Counterinsurgency
Thematic Bibliography no. 1/13

La contre-insurrection
Bibliographie thématique no. 1/13
How to borrow items from the list below:

As a member of the NATO HQ staff you can borrow books (Type: M) for one month, journals (Type: ART) and reference works (Type: REF) for one week. Individuals not belonging to NATO staff can borrow books through their local library via the interlibrary loan system.

How to obtain the Multimedia Library publications:

All Library publications are available both on the NATO Intranet and Internet websites.

Comment emprunter les documents cités ci-dessous:

En tant que membre du personnel de l’OTAN vous pouvez emprunter les livres (Type: M) pour un mois, les revues (Type: ART) et les ouvrages de référence (Type: REF) pour une semaine. Les personnes n’appartenant pas au personnel de l’OTAN peuvent s’adresser à leur bibliothèque locale et emprunter les livres via le système de prêt interbibliothèques.

Comment obtenir les publications de la Bibliothèque multimédia:

Toutes les publications de la Bibliothèque sont disponibles sur les sites Intranet et Internet de l’OTAN.
vi, 157 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584875445
Subject(s):
1. JIHAD
2. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM--CAUCASUS, NORTHERN (RUSSIA)
3. INSURGENCY--CAUCASUS, NORTHERN (RUSSIA)
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)
5. COUNTERINSURGENCY--CAUCASUS, NORTHERN (RUSSIA)
Added entry(s):
2. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'The three papers offered in this monograph provide a detailed analysis of the insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns being conducted by Islamist rebels against Russia in the North Caucasus. This conflict is Russia's primary security threat, but it has barely registered on Western minds and is hardly reported in the West as well. To overcome this neglect, these three papers go into great detail concerning the nature of the Islamist challenge, the Russian response, and the implications of this conflict. This monograph provides a basis for dialogue among US, European, and Russian experts concerning insurgency and counterinsurgency, which will certainly prove useful to all of these nations, since they will continue to be challenged by such wars well into the future. It is important for us to learn from the insurgency in the North Caucasus, because the issues raised by this conflict will not easily go away, even for the United States as it leaves Afghanistan.'
ID number: 80024668
Year: 2012

* This list contains material received as of January 3rd, 2013.-- Cette liste est arrêtée au 3 janvier 2013.
The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
xi, 201 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
(Cass Military Studies ; 45)
ISBN: 9780415667456
Author(s):
1. Mumford, Andrew
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
Notes:
'This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of British military experiences in the post-war era and endeavours to unpack their performance. During the twentieth century counter-insurgency assumed the status of one of the British military's fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after the Second World War, as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power many opportunities to deploy against an irregular enemy. However, this quantity of experience does not translate into quality. This book argues that the British, far from being exemplars of counter-insurgency, have in fact consistently proved to be slow learners in counter-insurgency warfare. The book presents an analysis of the most significant British counter-insurgency campaigns of the past sixty years: Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Arabia (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish 'Troubles' (1969-79) and the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). Colonial history is used to contextualise the contemporary performance in Iraq and undermine the commonly held confidence in British counter-insurgency. Blending historical research with critical analysis, this book seeks to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse the British approach to counter-insurgency, as well as considering the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare.'
ID number: 80024283
Year: 2012
Type: M

Pakistan's War on Terrorism: Strategies for Combating Jihadist Armed Groups since 9/11
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
157 p.; 24 cm.
(Asian Security Studies ; 30)
ISBN: 9780415688345
Author(s):
1. Puri, Samir, 1981-
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--PAKISTAN--PREVENTION
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--PAKISTAN
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 139-152. Includes index.
'This book examines Pakistan's strategies in the war against Islamist armed groups that began in late 2001, following the 9/11 attacks. The significance of the war inside Pakistan can hardly be understated. Starting in the tribal territories adjacent to Afghanistan, Pakistan's war would come to engulf much of the country through a brutal campaign of suicide bombings. Many thousands of Pakistani lives have been lost, the country gravely destabilized and the geostrategic balance of the region has been thrown into deep uncertainty. This book chronicles the decade-long war inside Pakistan as a campaign of
military manoeuvre and terrorist reprisal. The killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 on Pakistani soil by US forces suggested that Pakistan has been a duplicitous participant in the war on terror. The book addresses this theme, offering an analytic account of Pakistan's strategic calculus during this time, both in military and in political terms, and of how these factors have been filtered by Pakistan's unique strategic culture.'

ID number: 80024140
Year: 2012
Type: M

341.2 /00502
iv, 210 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9781553393535
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM--AFGHANISTAN
3. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
4. AFGHANISTAN--FOREIGN RELATIONS
5. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--AFGHANISTAN
Added entry(s):
2. Gareis, Sven, ed.
4. Queen's University. School of Policy Studies (CA)
Notes:
'In the aftermath of 9/11, a NATO-led coalition entered Afghanistan. A decade later, the country's prospects are still very troubling. As the coalition gradually prepares to withdraw and the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police assume increasing responsibility, this book brings together Canadian and European experts to answer important questions concerning the country's future: What has been the impact of ten years of international intervention? What lessons have been learned about the conduct and consequences of such missions? Three sets of critical issues are discussed in this book: first, whether the doctrine of counterinsurgency, introduced officially by the US in 2009, can be implemented to lasting effect against a persistent and adaptive foe; second, whether what is now called the 'comprehensive approach' can achieve the long-sought but still elusive aim of seamless coordination among military and civilian actors at the local, national, and alliance levels; and, finally, how the outcome of the intervention in Afghanistan is likely to affect, and be affected by, the evolving regional and global order.'

ID number: 80024606
Year: 2012
Type: M
Operational Art in Counterinsurgency: A View from the Inside -
Washington: Institute for the Study of War.
52 p.: ill.; 30 cm.
(Report ; 5)
Author(s):
1. Dubik, James M.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Added entry(s):
1. Institute for the Study of War (US)
Notes:
'This monograph provides a framework for understanding operational art in counterinsurgency campaigns, at least ones like those the US and its allies conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to the framework, the monograph describes how one set of strategic civil-military leaders, who were the operational artists charged with executing the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq during 2007 and 2008, achieved sufficient alignment in order to produce unity of effort and coherency of action throughout the civil-military organization.'
URI:
ID number: 80024520
Year: 2012
Type: M

xix, 75 p.; 23 cm.
(Letort Papers)
ISBN: 1584875534
Author(s):
1. Taylor, G. Scott
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. NATION-BUILDING--IRAQ
4. NATION-BUILDING--USA
5. USA--ARMED FORCES--STABILITY OPERATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'The Army goes to great lengths to capture lessons learned and preserve these lessons for current practitioners and future generations. Though the Army is one of the most self-critical organizations found in American society, a well-deserved reputation has also been earned for failing to inculcate those lessons by transforming the institutional Army. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. In Iraq, out of necessity while in contact with a dynamic enemy, the Army transformed on the battlefield with radical changes in doctrine, organization, training, and materiel, which significantly enabled battlefield success. As a result of the withdrawal of troops from Iraq at the end of 2011, this paper analyzes the success of the military's counterinsurgency strategy and nation-building efforts, examines the future of combat which the Army may face in order to recommend a suitable force posture, and makes recommendations for future competencies and capabilities.
utilizing the problem-solving construct of DOTMLPF in order to ensure future victories in this relevant component of the full spectrum of conflict.'

ID number: 80024667
Year: 2012
Type: M

355.4 /01768
xiii, 381 p.; 25 cm.
ISBN: 9780415567336
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
2. Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, 1972- , ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
'This handbook provides a wide-ranging overview of the current state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an up-to-date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and counterinsurgencies. In recent years, and more specifically since the insurgency in Iraq from 2003, academic interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has substantially increased. These topics have become dominant themes on the security agenda, replacing peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and terrorism as key concepts. The aim of this volume is to showcase the rich thinking that is available in the area of insurgency and counterinsurgency studies and act as a further guide for study and research.'
ID number: 80024373
Year: 2012
Type: M

623 /00544 REF
845 p. : ill. ; 33 cm.
ISBN: 9780710630384
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
2. POLICE--EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
Added entry(s):
1. Hawkins, Chris, ed.
2. Kolendo, Stefan, ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
ID number: 80024624
Year: 2012
Type: REF
Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
xxxi, 308 p.: ill.; 26 cm.
ISBN: 9780833058157

Author(s):
1. Connable, Ben

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA

Added entry(s):
1. RAND National Defense Research Institute (US)

Notes:

'Bibliography: p. 289-308.

Campaign assessments help decisionmakers in the US Department of Defense, Congress, and the executive branch shape what tend to be difficult and lengthy counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Assessment informs critical decisions, including the allocation of resources and major shifts in strategy. The complex and chaotic environment of the typical COIN campaign presents vexing challenges to assessment, and efforts to overcome these challenges are mired in an overreliance on aggregated quantitative data that are often inaccurate and misleading. This comprehensive examination of COIN assessment as practiced through early 2011, as described in the literature and doctrine, and as applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps in this centralized, quantitative approach. The author proposes an alternative process—contextual assessment—that accounts for the realities of the COIN environment and the needs of both policymakers and commanders.'

ID number: 8024539
Year: 2012
Type: M

Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
viii, 308 p.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9780300166712

Author(s):
1. Ledwidge, Frank

Subject(s):
1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011--PARTICIPATION, BRITISH
2. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-2011--PARTICIPATION, BRITISH
3. GREAT BRITAIN--MILITARY POLICY
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN

Notes:


'Partly on the strength of their apparent success in small wars such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world-beating. Yet under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with militia violence and fear, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand province resulted in numerous casualties and a burgeoning opium trade. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly baled out by the US military. The author examines here the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers and his own experiences, he looks in detail at how British strategy is developed and how senior officers are trained. He discusses the culture of the British military, arguing that at the root of these flawed operations has been a
reliance on obsolete structures, approaches and tactics, a
culture of not asking difficult questions and - above all - an
inability to adapt to new challenges. This is an eye-opening
analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous
costs.'

ID number: 80024182
Year: 2011
Type: M

355.4 /01740
Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future
Efforts - Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
xxviii, 131 p.: col. ill. ; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780833052117
Author(s):
1. Kelly, Terrence K.
2. Bensahel, Nora
3. Oliker, Olga
Subject(s):
1. MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AMERICAN--AFGHANISTAN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. USA--ARMED FORCES--STABILITY OPERATIONS
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
'Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the
counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition
forces in Afghanistan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in
large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance given to
the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other
security forces, assistance that the International Security
Force must provide while fighting the insurgents. Yet senior
U.S. military and civilian officials have posed many questions
about the effectiveness of SFA in Afghanistan, and no
empirically rigorous assessments exist to help answer these
questions. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan
over time and documents U.S. and international approaches to
building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009.
Finally, it provides observations and recommendations that
emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and
their implications for the U.S Army.'

ID number: 80024129
Year: 2011
Type: M

129 p.; 24 cm.
(Streamlines & Doctrines)
ISBN: 9782717860252

Author(s):
1. Cailleteau, Francois

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
'A travers l'etude d'une dizaine de cas de guerres de contre-insurrection etales sur deux siecles, l'auteur essaye de determiner les conditions qui permettent de predire, a partir de donnees disponibles avant d'engager des forces armees contre une insurrection, si celle-ci a des chances raisonnables d'etre vaincue. L'evolution de facteurs decisifs comme la demographie des peuples, la reduction des effectifs des armees modernes et le refus croissant des societes developpees de l'emploi de la violence rend de plus en plus improbable la perspective du succes comme le montrent les derniers engagements en Iraq et en Afghanistan. Dans ces conditions, le courage et le savoir-faire des soldats seront le plus souvent impuissants et leur sacrifice inutile.'

ID number: 80024336
Year: 2011
Type: M


xxxv, 283 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780833053145

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. INSURGENCY

Notes:
This monograph is the second of two volumes that examine how countries confronting insurgencies transition from a high level of violence to a more stable situation. It examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to identify the key factors necessary for a successful transition. In some of the cases, such as Iraq's Anbar province and Afghanistan, the United States was (or still is) directly involved in combat operations; in the Philippines and Colombia, it played a supporting role; in others, there was little U.S. involvement of any consequence. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved and examine what the government did right - or wrong - to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to stability. They note that in each case, there was a need to understand the participants in the insurgency and the grievances and needs of the local population; to balance security needs with reforms in other areas; and to plan for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militias and government and insurgent forces.'

ID number: 80024235
Year: 2011
Type: M
Counterinsurgency and other stability operations seldom present a nation with trials that threaten its very survival, barring cases in which that nation is the target of insurgents. Bonds between coalition members are therefore weaker than when threat of annihilation reinforces mutual dependence. Such situations are further complicated by the use of force likely not being the primary implement for attaining ultimate success. Devoid of a preeminent threat and denied primary dependence on armed forces, core coalition objectives tend to be political rather than military in character and include counterinsurgency, nation building, developing government capacity, and providing humanitarian assistance - activities often associated with stability operations. Armed forces are not staffed or trained to meet the long-term demands of many of these tasks. An alliance or coalition must therefore incorporate participation by other government agencies and - ultimately - that of the indigenous government and its population more than is expected during conventional combat operations. Recent contingencies have also seen commercial enterprises, militias, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations become key participants in these undertakings. The result is coalitions of a size seldom seen and with a number of affiliations rarely, if ever, approached before the late 20th century. This monograph investigates the dramatic expansion of challenges confronting alliances and coalitions today and thereafter considers potential solutions that include questioning the conception of what constitutes a coalition in today's world.
La guerre irreguliere - Paris : Economica.
375 p.; 24 cm.
(Bibliotheque Strategique)
ISBN: 9782717859492
Subject(s):
   1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
   2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
   3. WARFARE, CONVENTIONAL
Added entry(s):
   2. Strachan, Hew, ed.
   3. Danet, Didier, ed.
Notes:
   Includes index.

Le phenomene de la guerre irreguliere n'est pas dans son essence inedit, ses racines plongent en fait profondement dans le passe et sont presentes dans les guerres qui ont jalone l'histoire europeenne depuis le milieu du XVIIe siecle ... Mais ses formes actuelles, qu'il s'agisse de theatres comme l'Irak ou l'Afghanistan, comportent des aspects originaux et nouveaux. La reflexion sur la guerre irreguliere oblige a s'interroger sur la normativite implicite de la 'guerre reguliere', a considerer en profondeur le role des peuples impliques, a examiner sans tabou les atouts tactiques de l'adversaire irregulier. Il s'agit de faire appel non seulement a l'histoire, mais aussi a la geographie, a l'economie, aux sciences sociales et politiques, au retour d'experience des conflits en cours.'

vii, 95 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9781584874959
Author(s):
   1. Mockaitis, Thomas R.
Subject(s):
   1. INSURGENCY
   2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
   1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
   'Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations that become committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or they evolve into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. The author concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of U.S. success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns.'

ID number: 80023883
Year: 2011
Type: M

ID number: 80024047
v, 28 p.; 28 cm.
(Carlisle Papers)
ISBN: 1584874848
Author(s):
  1. Fulk, Baucum
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
  2. TERRORISM--USA--PREVENTION
  3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009
  4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Added entry(s):
  1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'The single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National Command Authority is how best to counter violent extremism. The National Command Authority has four broad strategies through which it may employ military forces to counter violent extremism: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism. The Long War is anticipated to continue for decades, perhaps generations. Thus, it is imperative to select the best strategy or strategies for employing military forces. Based on historical lessons in combating terrorism, the best strategy is efficient and sustainable and avoids overreacting, acting incompetently, or appearing to be either over reactive or incompetent. Counterinsurgency is neither efficient nor sustainable from a military, economic, or political perspective. It is a high risk strategy because it is a large, highly visible undertaking through which the United States may easily overreact, act incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incompetent. Counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism are each both efficient and sustainable from a military and economic perspective. These three strategies each have inherent political concerns, hazards, or constraints. However it is considerably less likely that the United States will overreact, behave incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incompetent through engaging in one or more of these three strategies than by engaging in counterinsurgency. Support to insurgencies is economically and militarily efficient and sustainable, but it carries substantial political risks. Thus, an overall strategy combining counterterrorism and antiterrorism is the best means of employing military forces to counter violent extremism.'
2010

355.4  /01679
Counterinsurgency in Pakistan - Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation.
xxi, 185 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780833049766
Author(s):
1. Jones, Seth G., 1972-
2. Fair, C. Christine
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--PAKISTAN
2. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--PAKISTAN
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
Notes:
'Since 2001, Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups, including al Qa'ida, that directly affect US national security. Despite some successes, militant groups continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and a range of other countries. Numerous militant networks - including al Qa'ida and other foreign fighters - exist in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province. This volume examines these militants, their history, and their relationships with the people and government of Pakistan and identifies means for enhancing cooperation between people and government to reduce the militant threat.'
ID number: 80023476
Year: 2010
Type: M

355.4  /01669
Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level - Paris : Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces.
70 p. : ill.; 30 cm.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--FRANCE
Added entry(s):
1. Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (FR)
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 70.
'This document covers a particular course of action that is a subset of tactical operations and is conducted primarily during the stabilization phase in order to restore security: counterinsurgency (COIN). It has been developed in order to compensate for the lack of appropriate tactical procedures adapted from classical coercive methods (offensive or defensive) and the control of secured areas.'
ID number: 80023372
Year: 2010
Type: M
'Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future.'
xiii, 164 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780815704096
Author(s):
  1. O'Hanlon, Michael E.
  2. Sherjan, Hassina
Subject(s):
  1. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
  3. TALIBAN
Added entry(s):
  1. Brookings Institution (US)
Notes:
  Includes index.
' This book provides a succinct look at the current situation in Afghanistan with policy prescriptions for the future. Drawing partly on personal experiences, the authors outline the tactics being used to protect the Afghan population and defeat the insurgents. They discuss ongoing efforts to reform the Afghan police, to run a better prison system for detainees, to enlist the help of more of Afghanistan's tribes, and to attack corruption. They also discuss the Afghan resistance, including an explanation of how the Taliban mounted a comeback and what it will take to defeat them. The authors also seek to demolish common myths about Afghanistan, such as the notion that somehow its people hate foreigners. And they explain how to use metrics, such as those in the Brookings Afghanistan Index, to determine if the new strategy is succeeding in the course of 2010 and 2011. Included are policy suggestions to further increase the size and capabilities of the Afghan army and police, to facilitate Afghan businesses' involvement in economic recovery, to expand the role of other Muslim nations in the effort, and to create a strong international aid coordinator as a civilian counterpart to NATO's military leader.'
ID number: 80023171
Year: 2010
Type: M

xiv, 78 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
(OIF Key Decisions Monograph Series ; 2)
ISBN: 1584874414
Author(s):
  1. Metz, Steven, 1956-
Subject(s):
  1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011--DECISION MAKING
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Added entry(s):
  1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
' The author looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible, perhaps probable, strategic success. He provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged, with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision, could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph shows the
The perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.'

ID number: 80023312
Year: 2010
Type: M

351 /00050
x, 195 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9781588267290
Author(s):
1. Bayley, David H.
2. Perito, Robert M., 1942-
Subject(s):
1. POLICE--IRAQ
2. POLICE--AFGHANISTAN
3. LAW ENFORCEMENT--POLITICAL ASPECTS
4. TERRORISM--PREVENTION
5. COUNTERINSURGENCY
6. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ
7. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
"Frustrated efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan give urgency to the questions of how to craft effective, humane, and legitimate security institutions in conflict-ridden states - and whether legitimate policing can in fact be developed in the midst of insurgency and terrorism. Against the backdrop of failed US attempts to train police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the authors explore the role of the local police as an element of successful peace operations and counterinsurgency campaigns. Their analysis ranges from the specifics of training to the larger arena of broad institutional reform. Equally practical and grounded in theory, their work offers crucial guidance on the role and training of local police forces that must grapple daily with the challenges of ongoing conflicts.'

ID number: 80023197
Year: 2010
Type: M

355.4 /01663
How Insurgencies End - Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation.
xxiv, 244 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780833049520
Author(s):
1. Connable, Ben
2. Libicki, Martin C.
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
1. Rand Corporation (US)
2. National Defense Research Institute (US)
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 223-244.
"This study tested conventional wisdom about how insurgencies end against the evidence from 89 insurgencies. It compares a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency case studies with lessons from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) literature. While no two insurgencies are the same, the authors find that modern insurgencies last about ten years and
that a government's chances of winning may increase slightly
over time. Insurgencies are suited to hierarchical organization
and rural terrain, and sanctuary is vital to insurgents.
Insurgent use of terrorism often backfires, and withdrawal of
state sponsorship can cripple an insurgency, typically leading
to its defeat. Inconsistent support to either side generally
presages defeat for that side, although weak insurgencies can
still win. Anocracies (pseudodemocracies) rarely succeed
against insurgencies. Historically derived force ratios are
neither accurate nor predictive, and civil defense forces are
very useful for both sides. Key indicators of possible trends
and tipping points in an insurgency include changes in
desertions, defections, and the flow of information to the COIN
effort. The more parties in an insurgency, the more likely it
is to have a complex and protracted ending. There are no COIN
shortcuts.'

ID number: 80023306
Year: 2010
Type: M

355.4 /01683
xiv, 114 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(Strategies & Doctrines)
ISBN: 9782717858785
Author(s):
1. Courreges, Herve de
2. Germain, Emmanuel
3. Le Nen, Nicolas
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 103-111.
'De la revolte des Macchabee aux combats d'Afghanistan, de Little
Big Horn a Mogadiscio, des vietminh aux talibans, la guerre de
contre-insurrection constitue depuis des siecles le quotidien
des armees des grandes puissances. Pourquoi la majorite des
recents conflits de ce type ont-ils e te perdus par les
contre-insurges ? Comment quelques centaines ou milliers de
rebelles ont-ils pu ainsi, a travers le monde, tenir en echec
des armees puissantes et entrainees chargees de les detruire ?
Qu'en ont dit les theoriciens de la guerre et de la politique ?
Comment expliquer le vide conceptuel et pratique sur ce sujet
depuis la these remarquable d'un officier francais publie aux
E tats-Unis en 1964 ? Cet ouvrage fait le point sur la question
et souligne le caracter e eminemment politique de ce type de
combat qu'il faut reinventer. Trois praticiens nous y invitent
et proposant trois principes simples et fondateurs a garder en
memoire pour tous ceux qui, acteurs ou observateurs, civils ou
militaires, sont concernes par les conflits modernes
d'aujourd'hui et de demain.'

ID number: 80023499
Year: 2010
Type: M
ISBN: 9782361590048
Subject(s):
   1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
Notes:
'A la faveur des conflits irakien et afghan, la doctrine de contre-insurrection marque un retour fracassant sur la scene internationale. Qu'on la qualifie de subversive, de culturelle, de contre-revolutionnaire, d'irreguliere ou encore d'hybride, cette guerre dans la guerre, destinee a soutenir la stabilisation d'un pays par l'action conjointe de la force armee et des moyens politiques, economiques et sociaux, suscite passions et polemiques. Mais ce concept, pour certains rendu caduc par les guerres de decolonisation et du Vietnam, est-il la seule veritable alternative strategique a l'enlisement des forces occidentales dans des conflits asymetriques ? Ou bien n'est-il qu'un simple discours de legitimation a destination de l'opinion publique, voire le cache-sexe d'une politique d'emprise neocoloniale ? Un sujet brulant pour un debat passionne qui divise les politiques et les militaires, la France et les Etats-Unis.
ID number: 80023882
Year: 2010
Type: M

Counterinsurgency - London : Hurst.
ISBN: 9781849040303
Author(s):
   1. Kilcullen, David J.
Subject(s):
   1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
   Includes index.
ID number: 80023395
Year: 2010
Type: M

ISBN: 9781584874584
Author(s):
   1. Mariowe, Ann, 1958-
Subject(s):
   1. GALULA, DAVID, 1919-1967
   2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
   1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'This monograph is based on interviews with David Galula's surviving family and friends as well as archival research. It places Galula's two great books in the context of his exposure to Mao's doctrine of revolutionary warfare in China, the French Army's keen interest in counterinsurgency in the second half of the 1950s, and the transmission of French doctrine to the U.S. military in the early 1960s. It also discusses home-grown
American counterinsurgency pioneers like General Edward Lansdale, who promoted Galula's American career and encouraged him to write a book. It details the counterinsurgency fever of President John F. Kennedy's administration, a nearly forgotten episode. Galula died in relative obscurity at the age of 49 in 1967. He had the odd historical luck of not having been a part of the counterinsurgency fever of his day, but of ours instead.'
to spark conflict between states. While some countries have engaged in cooperative strategies to contain transnational violence, many neighbours have been drawn into prolonged conflict over the issue of foreign sanctuaries. The author examines here several recent transnational insurgencies and their implications for regional relations. While the majority of cases resulted in an escalation of conflict between neighbors, in some instances countries have been able to construct successful border security regimes. This monograph discusses these patterns of conflict and cooperation. The author uses past cases of conflict and cooperation over transnational militancy to underscore the current issues facing Iraq and Afghanistan.'
ix, 46 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
(PKSOI Papers)
ISBN: 9781584874577
Author(s):
1. Keller, Dennis E.
Subject(s):
1. POLICE TRAINING--USA
2. USA--ARMED FORCES--STABILITY OPERATIONS
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'Establishing an effective local police force is one of the most critical elements of successful counterinsurgency and stability operations, but is a task for which the U.S. government is poorly prepared and lacks capacity. This monograph retraces the recent history of U.S. foreign police training, from the well-coordinated effort by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1961 to 1974, the U.S. congressional prohibition of the use of foreign assistance funds for police training which ended the USAID police training role in 1974, and the subsequent evolution of a patchwork approach to U.S. foreign police training involving up to 30 departments and agencies, a variety of private police contractors, and multiple fund appropriations. Despite this bureaucratic complexity, the key principles for developing effective local police in stability operations remain the same. There must be a distinction between stability policing and community based policing, with a transition from the former to the latter at the appropriate phase of stability operations. Normative standards are critical for effective community based policing, and must be established by shaping police organizational subculture in the context of local societal culture. This monograph explores the way ahead to achieve these goals for effective local police in stability operations in the current complex and challenging operational environment.'

ID number: 80023494
Year: 2010
Type: M
2009

355.4 /01633
250 p. : ill. ; 21 cm.
(NDC Forum Paper ; 11)
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--NATO
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. ISAF
4. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
Added entry(s):
1. Schnaubelt, Christopher M., ed.
2. NATO Defence College (IT)
ID number: 80023046
Year: 2009
Type: M

355.1 /00059
Ethics Education for Irregular Warfare - Farnham, UK : Ashgate.
xviii, 165 p. ; 24 cm.
(Military and Defence Ethics)
ISBN: 9780754677000
Subject(s):
1. MILITARY ETHICS
2. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
4. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
Added entry(s):
1. Carrick, Don, ed.
2. Connelly, James, ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
'This volume considers the extent to which the theory and practice of educating soldiers, sailors and airmen in the ethics of 'old fashioned' warfaring is adequate to prepare members of the military to meet the more complex ethical challenges faced when engaging in irregular warfare in the 21st century. Authors address issues of major and ongoing importance for military personnel of Western states. In recent years, events in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the requirement that such personnel, drawn from the armed forces of many different countries, should behave in an ethical manner at all times. Public and political interest in such matters is intense, and the behaviour of armed forces personnel is the subject of unrelenting media scrutiny. Consequently, efforts to improve the ethical education of military personnel have acquired a high priority.'
ID number: 80023399
Year: 2009
Type: M
ISBN: 9789004171299
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
3. TERRORISM--PREVENTION--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
4. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
5. MILITARY ETHICS
Added entry(s):
1. Baarda, Ted van, ed.
2. Verweij, Desiree, ed.
3. Netherlands Defence Academy (NL)
4. Netherlands Institute for Military Ethics (NL)
5. Ministry of Defence (NL)
Notes:
Includes index.
'This collection of essays links the medieval traditions of jus in bello, codified by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the Christian Church nearly eight centuries ago, to examination of modern challenges and moral dilemmas relating to the ethics and laws of conflict and crises of all types in the twenty-first century, and in a global context among people of many different faiths and beliefs, and none.'
ID number: 80022830
Year: 2009
Type: M

Doctrine de contre rebellion - Paris: Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces. 70 p. : ill.; 30 cm.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--FRANCE
Added entry(s):
1. Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (FR)
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 70.
'Ce document traite d'un mode d'action particulier du mode tactique de securisation qui intervient principalement en phase de stabilisation : la contre rebellion. Il a ete elabore pour combler l'absence de procedes tactiques adaptes entre les modes coercitifs classiques (offensifs ou defensifs) et le controle de zone en securisation. Il vise aussi a mettre un terme a la confusion des termes utilises pour designer ce mode d'action : contre-insurrection, contre-guerilla, contre-terrorisme sont utilises dans la litterature militaire et doctrinale passee et presente, avec des definitions parfois inadaptees.'
ID number: 80022706
Year: 2009
Type: M
The Afghanistan Campaign: Can We Win? - Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies. 28 p.; 30 cm.

Author(s):
1. Cordesman, Anthony H.

Subject(s):
1. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
2. ISAF
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN

Added entry(s):
1. Center for Strategic and International Studies (US)

ID number: 80022839
Year: 2009
Type: M

ISBN: 9782874950704

Author(s):
1. Hubac, Olivier
2. Anquez, Matthieu

Subject(s):
1. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
2. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
4. GEOPOLITICS--AFGHANISTAN

Notes:

'Ce livre revient sur les fondamentaux geopolitiques de l'Afghanistan et fournit les elements indispensables a la comprehension du debat sur la presence des troupes de l'OTAN et des Americains. Il propose une veritable analyse de la nature de l'ennemi combattu et retrace la genese de la politique de contre-insurrection en vigueur. Comment et pourquoi l'Afghanistan est-il devenu le plus prioritaire des conflits ? La strategie appliquee est-elle la bonne ? L'Occident peut-il et, surtout, veut-il encore gagner la guerre ? Apres l'Irak, une nouvelle defaite des democratis occidentales pourrait-elle signifier l'incapacite de celles-ci a mener les guerres d'aujourd'hui ?'

ID number: 80023346
Year: 2009
Type: M
In the first few years of the post-9/11 era, the established models for fighting 'small wars' proved distressingly ineffective against resilient insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the insurgents fought Western militaries to a stalemate, it was clear that a new approach was necessary. The author takes us on the ground to uncover the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the global challenge (the 'War on Terrorism') and small wars across the world. He explains that today's conflicts are a complex hybrid of contrasting trends: local social networks and worldwide movements; traditional and postmodern culture; local insurgencies seeking autonomy and a broader terrorist campaign. He warns that America has tended to conflate these trends, blurring the distinction between local and global struggles and thereby enormously complicating our challenges. The West has continually misidentified insurgents with limited aims and legitimate grievances - 'accidental guerrillas' - as members of a unified worldwide terror network. We must learn how to disentangle these strands, develop strategies that deal with global threats, avoid local conflicts wherever possible, and win then where necessary.

As the bloodshed in Iraq intensified in 2005, Afghanistan quickly faded from the nation's front pages to become the 'other war', supposedly going well and largely ignored. In fact, the insurgency in Afghanistan was about to break out with renewed force, the drug problem was worsening, and international coordination was losing focus. That July, Ronald Neumann
arrived in Kabul as the US ambassador. His account of how the war in Afghanistan unfolded over the next two years is rich with heretofore unexamined details of operations, tensions, and policy decisions.'
The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to bin Laden - London: Hurst.
vii, 292 p.; ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9781849040129
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 267-278. Includes index.
'The author focuses on the situation in Afghanistan to see how threats from one theater of operation impact on us domestically in the UK and the US. He maps the transformation of insurgencies against the rapid modernization of their origin cities, noting the ways in which technology has accelerated and complicated a variety of coalitions and the efforts to defeat them. The current bin Laden era, the author argues, must be understood from a Maoist perspective of insurgency. The campaigns of mid-century are directly linked to the global movements of tomorrow, yet the past two decades of insurgent activity have also marked a new chapter in the practice, in which propaganda of the deed (i.e. suicide bombings) has become centrally important. This shift presents new challenges to our traditional, time-honored response to terror and places a greater emphasis on mastering the virtual, cyber-based dimension of these campaigns. The author revisits the roots of global insurgencies, describes their nature and character, reveals the power of mass communications and grievance, and recommends how individual nations can counter these threats by focusing on domestic terrorism.'

ix, 280 p.; 25 cm.
ISBN: 9780313364709
Author(s):
1. Rid, Thomas, 1975-
2. Hecker, Marc
Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
3. MASS MEDIA AND WAR
4. DIGITAL MEDIA
5. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Notes:
'This book argues that two intimately connected trends are putting modern armies under huge pressure to adapt: the rise of insurgencies and the rise of the Web. Both in cyberspace and in warfare, a public dimension has assumed increasing importance in only a few years. The book traces the contrasting ways in which insurgents and counterinsurgents have adapted irregular conflict to novel media platforms. It examines the public affairs policies of the US land forces, the British Army, and the Israel Defense Forces. Then, it compares the media-related counterinsurgency methods of these conventional armies with the methods devised by their irregular adversaries, showing how such organizations as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah use the Web, not merely to advertise their political agenda and
influence public opinion, but to mobilize a following and put violent ideas into action. But the same technology that tends to level the operational playing field in irregular warfare also incurs heavy costs on insurgents, and even heavier costs on terrorists.'

ID number: 80022660
Year: 2009
Type: M

355.4 /01598
Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare -
xv, 458 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9781597972604
Subject(s):
1. INFORMATION WARFARE--USA
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE--USA
4. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009
Added entry(s):
1. David, G. J., ed.
Notes:
- This book seeks to illuminate the uses of information in armed conflict by juxtaposing the views of those who engage in manipulating information against the historic context. The anthology is divided into four sections: geopolitical, strategic, operational, and tactical. Because the nexus of information conflict is most easily viewed in the world's contemporary violent confrontations, this anthology is heavily weighted toward military personnel who have managed these difficult issues.'

ID number: 80022543
Year: 2009
Type: M

355.4 /01620
A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq -
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
xviii, 347 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(The Yale Library of Military History)
ISBN: 9780300152760
Author(s):
1. Moyar, Mark, 1971-
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. COMMAND OF TROOPS
Notes:
- According to the prevailing view of counterinsurgency, the key to defeating insurgents is selecting methods that will win the people's hearts and minds. The author assails this conventional wisdom, asserting that the key to counterinsurgency is selecting commanders who have superior leadership abilities. Whereas the hearts-and-minds school recommends allocating much labor and treasure to economic, social and political reforms, the author advocates concentrating resources on security, civil administration, and leadership development.'

ID number: 80022904
Year: 2009
Type: M
After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, the author focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. The author clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.


ID number: 80022907
Year: 2009
Cost: 0.00 EU
Type: M

This book analyses the conduct of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) counterinsurgency operations during the two major Palestinian uprisings (1987-9 and 2000-5) in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Divided into two parts, the book explores, first, the function and historical background of the IDF, and, second, how the IDF has coped with and adapted to the two intifadas. Drawing on a variety of sources, it analyses the degree of success experienced by the IDF in adapting its conventional conduct of warfare to the realities of the Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict. By examining the way in which the IDF and the Israeli security doctrine were formed and developed over time, the book also explores how far Israeli strategic assumptions, civil-military relations, the organisational culture, command and control structure, and conduct of the IDF have affected its adaptation to the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also provides new insights into how conventional armies struggle with
contemporary insurgency.'
ID number: 80023538
Year: 2008
Type: M

355.4  /01630
Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency - Westport, CT : Praeger
Security International.
xii, 189 p. : ill.; 25 cm.
ISBN: 9780275999476
Author(s):
  1. Mockaitis, Thomas R.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
  2. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
  3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
'The US military in Iraq faces the most complex counterinsurgency
campaign in its history and perhaps the history of modern
warfare. The author situates the Iraq War in its broad
historical and cultural context. He argues that the Army's new
document outlines the correct approach to winning in Iraq.
However, three years of desultory conflict amid ongoing
revelations that the premises upon which the administration
argued the need for invading Iraq may be false have eroded
support of the war. The American armed forces may soon find
themselves in the unfortunate situation of having found a
formula for success at almost the same time the voters demand
withdrawal. Within this context, the author examines the
conflict in Iraq, from the early 1990s, to pre-invasion
planning in 2003, to the rise of insurgent movements and the
challenges they posed in the aftermath of the fighting. He
traces the ongoing efforts to shape a doctrine that will allow
US forces to successfully deal with the growing insurgency.'
ID number: 80022994
Year: 2008
Type: M

355.4  /01571
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare - Botley, UK : Osprey Publishing.
304 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9781846032813
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
  1. Marston, Daniel, ed.
Notes:
'Insurgency, terrorism and the resulting bloodshed have become
facts of life in the modern world and the difficulties armies
face in controlling them have been graphically demonstrated,
not least in Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategies and tactics used
to counter insurgencies range from conventional military
operations to a combination of military and political strategy,
including propaganda and Psy-Ops. However, successful
strategies and lessons learned in one conflict are often
forgotten following its conclusion, with bloody consequences
for the next war. A range of military and civilian experts are
brought together here to examine the development and practice
of counterinsurgency doctrine from the beginning of the
twentieth century to the Iraq conflict. Each of the thirteen
chapters discusses the conflict and its background, the strategies and tactics developed in the attempt to contain and defeat the insurgency and their success or otherwise, and the contribution of the conflict to the overall development of counterinsurgency in modern warfare.'

ID number: 80022173
Year: 2008
Type: M

355.4 /01538
ix, 303 p.; 24 cm.
(Routledge Global Security Studies ; 2)
ISBN: 9780415413572
Subject(s):
   1. MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
   2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
   1. Terriff, Terry, 1953- , ed.
   2. Karp, Aaron, ed.
Notes:
   Includes index.
'This book examines the meaning of the rising tide of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, which increasingly dominates world-wide military planning. After the 1991 war with Iraq, it seemed that the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' would assure the United States and its allies of ever greater military dominance. However, rapid victories like the toppling of the Afghan Taliban in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in 2003 now seem like isolated events in a long struggle. For the first time since the Vietnam War ended, the problems of insurgency have leapt to the top of the international security agenda. Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq are bogged down by insurgency, while virtually every country is struggling to ensure its domestic safety against terrorist threats. In this book, some leading advocates of 'Fourth-Generation Warfare' maintain that irregular warfare is evolving into the dominant form of conflict. However, other strategic thinkers argue that the novelty of irregular warfare has been exaggerated. Others examine the lessons of warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ability of military organizations to deal with the new challenge. Case studies from the United States, India, Israel, NATO and others reveal military thinkers working at the limits of their trade to adapt old institutions and assumptions to address the rising challenge.'

ID number: 80021518
Year: 2008
Type: M
2007

323 /01007
(Letort Papers)
ISBN: 1584872756
Author(s):
1. Mitra, Durga Madhab (John)
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
3. INSURGENCY--INDIA
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'This monograph analyzes the susceptibility of Third World countries to insurgency and develops a theoretical perspective to illuminate some of the factors contributing to insurgency in these countries. A simple linear model for India has been developed to demonstrate how the degree of inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social identity of its population, and the amount of external influence on the area determine the propensity of that area for insurgency. The author discusses implications of the Indian model for various aspects of counterinsurgency strategy for the Third World, including economic development, the role of democracy, social and political autonomy, and counterinsurgency operations. He then makes recommendations for effective counterinsurgency strategy and for long-term stability in these countries.'
ID number: 80021235
Year: 2007
Type: M

355.4 /01540
War in Iraq: Planning and Execution - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
xix, 263 p. : ill.; 24 cm.
(Strategy and History ; 21)
ISBN: 9780415420754
Subject(s):
1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
2. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Added entry(s):
1. Mahnken, Thomas G., ed.
Notes:
Includes index.
'This volume brings together a group of essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both US-led major combat operations to defeat the Ba'athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency. The chapters were written by some of the leading scholars on the Iraq War, many of whom have practical first-hand experience. It is also the first work on the Iraq War to incorporate an understanding of the Iraqi side, based on a systematic analysis of captured Iraqi archives.'
ID number: 80021535
Year: 2007
Type: M
Rethinking Insurgency - Carlisle, PA : US Army War College.
vi, 69 p.; 30 cm.
ISBN: 1584872977
Author(s):
1. Metz, Steven, 1956-
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing. With the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities. The author argues that while exceptionally important, this relearning process focused on Cold War era nationalistic insurgencies rather than the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War security environment. To be successful at counterinsurgency, he contends, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency, which has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine.'
URI:
ID number: 80023269
Year: 2007
Type: M

liv, 419 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 9780226841519
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Bibliography: p. 391-399. Includes index.
'When the US military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. This volume was written to fill that void. The manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.'
ID number: 80021871
Year: 2007
Type: M
For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all US cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, US military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.'

Author(s):  
1. Birtle, Andrew James

Subject(s):  
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA--HISTORY

Added entry(s):  
1. US Army. Center of Military History

Notes:  
'This book includes nine chapters on the development, education, and propagation of counter-insurgency and contingency operations doctrine. It begins with the immediate post-Second World War period, explores the effervescence of the American 'counterinsurgency era' during the 1960s, and culminates with some observations on the demise of counter-insurgency-related doctrine during the final years of Vietnam. It also comprises a short postscript that assesses the Vietnam-eracounter-insurgency doctrine's utility, in view of the ultimate US withdrawal from Vietnam.'

ID number: 80021696  
Year: 2006  
Type: M


Author(s):  
1. Hashim, Ahmed S.

Subject(s):  
1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011

Notes:  
'In this sobering account of the ongoing violence in Iraq, the author reveals the insurgents behind the widespread revolt, their motives, and their tactics. The insurgency, he shows, is not a united movement directed by a leadership with a single ideological vision. Instead, it involves former regime loyalists, Iraqis resentful of foreign occupation, foreign and domestic Islamist extremists, and elements of organized crime. These groups have cooperated with one another in the past and coordinated their attacks; but the alliance between nationalist Iraqi insurgents on the one hand and religious extremists has frayed considerably. The US-led offensive to retake Fallujah in November 2004 and the success of the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly in January 2005 have led more 'mainstream' insurgent groups to begin thinking of reinforcing the political arm of their opposition movement and to seek political guarantees for the Sunni Arab community in the new Iraq. The author begins by placing the Iraqi revolt in its historical context. He next profiles the various insurgent groups, detailing their origins, aims, and operational and tactical modi operandi. He concludes with an unusually candid assessment of the successes and failures of the Coalition's counter-insurgency campaign.'
Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism - Carlisle, PA : US Army War College.
v, 307 p. : ill.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584872470
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
4. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
Added entry(s):
1. Murray, Williamson, ed.
2. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
ID number: 80021069
Year: 2006
Type: M

viii, 211 p.; 25 cm.
ISBN: 0275989909
Author(s):
1. Cassidy, Robert M.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. INSURGENCY
3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009
Notes:
'Since September 2001, the United States has waged what the government initially called the 'global war on terrorism (GWOT)'. Beginning in late 2005 and early 2006, the term Long War began to appear in US security documents. The description Long War - unlimited in time and space and continuing for decades - is closer to reality and more useful than GWOT. The author argues that this protracted struggle is more correctly viewed as a global insurgency and counterinsurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, he maintains, comprise a novel and evolving form of networked insurgents who operate globally, harnessing the advantages of globalization and the information age. They employ terrorism as a tactic, subsuming terror with their overarching aim of undermining the Western-dominated system of states. Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency has vital implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change - all reviewed in this work. The author combines the foremost maxims of the most prominent Western and Eastern philosophers of war to arrive at a threefold theme: know the enemy, know yourself, and know what kind of war you are embarking upon. To help readers arrive at that understanding, he first offers a distilled analysis of al Qaeda and its associated networks, with a particular focus on ideology and culture. In subsequent chapters, he elucidates the challenges big powers face when they prosecute counterinsurgencies, using historical examples from Russian, American, British and French counterinsurgent wars before 2001. The book concludes with recommendations for the integration and command and control of indigenous forces and other agencies.'
323 /01005
(PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era)
ISBN: 0275992691
Author(s):
1. Galula, David, 1919-1967
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Includes index.
'This book defines the laws of counterinsurgency warfare. It outlines lessons from the 1950s and 60s that are relevant to modern conflicts and provides an analysis of how to countermine insurgency, and of the elements that might hinder its defeat.'

323 /01005
(Strategies & Doctrines)
ISBN: 9782717855098
Author(s):
1. Galula, David, 1919-1967
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
'Les armees occidentales actuellement engagees dans des conflits d'un type nouveau, face a un adversaire insaisissable, pourraient-elles s'inspirer de l'histoire des guerres revolutionnaires pour se sortir de l'impasse strategique dans laquelle elles semblent installeees ? Pour l'auteur, la victoire des insurges n'est pas une fatalite : en s'adaptant a la situation, le gouvernement de contre-insurrection peut s'assurer du soutien de la population, qui est la cle du succes. Son approche de la question est donc avant tout politique, sans recours systematique a la violence.'
Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare -
Annapolis, MD : Naval Institute Press.
xvii, 218 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9781591147459
Author(s):
  1. Rothstein, Hy S.
Subject(s):
  1. USA--MILITARY POLICY
  2. USA--ARMED FORCES
  3. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA
  4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
  5. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
Notes:
  Bibliography: p. 205-212. Includes index.
'The author examines here why the US military cannot conduct
unconventional warfare despite a significant effort to create
and maintain such a capability. He argues that although the
operation in Afghanistan appeared to have been a masterpiece of
military creativity, the United States executed its impressive
display of power in a totally conventional manner. Pointing out
that the initial phase of the war was appropriately
conventional given the conventional disposition of the enemy,
the author maintains that once the Taliban fell and the war
became increasingly unconventional, the US response became more
conventional. In this book, the author presents an
authoritative overview of the current American way of war and
addresses the specific causes of the 'conventionalization' of
US Special Forces, using the war in Afghanistan as a case
study. He draws a distinction between special operations and
unconventional warfare, reminding us that the use of Special
Forces does not automatically make the fighting unconventional,
and he questions the ability of US forces to effectively defeat
irregular threats. In conclusion, the author suggests ways to
regain lost unconventional warfare capacity.'
ID number: 80021728
Year: 2006
Type: M

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife : Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya
xxix, 249 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 0226567702
Author(s):
  1. Nagl, John A., 1966-
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
  2. MALAYA--HISTORY--MALAYAN EMERGENCY, 1948-1960
  3. VIETNAM WAR, 1961-1975
  4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--MALAYA
  5. COUNTERINSURGENCY--VIETNAM
Notes:
'Armies are often accused of preparing to fight the previous war.
In this book, the author considers the now-crucial question of
how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of
conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Comparing
the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in
the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in
the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975, the author argues that
organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from
unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the
British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam.

ID number: 80021140
Year: 2005
Type: M

323 /00948
(Whitehall Paper Series ; 64)
ISBN: 0855161175
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Added entry(s):
1. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (GB)
Notes:
'In the counter-insurgency campaigns that followed the swift and successful interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Coalition forces failed to exploit their technical and planning superiority; the best they have achieved is a war of gradual attrition. Meanwhile, it is the globally organized insurgents who have become the more successful manoeuvrists, moving with surprising agility and impact between the operational, the strategic and the virtual. The author argues here that to turn the tide against a global insurgency requires a rigorous effort to define the adversary with greater precision. This would reveal a headless, structureless network that grows organically and responds instinctively to events in a way that is more dangerous than the vertically organized versions of Al-Qa'ida that are part of the misleading rhetoric of 'global terrorism'. The international response to this phenomenon is, at present, too unwieldy and disparately motivated to succeed. To regain the initiative, a future Coalition needs to be more globally minded, culturally inclusive and less tolerant of the multi-agency shambles that characterizes the operational space.'

ID number: 80020436
Year: 2005
Type: M


In a global climate of turmoil and upheaval, widespread insurgencies are seriously challenging national and international stability. Inevitably, the United States will become involved, directly or indirectly, in some of these conflicts. The author explores insurgencies ranging across five continents and spanning more than two centuries. Analyzing examples from North and South America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, he identifies recurrent patterns and offers useful lessons for future policymakers. His twofold approach to counterinsurgency is easily applied to a democratic polity such as the US. The first element, developing the strategic basis for victory, emphasizes creating a peaceful path to the redress of legitimate grievances, committing sufficient troops to the counterinsurgent operation, and isolating the conflict area from outside aid. The second element aims at marginalizing the insurgents and includes fair conduct toward civilians and prisoners, systematic intelligence gathering, depriving insurgents of weapons and food, separating insurgent leaders from their followers, and offering amnesty to all but the most incorrigible.

This monograph comes at a time when US and other world political and military leaders are struggling with the 'new' political-psychological aspects of unconventional conflict. Unfortunately, the strategic theory of unconventional political war has played little part in the discourse. Yet political-insurgency war is the most likely type of conflict to challenge the maintenance and enhancement of global and regional security over the near-to-long term. Contemporary political-insurgency war is a threat we can ill afford to ignore. Through the analysis of the cases of Argentina (1969-79), Peru (1962-present) and Italy (1968-82), the author identifies the political-strategic challenges of modern
unconventional conflict. He stresses the political complexity of insurgency and the broader implications for the promises of democracy, free market economies, and prosperity implicit in the mandates to civil-military forces that confront global and regional instability. These cases are significant because they address counterinsurgency as much as they do insurgency. As a consequence, this examination is a logical point from which to begin to understand how governments and international organizations might ultimately control - or succumb to - the strategic challenges of political-insurgency war. The author's recommendations impose no easy set of tasks. Nevertheless, if the US and other global leadership ignore the highly political aspects of modern unconventional conflict, the resultant instability and possible state failure will adversely shape the security environment in which all nations must struggle to survive.'

ID number: 80019945
Year: 2004
Type: M

323 /00883

viii, 43 p.; 23 cm.
ISBN: 1584871784
Author(s):
1. Metz, Steven
2. Millen, Raymond
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)
Notes:
'Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has developed a national security strategy designed to eliminate the conditions that spawn asymmetric threats. An important part of that is helping build stable, legitimate governments in nations which allowed or supported terrorism and other forms of asymmetric aggression. This has led the United States to renewed involvement in counterinsurgency. The United States, particularly the Army, has a long history of counterinsurgency support. During the past decade, though, this has not been an area of focus for the American military. To renew its capability at counterinsurgency, the military is assessing 21st century insurgency, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and revising its strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine. This monograph is designed to contribute to this process. The authors argue that 20th century strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine should not be applied to 21st century insurgency without further refinement. They contend that there are two major variants of insurgency which they label 'national' and 'liberation'. Most existing strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine are derived from American experience with national insurgencies, but these need to be adapted when confronting liberation insurgencies.'

ID number: 80019944
Year: 2004
Type: M

xiv, 41 p.; 23 cm.
(Studies in Asymmetry)
ISBN: 1584870680

Author(s):
1. Manwaring, Max G.

Subject(s):
1. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
2. INSURGENCY
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
4. GUERRILLA WARFARE
5. USA--MILITARY POLICY

Added entry(s):
1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes:
'The author wrote this monograph in response to the fact that today over half the countries in the global community are faced with one variation or another of asymmetric guerrilla war. Insurgencies, internal wars, and other small-scale contingencies (SSCs) are the most pervasive and likely type of conflict in the post-Cold War era. That the United States will become involved directly or indirectly in some of these conflicts is almost certain. Yet, little or no recognition and application of the strategic-level lessons of the Vietnam War and the hundreds of other smaller conflicts that have taken place over the past several years are evident. The purpose of this monograph is to draw from the lessons of the recent past to better prepare today's civilian and military leaders to meet the unconventional and asymmetric warfare challenges that face the United States and the rest of the international community.'

ID number: 80017445

Year: 2001
Type: M
Recalibrating US-Pakistan Relations.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 35, no. 3, Summer 2012, p. 93-107.)
Author(s):
1. Mullick, Haider Ali Hussein
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--PAKISTAN
2. USA--MILITARY RELATIONS--PAKISTAN
3. PAKISTAN--MILITARY RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
Pakistani counterinsurgency has actually improved markedly since 2009, but absent a push to normalize US-Pakistani relations by narrowing the gap between what Washington seeks from Islamabad and what is feasible, these counterinsurgency gains will reverse.
ID Number: JA028789
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

Organizing for Counter-Insurgency : Explaining Doctrinal Adaptation in Britain and Germany.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 33, no. 1, April 2012, p. 27-58.)
Author(s):
1. Dyson, Tom
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GERMANY
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
4. ISAF
5. MILITARY DOCTRINE--GREAT BRITAIN
6. MILITARY DOCTRINE--GERMANY
Notes:
Why do allies not adapt evenly even in time of war ? This article maps and explains differentiation in the development of the stabilization and counter-insurgency doctrines of the British and German militaries during deployment in Afghanistan. In doing so the study analyses the neglected issue of the organizational capabilities of the British and German militaries to develop and apply military doctrine that is appropriate to the exigencies of the contemporary operational environment. Drawing upon documentary analysis and

* This list contains material received as of January 3rd, 2013.– Cette liste est arrêtée au 3 janvier 2013.
semi-structured interviews, this article uncovers new empirical material on the institutional reforms which have been undertaken to strengthen the adaptability of doctrine and its application in operations. It finds that while the British military's organizational capabilities were characterized by deficits at the tactical level between 2006 and 2009, recent years have seen significant improvement. In contrast, the organizational capabilities of the German military remain stunted. While international structure is the main independent variable driving doctrinal adaptability, domestic variables exogenous to the military are the dominant intervening factor determining the development of effective organizational capabilities. Neoclassical realism provides the strongest analytical leverage in understanding the factors determining the capacity of militaries to adapt doctrine to the operational environment.

ID Number: JA028589
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

'Getting COIN' at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan : Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army.
(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 35, no. 4, August 2012, p. 513-539.)

Author(s):
1. Catignani, Sergio

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001---PARTICIPATION, BRITISH

Notes:
This article reassesses the extent to which the British Army has been able to adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While adopting Farrell's definition of bottom-up military adaptation, this article contends that the task force/brigade level of analysis adopted by Farrell and Farrell and Gordon has led them to overstate the degree to which innovation arising from processes of bottom-up adaptation has actually ensued. Drawing on lower level tactical unit interviews and other data, this article demonstrates how units have been unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of counter-insurgency warfare.

ID Number: JA028816
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART
How to Lose Allies and Finance Your Enemies: The Economisation of Conflict Termination in Afghanistan.
(CONFLICT, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT, vol. 12, no. 3, July 2012, p. 249–271.)
Author(s):
1. Zyck, Steven A.
Subject(s):
1. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE--AFGHANISTAN
2. WAR--TERMINATION
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Aid-focused approaches to counterinsurgency reflect a belief that large volumes of development assistance may erode insurgent groups' popular support and ability to recruit. In Afghanistan, this 'economised' approach to conflict termination, as the author terms it, formed a central component of the international strategy. As insecurity increased, more aid was provided to the most violent areas, creating a series of secondary effects which undermined stability. Firstly and most importantly, aid served to create rather than ameliorate grievances. Poorly conceived programmes, which focused more on volumes of development assistance than the design of interventions, resulted in reduced support among the Afghan citizenry for the international community and nascent state in Kabul. Secondly, 'economised' approaches to the insurgency created incentive structures that favoured instability. Thirdly, large aid flows in highly insecure areas led to 'leakage' which financed insurgent groups. These findings lend further support to those who increasingly observe that the relationship between security and development is nuanced and that simply proving more aid may in some cases yield less security in conflict-affected contexts.

ID Number: JA028769
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

The British Approach to COIN and Stabilisation: A Retrospective on Developments since 2001.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 157, no. 4, August-September 2012, p. 62-71.)
Author(s):
1. Alderson, Alexander
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
Notes:
The author was responsible for the publication of the new British Army doctrine on counter-insurgency in 2009. Three years after its publication, he looks back at how the doctrine was formulated, dissecting its historical and contemporary influences, conceptual framework and practical application. His insider's reflection on the elaboration of UK doctrine illuminates the ongoing nature of the process, and highlights the need for constant attention and innovation to meet the challenges faced by the British Army.

ID Number: JA028756
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART


Author(s): 1. Mumford, Andrew

Subject(s): 1. TORTURE--GREAT BRITAIN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN

Notes:
This paper explores brutality and torture in the history of British counter-insurgency campaigns. Taking as a pretext the British government's announcement in January 2012 to scrap a judicial review into the rendition and torture of UK citizens at Guantanamo Bay by American intelligence operatives with the complicity of British intelligence agencies, the paper posits that the actions this review was supposed to evaluate are not restricted to counter-terrorism. By examining the historical usage of interrogation methods by the British in counter-insurgency campaigns against suspected IRA members in the first decade of the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland, this article builds a wider frame of reference for the recent controversies surrounding the treatment of detainees during the British occupation of southern Iraq. Although the detention and interrogation of suspects in counter-insurgency campaigns is a necessary security measure, the oft-heralded British adherence to 'minimum force' is heavily mythologised given the prevalence of the brutal treatment of detainees. Considering the detrimental impact (in an ethical, legal and security context) that the existence of torture during detention and interrogation had in these cases, the article upholds an absolutist position on the prohibition of torture.
Field Manual 3-24 and the Heritage of Counterinsurgency Theory. 
(MILLENNIUM, vol. 41, no. 1, September 2012, p. 91-111.)
Author(s):
  1. Cromartie, Alan
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
The Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 has been accused of being over-dependent on the counterinsurgency 'classics' Galula and Thompson. But comparison reveals that it is different in spirit. Galula and Thompson seek practical control; the Manual seeks to build 'legitimacy'. Its concept of legitimacy is superficially Weberian, but owes more to the writings of the American Max Manwaring. The Manual presupposes that a rights-based legal order can (other things being equal) be made to be cross-culturally attractive; 'effective governance' by itself can build legitimacy. The fusion of its methods with an ideology creates unrealistic criteria for success. Its weaknesses suggest a level of incapacity to think politically that will, in time, result in further failures.
ID Number: JA028784
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

Counterinsurgency : Not a Strategy, But a Necessary Capability. 
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 65, 2012, p. 48-52.)
Author(s):
  1. Hammes, T. X.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
ID Number: JA028553
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

Counterinsurgency : Not a Strategy but a Necessary Capability. 
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 65, 2012, p. 48-52.)
Author(s):
  1. Hammes, T. X.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
ID Number: JA028631
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART
The Future of Counterinsurgency.
(ORBIS, vol. 56, no. 4, Fall 2012, p. 565-587.)
Author(s):
1. Hammes, T. X.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
This article addresses why counterinsurgency is not, in fact, a strategy, and why the United States will nevertheless need to retain a counterinsurgency capability. It further examines the drivers of modern insurgency; the range of counterinsurgency approaches that have worked globally; and several case studies that illustrate how the United States might improve its counterinsurgency activity moving forward.
ID Number: JA028924
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

The Heroes of COIN.
Author(s):
1. Rovner, Joshua
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The conventional wisdom holds that security in Iraq only improved after Gen. David Petraeus implemented a new counterinsurgency doctrine that stressed population security instead of aggressive operations against insurgent forces. This interpretation is strikingly similar to the historiography of the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam War. In each case observers criticized initial efforts as brutal and counterproductive, only to be rescued when enlightened new leaders arrived on the scene. This article challenges the familiar hero narrative, arguing that critics routinely exaggerate the importance of leadership changes because they view conflicts as experiments in counterinsurgency rather than exercises in state-building. Whereas counterinsurgency (COIN) theory emphasizes issues like public security and government legitimacy, theorists of state-building describe a bloody and protracted competition for power under conditions approaching anarchy. The upshot is that the 'heroes' of late-stage COIN might actually depend on the earlier 'villains' who did the dirty work of establishing political order and coercing the population into obedience.
ID Number: JA028518
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART
Atrocities in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies.
(CIVIL WARS, vol. 14, no. 1, March 2012, Special Issue.)
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
3. ATROCITIES
ID Number: JA028628
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

Counter-COIN : Counterinsurgency and the Preemption of Strategy.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 35, no. 9, September 2012, p. 597-617.)
Author(s):
1. Jones, David Martin
2. Smith, M. L. R.
3. Stone, John
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The notion of 'counterinsurgency' (COIN) has for some years been the central concept driving military operations in Afghanistan, and before that, in Iraq. It constitutes the dominant idea influencing much current military planning of the major Western powers. This study questions the assumptions and relevance of the thinking behind counterinsurgency doctrine. It suggests that the ultimate effect of its dominance is to reduce the highly contingent nature of war to a list of techniques, the application of which are regarded as a sufficient precondition whenever states deem that they are confronted by conflicts that can be described as an 'insurgency'. Such assumptions are both arbitrary and risk crowding out necessary, although by their nature very difficult, political judgments that are required for the effective construction and implementation of strategies that seek to ensure that the ends sought are proportional to the means employed.
ID Number: JA028805
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

Measuring Progress in Modern Warfare.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 54, no. 1, February - March 2012, p. 137-157.)
Author(s):
1. Kapstein, Ethan B.
Subject(s):
1. WAR--TERMINATION
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
In a counter-insurgency, metrics should seek to capture the population's beliefs about the future. Economic choices during periods of intense conflict are a reasonable proxy for such beliefs.
ID Number: JA028370
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART
Counterinsurgency, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2012, p. 27-38.)
Author(s):
1. Nachbar, Thomas B.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. RULE OF LAW
Notes:
The author attempts here to remind readers that 'law' is featured more prominently today in the conduct of war than at any other time in world history. Perhaps it is the emphasis emergent from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan or, possibly, it is linked to the ascendance of counterinsurgency as a form of warfare. The author further examines counterinsurgency to determine it is not, in and of itself, a contest for law but rather a quest for 'legitimacy'. He provides numerous examples of attempts to codify legitimacy in various documents and concludes that current doctrine is better at identifying when legitimacy exists or what it entails, rather than what it actually means. The challenge for counterinsurgents is to pick the model of legitimacy that is most helpful in developing an ideological position for a particular government.

ID Number: JA028707
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART

Home Away From Home: Dynamics of Counterinsurgency Warfare.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY vol. 31, no. 3, July - August 2012, p. 235-252.)
Author(s):
1. Treistman, Jeffrey
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The aim of this article is to obtain a better understanding of the outcomes of counterinsurgency warfare. It advances the hypothesis that the combined presence of a unified revolutionary force and external sanctuary will significantly increase the chances of victory for insurgents. The variables are tested against Portugal's involvement in the Colonial War, accounting for Portuguese defeat in Guinea-Bissau. The article concludes by extending the hypothesis to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, determining that the ability of the United States to succeed in Afghanistan is limited unless it seals the border with Pakistan and weakens the unity of insurgent forces.

ID Number: JA028758
Year: 2012
Language: English
Type: ART
Northern Ireland as Metaphor: Exception, Suspicion and Radicalization in the 'War on Terror'.

(SECURITY DIALOGUE, vol. 42, no. 6, December 2011, p. 483-498.)

Author(s):
1. Bigo, Didier
2. Guittet, Emmanuel-Pierre

Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--NORTHERN IRELAND
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--NORTHERN IRELAND
3. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009

Notes:
This article questions the fashionable view that Northern Ireland is a counterinsurgency lesson to be learned for the global 'war on terror'. It suggests that Britain's involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict - one of the longest conflicts within Europe in which a government has been at war with a clandestine organization - can be regarded as a meaningful metaphoric utterance in efforts to analyse the practical failures and threat discourses of the global 'war on terror'. Northern Ireland is more than a specific case study: it acts as an appealing metaphor in attempts to understand the logics and pitfalls of the 'war against terrorism', where the increasing primacy granted to terror control - present and future - means that Western governments are increasingly more willing to infringe otherwise inviolable rights in the pursuit of a supposed greater good - security. The article explores the political economy of unease, suspicion, exception and radicalization in the 'war against terrorism'. It concludes that Northern Ireland is not a model than can be exported around the globe but an invitation to analyse contingency, daily operations of security, and their effects on social practices and routines. Northern Ireland also represents a remarkable inducement to assess how exception, suspicion and radicalization are correlated, as well as to recognize that efforts to contain the unpredictability of the future are self-defeating.

The German Politics of War: Kunduz and the War in Afghanistan.

(INTernational AFFAIRS, vol. 87, no. 2, March 2011, p. 397-417.)

Author(s):
1. Noetzel, Timo

Subject(s):
1. GERMANY--MILITARY POLICY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GERMANY
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
4. GERMANY--ARMED FORCES--AFGHANISTAN

Notes:
This article analyses the way in which Germany's participation in the international intervention in Afghanistan has shaped and transformed the country's politics of defence and deriving policies. It argues that in the wake of operational challenges posed by the insurgency in northern Afghanistan since 2007, and in particular the increasing rate of German combat fatalities, established post-Cold War dogmas of German politics are becoming subject to erosion. Developments in the Kunduz region of northern Afghanistan, with the tanker bombing of 4 September 2009 as its apex, have had a catalyst function in this process. In particular, strategic, operational and tactical requirements
for counterinsurgency operations have had significant politico-strategic repercussions for the country's defence and security policy more generally. As a result, in recent years the Bundeswehr has begun to undergo a far-reaching structural process of military adaptation and innovation. The article explains and analyses this phenomenon of political change and military learning in the context of political paralysis.

(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 34, no. 5, May 2011, p. 383-401.)

Author(s):
1. Johnson, David E.

Subject(s):
1. ISAF
2. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--NATO
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN

Notes:
This article examines ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operations in Afghanistan as a way to get at the strategic disconnects in ends, ways, and means that the author believes are endemic to large-scale protracted stability and COIN (counterinsurgency) operations against adversaries who do not pose palpable existential threats to the members of an alliance. The article focuses mainly on the period that followed President Barack Obama's December 2009 announcement of a civilian and military 'surge' in Afghanistan through the early stages of the ISAF offensive in Marjah, which began in February 2010. The article concludes that the fundamental strategic issue is that the Allies are not willing (or able) to devote enough resources to achieve their stated objectives. No matter how much the 'Ways' might be improved, the 'Means' are not sufficient to attain the 'Ends'. Thus, what is needed is a more realistic understanding of what ISAF can accomplish in Afghanistan and what NATO might be expected to accomplish in future operations.
Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan : What Now for British Counterinsurgency ?.


Author(s):
1. Egnell, Robert

Subject(s):
1. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
4. GREAT BRITAIN--ARMED FORCES--AFGHANISTAN

Notes:
This article analyses the conduct of British operations in Helmand between 2006 and 2010 and discusses the implications for the legacy and future of British counterinsurgency. A number of lessons stand out: first, competence in the field of counterinsurgency is neither natural nor innate through regimental tradition or historical experience. The slow adaptation in Helmand - despite the opportunity to allow the Basra experience to be a leading example of the need for serious changes in training and mindset - is an indication that the expertise British forces developed in past operations is but a distant folktale within the British Armed Forces. Substantially changed training, painful relearning of counterinsurgency principles and changed mindsets are therefore necessary to avoid repeated early failures in the future. Moreover, despite eventually adapting tactically to the situation and task in Helmand, the British Armed Forces proved inadequate in dealing with the tasks assigned to them for two key reasons. First, the resources of the British military are simply too small for dealing with large-scale complex engagements such as those in Helmand or southern Iraq. Second, the over-arching comprehensive approach, and especially the civilian lines of operations that underpinned Britain's historical successes with counterinsurgency, are today missing.

ID Number: JA027687
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Coeurs et esprits en Afghanistan : pourquoi la victoire se derobe.


Author(s):
1. Exum, Andrew M.

Subject(s):
1. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN

Notes:
La campagne de contre-insurrection vise a creer un espace pour le developpement de solutions politiques menant a la paix. En Afghanistan, les moyens devolus ont ete brides par la priorite irakienne. Le soutien pakistanais aux insurges afghans demeure. La faiblesse du gouvernement afghan interdit d'en faire un relais efficace de l'action internationale et de valoriser au maximum l'aide recue. Tous ces problemes expliquent largement l'echec a creer l'espace de la sortie de guerre.

ID Number: JA027879
Year: 2011
Language: French
Type: ART
Plan A-Minus for Afghanistan.
Author(s): 1. O'Hanlon, Michael  
2. Riedel, Bruce
Subject(s): 1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN  
2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN--PREVENTION  
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
Notes: The administration's plan - a counterinsurgency strategy - has a good chance to succeed in Afghanistan. But if it fails, rather than a widely-proposed counterterrorism-plus strategy, a better alternative strategy would focus on a smaller number of key districts while standing up the Afghan army and police.
ID Number: JA027540 Year: 2011 Language: English Type: ART

L'Amerique en guerre : grandeur et decadence de la contre-insurrection.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, vol. 76, no. 3, 2011, p. 617-629.)
Author(s): 1. Tenenbaum, Elie
Subject(s): 1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA  
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN  
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes: Apres l'echec du concept de 'regime change' en Irak, la 'contre-insurrection' a constitue depuis quelque temps le paradigme des operations exterieures americaines. Elle obtient un certain succes en Irak, mais echoue en Afghanistan. La contre-insurrection a une histoire complexe dans les rivalites entre services des armees et exige une mobilisation de moyens, surtout humains, hors de portee des guerres limitees. La sortie d'Afghanistan marquera sans doute la fin du cycle de la contre-insurrection.
ID Number: JA028013 Year: 2011 Language: French Type: ART

(SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES, vol. 22, no. 4, October 2011, p. 619-643.)
Author(s): 1. Thruelsen, Peter Dahl
Subject(s): 1. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM  
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY  
3. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM--AFGHANISTAN  
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes: This article argues that the debate on security sector reform (SSR) needs to be taken further by taking into consideration the fact that, even though the SSR concept was not originally developed as an element in stabilising states undergoing an insurgency, it is very much being used for exactly that. When conducting counterinsurgency with a focus on the creation of stability, the baseline will ultimately have to be security sector stabilisation (SSS) as a precondition for complete SSR
implementation. However, the two must be connected to avoid them undermining each other. This is important if a comprehensive approach to programme implementation and especially sustainability is to guide the programme, and not just isolated 'train and equip' stand-alone projects that do not solve either the initial need for stabilisation or the long-term need for accountable security forces. Currently, in Afghanistan the surge for security by the international military is in danger of overtaking the other elements of the SSR, thereby undermining the primary end state and thus risking laying the wrong foundation for the long-term process of SSR.

Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine: From Counterinsurgency to Stabilization.

(INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 87, no. 2, March 2011, p. 317-333.)

Author(s):
1. Griffin, Stuart

Subject(s):
1. GREAT BRITAIN--MILITARY POLICY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
3. PEACEKEEPING FORCES, BRITISH

Notes:
The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been 'JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution'. 'Security and Stabilisation' is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, 'FM 3-24: The Counterinsurgency Field Manual' and 'FM 3-07: The Stability Operations Field Manual'; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges 'Security and Stabilisation' must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions.
The Other Side of the COIN: Private Security Companies and Counterinsurgency Operations.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 34, no. 10, October 2011, p. 782-801.)

Author(s):
1. Petersohn, Ulrich

Subject(s):
1. PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
4. PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES--IRAQ
5. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ

Notes:
The Iraq War was a watershed regarding the scope of battlefield support by Private Security Companies (PSC). Skeptics soon raised concerns about these new actors being an impediment to the success of the very same operations they are meant to support. According to the critics, PSCs are grist to the mill for insurgents as they employ aggressive tactics and thereby alienate the population, cause credibility problems because they enjoy impunity, and increase coordination problems since they are not subordinated under the military chain of command. This article argues that this is not a necessary result of their employment, but rather the consequence of a lack of preparedness to operate alongside PSCs. However, the military is accustomed to adapting to new unexpected circumstances. Hence, when problems occurred, the armed forces underwent a trial and error learning process that improved PSC employment. The empirical picture supports this view. Initially, the counterinsurgency effort did indeed suffer from the actions, lack of oversight, and lack of coordination of PSCs. However, over the course of the Iraq War, most of the shortfalls were either improved significantly or even resolved.

ID Number: JA028146
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Whose COIN?.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 60, 2011, p. 19-25.)

Author(s):
1. Etzioni, Amitai

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA

ID Number: JA027378
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART
A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror.
(SEcurity Dialogue, vol. 42, no. 1, February 2011, p. 21-37.)

Author(s):
1. Gilmore, Jonathan

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. HUMAN SECURITY

Notes:
The current US counterinsurgency approach, introduced in 2006, has been highlighted as representing a significant shift in the US military's approach to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Restraint in the use of force, a focus on development projects and increased awareness of local cultures might be interpreted as signalling the emergence of a more reflective and empathetic US military, with greater acceptance of human security principles. This article contests such an interpretation, arguing that US counterinsurgency contains a range of characteristics that render it an unsuitable tool for addressing the underlying social and political problems of Iraq or Afghanistan, as well as an inappropriate platform for the realization of human security principles. Counterinsurgency retains a significant role for high-impact war-fighting, remains firmly embedded within the narrative of the War on Terror, and is likely to lead to the disempowerment of local populations. Taken together, these interlinked characteristics make the US counterinsurgency model an unlikely vehicle for the development of a long-term positive peace in the societies within which it is being applied and risks seriously compromising the credibility of future attempts to help protect the security and well-being of individuals and groups beyond one's own national borders.

ID Number: JA027667
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 60, 2011, p. 14-18.)

Author(s):
2. Kilcullen, David

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA

ID Number: JA027377
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART
(Security Dialogue, vol. 42, no. 6, December 2011, p. 517-535.)
Author(s):
1. Kienscherf, Markus
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
This article argues that US counterinsurgency doctrine forms a programme of both liberal rule and liberal war whose ultimate purpose is the pacification of recalcitrant populations and their eventual (re)integration into the networks of liberal governance. Designed to promote 'safe' forms of life while eradicating 'dangerous' ones, the doctrine constitutes a response to both the biopolitical problematization of human (in)security and the geostrategic problematization of US national security. Counterinsurgency aims to harness sociocultural knowledge in order to conduct a form of triage between elements of targeted populations. It also seeks to inscribe the divisions on which such a triage is based into space by means of practices that derive from earlier methods of imperial policing. Ultimately, counterinsurgency's production and implementation of a biopolitical differentiation between 'safe' and 'dangerous' human lives is likely not only to reinforce existing societal divisions within targeted populations but also to create new global, regional and local divisions and to generate resistance to what many people will always view as imperial domination. The societal divisions and resistance engendered by counterinsurgency may reinforce Western problematizations of insecurity and hence lead to further counterinsurgency campaigns in the future. Counterinsurgency doctrine is thus not so much a programme of peace and stability as one of spatially and temporally indeterminate pacification.
ID Number: JA028349
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Hearts and Minds, Cultural Awareness and Good Intelligence: The Blueprint for Successful Counter-Insurgency?.
(Intelligence and National Security, vol. 26, no. 4, August 2011, p. 445-459.)
Author(s):
1. Duyvesteyn, Isabelle
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Are a hearts and minds approach, reliable intelligence and cultural awareness the most important ingredients for success in counter-insurgency, as present prescriptions claim? This article focuses on some of the notable non-kinetic aspects of counter-insurgency and aims to critically reflect on their role and importance. It argues that the hearts and minds ideas, the emphasis on intelligence and cultural awareness are often problematic both for their methodological foundations and empirical weight. The article closes by identifying avenues for further research.
ID Number: JA027909
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART
The Agency of Force in Asymmetrical Warfare and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Chechnya.
(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 34, no. 5, October 2011, p. 647-680.)

Author(s):
1. Miakinkov, Eugene

Subject(s):
1. CHECHNYA (RUSSIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1994-
2. USE OF FORCE (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
4. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Notes:

The use of force in asymmetrical warfare, and in counterinsurgency operations in particular, has been written off as strategically dangerous and politically irrational. The goal of the article is to examine the role of force in a modern military context and determine if victory through its application is theoretically feasible. This hypothesis is tested against the backdrop of the conflict in Chechnya. The work examines the Russian military and public policy as a subordinate subject to the overall inquiry of the article in an attempt to show that force was one of the major factors behind Russian military success in 2001.

ID Number: JA028178
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Agents for Stability or Chaos: Conceptualizing Intelligence 'Relevance' in Counterinsurgency.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 34, no. 3, March 2011, p. 212-227.)

Author(s):
1. Michaels, Jeffrey H.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Notes:

Recent discussions among US officials about how the intelligence community can demonstrate its 'relevance' to counterinsurgency have been dominated by an ideology that presupposes large-scale military intervention, and in which the role of intelligence is limited to improving analysis in support of current military activities, with little debate of future requirements. This article highlights a number of alternative conceptions of intelligence 'relevance' to counterinsurgency, based on a study of several historical and contemporary US and non-US cases, and by applying a wider definition of counterinsurgency that includes cases where the military plays a subordinate role relative to the intelligence services.

ID Number: JA027587
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART
The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN.
(SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES, vol. 22, no. 2, May 2011, p. 239-257.)
Author(s):
  1. Porch, Douglas
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Counterinsurgency (COIN) has again emerged as a topic of both contemporary and historical interest in the age of what has been called a global counterinsurgency. However, little attention is being paid to the historical lineage of a COIN doctrine that is being rediscovered and promoted by an enthusiastic group of military intellectuals and commanders as the basis for US Army and Marine Corps doctrine. This article argues that historical claims for COIN success, based on courting popular gratitude by improving economic conditions, are at best anchored in selective historical memory, when not fantasy fabrications. The first argument of this article is that COIN does not constitute a distinct form of warfare, but merely a sub-set of minor tactics. Second, 'hearts and minds', so-called population-centric warfare, has seldom been a recipe for lasting stability. Rather, historically counterinsurgency succeeded when it has shattered and divided societies by severely disrupting civilian life. In fact, COIN is a nineteenth century legacy of empire whose uniqueness and impact was mythologized in its own day, and that is unlikely to prove a formula for strategic success in the twenty-first century.
ID Number: JA027866
Year: 2011
Language: English
Type: ART

Wiping Out 'The Bandits': Romanian Counterinsurgency Strategies in the Early Communist Period.
(JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES, vol. 23, no. 4, October - December 2010, p. 666-691.)
Author(s):
  1. Miroiu, Andrei
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--ROMANIA
Notes:
Drawing on the contemporary literature of counterinsurgency as well as primary sources, this article investigates the successful suppression of partisan groups by the Romanian communist authorities during the 1940s and 1950s.
ID Number: JA027461
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART
The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine.
(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 33, no. 5, October 2010, p. 727-758.)
Author(s):
1. Rid, Thomas
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--FRANCE
Notes:
In counterinsurgency, the population is the center of gravity. This insight has become a key doctrinal tenet of modern armed conflict. But where does it come from? The razzia, a tactic introduced by the French in North Africa around 1840, first thrust tribal populations into the focus of modern operational thinking. Soon the pioneering bureaux arabes added an administrative, civil, and political element. Eventually, in the 1890s, French operations in Madagascar gave rise to a mature counterinsurgency doctrine. David Galula, a French writer who heavily influenced the American Counterinsurgency manual, is merely the joint that connects the nineteenth century to the twenty-first.
ID Number: JA027295
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART

(SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES, vol. 21, no. 3, September 2010, p. 429-458.)
Author(s):
1. Dimitru, George
2. Graaf, Beatrice de
Subject(s):
1. ISAF
2. NETHERLANDS--ARMED FORCES--AFGHANISTAN
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--NETHERLANDS
5. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Rarely has a military commitment led to such intense discussion in the Netherlands as the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. In February 2010, the Netherlands' coalition government even collapsed after the two largest parties failed to agree on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan later this year. This article deals first of all with the difficult discussion over the Afghanistan mission of the TFU. The authors then subject three ISAF operations to close scrutiny. The authors provide some suggestions to help understand better this pivotal point in the execution of the whole operation and thus give a fuller picture of the Dutch counterinsurgency approach in Uruzgan.
ID Number: JA027202
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART
Counter-Insurgency in the Grey: The Ethical Challenge for Military Conduct.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 31, no. 1, April 2010, p. 34-60.)

Author(s):  
1. Dowdall, Jonathan  
2. Smith, M.L.R.

Subject(s):  
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--MORAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS

Notes:  
This study examines contemporary counter-insurgency (COIN) warfare in terms of military ethics. The intention is to reflect upon the changing face of COIN conduct in the light of serious ethical challenges resulting from modern trends affecting combatant status, and the deployment of military force in a multi-purpose framework. It engages with what many commentators have termed the 'grey area' of the Just War tradition: the ambiguous and challenging interim zone that lies in between the more clearly defined forms of COIN conduct. The resultant analysis suggests the need for a more nuanced form of ethical conduct, orientated around restraint, more flexible discriminatory principles and a proportionality framework closer to domestic policing than formal warfare. In particular, this analysis suggests that by hybridizing the military imperative with the policing model of the continuum of force a more effective, less vague and more ethically coherent construct can be produced. By embracing these concepts, military practitioners may overcome ambiguous and unhelpful moral guidance and tailor their conduct more closely to the challenges of the contemporary COIN environment. Such actions with assure they act as justly as possible in the face of 'grey area' ethics.

ID Number: JA026844  
Year: 2010  
Language: English  
Type: ART

The Afghanistan Choice: Peace or Punishment in the Pashtun Belt.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 155, no. 4, August - September 2010, p. 38-44.)

Author(s):  
1. Cassidy, Robert M.

Subject(s):  
1. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-  
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN  
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--PAKISTAN  
4. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN--PREVENTION  
5. TERRORISM--PAKISTAN--PREVENTION

Notes:  
The war presses steadily on in Afghanistan, with proponents arguing the rationale for either counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency as the approach for achieving the most favourable outcome. But neither alone can unseat the enduring alliance between the Taliban, Al-Qa'ida and the Pashtun people who straddle the Durant Line. The Pashtun Belt is the key to success in this conflict: winning the support of the population there requires a combination of both approaches in a complementary way to stabilise the region, and to deny it to the likes of Al-Qa'ida and its ilk, while aiming for a broader regional rapprochement in the longer term.

ID Number: JA027387  
Year: 2010  
Language: English  
Type: ART
Pakistan's Anti-Taliban Counter-Insurgency.

Author(s):
1. Zaidi, Syed Manzar Abbas

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--PAKISTAN
2. TALIBAN
3. TERRORISM--GOVERNMENT POLICY--PAKISTAN

Notes:
Before Pakistan's military operations Rah-e-Haq and Rah-e Nijat, the state's counter-insurgency strategy in the troubled frontier regions was inconsistent. However, current operations are focused on heavy firepower without due emphasis on political and economic solutions, which risks creating a protracted conflict and contrasts sharply with the latest international effort in Afghanistan.

Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together ?.

Author(s):
1. Boyle, Michael J.

Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN--PREVENTION
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN

Notes:
One of the underlying assumptions of the contemporary debate over Afghanistan is that counterterrorism objectives can be achieved through counterinsurgency methods. The recent decision by President Barack Obama to deploy 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan is premised on the idea that to disrupt Al Qaeda and prevent it from forming training camps in Afghanistan it will be necessary to first reverse the momentum of the Taleban insurgency. This approach - which places the US and UK on the offensive to disrupt terrorist plots before they arrive on their shores - assumes that the threats from Al Qaeda and the Taleban are intertwined and thus the strategy of response must seamlessly comprise elements of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. In fact, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are very different - often contradictory - models of warfare, each with its own associated assumptions regarding the role of force, the importance of winning support among the local population, and the necessity of building strong and representative government. Rather than being mutually reinforcing, they may impose tradeoffs on each other, as counterterrorism activities may blunt the effectiveness of counterinsurgency approaches and vice versa. The last four years in Afghanistan provide evidence that when employed in the same theatre counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies can offset one another. To be in a position to begin the withdrawal of US troops before July 2011, the Obama administration will need to find a way to manage the tradeoffs between its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan.
'Phase IV' Operations in the War on Terror : Comparing Iraq and Afghanistan.
(ORBIS, vol. 54, no. 2, Spring 2010, p. 185-198.)
Author(s):
1. Celso, Anthony N.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
This article identifies the obstacles and prospects of implementing President Obama's surge strategy in Afghanistan by examining four issues: (1) the origins and implementation of the Iraq surge policy; (2) U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan; (3) a comparative examination of Afghan and Iraqi tribal insurgent structures; and (4) suggestions for a counterinsurgency policy more in sync with regional social and tribal structures.
ID Number: JA026705
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART

(CIVIL WARS, vol. 12, no. 3, September 2010, p. 282-303.)
Author(s):
1. Egnell, Robert
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
This article conducts a critical analysis of the historical lessons, the assumptions and the conduct of 'hearts and minds' approaches to counterinsurgency. This results in challenges. Theoretically the 'hearts and minds' approach is rooted in modernisation theory and a normative Western approach to legitimacy that fails to live up to the expectations of the local population. The approach is also based on lessons from past successes such as the British 1950s campaign in Malaya. However, a great contextual shift has taken place since then and the relevance of past experiences is therefore questionable in a context of complex state-building in the wake of intervention. This also has practical consequences as we seek to rectify the often misapplied approaches of today.
ID Number: JA027484
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART
Community Defense in Afghanistan.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 57, 2010, p. 9-15.)
Author(s):
  1. Jones, Seth G.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
  2. TRIBES--AFGHANISTAN
  3. INTERNAL SECURITY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
America's counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy needs to better incorporate working with tribal and other community forces in Afghanistan, with a direct link to the Afghan government. This article outlines the development of local defense forces in Afghanistan, which should be leveraged along with other efforts to build to ANA and ANP, counter the pervasive corruption, and improve governance. It begins by outlining the importance of protecting the local population, especially the challenge of relying only on Afghan National Security Forces to establish order in rural areas. It then examines the historical precedent for working with tribal and other local defense forces. It concludes by outlining a community defense initiative that needs to be carefully monitored and shaped by the Afghan government and international community.

Time for a Strategic and Intellectual Pause in Afghanistan.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 40, no. 2, Summer 2010, p. 33-45.)
Author(s):
  1. Millen, Raymond A.
Subject(s):
  1. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
The author calls for a strategic pause in the way America is executing its Afghanistan strategy. He focuses on three strategic misconceptions he believes require greater scrutiny: associating the Hearts-and-Minds strategy with government legitimacy, using the correlation of forces as the foundation of the strategy, and assuming unity of effort is a natural consequence of multinational endeavors. The author leaves the reader with the warning that it is incumbent upon decision-makers to instill greater intellectual rigor on issues involving counterinsurgency and state-building.
Tough Talking: The Case for Negotiations with the Taliban.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 155, no. 6, December 2010, p. 60-66.)
Author(s):
1. Waldman, Matt
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. TALIBAN
3. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
4. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
Notes:
The Afghan insurgency is pervasive, persistent and gaining in strength. There are enormous obstacles to counter-insurgency and transition in Afghanistan, and efforts to defeat the insurgents are unlikely to succeed. There is an urgent need for an inclusive peace process, involving steps towards negotiations with the Taliban.
ID Number: JA027364
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART

Author(s):
1. Wilner, Alex S.
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--PREVENTION
2. TERRORISM--AFGHANISTAN
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
This article examines the coercive and deterrent utility of targeting the leaders of violent, non-state organizations with precision force. Building on the literatures on targeted killings and deterrence theory, this article provides a case study analysis of targeted killings in Afghanistan. Relying on publicly available and semi-private sources, the article presents a comparative analysis of four targeted killings conducted against Taliban leaders. Findings suggest that the eliminations degraded Taliban professionalism, diminished the
group's success rates, influenced their selection of targets, and weakened morale. These findings speak to the efficacy of targeted killings in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and to their value as both counter-capability and counter-motivation operations.

Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency.
(SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES, vol. 21, no. 3, September 2010, p. 459-475.)
Author(s):
1. Bennett, Huw
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
Notes:
With strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan far from certain, comforting beliefs about Britain's superiority at counterinsurgency have come under increasingly sceptical scrutiny. This article contributes to the debate with particular reference to the supposedly pivotal principle of minimum force. After discussing the recent literature on the subject, the article critiques the methodology employed by advocates of the traditionalist view on British COIN, arguing for a more rigorous historical approach based on primary sources. Following these historical matters, it is argued that conceptually, minimum force should be analysed dialectically in relation to practices of exemplary force, and above all, on the evidence of what happens in a conflict. Arguably the value ascribed to doctrine in strategic analysis has become unduly inflated, and we must look beyond it to understand war and political violence.

(SURVIVAL, vol. 52, no. 4, August - September 2010, p. 131-157.)
Author(s):
1. Ucko, David H.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011--GREAT BRITAIN
Notes:
The conduct of operations in Iraq and the circumstances of withdrawal in 2009 are likely to have effects as far-reaching as the initial invasion in 2003.
The Fallujah Awakening: A Case Study in Counter-Insurgency.
(SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES, vol. 21, no. 4, December 2010, p. 591-609.)
Author(s):
1. Green, Daniel R.
Subject(s):
1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
The successful pacification of Fallujah in 2007 during the Anbar Awakening movement was due to the coordinated efforts of US and Iraqi forces to physically and psychologically separate the people from the insurgency. Efforts along security, political, and development lines along with a robust tribal effort eliminated the armed insurgency and set the basis for victory in the area. But a synchronized delivery of these resources was insufficient to defeat the insurgency by itself absent the population's decision to turn against the insurgents. This process began to occur in 2006 and was successfully capitalized upon by Coalition Forces in Fallujah in 2007.

The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 33, no. 2, April 2010, p. 17-32.)
Author(s):
1. Pollack, Kenneth M.
2. Sargsyan, Irena L.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. DISENGAGEMENT (MILITARY SCIENCE)
Notes:
The United States is leaving Iraq, but how it leaves is tremendously important. The authors draw lessons from recent history around the world to foresee the risks, namely civil war resuming or problems between Iraqi military and civilian government arising, and how to minimize them.

Counterinsurgency 3.0.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 40, no. 1, Spring 2010, p. 34-46.)
Author(s):
1. Choharis, Peter Charles
2. Gavrilis, James A.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AMERICAN
Notes:
This article explains how civilian and military policy-makers have incorrectly assumed that international development aid is inherently beneficial to local populations; necessarily fosters stability; and invariably leads to a grateful populace that will shun insurgents, thereby advancing US strategic goals. The article posits that using international aid to combat radical Islamic insurgencies is more complex than aid advocates assume and outlines how small-scale, micro-development based on corporate social responsibility practices, rather than traditional foreign aid, will have the greatest and most
enduring impact against Islamic insurgencies. Such an approach most effectively inculcates beliefs and institutionalizes behaviors that are congenial to the West while being sensitive to local conditions.

Counterinsurgency and Beyond.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 40, no. 1, Spring 2010, p. 20-33.)
Author(s):
1. Lacquement, Richard A.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS--USA
Notes:
This article presents a framework to assist military and civilian leadership to comprehensively meet counterinsurgency challenges. It consists of four sections. The first section provides an elaboration on the comprehensive nature of counterinsurgency efforts and the concomitant imperatives for integrating military and civilian efforts. This section lays out the COIN imperatives with emphasis on desired effects or outcomes. The second section provides a summary of counterinsurgency participants and their roles and interests. The third section addresses how to integrate military and civilian activities in COIN. It addresses some of the principles for unifying civilian-military efforts. The fourth section offers analysis and recommendations aimed at improving American approaches to counterinsurgency with respect to current challenges.

Counterinsurgency Principles for the Diplomat.
(ORBIS, vol. 54, no. 2, Spring 2010, p. 215-231.)
Author(s):
1. Amend, Kurt
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The recent resurgence of interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has revealed a deficit in material written by and for the diplomat, the actor ostensibly responsible for the political component of a counterinsurgency campaign. Classical theorists stress that progress along the political track is essential for ultimate success. Recent commentary, in shedding new light on the characteristics of modern insurgencies, reaffirms this principle. To make political headway the diplomat-counterinsurgent needs to develop a strategic narrative, build a political strategy around the narrative, acquire expertise, become a catalyst for political change, and maximize contact with the local population. In doing so, he will make important contributions to and help accelerate success in a counterinsurgency campaign.
The Myth of a Kinder, Gentler War.
(WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, vol. 27, no. 1, Spring 2010, p. 75-86.)
Author(s):
1. Cohen, Michael A.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The article examines issues arising from the fighting of counter-insurgency wars. The central focus of the article is a recognition that counter-insurgency conflicts are frequently violent and have an impact on civilians who are often coerced and brutalized by both sides involved in fighting. The discussion is centered on the undertakings of American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops engaged in the prosecution of the Afghan War. A brief history of counter-insurgency conflicts is provided.

Vaincre les insurrections.
(SECURITE GLOBALE, no. 12, ete 2010, p. 97-108.)
Author(s):
1. Courreges, Herve de
2. Germain, Emmanuel
3. Le Nen, Nicolas
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
This article demonstrates that there are more similarities between peacekeeping and counter-insurgency than often recognized. In today's 'war among the people', the counter-insurgent cannot succeed with offensive military capabilities alone and must seek to apply also non-kinetic and defensive methods; whereas the peacekeeper often is forced to apply 'robust' and kinetic means to implement a mandate. As a result, the two concepts seem to be converging and share commonalities. The article compares the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 'capstone doctrine' and the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual to argue that the two doctrines share similarities in six areas: 1) a focus on civilian solutions; 2) a need for protection of civilians; 3) international coherence; 4) host-nation ownership; 5) use of intelligence in support of operations; 6) limitations on the use of force. The article suggests areas where the two doctrines could mesh with each other.
The Security Trinity: Understanding the Role of Security Forces in COIN.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 59, 2010, p. 35-39.)
Author(s):
1. Greek, Eric E.
Subject(s):
1. POLICE
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
3. POLICE--IRAQ
4. POLICE--AFGHANISTAN
ID Number: JA027195
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART

The Insurgent's Response to the Defense of Cities.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 40, no. 3, Autumn 2010, p. 103-117.)
Author(s):
1. Jardine, Eric
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The author examines why the majority of counterinsurgency campaigns begin in the major cities of contested nations. He attempts to answer two questions for the reader: Why do counterinsurgencies begin their campaigns in cities? And, how does an insurgency react to this decision on behalf of the counterinsurgency? He concludes that the deployment of counterinsurgency forces in rural areas and the leveraging of local power holders are two methods for increasing the counterinsurgent's probability of success.
ID Number: JA027592
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART

Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency.
(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 33, no. 1, February 2010, p. 81-121.)
Author(s):
1. Jones, David Martin
2. Smith, M. L. R.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it.
ID Number: JA026643
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART
Care and Counterinsurgency.  
(JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, p. 139-159.)  
Author(s):  
  1. Levine, Daniel H.  
Subject(s):  
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY  
Notes:  
Counterinsurgency demands different tactics than conventional warfare, and as a result requires a different moral perspective as well. Counterinsurgents face a situation in which the distinction between civilians and combatants can be obscure, and where they are expected not just to defeat an enemy but to actively promote the interests of, and build trust with, the civilian population. What counterinsurgents need are not new moral rules of war so much as new virtues that will let them conduct their activities, within the moral minimums set by the rules of war, in a way more coherent with the implicit values of just counterinsurgency. These virtues have been explored in what may be a surprising area - discussions of the 'ethic of care' inspired by the need to manage urges to violence and anger in the context of building trust relationships in the family. Reflection on the ethics of care can reveal a way of thinking about counterinsurgency that highlights the importance of developing attentiveness, creativity, and restraint in a counterinsurgent's relations both with civilians in the area of operation and even with insurgent combatants.  
ID Number: JA027017  
Year: 2010  
Language: English  
Type: ART  

A Cognitive Approach to COIN : Countering Dangerous Beliefs.  
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 26, no. 3, September 2010, p. 273-288.)  
Author(s):  
  1. MacNeil, Jeffrey A.  
Subject(s):  
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY  
Notes:  
The scope of this article is to provide 1) an introductory framework that illustrates the underlying belief structures that encourage active or passive support of insurgencies; 2) historic and contemporary examples of targeting these beliefs both directly or indirectly; and 3) recommendations for the inclusion of a coherent cognitive theory that can guide military COIN operations to increase popular support. Social engagement of the population is crucial for effective belief targeting; elements of social psychology and attitude change are therefore integrated into the proposed model. The primary objective for COIN forces in countering dangerous beliefs is to diminish the intensity of the belief, and consequently diminish the impact of the belief (passive or active support for insurgents).  
ID Number: JA027208  
Year: 2010  
Language: English  
Type: ART
Imperial Nostalgia, the Liberal Lie, and the Perils of Postmodern Counterinsurgency.
(SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES, vol. 21, no. 2, June 2010, p. 233-258.)

Author(s):
1. Marshall, Alex

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
Since 9/11, counterinsurgency is back in fashion; the 'war on terror' has even been branded a 'global counterinsurgency'. However, the context within which counterinsurgency originally arose is critical to understanding the prospects for its present success; the radically changed environment in which it is currently being conducted casts into considerable doubt the validity of the doctrine's application by many national militaries currently 'rediscovering' this school of military thought today. Above all, classical counterinsurgency was a profoundly imperial, state-centric phenomenon; consequently it only rarely faced the thorny issue of sovereignty and legitimacy which bedevils and may doom these same efforts today.'

Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern Wars – A Reply to Jones and Smith.

Author(s):
1. Nagl, John A.
2. Burton, Brian M.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
A Long-Term Counterinsurgency Strategy.

Author(s):
1. Patterson, John James

Subject(s):
1. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA
2. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--AFGHANISTAN
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY
5. AIR POWER

Notes:
The author examines the unique capabilities of Special Operations Forces to meet various strategic objectives and their synergistic relationship with airpower. He then assesses the strategic utility of this combination in an irregular warfare environment.

A Long-Term Counterinsurgency Strategy.

Author(s):
1. Patterson, John James

Subject(s):
1. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA
2. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--AFGHANISTAN
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY
5. AIR POWER

Notes:
The author examines the unique capabilities of Special Operations Forces to meet various strategic objectives and their synergistic relationship with airpower. He then assesses the strategic utility of this combination in an irregular warfare environment.

ID Number: JA026914
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART

Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern Wars – A Reply to Jones and Smith.

Author(s):
1. Nagl, John A.
2. Burton, Brian M.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
A Long-Term Counterinsurgency Strategy.

Author(s):
1. Patterson, John James

Subject(s):
1. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA
2. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--AFGHANISTAN
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY
5. AIR POWER

Notes:
The author examines the unique capabilities of Special Operations Forces to meet various strategic objectives and their synergistic relationship with airpower. He then assesses the strategic utility of this combination in an irregular warfare environment.

ID Number: JA026644
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART

A Long-Term Counterinsurgency Strategy.

Author(s):
1. Patterson, John James

Subject(s):
1. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA
2. SPECIAL FORCES (MILITARY SCIENCE)--AFGHANISTAN
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY
5. AIR POWER

Notes:
The author examines the unique capabilities of Special Operations Forces to meet various strategic objectives and their synergistic relationship with airpower. He then assesses the strategic utility of this combination in an irregular warfare environment.

ID Number: JA027593
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART
Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 33, no. 3, July 2010, p. 21-34.)
Author(s):
1. Zambernardi, Lorenzo
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in practice a counterinsurgent needs to choose two out of three. This is the impossible trilemma of counterinsurgency.
ID Number: JA026952
Year: 2010
Language: English
Type: ART

Missing Links : The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency Thinking.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 154, no. 1, February 2009, p. 16-21.)
Author(s):
1. Noetzel, Timo
2. Schreer, Benjamin
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GERMANY
Notes:
The need for COIN operations to tackle the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is accepted by most coalition members. The German army has yet to adapt to this development. This article examines why the German political establishment still contests the need for counter-insurgency tactics in northern Afghanistan.
ID Number: JA025653
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Author(s):
1. Noetzel, Timo
2. Schreer, Benjamin
Subject(s):
1. ISAF
2. AFGHAN WAR, 2001–
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--NATO
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
The operation in Afghanistan threatens to overburden the Atlantic alliance. In the face of a complex and growing Afghan insurgency movement, the world's most powerful military alliance struggles to maintain political unity and displays significant gaps regarding military capabilities. Will Afghanistan become NATO's 'Vietnam', leaving a deep negative imprint on the future of the Atlantic alliance? Historical analogies should always be treated cautiously as no two wars are alike. Yet, as this article argues, NATO might well suffer similar politico-military consequences from trying to succeed in counter-insurgency as did US forces in Southeast Asia. Particularly, political issues of legitimacy and sustainability loom large. Further, in the case of 'defeat' at the Hindu Kush the Afghan operation will likely have a significant impact on NATO's future as an international security actor. While failure
in Afghanistan will not result in the Atlantic alliance's demise, failure will nevertheless decrease the credibility of NATO as a global security actor and greatly diminish its capability for strategy-making. In the eyes of many allies, the demonstration of severe political and military limits when endeavouring to succeed in a complex contested nation-building scenario will greatly diminish NATO's utility as a Western instrument to project stability far beyond its traditional theatres of operation.

Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy.
Author(s):
1. Betz, David
2. Cormack, Anthony
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN

Flipping the Taliban.
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 88, no. 4, July - August 2009, p. 34-45.)
Author(s):
1. Christia, Fotini
2. Semple, Michael
Subject(s):
1. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
2. TALIBAN
3. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
President Barack Obama's proposed deployment of 21,000 more US troops to Afghanistan is necessary to tip the balance of power against the Taliban. But it will not be enough. Washington and its allies must accompany the move with a political 'surge', an effort to persuade large groups of insurgents to give up their fight. This can be done: in Afghanistan, battles are often decided by defections rather than fighting, and for many members of the Taliban, the insurgency is less a matter of ideology than a way of life.

ID Number: JA026480
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

ID Number: JA025695
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

ID Number: JA026009
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
This article examines Britain's capabilities and resources in Helmand Province, and assesses the high-level strategy and civilian-military inter-relationships that provide the overarching framework of current operations. In doing so, the authors analyse the British counter-insurgency approach, arguing that the UK's troops have faced and overcome unique challenges in Afghanistan.

This article assesses the British military effort in Afghanistan looking at three key elements in the campaign: strategy, military operations, and the inter-agency 'Comprehensive Approach'. The authors start by recognising the scale of the challenge that has faced the British: of all the provinces in Afghanistan, Helmand is the toughest to stabilize and secure. They then examine the evolution of all three elements above and find significant improvements in each: a flawed strategy has been corrected; the military have received more resources and become significantly better at COIN; and there is significant progress in the development of the inter-agency approach. In short, what the Americans will find in Helmand is a British COIN machine; a little creaky perhaps, but one that is fit for purpose and getting the job done. The authors briefly conclude on the prospects and the key to success: namely the development of a more coherent international strategy that accommodates the challenges posed by both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration.
(TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, vol. 21, no. 3, July - September 2009, p. 359-377.)
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. TERRORISM--USA--PREVENTION
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
4. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
Notes:
This article assesses the scope and nature of the current terrorist threat to the United States and suggests a strategy to counter it. It focuses first on creating a micro approach to address the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It then considers the requirements of a broader macro strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency.
ID Number: JA026088
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Winning in Afghanistan.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 39, no. 1, Spring 2009, p. 5-21.)
Author(s):
1. Jalali, Ali A.
Subject(s):
1. AFGHANISTAN--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
The author details the measures necessary for an effective and accountable Afghan government capable of providing the rule of law and security for its citizens. The author believes that such a government will be capable of providing the rule of law and security for its citizens. Jalali believes that such a government will be capable of forming an effective partnership with neighbors and the international community in efforts to stabilize the region. He concludes with a warning that long-term stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved through measures directed at changing the current divisive national environment, not simply by pursuing solutions at the local level of government in an expeditious effort to accomplish more immediate and temporary gains.
ID Number: JA025906
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
Antidote to Insurgency.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 65, no. 1, January 2009, p. 8-10.)
Author(s):
1. Khan, Ayesha
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. TALIBAN
Notes:
Formulating a new strategy for Afghanistan's insurgency will not be easy. More troops might further inflame local frustration, but getting tribes to do the fighting could be costly too. Then there is the tricky question of talking to the Taliban, does it include insurgents in Pakistan as well?
ID Number: JA025454
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Justice and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan: A Missing Link.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 154, no. 1, February 2009, p. 6-9.)
Author(s):
1. Ledwidge, Frank
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATION OF--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
Recent counter-insurgency doctrine has largely ignored the justice sector. This article, referring to current multinational efforts in Afghanistan, contends that this is a serious mistake. It is an error not made by the Taliban, who are acutely aware of its importance.
ID Number: JA025652
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Recasting Afghan Strategy.
(SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES, vol. 20, no. 1, March 2009, p. 87-117.)
Author(s):
1. Orr, Allan
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
Notes:
This article aims to examine current counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan to posit an untried theoretical concept of operations for the war being waged there. By doing so it argues that Coalition and NATO forces operating there may be required to fundamentally recast Afghan war-policy if a resurgent Taliban and Al-Qa'eda are to be countered in both the military and political spheres of present day Afghanistan. By way of strategy this article posits that a more optimal strategy in Afghanistan, in light of the campaign's apparent difficulties, might be to seed local security apparatuses, designated herein as 'Rural Paramilitary Forces.'
ID Number: JA025861
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
Trotsky in Baluchistan.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 104, November - December 2009, p. 61-71.)
Author(s):
1. Rashid, Ahmed
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
ID Number: JA026299
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Adapting Government for Stabilisation and Counter-Insurgency Operations.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 154, no. 6, December 2009, p. 8-13.)
Author(s):
1. Rathmell, Andrew
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
The demands of counter-insurgency have sparked much discussion about the need for army reform. But it is also the case that government, as a whole, must adapt to the present campaign. Britain has lagged behind the US in this regards, and it is not clear that sufficient political will exists in the UK for real change. However, British capacity is only ever the first step: ultimately, what matters for successful stabilisation is the capability and legitimacy of the host government.
ID Number: JA026420
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan.
(SURVIVAL, vol. 51, no. 1, February - March 2009, p. 29-60.)
Author(s):
1. Roberts, Adam
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan are exposing the difficulty of applying traditional counter-insurgency doctrine in today's conditions.
ID Number: JA025551
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
US President Barack Obama's current policy, in line with the prevailing Washington consensus, favours escalation in Afghanistan. The idea is that as the United States' military presence in Iraq is drawn down, the use of force can be refocused on Afghanistan to forge a more viable state. The principal instruments of this policy are more American troops with better force protection (a customised version of the counter-insurgency 'surge' employed with ostensible success in Iraq) and firmer bilateral diplomacy with Pakistan. The administration's policy appears to be overdetermined. The premise of the policy is that the United States must 'own' Afghanistan in order to defend its strategic interests. But that premise begs the question of whether US strategic interests actually require the United States to assume the grand and onerous responsibility of rebuilding the Afghan state. They do not.

By 2008, in the face of mounting criticism of the British performance in Iraq and clear evidence that the US surge was 'working', the transatlantic debate on small wars had been inverted: 'Basra' had supplanted 'Malaya' as shorthand for British skill in irregular warfare; it was now the Americans who seemed the masters of modern counterinsurgency and the British the students in need of instruction. The author examines what this apparent role reversal - and the accompanying 'family feud' - really says about Anglophone armies.

Notes:
1. US President Barack Obama's current policy, in line with the prevailing Washington consensus, favours escalation in Afghanistan. The idea is that as the United States' military presence in Iraq is drawn down, the use of force can be refocused on Afghanistan to forge a more viable state. The principal instruments of this policy are more American troops with better force protection (a customised version of the counter-insurgency 'surge' employed with ostensible success in Iraq) and firmer bilateral diplomacy with Pakistan. The administration's policy appears to be overdetermined. The premise of the policy is that the United States must 'own' Afghanistan in order to defend its strategic interests. But that premise begs the question of whether US strategic interests actually require the United States to assume the grand and onerous responsibility of rebuilding the Afghan state. They do not.

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1. By 2008, in the face of mounting criticism of the British performance in Iraq and clear evidence that the US surge was 'working', the transatlantic debate on small wars had been inverted: 'Basra' had supplanted 'Malaya' as shorthand for British skill in irregular warfare; it was now the Americans who seemed the masters of modern counterinsurgency and the British the students in need of instruction. The author examines what this apparent role reversal - and the accompanying 'family feud' - really says about Anglophone armies.
The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 32, no. 1, January 2009, p. 43-59.)
Author(s):
1. MacCary, John A.
Subject(s):
1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
2. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
5. TRIBES--IRAQ
Notes:
The September 2006 shift in Iraq's al Anbar province was caused neither by the number of U.S troops in 'the surge', nor outrage at the brutality of al Qaeda's tactics, but the Sunni tribal sheikhs' increased sense of al Qaeda's threat to their power, leading them to align with the U.S. military and its new strategy.
ID Number: JA025672
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Victory over Terrorism: Essential Services as Counterinsurgency Strategy.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 53, 2009, p. 110-115.)
Author(s):
1. Treistman, Jeffrey Philip
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
ID Number: JA025704
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 32, no. 10, October 2009, p. 909-918.)
Author(s):
1. Walker, Lydia
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
4. INSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is designed to combat a defined insurgency. In the present situation in Iraq, COIN's definition has been radically extended to include nation-building as well. This additional function has expanded the scope of the role of the Coalition Forces in Iraq. Yet COIN in its present incarnation may not be enough to finalize the implementation of the strategy of nation-building. This article finds three main criticisms/limitations of contemporary COIN strategy: (1) It is predicated on a classic notion of insurgency that looks very different from present conflicts. (2) Although COIN advocates a political solution to a political problem, it uses (by default) mainly military mechanisms to carry it out. (3) Completion of the intricate and ambitious tasks necessary to defeat
insurgencies in foreign lands may lie outside the direct control of the United States.

ID Number: JA026245
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

(SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES, vol. 20, no. 1, March 2009, p. 160-184.)
Author(s):
  1. Clemis, Martin G.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
Written in response to the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the new US Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual reflects a unity of effort between the military and academic worlds rarely seen at the doctrinal or operational level. Because counterinsurgency operations are predicated upon an intimate understanding of human behavior as well as the social, economic, and political forces that can aggravate and encourage insurgents to take up arms against the standing authority, the American military has called upon scholars to lend their expertise towards developing nonmilitary or 'nonkinetic' prescriptions for battling 'internal' war over the years. Since the early 1960s many within the academic community have answered that call. Such participation, however, has sparked a bitter debate among members of both academe and the military. This article examines the role that human rights advocates and social scientists have played in shaping counterinsurgency doctrine as well as the controversy this participation has produced both during the Cold War and today.

ID Number: JA025863
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

The United States and Counterinsurgency: 'Political First, Political Last, Political Always'.
(INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 85, no. 1, January 2009, p. 61-79.)
Author(s):
  1. Cornish, Paul
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
According to the status of forces agreement signed by Iraq and the United States in November 2008, US troops are to be withdrawn entirely from Iraq by the end of 2011. A few days later it was also revealed that the British force in Iraq, numbering about 4,100 troops, will be reduced to a contingent of just a few hundred military advisors by summer 2009. The counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, on the other hand, is to be intensified in the form of a 'surge' in military and political effort. Counterinsurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have long been at the centre of the security policy debate in the United States and elsewhere; a debate which seems unlikely to be resolved in the near future. But what exactly is counterinsurgency? This article offers some reflections on the practice and the politics of an especially complex form of military engagement. All military activity should be understood through the prism of politics, and counterinsurgency particularly.

83

Author(s):
1. Floersheim, Bruce

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA
3. USA--ARMY

Notes:
An intense debate now rages concerning whether the Army should be
preparing and organizing to conduct more ambiguous, irregular
operations or focus on maintaining its well honed edge in
high-intensity warfare. The terms of the debate are clearly
affected by the fact that United States is currently embroiled
in perilous counterinsurgency and other irregular operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Should the Army recalibrate itself to
wage counterinsurgency and other irregular operations more
effectively, or does it need to keep doing what it does best
with an eye to future conventional warfare? Given the
impossibility of accurately predicting the character of future
conflict, it is necessary for the Army to strike a balance
between the extremes. But for the Army to effectively implement
a policy of 'balance', it must be prepared to dramatically
change the way it organizes itself and drop its opposition to
specializing its forces for irregular and conventional warfare,
respectively. The approach that the Army should take should be
based upon a Total Force construct. By utilizing the entire
Total Force portfolio, it should be possible to better optimize
the mix of ground units prepared for conventional war,
irregular war or peace operations to avoid a mis-match between
national security strategy and military force. In this manner,
it may be possible to stake our claim on the hard won lessons
of Iraq and Afghanistan, yet hedge against the unknowable
future.

A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 2009, p. 5-17.)

Author(s):
1. Gentile, Gian P.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA

Notes:
The author provides a persuasive argument that the US military's
myopic focus on population-centric counterinsurgency is a
direct result of the 2006 publication of Field Manual 3-24,
Counterinsurgency. The author espouses the belief that
over-emphasis with regard to the role played by the populace
has perverted the Army's focus and warfighting capabilities,
limiting its ability to improvise and respond to differing
threats. He believes this new way of war (population-centric
counterinsurgency) has become the only operational tool in the
Army's repertoire capable of dealing with problems of
insurgency and instability. The author concludes that
population-centric COIN may be an effective operational
methodology, but it should never be considered a strategy.

A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 39, no. 4, Winter 2009 - 2010, p. 45-57.)

Author(s):
1. Goode, Steven M.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA

Notes:
The author draws upon research by the Center for Army Analysis at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to provide an informed discussion regarding the guidelines for force requirements in counterinsurgency. The author analyzes force requirements from a number of insurgencies to suggest guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. His analysis of these insurgencies and the interpretation of data support the conclusion that adequate forces can enable the counterinsurgent's ability to provide a certain level of security in the area of operations, but security alone will not be sufficient for victory. The author cautions that the research presented should not be construed as policy recommendations or a call for specific force levels, but rather, it serves as a guide for the planning and execution of future operations.

(PARAMETERS, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 2009, p. 18-31.)

Author(s):
1. Gregg, Heather S.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA

Notes:
The author bases the article's thesis on the belief that whichever side wins the support of the population wins the battle. She reminds the reader that the battle is not the war. The war, in fact, requires transitions from the short-term objectives associated with population engagement to the long-term viability of the host nation as reflected in a stable and functioning state. The author believes it is critical that America's military understands that its long-term goal is much more than simply winning the population over to a particular philosophy or belief; it requires the successful execution of the near-term measures that support the establishment of a functional state. In support of her conclusion, the author provides a detailed examination of three analytical stages required to achieve victory in COIN : population engagement, stability operations, and the creation of a functioning state.
The Future of War and American Military Strategy.  
(ORBIS, vol. 53, no. 2, Spring 2009, p. 300-318.)

Author(s):
1. Horowitz, Michael C.
2. Shalmon, Dan A.

Subject(s):
1. USA--STRATEGIC ASPECTS
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE--USA
4. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS (MILITARY SCIENCE)--USA

Notes:
The outcome of ongoing debates over the future of American military strategy will play a critical role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the United States over the next decade. Traditionalists worry about the shift towards emphasizing counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare, believing that the use of force is often ineffective in COIN situations and the American military should concentrate on planning for conventional war. In contrast, COIN advocates argue that the United States must focus its efforts on preparing for the wars it is most likely to fight, irregular wars. However, both schools of thought rely on assumptions about the future security environment that may reveal another path forward. First, although it seems intuitive to view irregular warfare as the dominant future concern, it is exceedingly difficult to predict accurately the future security environment, as the last 20 years have clearly shown. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the character of emergent threats will depend on how the United States focuses its resources. Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation. However, with some smart and careful investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task, the United States military can both lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the short to medium term.

ID Number: JA025694
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Learning Under Fire: Progress and Dissent in the US Military.  
(SURVIVAL, vol. 51, no. 4, August - September 2009, p. 31-48.)

Author(s):
1. Tohn, David
2. Wharton, Jaron

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA

Notes:
The Pentagon’s shift to a counter-insurgency posture was catalysed by junior leaders responding to tactical problems and senior institutional dissidents driving deep, controversial changes in doctrine and culture.

ID Number: JA026052
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 32, no. 2, April 2009, p. 103-120.)
Author(s):
1. Byman, Daniel
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Talks with insurgents are often necessary to end conflicts, but
they can also be politically costly, fail, and even backfire.
Policymakers and analysts should consider these eight
questions, derived from Iraq and elsewhere, for Afghanistan and
beyond.
ID Number: JA025787
Year: 2009
Language: English
Type: ART

Contre-insurrection(s).
(SECURITE GLOBALE, no. 10, hiver 2009 - 2010, numero entier.)
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
ID Number: JA026627
Year: 2009
Language: French
Type: ART

Une necessite complexe: la place des civils en contre-insurrection.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 65eme annee, no. 11,
novembre 2009, p. 60-67.)
Author(s):
1. Esquerre, Hugues
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
Notes:
La conduite d'operations de contre-insurrection impose au XXIe
siecle des contraintes diverses qui interdissent au militaire de
la gerer seul. La mise en oeuvre de competences civils doit
donc completer l'action purement securitaire. Or, cela souleve
des problemes de prerogatives et de choix dans la definition
d'une structure de commandement. Ainsi malgre la reussite
avee de l'unification de l'action operationnelle sous l'egide
du militaire, cette possibilite semble souvent incongrue aux
cercles decisionnels contemporains. Les militaires et civils
doivent donc evoluer pour accepter cette idee, ce qui signifie
en France de depasser definitivement le traumatisme ancien
herit de des annees 60.
ID Number: JA026323
Year: 2009
Language: French
Type: ART
Counter-Insurgency Politics: Going Global.
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 65, no. 10, October 2009, p. 26-28.)
Author(s):
1. Jones, David Martin
2. Smith, M. L. R.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
What motivates Islamic extremism? There can be few more significant questions since the answer helps shape security policy. But the lack of agreement on the key factors weakens domestic and international responses to violent threats.

Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 2009, p. 49-64.)
Author(s):
1. Krause, Lincoln B.
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The author examines a number of insurgencies to determine that despite the pivotal role played by insurgent mistakes, academics and practitioners continue to concentrate disproportionately on the government's role in combatting and defeating insurgencies. There is virtually no mention in the related genre of the incidence or function of insurgent mistakes. The author divides insurgent strategic mistakes into two categories: 'original sin' and 'situational miscalculations'. He focuses his analysis on the latter to determine that the majority of these mistakes are made by insurgent leaders during the early portion of the insurgency and often involve decisions related to intermediate objectives and tactics. The author then analyzes the ten most likely situational miscalculations made by insurgent leaders and concludes that the US military needs to not only recognize their existence, but also integrate the lessons-learned from these mistakes into current doctrine.

Einsatz in einem komplexen und dynamischen Umfeld: Counterinsurgency.
(EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 58. Jg, Nr. 5, Mai 2009, S. 36-39.)
Author(s):
1. Larsen, Uwe
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
ID Number: JA025904
Year: 2009
Language: German
Type: ART
Les armées occidentales face aux rébellions locales.

(POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 123, printemps 2009, p. 205-218.)

Author(s):
1. Lasserre, Isabelle

Subject(s):
1. MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
The interminable Iraq conflict; the Afghan quagmire; Israel's inability to crush Hezbollah (in 2006) or Hamas (last winter) ...
Since the beginning of the new millennium, Western armies, however powerful and well-equipped they may be, have had a hard time defeating rebellious forces with significantly fewer resources. In the United States as in Europe, a new paradigm is taking shape in military circles. It is drawn from lessons learned from the mistakes of the past few decades - by the French in Algeria and the Americans in Vietnam - as well as the successes of General David Petraeus in Iraq. Recently appointed commander of the US Army's Central Command, Petraeus considers it crucial to combine military pressure with efforts to win over the 'hearts and minds' of the local population. This is, of course, a long-term process, but in all theaters of operation, it is the only way to achieve real victory.

ID Number: JA025893
Year: 2009
Language: French
Type: ART

Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars.


Author(s):
1. Lyall, Jason
2. Wilson, Isaiah

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
During the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes. Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands. What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency (COIN) wars? The authors argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is primarily responsible for this shift. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations. This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population. Modern militaries may therefore inadvertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies. The authors test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies (1800-2005) and paired comparison of two U.S Army divisions in Iraq (2003-2004). They find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent's status as an occupier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat. By contrast, the authors find only partial support for conventional power- and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success.

ID Number: JA025711
Year: 2009
Language: English
De Clausewitz a Galula, la singularité de la guerre contre-insurrectionnelle.
(DEFENSE NATIONALE ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE, 65eme année, no. 10, octobre 2009, p.97-105.)

Author(s):
1. Meissonnier, Matthieu

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
La lecture comparée de Clausewitz et Galula, comme semble nous y inviter le général américain Petraeus, permet de comprendre ce que le second doit au premier, mais surtout en quoi il innove. Elle permet d'appréhender la singularité de la guerre contre-insurrectionnelle. Selon Galula, elle se caractérise par la maîtrise de la violence et le refus de la montée aux extrêmes. Son centre de gravité n'est pas l'armée adverse, mais la population qu'il faut conquérir. Enfin, elle confirme la prépondérance du politique sur le militaire et exclut toute autonomie de la sphère de la guerre.

ID Number: JA026219
Year: 2009
Language: French
Type: ART

2008

Counter-What? Germany and Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan.

Author(s):
1. Noetzel, Timo
2. Schreer, Benjamin

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GERMANY
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN

ID Number: JA024874
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Cellphones in the Hindu Kush.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 96, July - August 2008, p. 42-51.)

Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
2. Jones, Seth G.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. AFGHANISTAN--BOUNDARIES--PAKISTAN
3. PAKISTAN--BOUNDARIES--AFGHANISTAN

Notes:
You can't win the war without settling the frontier. Why the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is the key to fighting terror.

ID Number: JA025030
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART
Afghanistan: Some Recent Observations.
Author(s):
  1. Rose, Michael
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
  2. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--AFGHANISTAN
ID Number: JA025458
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

From Great Game to Grand Bargain.
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 87, no. 6, November - December 2008, p. 30-44.)
Author(s):
  1. Rubin, Barnett R.
  2. Rashid, Ahmed
Subject(s):
  1. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
  Afghanistan and Pakistan are in crisis. More U.S. troops, more
  money, and attacks into Pakistan's lawless tribal areas will do
  little to counter the growing threats or avert chaos. U.S.
  strategy must seek a diplomatic grand bargain - forging
  compromise with insurgents while addressing an array of
  regional rivalries and insecurities.
ID Number: JA025213
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Iraq ans Its Borders: The Role of Barriers in Counter-Insurgency.
Author(s):
  1. Alderson, Alexander
Subject(s):
  1. IRAQ--BOUNDARIES
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
  The purpose of this article is to determine the merits of Iraq
  adopting border security measures in order to counter both
  insurgent threats and organized crime. The article examines
  border security in the context of counter-insurgency theory and
  doctrine, looks at four case studies, and identifies
  principles. Finally, it makes conclusions about the
  appropriateness of border barriers to assist with improving
  Iraq's internal security and stability.
ID Number: JA024825
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART
The US 'Surge' as a Collaborative Corrective for Iraq.
Author(s):
1. Arnold, Matthew B
Subject(s):
1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
What is the collaborative approach that defines US strategy for the Iraq War? This article provides an analysis of the so-called 'surge' during 2007 through the lens of the US's ability to collaborate effectively or not with Iraqi partners. The US's predicament in Iraq results from the fact that it has struggled profoundly at the art of collaboration. Given that, the current surge of US troops is a corrective of past policy mistakes in building adequate relationships linking US power to Iraqi partners and thence more broadly to Iraq society. Without such necessary relationships, the socio-political dynamics conducive to improved security, national reconciliation and economic regeneration have been lacking. Specifically, the surge is a strategy to re-arrange collaborative relationships within Iraq by allowing the dependence on Shia militias and by bringing Sunni actors into partnership with the US and subsequently re-engaging them with Iraq's political processes.

ID Number: JA024826
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?.
Author(s):
1. Byman, Daniel
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
This article examines whether the outbreak of the insurgency after the US invasion of Iraq was an avoidable policy failure or whether the structural conditions surrounding the occupation made such an outbreak inevitable. Several U.S. policy mistakes, in particular the deployment of too few troops, a lack of comprehensive political and military planning for the occupation, disbanding the Iraqi military, the failure to establish a government in waiting and overly aggressive de-Baathification, greatly exacerbated rather than ameliorated the various structural problems. More fundamentally, structure and policy choices interacted at all levels to explain the Iraq failure. The unavoidable conditions that coalition forces encountered in Iraq – divided society devastated by years of war, sanctions, and misrule – and the political context in the United States made the challenge for successful policy execution difficult. This structure constrained and delimited the options open to U.S. policy makers but, even within those narrow limits, the United States made many bad choices that further diminished the chances of success. A particularly important series of policy mistakes occurred well in advance of the build-up to war itself. The orientation of the U.S. armed forces away from counterinsurgency, the failure to establish a political settlement before invasion, and other controllable policy choices in the prewar period all led to enormous difficulties during the occupation itself. Thus, by the time of
the invasion, these policy choices had become almost like structural constraints and the failures had a snowballing effect, making policy corrections far more difficult.

The Strategic Hub Concept: Plan C for Iraq?.
Author(s):
1. Orr, Allan
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
This article applies what is termed a 'strategic hub' concept of counterinsurgency to the war in Iraq. This concept posits that the development of insurgent and militia nodes or 'hubs' of activity could provide a more relevant way to address the key dilemmas of the Iraq equation in light of the Coalition and Iraq government's inability to secure Iraq. The article argues that ceding the insurgency and militias ground on a temporary basis may be required to maintain both military and political momentum in the post 'surge' Iraq given the draw down of US forces, the immaturity of the Iraqi Security Forces, and the present state of American and Iraqi politics.

Author(s):
1. Sky, Emma
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
ID Number: JA024828
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

With Friends Like These: Grievance, Governance, and Capacity-Building in COIN.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 2008, p. 79-90.)
Author(s):
1. Chamberlain, Robert M.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
The author challenges here an emerging trend within today's military to develop a standardized template for counterinsurgency. Specifically, that portion of the template that assumes enhancing the power of the state will make the population less likely to support insurgents. In developing a rationale for arguing against such a template the author applies the doctrine outlined in FM 3-24 to the 1980-91 insurgency in El Salvador. He believes the lessons gained from an insurgency that ended some 17 years ago provide a valuable
guide for leaders dealing with the contradictions inherent in the Long War. The author concludes that while the American military has made significant strides in the tactical and operational aspects of counterinsurgency, it faces great challenges in the strategic realm.

Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today.
Author(s):
1. Dunlap, Charles J.
Subject(s):
1. AIR POWER
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
This article examines why airpower became critical to COIN operations in 2007, a trend continuing today and one with huge implications for the future. Among other things, the author discusses the revolutions in precision and persistence that have so radically enhanced airpower's value in COIN warfare. He also outlines the strengths and weaknesses of the Air Force's new doctrine on irregular warfare which seeks to capture the service's COIN approach. The author argues that while FM 3-24's surface-force-centric approach to COIN can work, recent experience in Iraq demonstrates that leaders of all services want a more joint and interdependent concept that exploits airpower in all its dimensions. Such an approach can reduce the need for the enormous numbers of US ground forces FM 3-24 entails, freeing them to prepare for other kinds of conflicts. Airpower can help, this article contends, to provide options for decisionmakers faced with a COIN challenge that capitalize on systems which are also useful in other kinds of conflicts.

The Art of Petraeus.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 98, November - December 2008, p. 53-59.)
Author(s):
1. Hammes, Thomas X.
Subject(s):
1. USA--ARMED FORCES
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
There is no doubt that General Petraeus's strategies salvaged Iraq. His successes, however, mask a vital policy debate about the future of our armed forces. American leaders must ignore the false choice between forces prepared for counterinsurgency or those trained for conventional warfare. Can we create a military ready for all types of future wars?
Jus Post Bellum and Counterinsurgency.
Author(s):
1. Johnson, Rebecca
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. COMBATANTS AND NONCOMBATANTS (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
Notes:
The United States' continuing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused reflection on how best to wage counterinsurgency, recognizing that the blurred lines between combatants and noncombatants that characterize this type of fighting broaden the range of opportunities and obligations counterinsurgents face. While many have looked to jus in bello constraints on the just conduct of war to guide this effort, jus post bellum requirements for the just cessation of conflict provide a better framework in which to discuss how soldiers and marines may effectively and ethically pursue insurgents while simultaneously building host-nation capacity to govern politically, economically and militarily. This paper demonstrates how jus post bellum obligations provide an important structure within which counterinsurgents may understand the full range of their obligations to the host nation and its population, best pursue insurgents while honoring their commitment to noncombatant immunity, and set the standard for what constitutes the end of the conflict and the appropriate point for military disengagement.

ID Number: JA025172
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Three Years and You're Out.
(NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 93, January - February 2008, p. 54-57.)
Author(s):
1. Metz, Steven
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
As the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan fester and grow, we need to face facts. Americans are only prepared to support major counterinsurgency operations for about three years. Yet, when the United States enters a war, it doesn't base its strategy on this inevitability. Instead, they tell themselves that they are in for as long as it takes. That may be morally satisfying, but it's politically unrealistic. With this certain wane in public and congressional backing, Americans need to choose their confrontations wisely and rethink their tactics.

ID Number: JA024504
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART
Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War.
Author(s):
  1. Roper, Daniel S.
Subject(s):
  1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009
  2. INSURGENCY
  3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
America's policy of framing its war against extremists as a 'War on Terrorism' has resulted in an erroneous paradigm for countering terrorism and insurgencies. Not only does this policy mischaracterize the enemy, it obscures an understanding of their techniques and impedes the development and implementation of a strategy to counter the acts of these enemies. The author outlines a number of steps the United States should take to refocus its strategic frame of reference to more effectively address remediating symptoms and the deeper causes associated with such threats. He calls for clear thinking supported by clear language; characterized by removing the phrase 'war on terrorism' from the official lexicon and replacing it with more precise and descriptive terms. It is this clear articulation of this strategy that will allow for the integration of all the elements of national power in the effective prosecution of America's national security objectives.
ID Number: JA025355
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

Innovation or Inertia: The US Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency.
(ORBIS, vol. 52, no. 2, Spring 2008, p. 290-310.)
Author(s):
  1. Ucko, David
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
Following its encounter with insurgent violence in Iraq, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has sought to improve the US military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency. This effort suggests a potential turning-point in the history of the US military, which has traditionally devoted its attention and resources to 'high-intensity' or 'conventional' combat. Given this institutional culture, what are now the prospects of the US military 'learning counterinsurgency'? In many ways, the ongoing reorientation is promising and targeted, informed directly by the US campaign in Iraq. At the same time, Pentagon priorities still reveal a remarkable resistance to change, and this in spite of the radically altered strategic environment of the War on Terror. Given this intransigence - and the eventual fallout from the troubled Iraq campaign - the ongoing learning of counterinsurgency might very well fail to produce the type of deep-rooted change needed to truly transform the US military.
ID Number: JA024681
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART
COIN in the Real World.
Author(s):
  1. Haines, David R.
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
The author espouses the belief that classic and contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is often applied to states that would have a difficult time, at best, translating the directed practices into reality. He uses examples of insurgencies in India and Thailand to demonstrate how the application of contemporary COIN practices is often beyond the means and capabilities of nations suffering from the threat of insurgency. The author concludes that a more realistic approach to the execution of COIN would be to write a doctrine that accounts for the failings or inabilities of a particular state, and then measuring any success or failure against more rational metrics and expectations.
ID Number: JA026342
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 153, no. 1, February 2008, p. 36-40.)
Author(s):
  1. Lewis, Julian
Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
ID Number: JA024873
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

War in the Gray: Exploring the Concept of Dirty War.
Author(s):
  1. Smith, M. L. R.
  2. Roberts, Sophie
Subject(s):
  1. WAR
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
This study explores the meaning of 'dirty war'; a term that has been in increasing usage in popular and academic discussion. It endeavors to detach the phrase from its normative connotations, and using a strategic methodology along with supporting case studies, seeks to arrive at a theoretical exposition of the dirty war concept. The investigation attempts to provide a working definition that helps make sense of the term, and develops some notions of what dirty war might constitute in contradistinction to its antonym, clean war. It is argued that dirty war represents a form of strategic practice occurring in the gray area between the criminal justice and war models of counterinsurgency, and possesses its own distinctive escalatory path. Finally, the analysis returns to the ethical and normative features implicit in the term, pointing to the outstanding dilemmas that continue to permeate the study of war.
ID Number: JA024922
Year: 2008
Feldzugsplanung zur Counterinsurgency.
(OSTERREICHISCHE MILITARISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 46. Jg., Heft 2, Marz - April 2008, S. 151-162.)
Author(s):
1. Vego, Milan
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
ID Number: JA024564
Year: 2008
Language: German
Type: ART

Intelligence Sharing for Counter-Insurgency.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 24, no. 3, September 2008, p. 281-301.)
Author(s):
1. Walsh, James Igoe
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
Notes:
This article analyzes how and why governments co-operating against an insurgency can effectively share intelligence. Host countries facing armed opposition on their territory often secure military and intelligence assistance from allied states.
ID Number: JA025176
Year: 2008
Language: English
Type: ART

2007

The European Union and Counter-Insurgency: Capability, Credibility, and Political Will.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 28, no. 1, April 2007, p. 182-196.)
Author(s):
1. Bird, Tim
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--EU
Notes:
Contemporary counter-insurgency (COIN) operations demonstrate the necessity of ensuring that military lines of activity are coordinated with wider political, economic, and diplomatic strands. Some observers see the European Union as being uniquely well placed to provide such policy coordination because of its ability to draw on a wide range of civil and military capabilities. This article argues that the EU's potential as a significant and credible COIN actor is, in fact, severely undermined, both by a failure to develop the capabilities required to conduct sustained high-intensity military operations, and also by a strategic discourse that sees such activity as either illegitimate, too problematic, or outside the mission framework typology that has underpinned the development of the EU's security and defence policies. The lack of consensus on an approach, and the absence of the political will to develop one, suggests that, with respect to highly challenging contemporary COIN operations, the EU has little to offer.
ID Number: JA024463
NATO and Counter-Insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 28, no. 1, April 2007, p. 163-181.)

Author(s):
1. Kay, Sean
2. Khan, Sahar

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--NATO

Notes:
This article examines NATO as a tool for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. The authors show how its multinational character, reliance on consensus, and limited resources make NATO an unlikely contributor to effective COIN. Its role in the 1995 intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina is used to show that, in a suitably permissive environment, NATO can help to alleviate the conditions that can lead to insurgency movements. However, NATO's role in Afghanistan shows that the organization has serious limitations in the more challenging circumstances that tend to characterize contemporary COIN. It engaged there in such a way that it was difficult for it to play an effective tactical role, and its strategic liabilities were increasingly exposed. The article puts forward ways in which NATO might be reformed to take a more positive role in COIN and concludes that if it cannot make such a transition, its decline as a relevant tool for international security management will accelerate.

ID Number: JA024461

British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan.
(DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 23, no. 2, June 2007, p. 201-225.)

Author(s):
1. Chin, Warren

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
2. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
4. ISAF

Notes:
The principal focus of this paper concentrates on the counter-insurgency campaign devised by the British to deal with the Taliban and explores the critical challenges confronting British COIN doctrine when fighting in an intra-state conflict like Afghanistan's. In the past, British success in this spectrum of war has relied on a series of pillars of support in the prosecution of such campaigns. Key among these has been an understanding of the history, culture and language of the people in whose territory the war is being waged, having an effective bureaucratic and security infrastructure through which to conduct the COIN campaign, and centralized national control over the planning process and the resources invested to fight this conflict. Many of these pre-conditions do not exist in Afghanistan and this make the implementation of British COIN strategy extremely challenging.

ID Number: JA023970

99
Type: ART

Revising the British Army's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine.  
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 4, August 2007, p. 6-11.)
Author(s):
1. Alderson, Alexander
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
ID Number: JA023979
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Is UK Doctrine Relevant to Global Insurgency ?.  
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 2, April 2007, p. 34-38.)
Author(s):
1. Mackinlay, John
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
ID Number: JA023625
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq.  
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 6, December 2007, p. 8-11.)
Author(s):
1. Strachan, Hew
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
ID Number: JA024508
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Counter-Insurgency : Echoes from the Past.  
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 5, October 2007, p. 18-22.)
Author(s):
1. Torpy, Glenn
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
ID Number: JA024259
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, and Means in Iraq.
Author(s):
  1. Reider, Bruce J.
Subject(s):
  1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
This article contends that America has overly simplified the conflict in Iraq by defining it primarily as an insurgency. The author utilizes Clausewitz's relationship of ends, ways, and means, the 'paradoxical trinity' to analyze the current situation. He concludes that America needs to refocus its strategy beyond counterinsurgency operations to address the low-grade, civil war and terrorist activities that continue to contribute to instability. It is only through this rebalancing of ends, ways, and means that the United States can realize an acceptable political-end state; achievable within the means the nation is willing to expend, and the ways we as a nation support.
ID Number: JA024478
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

The Military and Reconstruction Operations.
Author(s):
  1. Ryan, Mick
Subject(s):
  1. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--AFGHANISTAN
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
The author paints here a revealing picture of the missions Provincial Reconstruction Teams are undertaking in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of counterinsurgency operations. The convergence of military and non-military tasks is creating an ever-increasing demand for military forces to participate in the conduct of humanitarian missions in support of these operations. The author believes that in many cases, the effects of reconstruction activities are much more critical to the success of counterinsurgency campaigns than tactical operations. The author does not minimize the necessity for robust combat forces, but rather, emphasizes the requirement for the proper balance between kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities.
ID Number: JA024500
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
The author notes here that throughout history counterinsurgency operations have been viewed as an arduous business, entailing tremendous popular support, political resolve, and resources. He believes that the recent publication of US Army Field Manual 3-24 and US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 does, for the first time, provide a slight glimmer of hope and a reasonable degree of tactical momentum for the way America attempts to counter insurgent threats. Utilizing his 'ally's perspective' the author reviews the process associated with the drafting of the new documents and their application in Iraq and Afghanistan. From an ally's perspective, he believes the new doctrine reflects sound theory providing the doctrinal underpinning for successful counterinsurgency operations. He believes the new doctrine is to be commended not just for what it says, but for how it translates to effective operations in the field.
(COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 26, no. 4, July - September 2007, p. 285-293.)

Author(s):
1. Ladwig, Walter C.

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. POLICE

Notes:
The lack of an institutional capacity and a legal authority to train foreign police forces is undercutting US security assistance in the war on terror. From Iraq to Afghanistan to the Philippines, effective police forces are a key component of efforts to combat insurgency. This article discusses the importance of effective policing to counterinsurgency, briefly explores the history of American police assistance during the Cold War, and proposes a means by which, for a fraction of what it spends annually on military assistance programs, the United States can leverage domestic police academies to provide high quality support and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies.

ID Number: JA024267
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART


Author(s):
1. Metz, Steven

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. INSURGENCY

Notes:
This article is an insightful review of the role that insurgencies have played throughout history and what the strategy portends for the future. The author develops his thesis based on the belief that America erred in its look back to the insurgencies of the twentieth century when formulating counterinsurgency doctrine following 9/11. He believes that the United States has once again used the lessons from old conflicts to derive new strategies; in essence, again preparing to fight the last war. He challenges the military and the defense analytical community to reexamine the lessons learned from the insurgencies of the twenty-first century. The author believes the lessons of Somalia, Bosnia, Congo, and Sierra Leone are much more applicable to today's strategic environment than those modeled on Vietnam and Algeria. He concludes that whether counterinsurgency operations remain a primary mission for the US military or not, we should never again fall into the intellectual trap of confronting new security challenges with outdated ideas and old strategies.

ID Number: JA024476
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART
An American View of Twenty-First Century Counter-Insurgency.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 152, no. 4, August 2007, p. 12-16.)
Author(s): 1. Nagl, John A.
Subject(s): 1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
ID Number: JA023980
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Arresting Insurgency.
(JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, no. 47, 2007, p. 117-122.)
Author(s): 1. Teamey, Kyle B.
Subject(s): 1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. ARREST--USA
3. IMPRISONMENT--USA
ID Number: JA024092
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

Confronting Insurgencies: Historical Experience and Policy Responses.
(CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 28, no. 1, April 2007, Special Issue.)
Subject(s): 1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
ID Number: JA024460
Year: 2007
Language: English
Type: ART

2006

Calibrating Ink Spots: Filling Afghanistan's Ungoverned Spaces.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 151, no. 4, August 2006, p. 16-25.)
Author(s): 1. Mills, Greg
Subject(s): 1. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--AFGHANISTAN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
3. AFGHAN WAR, 2001-
ID Number: JA022850
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART
Afghanistan : reduire l'insurrection : le cas du Sud-Est.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGEREE, 71e annee, no. 1, 2006, p. 105-118.)
Author(s):
1. Trives, Sebastien
Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--AFGHANISTAN
Notes:
L'insecurite s'accroit dangereusement dans nombre de regions d'Afghanistan. Dans le sud-est du pays, le developpement de l'insurrection est aide de l'exterieur, mais il depend aussi de facteurs internes : la force des structures tribales, des reseaux religieux traditionnels, la faible presence du gouvernement central, etc. Une strategie globale de contre-insurrection est necessaire, qui prenne en compte l'ensemble de ces facteurs, avec un engagement renouvele de la communaut interationale.
ID Number: JA022429
Year: 2006
Language: French
Type: ART

(JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, vol. 50, no. 6, December 2006, p. 831-854.)
Author(s):
1. Boettcher, William A.
2. Cobb, Michael D.
Subject(s):
1. CASUALTY AVERSION (MILITARY SCIENCE)
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
In the early stages of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, military leaders resisted the release of body count and 'casualty ratio' data. However, in the Spring of 2004, the US military (and American media) began to focus on the 'limited' American casualties in specific operations versus the 'significant' number of insurgents killed. This article examines the extent to which body count/casualty ratio 'frames' and individual casualty tolerance influence public perceptions about the war and the success or failure of US military operations. Two experiments were conducted pitting alternative casualty frames against one another to measure their relative impact. The results demonstrate the influence of framing effects on public perceptions and clarify understanding of the determinants and impact of casualty tolerance.
ID Number: JA023101
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.
(STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, vol. 29, no. 2, March 2006, p. 103-121.)
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
The United States has long been frustrated in fighting insurgencies. An almost unbroken string of mostly ill-fated experiences in effectively prosecuting this unique blend of political-military operations can be traced backward over nearly half a century from the situation in Iraq today to the early 1960s, when the US became heavily engaged in Indochina's wars. Vietnam and Iraq thus form two legs of a historically fraught triangle - with America's experiences in El Salvador in the 1980s providing the connecting leg. The aim of this article is to use the present as prologue in order to understand in counterinsurgency terms where we have gone wrong in Iraq: what unique challenges the current conflict in Iraq presents to the US and other coalition military forces deployed there; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations and requirements.

Les impasses de la contre-insurrection.
(POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 71e annee, no. 4, 2006, p. 849-861.)
Author(s):
1. Luttwak, Edward N.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
Notes:
Les nouvelles recommandations des generaux americains pour faire face a l'insurrection irakienne risquent de s'averer vaines. Celles-ci traduisent en effet les reticences des responsables politiques americains a gouverner directement les territoires envahis. Pourtant, les recettes d'une contre-insurrection reussie sont connues. Elles sont applicables en Irak comme sur d'autres theatres, mais le refus etheque et inevitable de les mettre en oeuvre place les occupants dans une situation difficile.

ID Number: JA022347
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

ID Number:JA023145
Year: 2006
Language: French
Type: ART
Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Fallujah.

Author(s):
1. Malkasian, Carter

Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ
2. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011

Notes:
Perceptions and efforts to signal resolve can play an important role in counterinsurgency. The Coalition offensive against Fallujah in April 2004 demonstrates the limitations of relying on military force to signal resolve. The offensive catalyzed insurgent violence in Iraq and generated popular support for the insurgency. The Coalition prematurely halted the offensive because the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) could not maintain support for the Coalition in the face of popular outrage. Given the importance of democratizing Iraq and establishing a sovereign government, the objections of the IGC could not be ignored. Without Iraqi political support, military force ultimately signaled weakness instead of resolve.

ID Number: JA022701
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Structural Vulnerabilities of Network Insurgencies : Adapting to the New Adversary.

Author(s):
1. Muckian, Martin J.

Subject(s):
1. INSURGENCY
2. INSURGENCY--IRAQ
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ

Notes:
This article examines the distinction between Maoist and modern insurgencies and the implications for counterinsurgency methods. First, it contrasts the two types of insurgencies in terms of their organizations and strategies. Building on that information, it analyzes the vulnerabilities of Maoist and modern insurgencies in their organization, political cohesion, support base, and use of information technology. From this analysis, it draws conclusions about how to modify twentieth century methods to combat the modern insurgent. The purpose of this article is not to propose a comprehensive strategy for a modern counterinsurgency. Instead, it examines one component of such a plan - understanding and exploiting the insurgent's structural vulnerabilities. It does not exhaust this analysis; the conclusions drawn here are demonstrative of the possibilities inherent in this methodology. Throughout the article, the conflict in Iraq is used as an illustrative example of a modern insurgency. The Iraqi insurgency is thus far the most advanced embodiment of netwar, where small groups coordinate, communicate, and conduct their campaigns in an interneted manner, without a precise central command. As such, this conflict is a powerful predictor of the future of insurgency.

ID Number: JA023372
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART
Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency.
(PARAMETERS, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 2006, p. 15-29.)
Author(s):
1. Barno, David W.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. USA--MILITARY POLICY
Notes:
The author provides readers with a soldier's view of how America might successfully conduct a global counterinsurgency. He believes we are at risk of failing to understand the very nature of the war we are fighting - a war of intelligence and perceptions. The author warns that even an unbroken series of military victories in a global counterinsurgency will not ensure strategic success. He concludes that America's military must size ownership of 'war-winning' as well as 'war-fighting' if it is to accomplish its mission of defending the society it is pledged to protect.

Friends like These : Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism.
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 31, no. 2, Fall 2006, p. 79-115.)
Author(s):
1. Byman, Daniel L.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. TERRORISM--USA--PREVENTION
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY
4. TERRORISM--PREVENTION
Notes:
US allies that are fighting al-Qaeda-linked insurgencies often suffer illegitimate regimes, civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup, economic backwardness, and discriminatory societies. These problems, coupled with allies' divergent interests, serve to weaken allied military and security forces tactically, operationally, and strategically. The ability of the United States to change its allies' behavior is limited, despite the tremendous difficulties these problems create, because relying on allied forces is a key component of US strategy in the war on terrorism and the US goal of handing off security to Iraqi military forces. To reduce the effects of allies' weaknesses, the United States should try to increase its intelligence on allied security forces and at times act more like a third party to a conflict. In addition, Washington must have realistic expectations of what training and other efforts can accomplish.
The author develops his thesis based on the belief that the use of indigenous forces in any counterinsurgency will not only yield significant increases in the quantity of troops on the ground, but also an exponential improvement in actionable intelligence. The author provides an analysis of American and French experiences with indigenous forces in various counterinsurgencies. He then concludes with a recommendation that the employment of such forces should be under the direction of a joint or combined interagency counterinsurgency task force. What makes this recommendation unique is the structure of the task force. The author's design would include elements from the armed services' conventional forces, Special Operations Forces, the CIA, Department of State, and indigenous intelligence units. Such an organization would then be capable of carrying out the full range of counterinsurgency operations within any autonomous area.

ID Number: JA022603
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

In terms of its doctrine and training, the United States military has been transformed by the war in Iraq. The army, which is carrying the principal load among the military services, has embraced counter-insurgency as one of its primary missions. These changes reflect the military's ability to adapt to the changing battlefield. They are intended not only to guide the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also future operations in the 'long war' against violent Islamic extremists. The new emphasis on counter-insurgency, however, is largely disconnected from the Defense Department's previously established spending priorities and personnel policy. The result is that American defence is in a state of strategic confusion. There are not enough forces to effectively carry out counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining a strategic reserve for other threats. To fully exploit the long overdue emphasis on counter-insurgency, maintain sufficient forces for dealing with unanticipated contingencies and bring coherence to American defence strategy, the Pentagon needs to increase the United States' ground forces.

ID Number: JA023085
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART
From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency.
Author(s):
1. Hoffman, Bruce
Subject(s):
1. QAIDA (ORGANIZATION)
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
3. TERRORISM--USA--PREVENTION
ID Number: JA023224
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies.
Author(s):
1. Baker, Jim
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
This article presents the essentials of a successful counterinsurgency strategy by applying a technique known as systems thinking. The fundamentals of good strategic thought lie both in recognizing the most significant interactions between different players, how they influence each other in unexpected ways, and how to measure progress in achieving the ends of the strategy. Systems thinking has proven successful in other contexts at explaining human behavior, policy choices, unintended consequences, and the resistance of systems to change. It also offers insight into how to assess one of the most difficult questions related to strategy in complex environments - how to know when the strategy has been successful.
ID Number: JA023373
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Brutality or Restraint.
(INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 7, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 78-89.)
Author(s):
1. Creveld, Martin van
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Counterinsurgency campaigns have proven a very tricky business. In fact, there are surprisingly few examples of successful counterinsurgency actions while there are dozens of examples that have ended in debacle. Two campaigns that worked were Syria's putdown of the Muslims Brothers uprising in the early 1980s and the British Army's campaign in northern Ireland. Both illustrate very different ways to go about it.
ID Number: JA022634
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART
Fighting Insurgency on Sacred Ground.
(WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 29, no. 2, Spring 2006, p. 149-166.)
Author(s):
1. Hassner, Ron E.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Iraqi insurgents are using their own mosques as operational bases, often forcing US military commanders to choose between desecrating a sacred space or letting insurgents escape. Israel and India, along with experience from Iraq to date, offer four core lessons for how to respond.
ID Number: JA022313
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Counter-Insurgency Redux.
Author(s):
1. Kilcullen, David J.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
Counter-insurgency is fashionable again: more has been written on it in the last four years than in the last four decades. This is heartening for those who were in the wilderness during the years when Western governments regarded counter-insurgency as a distraction, of interest only to historians. So it is no surprise that some have urged the re-discovery of classical, 'proven' counter-insurgency methods. But today's insurgencies differ significantly - at the level of policy, strategy, operational art and tactical technique - from those of earlier eras. An enormous amount of classical counter-insurgency remains relevant. Indeed, counter-insurgency provides the 'best fit' framework for strategic problems in the 'war on terror'. But much is new in counter-insurgency redux, possibly requiring fundamental reappraisals of conventional wisdom.
ID Number: JA023088
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART

Learning about Counter-Insurgency.
(RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 151, no. 6, December 2006, p. 16-21.)
Author(s):
1. Kiszely, John
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY
Notes:
How well do militaries, in general, learn the lessons of counter-insurgency? What factors affect this learning process? And what might the answer to these questions tell us about how armed forces should approach the subject of learning about counter-insurgency in the future? This article sets out to answer these questions.
ID Number: JA023325
Year: 2006
Language: English
Type: ART
Author(s):
1. MacFadden, Eric M.
Subject(s):
1. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--GREAT BRITAIN
Notes:
To successfully engage and destroy the increasing contemporary insurgent threat, the US must develop standing, multifunctional, capabilities-based joint interagency task forces primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations. This research examines the critical elements of the British counterinsurgency campaign during the Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960. While not all inclusive, analysis of this campaign provides a starting point of annotation of critical capabilities required for the future conduct of counterinsurgency operations. These capabilities, combined with contemporary insurgent vulnerabilities, will define the critical capabilities required to derive the counterinsurgency team. Furthermore, this study proposes the requisite US government national assets necessary to shape the team. Lastly, this paper recommends the organizational structure and the team's relationship to the combatant command in order to facilitate its definitive and relative employment.

ID Number: JA022182
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART

Countering Global Insurgency.
(JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 28, no. 4, August 2005, p. 597-617.)
Author(s):
1. Kilcullen, David J.
Subject(s):
1. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2009
2. INSURGENCY
3. TERRORISM
4. COUNTERINSURGENCY--USA
Notes:
This article suggests that the War on Terrorism is actually a campaign against a globalized Islamist insurgency. Therefore, counterinsurgency approaches are more relevant to the present conflict than traditional terrorism theory. Indeed, a counterinsurgency approach would generate subtly, but substantially different, policy choices in prosecuting the war against Al Qaeda. Based on this analysis, the article proposes a strategy of 'disaggregation' that seeks to dismantle, or break, the links in the global jihad. Like containment in the Cold War, disaggregation would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war - a conception that has been somewhat lacking to date.

ID Number: JA022059
Year: 2005
Language: English
Type: ART
How to Win in Iraq.  
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 84, no. 5, September - October 2005, p. 87-104.)  
Author(s):  
1. Krepinevich, Andrew F.  
Subject(s):  
1. INSURGENCY--IRAQ  
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY  
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011  
Notes:  
Because they lack a coherent strategy, US forces in Iraq have failed to defeat the insurgency or improve security. Winning will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting down insurgents. And it will take at least a decade.  
ID Number: JA021797  
Year: 2005  
Language: English  
Type: ART  

Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence.  
Author(s):  
1. Staniland, Paul  
Subject(s):  
1. INSURGENCY  
2. COUNTERINSURGENCY  
Notes:  
Transnational insurgencies' unique challenges are not amenable to the offensive strategies that the Bush Doctrine emphasizes against terrorism. History strongly suggests that embracing a containment strategy, combining border defenses with aggressive propaganda and international intelligence cooperation, would be more successful in Iraq and beyond.  
ID Number: JA022189  
Year: 2005  
Language: English  
Type: ART  

2004  

Global Counterinsurgency: Without Strategy.  
(WORLD TODAY, vol. 60, no. 2, February 2004, p. 7-9.)  
Author(s):  
1. Mackinlay, John  
Subject(s):  
1. IRAQ WAR, 2003-2011  
2. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ  
3. COUNTERINSURGENCY--IRAQ  
4. INSURGENCY--IRAQ  
Notes:  
Successes like the capture of Saddam Hussein are morale boosters for security forces in Iraq and may help to ensure victory for President George Bush in his re-election bid. Hopefully they will also demonstrate to the Iraqi people that the coalition is gradually progressing at a tactical level. However, this flush of success also encourages the coalition to continue to operate without a campaign plan. On both sides of the Atlantic, leaders have failed to reveal a genuine counter-insurgent strategy for Iraq or, on a global scale, for the threat of radical Islamic activism. The two are linked and the absence of a strategic concept in Iraq is a microcosm of a larger global failure.  
ID Number: JA020180  
Year: 2004

Author(s):
  1. Kramer, Mark

Subject(s):
  1. CHECHNYA (RUSSIA)--HISTORY--CIVIL WAR, 1994-
  2. COUNTERINSURGENCY--RUSSIA (FEDERATION)

Notes:
The author provides a military overview of the latest Russian-Chechen war, which began in 1999. He examines the tactics used by Chechen guerrillas and the responses of Russian military and security forces. He explains why Russian troops have been unable to crush the separatist insurgency and why Chechen fighters have resorted to increasingly deadly acts of terrorism, including mass hostage-taking and suicide bombings in Moscow. These terrorist attacks have greatly reduced the prospect of a lasting political settlement. Although some of the problems that have dogged Russian forces in Chechnya are unique to that particular conflict, the prolonged war illustrates the general difficulty of counterinsurgency operations.

ID Number: JA021404
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART

Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare. (PARAMETERS, vol. 34, no. 1, Spring 2004, p. 16-28.)

Author(s):
  1. Tomes, Robert R.

Subject(s):
  1. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Notes:
The author revisits a number of classical works on counterinsurgency warfare to reveal common lessons and themes applicable to the current situation in Iraq. He does warn, however, that America's experience in Vietnam offers little for those planning or engaged in counterinsurgency operations. The author concludes it will require more than just dusting off the classics if America's military is to fully understand and inculcate the lessons-learned, insights, and perspectives required for successful counterinsurgency operations.

ID Number: JA020137
Year: 2004
Language: English
Type: ART
The United States faces an intractable dilemma in Iraq: insurgency if its stays or instability if it leaves. The sooner that a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, based on six principles, can be implemented, the better the chances to forestall the threat.
### Previous Issues

#### Anciens numéros

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/11</td>
<td>Human Security / La sécurité humaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform / La réforme du secteur de la sécurité</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/11</td>
<td>Perspectives on the Mediterranean World / Le monde méditerranéen en perspective</td>
</tr>
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<td>4/11</td>
<td>The Responsibility to Protect / La responsabilité de protéger</td>
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<td>5/11</td>
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<td>6/11</td>
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<td>8/11</td>
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<td>9/11</td>
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<td>1/12</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2/12</td>
<td>The Arab-Israeli Conflict since the Oslo Agreement / Le conflit israélo-arabe depuis les Accords d’Oslo</td>
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<td>3/12</td>
<td>From Conflict to Peace-Building / Du conflit à la consolidation de la paix</td>
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<td>4/12</td>
<td>The Russian Armed Forces / Les forces armées russes</td>
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<tr>
<td>5/12</td>
<td>Deterrence Strategy / La stratégie de dissuasion</td>
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<td>6/12</td>
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