"This is the fourth of a series of 5 articles from CIOR on the Comprehensive Approach, derived from the CIOR Symposium on “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the Role of Reservists” held on the 11th of August 2010 in Stavanger (NO)."
"This is the third of a series of 5 articles from CIOR on the Comprehensive Approach, derived from the CIOR Symposium on “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the Role of Reservists” held on the 11th of August 2010 in Stavanger (NO)."
"This is the second of a series of 5 articles from CIOR on the Comprehensive Approach, derived from the CIOR Symposium on “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the Role of Reservists” held on the 11th of August 2010 in Stavanger (NO)."
"This is the first of a series of 5 articles from CIOR on the Comprehensive Approach, derived from the CIOR Symposium on “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and the Role of Reservists” held on the 11th of August 2010 in Stavanger (NO)."
Many of the articles listed below require access to online research databases, which are available to staff working at NATO HQ. If you are unable to access the article(s), please contact the Library.
States with limited statehood such as Somalia can cause transnational security challenges. The emergence of an insurgent group with links to Al Qaida and piracy emanating from its coast are cases in point. In this article, we tackle the question of whether the EU's comprehensive approach toward Somalia is working. To do this, we analyze its effectiveness, its legitimacy, and the influence of power by appraising three characteristics of the security governance concept in a critical manner. We conclude that the result is mixed. Even if the EU's comprehensive approach were perfect in a technical sense, it would still face restraints, because any solution has to come from Somali themselves. Not only should they be an integral part of it, they should become the real owners of the state-building process in the first place.
This includes: "Vers une approche globale de la gestion des conflits" p. 48-49, "1995-2005, l'évolution d'un concept" p. 50-51, "Occuper le terrain de la gouvernance et du développement" p. 52-53, "Liban : Le plan d'action des casques bleus français pour 2011" p. 54-55, "Le GIACM, interface entre civils et militaires" p. 56-57, "Opposition ou complémentarité ? Points de vue humanitaires" p. 58-59
This article explores why international actors assign such high importance to coherence. It argues that the assumptions on which the principle of coherence is based are flawed, and that the empirical and theoretical evidence indicates that there is much less room for coherence than generally acknowledged in the policy debate. It recommends that the international community should lower its expectations and adopt more realistic polices. The current approach tends to put pressure on all partners to adopt a maximal approach to coherence, regardless of their relations to each other and the operational context. Coherence should not be understood as an effort aimed equally at all, nor should all partners be expected to achieve the same level of unity of effort. Coherence should rather be understood as a scale of relationships, and the most appropriate and realistic level of coherence that can be achieved will depend on the exact constellation of organizations in an interdependent relationship in that specific operational context. This article offers a typology of the range of likely relationships, as well as an explanation of the circumstances that may determine the level of coherence that can be realistically expected to develop, depending on the context and the nature of the relationships among the partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Since 1989 the international community has been called on repeatedly to address the security dilemma posed by weak states. NATO has found this to be a particularly daunting task given that the organization's traditional resources make only a small contribution to providing security in post-conflict states. As a result the alliance has attempted to create a new capability that merges civilian and military efforts. This process has met with limited success in Afghanistan. This article examines the evolution of the comprehensive approach in NATO and specifically the UK's attempts to implement the comprehensive approach in the first Helmand campaign of 2006. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
In 1999, few people would have predicted that the EU would send ships to Somalia, police to Afghanistan, judges to Kosovo and soldiers to Chad. Yet, that is exactly what the EU has been doing. The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) -since renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) - was launched shortly after NATO's war in Kosovo in June 1999, to ensure that Europeans could respond to international crises, including launching operations, without depending on the US (via NATO). Since 2003 the EU has initiated some 24 peace-support operations in Europe, Africa and Asia, using both civil and military resources, and some of these missions have had impressive results. However, at times there have been some real difficulties with CSDP operations, ranging from resource shortages, intermittent political support from Member States, and a lack of coordination between EU actors. Lessons already identified in the crisis management debate point to two fundamental factors of success. First, a comprehensive approach that brings together the different actors deployed in the field. Second, the resilience of the political and material commitment of crisis management actors, possibly over many years. Both these factors pose important questions for the future of EU peace operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
NATO has been right to adopt a joint Comprehensive Approach (CA) involving the international community since it is a prerequisite for success in its crisis response operations. However, it has been wrong to hail its CA as a "sine qua non" for success in Afghanistan, as the new strategy remains a work in progress. This article demonstrates that NATO's CA will fail in Afghanistan because three necessary conditions cannot be implemented in time: (1) Creation of NATO consensus on how the CA should be implemented, (2) Institutionalization of CA doctrine, procedures and thinking within the Alliance enabling it to plug and play with other actors, and (3) Establishment of effective cooperation with the organizations and local actors that NATO must cooperate with in Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
The article focuses on the approaches of the United Nations (UN), African Union, European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Operations (NATO) to manage conflict and foster coherence. It is noted that conflict management requires a multidimensional, comprehensive, or integrated approach, in order to achieve greater harmonization and synchronization among countries. According to the author, the comprehensive approach concept was adopted by the EU and NATO to describe their respective initiatives. [FROM EBSCO]
The article presents a discussion on the concept of security of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Comprehensive Approach to security threats of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is noted that humanitarian, military, political, social and economic factors should be considered when addressing threats. Also discussed is the concept of cooperative security. [FROM EBSCO]