomes are revised to include compromise as a midpoint between success and failure. A new data set of extended-immediate deterrence for the 1895-1985 period is presented and compared to previous data sets. Hypotheses about the effects of relative power and alliances on deterrence outcomes are developed to rectify the problem of selection bias due to unobservable prior beliefs. Alliances are shown to be a more reliable predictor of behavior than previously assumed. The results support theoretical expectations about the consequences of selection bias that more powerful states are less likely to acquiesce. The inclusion of compromise proves significant because only this outcome is strongly associated with the balance of power.

ID Number: JA017463
Year: 2001
Language: English
Type: ART

2000

Facing Nuclear and Conventional Reality.

Author(s):
  1. Gormley, Dennis M.
  2. Mahnken, Thomas G.

Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--USA
  2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--USA

ID Number: JA014885
Year: 2000
Language: English
Type: ART

How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence ?.

Author(s):
  1. Quinlan, Michael

Subject(s):
  1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--INDIA
  2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--PAKISTAN

Notes:
The risk that hostility between India and Pakistan may generate nuclear war depends upon factors too diverse and shifting for a simple prediction or assessment. Overall, the underpinnings of deterrence seem less solid than they had become in at least the later years of the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union. Stability in that setting became, however, very robust, and to say that risk is higher in South Asia is not to say that it is in absolute terms at all high. Nevertheless, the magnitude and repercussions of the catastrophe, should it happen, require
that everything practicable be done to reduce the risk. By far the biggest contribution would be a settlement of the Kashmir conflict.

L'Identité européenne de securité et de defense et la dissuasion nucléaire.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, 56eme année, no. 8-9, aout - septembre 2000, p. 20-37.)
Author(s):
1. Dumoulin, André
Subject(s):
1. ESDI
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE--EUROPE

Conventional Deterrence.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 19, no. 3, July - September 2000, p. 221-253.)
Author(s):
1. Rhodes, Edward
Subject(s):
1. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

Notes:
Studies of conventional deterrence, although differing in methodology and underlying assumptions, have yielded three key findings: many potential adversaries are, at least at times, undeterrible; in dealing with adversaries that are deterrable, it is important to deny them the expectation of a quick military victory and political fait accompli; and, if deterrence fails, and aggression occurs, threats to use conventional military force to impose suffering and destruction are less likely to compel the aggressor to capitulate than are threats to defeat its military forces and to deny it its politicomilitary objectives. This article examines these conclusions and their policy implications and argues that conventional deterrence is unlikely to yield a stable stalemate or to offer American policymakers much of a panacea, and that in the long run conventional deterrence and conventional war are likely to be closely linked.

Does Deterrence Have a Future ?.
(ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 30, no. 8, October 2000, p. 3-8.)
Author(s):
1. Freedman, Lawrence
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Deterrence in the 21st Century.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 19, no. 3, July - September 2000, p. 255-261.)
Author(s):
1. Gray, Colin S.
Subject(s):
1. DETERRENCE (STRATEGY)
Notes:
The author discusses the durability and utility of the deterrence concept in strategy. Although they are a historical constant, deterrent relationships do not fit precise, static, linear models but instead are unreliable and unique. The theories of deterrence remain applicable after the Cold War, but strategists must determine whom to deter, how to deter them, when, and why.
ID Number: JA015764
Year: 2000
Language: English
Type: ART

The Assured Vulnerability Paradigm : Can It Provide a Useful Basis for Deterrence in a World of Strategic Multi-Polarity ?.
(DEFENSE ANALYSIS, vol. 16, no. 3, December 2000, p. 239-256.)
Author(s):
1. Curtis, Willie
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Notes:
This article examines a number of assumptions regarding the viability of the Assured Vulnerability Paradigm for providing a useful basis for deterrence and strategic force structuring in a world of strategic multi-polarity. The study uses a retrospective historical approach to examine the basic assumptions of the Assured Vulnerability Paradigm in a world of strategic bi-polarity; outlines a set of questions regarding the assumptions; and provides a critique of the paradigm's ability to cope with the new challenges to strategic deterrence in a world of strategic multi-polarity.
ID Number: JA016701
Year: 2000
Language: English
Type: ART

Nuclear Order and Disorder.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 76, no. 4, October 2000, p. 703-724.)
Author(s):
1. Walker, William
Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Notes:
After a decade of great progress in diminishing the risks posed by nuclear weapons, international nuclear relations came unstuck in the late 1990s. Why did this happen? This question is best answered through an understanding of how a 'nuclear order' was constructed during the Cold War, how it developed in the early post-Cold War period, and how confidence in it dissipated as the 1990s wore on. After considering how the nuclear order was founded upon linked systems of deterrence and abstinence, the article explains how both were destabilized in the mid- to late 1990s - cause and effects of the US shifting its ordering strategy towards protection (through missile defences) and
enforcement. Can confidence in nuclear order be restored? How should we regard the recent agreement among States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement to press for complete nuclear disarmament?

Droit international et dissuasion nucleaire.

Author(s):
1. Zbienen, Randal

Subject(s):
1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW
3. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
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