ABSTRACT: In 2011 NATO initiated the Inteqal process, i.e. the “transition” of security responsibilities from ISAF to the Afghan state and its security forces. The main
pillars of this process are the build up of the Afghan Army and Police and the improvement of Afghanistan’s governance system at both national and local level. Progress has been made in this respect, although challenges remain. NATO aims to complete the transition by 2014, while reducing its military presence in the country, but a substantial Allied footprint is likely to remain in Afghanistan beyond that date. The death of Bin Laden has brought about little changes to the situation on the ground, while it may have a significant impact on the
US’s attitude towards peace talks with the Taliban and thus influence the transition timeline and nature.
Richard N. Haass testifies before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, what constitutes an acceptable end-state in that country, and how the United States can best work to bring it about.
The EU mission, Eupol, is teaching civilian investigation skills and trying to improve the Afghan judiciary - a role that contrasts with the counter-insurgency mission of the US-led international troops. The UK parliamentary committee says that the EU's police mission to Afghanistan is "failing" and the timetable for withdrawing Nato-led troops is at risk.
Developing capable Afghan National Army (ANA) forces is a key element of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition effort to counter the insurgency and create sustainable security in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States, with assistance from NATO and other coalition nations, has worked to develop the ANA. [...] GAO examined (1) the extent of progress made and challenges faced in expanding the size of the ANA, (2) the extent of progress made and challenges faced in developing ANA capability, and (3) how much estimated future funding will be needed to sustain and further grow the ANA. GAO reviewed DOD and NATO documents and met with officials in Washington, D.C.; Tampa, FL; Brussels, Belgium; and Kabul, Afghanistan.
"This book provides a glimpse into what relatively small military units—teams, platoons, companies, and highly dispersed battalions—have done to roll back the insurgency in some of the more remote areas of Afghanistan. The focus is on counterinsurgency at the tactical and local levels."
Ashley JACKSON (19 November 2010)
Joint Briefing Paper by 29 Aid Organizations Working in Afghanistan for the NATO Heads of Government Summit, Lisbon, November 19-20, 2010, report published by Oxfam International.
Historical document that covers progress made in Afghanistan from April 1, 2010 to September 30, 2010. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States and NATO for security and stability in Afghanistan
Reconstruction, defined in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 as “the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development” has leapt to the forefront of Army priorities, measured by the important role that it plays in today’s counterinsurgency operations and its prominence in the latest doctrine. This paper examines the history of reconstruction as a part of Army operations, assesses the capabilities of today’s forces to conduct successful reconstruction operations in support of a counterinsurgency campaign, and makes recommendations to build a capability that is commensurate with the demands of our doctrine and the imperatives of the modern battlefield.
This report presents the argument that partnering is imperative for the success of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan... “Embedded partnering must be embraced at every level from HQ ISAF to the most junior organization, setting conditions for Afghanistan to grow into a democratic, unified, and independent nation.”
Les conflits d’aujourd’hui se déroulent dans un environnement technologique bien plus sophistiqué que pendant la période de la décolonisation. De nouveaux moyens aisément accessibles permettent aux insurgés de communiquer de manière beaucoup plus souple et décentralisée. Les possibilités en matière d’opérations psychologiques s’en trouvent démultipliées au point de jouer un rôle absolument central.
“In December 2001, the framers of the Bonn Agreement laid out a plan to end conflict in Afghanistan, heal a divided, wounded nation, and bring about lasting peace. However, nine years later, stability remains elusive, and these goals have yet to be fully realized. Theories abound but are ever evolving as to how to make progress; bright new ideas are mixed with transplanted success stories but yield unsatisfactory results. One area that has warranted much attention is the promotion of national reconciliation."
"This paper, written by the senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan and by a company-grade officer and a senior executive with the Defense Intelligence Agency, critically examines the relevance of the U.S. intelligence community to the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Based on discussions with hundreds of people inside and outside the intelligence community, it recommends sweeping changes to the way the intelligence community thinks about itself – from a focus on the enemy to a focus on the people of Afghanistan."